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
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C. A. 1 / 1847
BROWNSON'S

Timothy Saly,
New York.

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOLUME I.

(NEW SERIES.)

BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY BENJAMIN H. GREENE,
124, WASHINGTON STREET.
1847.

CAMBRIDGE:
METCALF AND COMPANY,
PRINTERS TO THE UNIVERSITY.

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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1847.

ART. I.—*The Two Brothers; or, Why are you a Protestant?*

I. MY old master, Jeremiah Milwood, as I have told you, had but two children, both sons, and with only about two years' difference in their ages. They were his pride, and he spared no pains or expense in their education. He was a stanch Presbyterian; and his highest ambition for his two sons was, that they should become earnest, devoted, and distinguished Presbyterian ministers. He seemed likely to be gratified. Both were of a serious turn, studious and piously inclined. Before the elder had completed his seventeenth year, both became subjects of grace, and both, on leaving college, entered the seminary.

During the second year of their residence in the seminary, their mother, a woman of great strength of character and sweetness of disposition, fell ill and died. From that moment, a striking change was observed in the tone and manner of John, the elder brother. He was his mother's favorite, and shared especially her confidence. At her request, he had spent several hours with her alone just previously to her death, and, though none of us knew what transpired to affect him, it was subsequently surmised, from one or two words which escaped him, that she had expressed, in that trying moment, to him, as the only member of her family she could hope to influence, or to whom she felt able to open her heart, some misgivings as to the truth of Presbyterianism, and had begged him, by his love of her and his regard for the welfare of his soul, to examine thoroughly its foundations before entering the

ministry. However this might be, it is certain he was never again what he had been. He returned, after the funeral obsequies, to the seminary, and even remained there several months ; but he lost his relish for the prescribed course of studies, and became unwilling to attend the services in the chapel. Finally, he wrote to his father, informing him that he did not wish to become a Presbyterian minister, and, indeed, could not, without binding himself to profess what he did not then believe and in all probability never should believe, and begging permission to return home and take some other calling. My old master, you know, was never remarkable for his sweetness and amiability, and the recent affliction he suffered in the loss of his wife had rendered him doubly sour and morose. His wrath was terrible. His son had disappointed him, disgraced him, and he replied to him, that, unless he continued at the seminary and returned to his original faith and resolution, he was henceforth no son of his, and must seek a home, father, and friends where he could find them. John, knowing explanation or expostulation would be vain, took the only alternative left him, and suffered himself to be exiled from his home. James, the younger brother, who in many respects resembled his father, remained at the seminary and completed his course.

John withdrew to a distant part of the country, assumed his mother's name, and supported himself for three or four years by teaching an academy. While teaching the academy, he contrived to study the profession of the law, in the practice of which he subsequently engaged, distinguished himself, and, in a few years, amassed a fortune adequate to his simple wants and tastes. Having done this, he retired from business and went abroad. James, on completing his course, was licensed to preach, and in a few months was called and ordained to the pastoral charge of a wealthy and influential congregation in one of our principal Atlantic cities, and was soon known and esteemed as one of the leading ministers of his denomination. About a year after his settlement, his father died and left him the bulk of his estate, which was considerable ; and a year later he married the beautiful and accomplished daughter and heiress of his richest parishioner, who brought him a still more ample fortune, and became the mother of five children, two sons and three daughters. Every thing prospered with him, and he had all that heart could wish. But, after a while, the tide of prosperity began to ebb ; death visited his palace, and

•

his children, one by one, all, save the youngest, who was deformed, sickly, and partially idiotic, were taken from him, and at length his wife followed them. He bore up with stoical fortitude against these repeated blows, but he felt them, — was forced to reflect on the certainty of death, the uncertainty of life, and the perishable nature of all earthly goods, more seriously than he had ever done before, and to some extent his heart was softened and his spirit bowed.

Time had hardly worn off the wire-edge of his grief and begun to heal the wound in his heart, when he was surprised by a letter from his brother, whom he had neither seen nor heard from for nearly thirty years. The letter offered him such sympathy and consolation as befitted the occasion, and brought him the intelligence that its writer was about to revisit his native land, and, following the yearnings of his heart, would hasten to embrace the brother he had never for a moment forgotten, or ceased to love. James received the letter with mixed emotions, but upon the whole without displeasure, and looked forward even with interest to his brother's return. In a few weeks after sending his letter, John embarked, and, favored with a short and pleasant passage across the Atlantic, landed in the city in which James was settled, and without delay drove with his baggage to his brother's residence. The brothers met ; but so altered in appearance was each, that it was with difficulty that either could recognize his brother in the other. The meeting was frank and cordial on the part of the elder, and less cold and restrained on the part of the younger than could have been expected from his general character. Perhaps he had recently had some compunctious visitings of conscience for having so long forgotten even to think of one he was bound by the ties of nature to love ; perhaps he had a vein of tenderness in his nature which had not hitherto been observed, and that early scenes and early recollections revived, and for the moment half subdued, the sectarian and minister. But be this as it may, he was not displeased to meet his brother. They were soon seated in a sumptuous apartment, engaged in free and familiar conversation. They recalled their boyish days and boyish frolics, spoke of their college life and college companions, and finally of their mother and her lamented death. The tone of both was subdued, and they turned their conversation upon death, sin, redemption, the resurrection, and immortal life. While speaking on these awful and sublime topics, John referred to

the change which early came over him with regard to his religious views, and stated that he was, and for years had been, a member of the Roman Catholic Church. This was unexpected as well as unwelcome news to James. If his brother had told him that he had become a Socinian or even an unbeliever, he would not have been surprised, and could have borne it ; but to be told that he, the principal mover of the Protestant league for the conversion of the Pope and the overthrow of Popery, had himself a brother who had turned Papist, was more than he could bear. He was thunderstruck, and seemed for some minutes as one bereft of thought and sense. Never had he been known to be so overcome. At length, he partially recovered, and said to his brother, — “ Mr. Milwood, your room is ready ; I must wrestle with God in prayer for you before I can speak to you again.” John bade him good night, and quietly retired to his room. It was already late in the evening, and, offering a prayer for his brother, another for the repose of the soul of his mother, and commending himself to his Heavenly Father and the protection of Our Lady and all the saints, he composed himself, with a subdued but serene mind, to rest.

II. The brothers met again in the morning in the breakfast-parlour. James was exteriorly composed, and greeted his brother in his blindest tone ; but a careful observer would have suspected that he intended to play the part of the civil and courteous host, rather than that of the warm and affectionate brother. Breakfast passed pretty much in silence. John was disposed to wait the motions of his brother, and James was undecided whether to broach the Catholic question or not. But he could not converse freely with his brother on indifferent matters ; he felt that sooner or later they must discuss the question, and perhaps the sooner the better. Revolving the matter for some time in his mind, he at length, throwing aside the morning paper he had been pretending to read, broke the silence by remarking to his brother : —

“ So it seems the result has been that you have turned Papist ? ”

“ I am a *Catholic*,” replied John, with a slight emphasis on the last word, intended as a quiet rebuke to his brother for employing a nickname.

“ It is strange ! What in the world could have induced the son of a Presbyterian father, piously brought up, well in-

structed in the Protestant religion, and not wanting in natural ability, to take a step so foolish, not to say so wicked ? ”

“ Let me rather ask my brother why he is a Protestant ? ”

“ Why I am a Protestant ? ”

“ Yes ; I am much mistaken, or that is the harder question of the two to answer.”

“ I am a Protestant because the Romish Church is corrupt, the Mystery of Iniquity, the Man of Sin, Antichrist, the Whore of Babylon, drunk with the blood of the saints, a cage of unclean birds, cruel, oppressive, tyrannical, superstitious, idolatrous — ”

“ But you are simply telling me why you are not a Catholic ; my question is, Why are you a Protestant ? ”

“ Protestantism is a solemn protest against Rome, and my reasons for not being a Catholic are my reasons for being a Protestant.”

“ Jews, Pagans, Mahometans, deists, atheists, protest as earnestly as you do against Rome ; are they therefore Protestants ? ”

“ Protestantism is, indeed, a protest against Rome ; but it is also a positive religion.”

“ Unaffected by supposing the Catholic Church to have never been or to have ceased to be ? ”

“ Yes ; Protestantism is independent of Romanism.”

“ A Protestant is one who embraces Protestantism in this independent, positive sense ? ”

“ Yes, if we speak properly.”

“ Before telling me why you are a Protestant, it will be necessary to tell what, in this sense, Protestantism is.”

“ It is the religion of the Bible ; — the Bible is the religion of Protestants.”

“ And the religion of the Bible is — ? ”

“ The truths revealed in the Bible.”

“ And these are —, ? ”

“ The great evangelical doctrines asserted by the Reformers against the false and corrupt doctrines of Rome, and which we commonly call the doctrines of grace.”

“ These doctrines are Protestantism ? ”

“ They are.”

“ So Protestantism is the religion of the Bible, and the religion of the Bible is Protestantism ! ”

“ There is nothing absurd or ridiculous in that. Protestantism, Sir, is the religion of the Bible, of the whole Bible, the

Bible alone, — that precious gift of God to man, — the word of God, the charter of our liberties, the source of redemption, the ground of the Christian's hope, carrying light and life, the blessings of truth, freedom, and civilization, wherever it goes ; and which you Papists, with characteristic cunning, lock up from the people, because you know full well, that, were they once to read it for themselves, they would make short work with the Pope and his minions, break their covenant with death and hell, and put an end to their blasphemies, idolatries, and oppressions."

"I suspect, brother, you have accommodated that from the speech you made at the last anniversary of the American Bible Society. It may do very well to address to the mob that collects on ' anniversary week ' ; but can you not give me a clear, distinct, and precise statement of what Protestantism really is ? "

"Protestantism is the great truth asserted by the Reformers against Rome, that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments contain all things necessary to salvation, and that they are the sole and sufficient rule of faith and practice."

"If I believe the Scriptures are sufficient, and are the sole rule of faith and practice, do I believe the whole of Protestantism ? "

"No ; you must also believe the word of God as contained in the Scriptures."

"And this word consists of certain *credenda* or propositions to be believed ? "

"It does ; and these may all be summed up in the text, — ' Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved. ' "

"To believe *on* the Lord Jesus Christ is to believe — ? "

"The truths he has revealed, whether of himself, or other things."

"These truths are — ? "

"The great evangelical doctrines asserted by the Reformers."

"That is, they are Protestantism. Therefore, Protestantism is — Protestantism ! But can you not be a little more particular, and tell me what these truths or doctrines are ? "

"You will find an excellent summary of them in the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the Larger and Shorter Catechisms."

"That is, they are Presbyterianism ? Protestantism, then, is Presbyterianism ? "

"What else, from my profession as a Presbyterian minister, should you infer to be my belief ?"

"I am rather slow to infer a Presbyterian minister's belief from his profession. But, if Protestantism be Presbyterianism, none but Presbyterians can be Protestants. Is this your belief ?"

"Not exactly ; for there are Protestants who are not Presbyterians."

"These, of course, differ more or less from Presbyterians, or else they would be Presbyterians. Consequently Protestantism must differ more or less from Presbyterianism."

"In non-essentials, but not in essentials. All who embrace the essentials are Protestants."

"Do Catholics embrace the essentials ?"

"According to the general opinion of Protestants, they do."

"Then, according to the general opinion of Protestants, Catholics are Protestants ?"

"But I think differently, and our General Assembly will soon, I hope, solemnly declare that Rome does not retain even the essentials of the Christian faith."

"That will be a sad day for Rome, no doubt ; but what, in your judgment, are the essentials ?"

"They are the great evangelical doctrines of the Reformation, embraced by all orthodox Protestants."

"And *orthodox* Protestants are — ?"

"All who agree in accepting the sufficiency of the Scriptures, and the great essential doctrines of revelation."

"Which means that the essential doctrines are the essential doctrines, and orthodox Protestants are orthodox Protestants."

"The essential doctrines are substantially what is held by Presbyterians."

"Those orthodox Protestants who are not Presbyterians differ from Presbyterians only in relation to non-essentials ?"

"That is all."

"Presbyterianism, or, what is the same thing, the orthodox faith, then, is made up of two parts, one essential, the other non-essential ?"

"All parts of the orthodox faith are not alike essential. But there may be differences which are not differences of faith. The Congregationalists, Evangelical Episcopalians, Dutch Reformed, the Calvinistic Baptists, &c., differ from us in matters of discipline and church government, while they embrace substantially the same faith we do."

“ Is infant baptism a matter of faith ? ”

“ Not strictly.”

“ Then you do not baptize infants because you believe Almighty God commands you to baptize them ? ”

“ We do ; but the point is not so essential, that those who differ from us must needs err essentially.”

“ One may, then, reject a positive command of God, without essential error ? ”

“ We think our Baptist brethren err grievously ; but, as they hold the great cardinal doctrines of the Gospel, we do not think their error is absolutely essential. In the present state of the religious world, it is the duty of God’s people to make the platform of Christian union as broad as possible, to discountenance theological wranglings, to seek to heal sectarian divisions, and to follow after the things which make for peace.”

“ But if you had no fears of Popery, and felt that your own sect had the power to make converts, I suppose you would regard the Baptists as of the number of those who bring in ‘ damnable heresies.’ ”

“ You are ungenerous ; I regret the unsoundness of my Baptist brethren, but I do not consider them as essentially wrong.”

“ Not even when they deny you the Christian character, by denying that your baptism is baptism, — and when they refuse to commune with you, on the ground that you are unbaptized persons ; that is, infidels, in the proper sense of the word ? ”

“ There they are wrong ; but still not essentially so, because baptism itself is a non-essential.”

“ Then you do not agree in opinion with our Lord, who says, ‘ Unless a man be born again of *water* and of the Holy Ghost, he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven ’ ? ”

“ Christian doctrines are distinguishable into fundamentals and non-fundamentals. The fundamentals are the essentials, the non-fundamentals are the non-essentials. All who believe the former are substantially orthodox, though they may differ about the latter.”

“ The non-fundamentals are either revealed truths, or they are not. If they are not, your distinction of fundamentals and non-fundamentals is simply a distinction between what is revealed and what is not revealed, between the word of God and the words of men or of devils ; and, on this supposition, the essentials will be what God has revealed, and the non-essentials what he has not revealed. If they are revealed truths,

you imply that a portion of the revealed word is unessential, and may be disbelieved or rejected without essential error. Which do you say?"

"Suppose we say they are no portion of the revealed word?"

"You cannot say that, because you have declared them to be revealed truths, by asserting that *Christian* doctrines are distinguishable into fundamentals and non-fundamentals. But pass over this. If you say the non-fundamentals, that is, the non-essentials, are not revealed truths, you imply, by making the fundamentals essential to be believed, that the *whole* revealed word is essential to be believed, and therefore deny that there can be any differences of opinion as to any portion of what is revealed, without essential error, which renders your distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals of no avail; since no one, unless a Protestant, is likely to contend that any thing more than what is revealed is essential to be believed. Is it not so?"

"So it appears."

"Then again, you say, men, though differing about the non-essentials, that is, about what is not revealed, are substantially orthodox, if they believe the essentials, that is, what is revealed. Now they may differ about the non-essentials, by believing, some, that they are, and some, that they are not, revealed truths, or portions of the word of God, as we see in the case of you and the Baptists concerning infant baptism; you believing it to be revealed and commanded by God himself, they believing it not revealed and implicitly forbidden. Now, if men may believe the non-essentials to be revealed, they may, according to you, without essential error, believe that to be the word of God which is the word of men or of devils. Do you admit this?"

"Of course not. 'Cursed is every one that addeth to the words of this book.' The condemnation of Rome is not so much that she denies the essential truths of the Christian religion, as that she overlays them by her corrupt additions, and renders them of none effect through the traditions of men. It is as much an error to add to the word as to take from it."

"Then you abandon this supposition, and take the other, — that the non-essentials are revealed truths, portions of the word of God?"

"Be it so, for the present."

"Then you must say, since you allow men to believe or reject them, without essential error, that a portion of the word of God, of the truth Almighty God has revealed, may be denied without essential error. Do you hold that one can be substantially orthodox, and yet deny a portion of God's word?"

"Even your own doctors distinguish between fundamentals and non-fundamentals, and teach that faith in the fundamentals suffices for salvation."

"This, even if true, would not avail you; for our doctors are no authority for you, and you cannot urge them against me in this discussion, since I am not defending the Church. But it is not true. Our doctors distinguish between the articles of the creed which are logically fundamental or primary, and those which are secondary, I admit; but they do not teach that faith in the primary alone suffices for salvation. They teach that the *whole* must be believed, either explicitly or implicitly, and simply add, that *explicit* faith in the primary articles, with implicit faith in the secondary, is all that is necessary, *necessitate medii*."

"That is all I ask. He who believes explicitly the primary believes implicitly the secondary; for the primary imply the secondary."

"So, on the other hand, he who explicitly *disbelieves* the secondary, implicitly disbelieves the primary; for the secondary presuppose or imply the primary. No man believes implicitly what he explicitly denies. But you hold the non-fundamentals may be explicitly denied without essential error; therefore, you cannot assume that they are implicitly believed."

"But do you pretend that every thing, however unimportant or insignificant, is essential to be believed?"

"Your faith, not mine, is the matter in question."

"As a Catholic, you are bound to hold that the book of Tobias is the word of God. In that book I read that Toby had a dog, and that the dog came to his master, wagging his tail. Is it essential to your salvation, that you believe with a firm faith that Toby really had a dog, and that the dog actually did wag his tail?"

"That is not precisely the question. Assuming the inspiration of the book, can you *deny* the fact without essential error?"

"Why not? Common sense teaches us that the fact is not and cannot be in itself essential."

"And do you hold that there can be essential error only where the matter denied is in itself essential ?"

"How can there be ?"

"What, in *religious* faith, is the immediate object believed ?"

"The truth of the particular proposition, whatever it may be."

"Not exactly ; for the faith is *religious* only where the proposition believed is a *revealed* proposition."

"The truth of the particular *revealed* proposition, then, whatever it may be."

"In believing, does the mind perceive the truth of the proposition believed, or only the proposition itself ?"

"Explain yourself."

"What is faith, as distinguished from knowledge or science ?"

"Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen."

"Or, as says St. Augustine, — '*Fides est credere quod non vides*,' — Faith is to believe what you do not see. But you must see or mentally apprehend the proposition, or you cannot assent to it. What, then, is that in the proposition which you assent to, but which you do not see ?"

"The truth of the proposition."

"As in the proposition, 'God exists in unity of essence and trinity of persons,' you distinctly apprehend the proposition, but not its truth ; for if you could apprehend or mentally perceive its truth, it would be a proposition, not of faith, but of knowledge or science, — knowledge, if perceived intuitively ; science, if perceived only by means of discursion. Hence, rationalists, when they refuse to believe the mysteries of faith because they cannot perceive their truth, deny, virtually, the possibility of faith, and fall into the absurdity of contending that they cannot have faith, unless it be knowledge or science ; that is, unless faith be impossible ! Where there is sight, there is not faith. Hence we say, faith will lose itself in sight, hope be swallowed in fruition, but charity abideth for ever. I mentally perceive the propositions of faith, or the *credenda* ; but I do not mentally perceive their truth. Therefore, the *truth* of the revealed proposition cannot be that which is *immediately* believed or assented to."

"So it would seem."

"If it is not *immediately* believed, it must be *mediately*

believed ; that is, must be believed *in* some thing else, *on* or by some authority, as is commonly said, at least formally distinct from itself."

"That must be true ; for faith is always by some authority distinct from the believer and the proposition believed."

"Then the *immediate* object believed will be, not the truth of the proposition, but this something else, this authority in, on, or by means of which it is believed ?"

"That I do not deny."

"Now, in *religious* faith, what is this ?"

"The Bible, as all Protestants contend, in opposition to Romanists, who say it is the Church."

"Catholics do not say the Church is the authority for believing the *truth* of the revealed proposition, but simply for believing the proposition is revealed ; and, if you reflect a moment, you must admit that the Bible is at best only authority for believing this or that is revealed, not authority for believing it true."

"We recognize no authority above the Bible."

"Then you place the Bible above God himself, which I own is what you who call yourselves Protestants often have the appearance of doing ; but this cannot be your meaning. All you can mean is, that, in determining what God has revealed, the Bible is a higher authority than the Church. But the Bible, although assumed to be the highest authority for determining what God has revealed, is yet no authority for saying what he reveals is true. Why do you believe what God reveals in or through the Bible is true ?"

"Because it is his revelation, his word."

"That is, you believe it because God says it, because God says so. But, in believing it because God says so, what is it you *immediately* believe ?"

"God himself."

"That is, you believe the proposition because it is God's word, and you believe his word because you believe him. But why do you believe him ?"

"Because it is impossible for him to lie."

"That is, because he is infinitely true, is truth itself, and can neither deceive nor be deceived ?"

"I have no objection to that."

"Then the object immediately believed, in believing a revealed proposition, is the infinite truth or veracity of God who reveals it."

"Be it so."

"Which, in religious faith, then, shall we say is the more essential point to be believed, — the matter revealed, or the infinite veracity of God who reveals it?"

"What is the difference?"

"The difference, perhaps, will appear, if you tell me what it is that makes the faith *religious* faith, or distinguishes it, as *religious* faith, from all other kinds of faith."

"It is religious faith because the proposition believed is a *revealed* proposition."

"If I believe the proposition, 'God exists in unity of essence and trinity of persons,' because you teach it, or because I think I have discovered and demonstrated it by my own reason, is my belief religious belief?"

"Why not, since the proposition in either case is the same? What difference can it make, if it be believed, for what reason or on what ground it is believed?"

"If I believe it because you teach it, I believe you, and what I immediately believe is that you are a man of truth and worthy of credit. Is there any thing religious in my believing you?"

"Not necessarily."

"If I believe it because I think I have discovered and demonstrated it by my own reason, I simply believe my own reason. Is to believe my own reason religious belief?"

"Certainly not."

"For, if it were, every belief, whether intuitive or scientific, would be religious, and the belief of falsehood as much as truth; since, in every act of belief, whether the belief be well founded or not, I believe my reason. But if I believe the proposition, not because you teach it, not because I discover or demonstrate it by my own reason, but because God says it, and therefore because I believe him, and that he is infinitely true, and can neither deceive me nor be deceived, and, furthermore, because he commands me to believe it, is my act now religious?"

"It is."

"Then it would seem that it is believing and obeying God, which makes the belief *religious* belief?"

"That appears to be so."

"Then the more essential point in *religious* belief is not simply belief of the matter revealed, but of God who reveals it?"

" Very well, let it be so."

" In every proposition, be it what it may, which I believe because God reveals it, I do believe him, do I not ? "

" So it follows from what we have said."

" But if the more essential point is to believe God, the more essential error must be to disbelieve him, must it not ? "

" Certainly, to disbelieve God is the most heinous offence of which man can be guilty. The grossest insult we can offer even to a fellow-mortal is to call him a liar ; and we call God a liar, whenever we disbelieve or refuse to believe him."

" But do I not disbelieve or refuse to believe God, and therefore make God a liar, whenever I refuse to believe a proposition because I have only his word for it ? "

" You do, and are guilty of the sin of infidelity."

" Then, if God has told me, no matter for what reason, that Toby had a dog and the dog wagged his tail, and I refuse to believe it, do I or do I not err essentially ? "

" You err essentially, as it appears from what we have said."

" Then there may be essential error, where the matter or proposition denied is not in itself essential ? "

" So it would seem."

" Then you will concede what you call the non-fundamentals, if revealed truths, can no more be denied without essential error than the fundamentals themselves ? "

" Not at all. Doubtless, where the matter is clearly and manifestly revealed, refusal to believe is essential error ; but it does not therefore follow that it is essential error to refuse to believe, where it is not clearly and manifestly revealed, where it is uncertain that God speaks, and, if he does, what is the exact meaning of what he says."

" This uncertainty, not the fundamental or non-fundamental nature of the matter in question, then, is that which saves the refusal to believe from being essential error ? "

" That seems to follow."

" If the same uncertainty existed with regard to what is fundamental, the refusal to believe it would, then, no more be essential, than the refusal to believe the non-fundamentals ? "

" That seems also to follow."

" In order, then, to determine what are the essentials, that is, what must be believed, and cannot be denied without essential error, and what are the non-essentials, that is, what without essential error may be either believed or denied, it will

be necessary to inquire, not what are the fundamentals and what the non-fundamentals, but what is or is not clearly and manifestly revealed."

" Since the fundamentals are all clearly and manifestly revealed, I have no objections to saying so."

" Whether the fundamentals are all clearly and manifestly revealed or not, you must so say, or abandon the ground you have taken. The essentials, then, are what is clearly and manifestly revealed ? "

" Be it so."

" The non-essentials what is not clearly and manifestly revealed ? "

" Agreed."

" He who believes all that is clearly and manifestly revealed believes all the essentials, is free from essential error, is substantially orthodox ? "

" Agreed, again."

" He who rejects any truth clearly and manifestly revealed errs essentially ? "

" He does."

" But he who rejects only the non-essentials does not err essentially ? "

" Stop there a moment. Men may differ as to the non-essentials without essential error ; but to differ in opinion about a point is not necessarily to deny it ; for both parties may intend to believe it, and would, if they could only ascertain the truth involved."

" But individuals may differ in some respects, even as to matters of faith, from Presbyterians, without erring essentially ? "

" I do not deny it."

" The points on which they differ must be non-essentials, otherwise the difference would be essential. In regard to these points they must differ from Presbyterians, either by holding some things to be revealed truths which Presbyterians do not, or by denying some things to be revealed truths which Presbyterians believe are revealed truths ? "

" They may also differ from them by simple ignorance."

" That is true ; but then they differ only negatively, not positively. Presbyterians in this respect must differ from one another ; for some are better informed as to what Presbyterianism is than others are or can be ; but they are, nevertheless, all alike Presbyterians. So I, as a Catholic, may be

ignorant of some points of the Catholic faith, and in this respect *differ* from the one who knows them all ; but I am as true a Catholic as he, because I intend to believe all the Church teaches, because I am ready to believe all as soon as explicitly propounded to me, and because the points on which I am ignorant I believe implicitly, since they are implied in what I believe explicitly. This is, therefore, a mere negative difference, and amounts to nothing. The differences in question are positive differences, and these must consist, either in believing things to be revealed which you deny to be revealed, or in denying certain things to be revealed which you believe to be revealed."

"I do not see how that follows."

"The differences we are considering concern matters of faith ; and nothing, I suppose you will grant, is or can be matter of faith which is not a divinely revealed truth. Or, rather, no man can hold any thing to be matter of faith, unless he holds it to be matter of revelation, that is, a revealed truth."

"I do not know about that."

"But you do ; for the faith we are speaking of is *religious* faith, and we have agreed that there can be *religious* faith only where the proposition believed is a *revealed* proposition."

"Very well, proceed."

"If, then, you admit differences as to matters of faith may exist without essential error, you must admit that the non-essentials may be either believed or *disbelieved* without essential error, unless you choose to admit that you yourselves are in essential error."

"How so ?"

"You certainly deny some things, which you call non-essentials, to be revealed truths ; such, for instance, as the divine institution of the Episcopacy, which is asserted by Protestant Episcopalians. But, if the non-essentials cannot be denied without essential error, then you err essentially in denying it. On the other hand, you assert infant baptism to be a divine command, which your Baptist brethren deny. Infant baptism, you say, is a non-essential ; if, then, non-essentials cannot be positively denied without essential error, your Baptist brethren err essentially, and are not, as you have admitted, substantially orthodox. Moreover, unless you admit the non-essentials may be either believed or disbelieved without essential error, your distinction between essentials and non-essentials

avails you nothing, and you must come back and say that none, who differ positively in any matter from Presbyterians, have or can have the essential faith ; and then you must recall your denial, and say that Presbyterianism and Protestantism are one and the same thing, and that Presbyterians are the only Protestants."

" Very well, I will not insist on the point. Say the non-essentials are matters which one may either believe or disbelieve without erring essentially."

" We now seem to be in a fair way of determining what Protestantism is. It is, you say, the essentials, and the essentials are all the truths clearly and manifestly revealed in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Tell me what these truths are, and you tell me what Protestantism is, and take the preliminary step towards answering my question, Why are you a Protestant ? "

III. Much to the relief of James, while he was considering what he should reply to John's last demand, the conversation was suspended by the entrance of Mr. Wilson, a brother Presbyterian minister, settled over the oldest Presbyterian congregation in the city. He was of Scottish descent, and upwards of seventy years of age, — a man of antiquated notions, with little respect for the younger ministers of his denomination. Presbyterianism, in his view, had nearly lost its original distinctive character. Wesley and Whitefield, by their appeals to heated passion and mere animal excitement, instead of reason and voluntary affection, had wellnigh ruined it. Presbyterians were now Methodists, Arminians, in all except name and outward organization and government ; and the new methods and measures lately adopted for the conversion of sinners appeared to him likely to prove in the end its total destruction. He saw with pain the lecture-room and rostrum superseding the pulpit, strolling evangelists and revival preachers the regular pastors, and " inquiry " and " anxious " meetings the orderly ministrations of the word.

Between him and James there was little sympathy. James was a man of his times. He understood the tendencies of his age and country, and held that it was the part of wisdom, if not indeed of duty, to yield to and obey them. To have power over the people, he held it to be necessary to consult them, to change with them, to take the direction they indicate, to be always just in advance of them, and never to lag behind them.

He availed himself of their passions and tendencies as the readiest way of occupying the post of leader, and, if he could only occupy that post, the direction he followed or the final goal he might reach was comparatively indifferent. He was adroit, shrewd, unscrupulous, but he did not know that he who leads the mob only by yielding to them leads them only by being their slave. The true leader is he who makes the multitude follow him, not he who follows them. He who has principles and will stand by them, though he stand alone, or be hewn down by the maddened multitude for his fidelity to them, is by many degrees superior to him who sacrifices his principles, if he have any, to popularity, or who has no principles but to ascertain and yield to the passions and tendencies of the mob. But of all this James knew, at least, cared, nothing. He lived in an age and country of demagogues, and he did not aspire to be thought superior to his age and compatriots. The greatest modern achievement in the state, he was accustomed to hear it boasted, had been to establish the rule of demagogues ; and why should it not be as glorious to establish this rule in the church as in the state ?

Little as James sympathized ordinarily with Mr. Wilson, he welcomed him in the present instance with great cordiality, and introduced him to his brother. After some commonplace remarks, he told him he had just learned that his brother, who had been absent for many years, had become a Catholic. He recapitulated the conversation they had just had, stated the point at which it had arrived, and begged Mr. Wilson to answer the question they were debating. Mr. Wilson was not pleased with the course adopted by James, and replied :—

“ If I had had the management of this discussion from the beginning, I should have given it another direction. Your brother has, doubtless, been under the training of the Jesuits, is versed in all their scholastic refinements and subtilities, and a perfect master of all the sophistical arts by which they entrap and bewilder the simple and unwary. When you dispute with such a man, mind and keep the management of the argument in your own hands. Consent to ply the laboring oar yourself, and you are gone. The great secret of dialectics is in knowing how to put your questions. You gentlemen of the modern school are far abler demagogues than logicians, and much better skilled in exciting the passions of the mob than in managing a discussion. I have often told you the folly and madness of neglecting severer studies. You have studied only

to conform to the multitude ; you have made the mob supreme, and taught them to lord it over their pastors, loosened them from their old moorings, set them adrift upon a stormy and tempestuous sea, without helm or helmsman, or rather with the helmsman bound to obey the helm. Their passions are a favorable gale for you to-day ; but what certainty have you that they may not make the port of Rome, or be stranded on the rocky beach of Popery, to-morrow ? Attempt to guide or control them, cross in any thing their prejudices or their wishes, and where are they, — where are you ? How often must I tell you, it is hard making the port of the Gospel with the Devil for pilot ? If you had had a grain of common sense, you would have insisted on your brother's answering your question, why he had become a Catholic, instead of consenting, as a great fool, to answer his question, why you are a Protestant. If you had been acquainted with the old Protestant controversialists, you would have seen that they leave Protestantism to take care of itself, while they reserve all their forces for the attack upon Rome."

"Never mind that now, Brother Wilson. I could hardly foresee the turn the conversation would take, for those Catholics I have known have generally contented themselves with replying to the charges brought against their Church, without going far in their attacks upon Protestantism ; and besides, it is no more than right, since Protestantism is a positive religion, that they who profess it should define what they mean by it, and give their reasons for believing it."

"If the old Protestant masters of whom Mr. Wilson speaks," interposed John, "had thought of that, and, before attacking Catholicity, had defined and established a religion of their own, my brother would have had an easy task now, if indeed any task at all."

"The true polemical policy is always to keep yourself and party on the offensive ; but if you imagine that Protestantism, as a positive religion, is indefinable and indefensible, you are very much mistaken."

"The readiest way to convict of that will be to define it, and give me good and valid reasons for believing it."

"In becoming a Catholic you abjured Protestantism. Am I to infer that you abjured you knew not what ?"

"Mr. Wilson pays me but a sorry compliment, if he supposes I shall voluntarily surrender what he terms the true polemical policy. The question is not what I may or may not know of Protestantism, what I may or may not have abjured,

on becoming a Catholic, but what Protestantism is, as understood by those who profess it ? ”

“ But, if you were not fully informed as to what Protestantism really was, how could you know that in abjuring it you were not abjuring the truth ? ”

“ He who has the truth has no need of knowing the systems opposed to it, in order to know that they must be false. But suppose you proceed with your definition. You profess to be a Protestant, and so able, experienced, and learned a man cannot be supposed to profess to believe he knows not what. If you know what it is, you can easily tell me.”

“ I will give you Dr. Owen’s definition. I dare say your brother has never read Owen’s works, nor Boston’s, nor those of any other man who was in breeches fifty years ago. It is a shame to think how the old worthies are neglected. Nobody reads them now-a-days. The study of school divinity is wholly neglected. Our theologians are frightened at a folio, tremble at a quarto, can hardly endure even an octavo. The demand is for works, “ short, pithy, and pungent.” It is the age of petty Tracts, Penny Magazines, Peter Parleys, Robert Merrys, trash, nonsense, and humbug.”

“ And yet it is the glorious age on which the glorious sun of the glorious Reformation beams in all its effulgence. If the Reformers were here, they would exclaim, *Et tu, Brute !* ”

“ I hope Mr. Wilson will not heed my brother’s sneer ; but proceed with his definition.”

“ Brother Milwood, have you Owen’s works ? No ? No, I dare say not. But I presume you have Dowling, D’Aubigné, and the last new novel.”

“ I do not read novels.”

“ The best thing you have said for yourself yet. Well, I see I must quote from memory. Protestantism, — remember I quote the *great* Dr. Owen, one of those sound old English divines who cared as little for Prelacy as for Papacy, and would no more submit to king than to pope. They were the men. It will be long before we shall look upon their like again. They were God’s freemen. The pomps and vanities of the world could not dazzle or blind them. They cared not for crown or mitre, and the blood of a king was to them as the blood of a common man. They went straight to their object. England was not worthy of them. The Lord directed them here. Here they laid the foundations of a noble empire. This is their work ; this land is their land, and their children’s after

them, and a crying shame is it, that a miserable, idolatrous Papist should be suffered to pollute it with his accursed foot."

"But you are thinking of the Independents, rather than of the Presbyterians. The Presbyterians were for king and covenant, and pretend to have disapproved of the execution of Charles Stuart."

"No matter. The Independents only completed what the Presbyterians began, and soon sunk into insignificance when left to struggle alone. In the glorious war against Prelacy and Papacy they were united as brothers, as I trust will always be their children."

"But the definition."

"Remember, I quote the words of the great Dr. Owen, great and good, notwithstanding he left the Presbyterians and became a Congregationalist ; — excepting in matters of church government, rigidly orthodox, and as much superior to the degenerate race of ministers in our day, as a huge old folio is to a modern penny tract, and whose works I recommend to both of you to read. Protestantism is, — ' 1. What was revealed unto the Church by our Lord and his Apostles, and is the whole of that religion which the Lord doth and will accept. 2. *So far as* needed unto faith, obedience, and salvation of the Church, what they taught, revealed, and commanded is contained in the Scriptures of the New Testament, witnessed unto and confirmed by the Old. 3. All that is required, that we may please God, and be accepted with him, and come to the eternal enjoyment of him, is that we truly and sincerely believe what is so revealed and taught, yielding sincere obedience unto what is commanded in the Scriptures. 4. If in any thing they [Protestants] be found to deviate from them, if it [what they teach] exceed in any instance what is so taught and commanded, if it be defective in the faith or the practice of any thing so revealed or commanded, they are ready to renounce it.' What do you ask more clear, brief, comprehensive, and precise than that ? "

"Did our Lord and his Apostles reveal any religion which they did not reveal to the Church, or which God doth not and will not accept ? "

"Of course not."

"Then Mr. Owen might have said simply, Protestantism is what was revealed by our Lord and his Apostles unto the Church."

"Perhaps he might."

“ What was so revealed is the true religion, is it not ? ”

“ It is.”

“ Then he would have said all, if he had said, Protestantism is the true religion.”

“ Be it so.”

“ If you will now tell me what is the true religion, you will tell me what Protestantism is.”

“ Mr. Owen tells you in his second article.”

“ I beg your pardon. He tells me in that *where* the true religion is, so far as needed ; but not *what* it is.”

“ In his third article, then.”

“ Not in that ; for in that he simply tells me, that, if I believe and obey the true religion, so far as contained in the Scriptures of the New Testament, I have all that God requires of me.”

“ Well, in the fourth.”

“ But that simply informs me, that, if Protestants have mistaken the true religion, if they contend for more or for less than is contained in the Scriptures, they are ready to renounce *it* ; although whether by *it* is to be understood true religion, the mistake, the excess, or the defect, he does not inform me. So, you perceive, I am not as yet told what Protestantism is.”

“ But you are told *where* it is, and that is enough.”

“ That may or may not be. The cook knew *where* the teakettle was when it fell overboard, but nevertheless he could not get it to make the captain’s tea.”

“ It is in the New Testament, witnessed unto and confirmed by the Old. You can go there and find it for yourself.”

“ Has it any mark by which I may recognize it when I see it ? ”

“ If you seek, you shall find. Our Lord himself says that, and I hope you will not dispute him.”

“ Does he say, if you seek *in the Scriptures of the New Testament*, you shall find ? ”

“ Not expressly.”

“ Do all who seek in those Scriptures find ? ”

“ All who faithfully study them and rightly understand them.”

“ Do all who attentively read them rightly understand them ? ”

“ No ; some wrest them to their own destruction, and bring in damnable heresies.”

“ You have faithfully studied and rightly understand them ? ”

“ I think so.”

“ Lest I should be one of those who wrest them to my own destruction, suppose you tell me what is the true religion which they contain, or which I ought to find in them.”

“ If you are one who would wrest the Scriptures to your own destruction, you would do the same with my statement of what they contain. I should do you no good by complying with your request. If you believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will you believe me.”

“ How, then, am I ever to know certainly what this thing you call Protestantism, and say is the true religion, really is ? ”

“ Read your Bible, Sir, with humble submission, without any reliance on yourself, with sincere and earnest prayer to the Holy Ghost to enlighten you, and you will be led into all truth.”

“ Perhaps so. But our question is not, What is truth ? but, What is Protestantism ? ”

“ Have I not told you Protestantism is the true religion ? He, then, who is led to the truth must needs be led to Protestantism.”

“ I stand corrected. But since some do wrest the Scriptures to their own destruction, and bring in ‘ damnable heresies,’ how do you determine infallibly that you may not yourself be one of them ? ”

“ I am accustomed, Sir, to being treated with respect, and I trust you mean me no insult.”

“ They who are accustomed to be treated with respect are, in general, slow to think themselves insulted. If Mr. Wilson does not know infallibly that he rightly understands the Scriptures, he cannot deny that it is possible he may be wresting them to his own destruction.”

“ Through God’s distinguishing grace vouchsafed to me, for no worthiness of mine, I have been enabled to see and know the truth.”

“ Is that same grace vouchsafed to all ? ”

“ To all whom God has preordained unto everlasting life ; but those whom he has from all eternity reprobated to everlasting death, for the praise of his vindictive justice, he leaves to their reprobate sense, to their own blindness, and even sends them strong delusions, that they may believe a lie and be damned.”

“ And these never had it in their power to come to the knowledge of the truth and be saved ? ”

“ If they had willed.”

“ Were they ever able to have willed ? ”

“ Naturally, yes ; morally, no.”

“ But actually ? ”

“ No. Those whom God ordains to everlasting death he ordains to sin, that they may be damned justly.”

“ That is a hard doctrine, Brother Wilson. It was taught indeed by the great Calvin, whom God so highly favored, but it is not now generally taught by Presbyterians. The doctrine of God’s decrees is, indeed, full of secret comfort to the elect, but it needs to be handled with great prudence, and is to be meditated in our closets rather than made the basis of our instructions to others. Sinners do not and cannot understand it. They only make a mock of it, and it proves to them the savor of death unto death.”

“ There it is ! The time has come when the people will no longer hear sound doctrine, when it is *imprudent* to declare the whole counsel of God. Hence the race of weak and puny saints, who must be fed on milk, and that diluted. Very well, I must leave you to manage the discussion in your own way ; but be on your guard. The time is not far distant, if things proceed as they have done for a few years back, when you will have no Protestantism to define or defend, but each man will have a gospel of his own. Good morning, gentlemen.”

IV. The conversation was not resumed for several days. James found it a less easy task to define Protestantism than he had imagined. He had been accustomed to take the word in a very loose and indefinite sense. As chief of the Protestant League, he had meant by it little else than the denial of Catholicity ; in his warfare against Socinians, Rationalists, and Transcendentalists, he had made it stand for doctrines and principles which logically implied the Catholic Church ; in his own pulpit, addressing the people of his charge, he had understood by it simply Presbyterianism, with a slight leaning, perhaps, towards Arminianism. But he had never given the term a clear, distinct, and uniform meaning, which he was willing to stand by in all places and on all occasions. He saw that to define it in a negative sense, and make Protestantism merely a protest against Rome, was not necessarily to distinguish it from paganism, Mahometanism, Judaism, deism, or even atheism ; and to restrict it to simple Presbyterianism, if not against his

conscience, was, in the present state of the world, bad policy. It would be tantamount to saying that Protestantism is an empty name ; that there are indeed Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Baptists, Methodists, &c., but no Protestants ; that there is a multitude of sects, indeed, sometimes arranged under one common name, but without any common faith or principles, except that of hostility to the Church. It would, moreover, too openly expose his weakness to the enemy, and confess that the great and mighty Protestant party, which had begun by assuming such lofty airs, and threatening to become commensurate with Christendom, had dwindled down to the little handful of Presbyterians in Great Britain and the United States, — those on the Continent having pretty generally lapsed into Socinianism, Rationalism, and Transcendentalism, — divided into four or five separate, if not hostile, communions, and their numbers every day relatively diminishing, which would create mirth rather than dread at Rome, against whom he wished to carry on a war of extermination. On the other hand, to extend its meaning so as to embrace all the so-called Protestant sects, from Dr. Pusey down to Theodore Parker, from Oxford to the Melodeon, was hardly less inconvenient. He would never march through Coventry at the head of such a motley company. Rome would declare that all Motleydom and all Devilism had broken loose. He should never hear the last of it. But to find a definition which should extend beyond the narrow boundaries of Presbyterianism without including all Sectarism was the difficulty. *Hoc opus, hic labor est.*

James spent several days in meditating on this problem, and without hitting upon a solution quite to his mind ; but having obtained a few hints from some of the earlier Protestant controversialists, and trusting to the chapter of accidents, he took occasion, finding himself in his library alone with John, to renew the discussion.

“ I think,” said he, addressing his brother, “ that, if you review our former conversation, you will own my last answer to the question, What is Protestantism ? is all that you have any right to demand.”

“ I have no wish to make any unreasonable demands. What I want is to find out precisely what, in its distinctive features, this thing or no thing which you call Protestantism is. If your answer tells me what it is, and distinguishes it, or enables me to distinguish it, from what it is not, it is unquestionably sufficient.”

“ Protestantism is the essentials, and the essentials are all the truths clearly and manifestly revealed in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.”

“ If to believe the essentials be all that is necessary to constitute one a Protestant, then all who believe all the truths clearly and manifestly revealed in the Scriptures must be Protestants.”

“ Certainly.”

“ If Catholics, as is very supposable, to say the least, believe all that is clearly and manifestly revealed in the Scriptures, then Catholics are Protestants.

“ But Catholics do not believe all that is clearly and manifestly revealed in the Scriptures.”

“ They profess to do so, and they say with you, all that is clearly and manifestly revealed is essential to be believed, and no point of it can be disbelieved without essential error.”

“ But they hold that other things than those clearly and manifestly revealed in the Scriptures are also essential to be believed.”

“ That is, they believe all that you define to be the essentials are essentials, but do not believe that these are all the essentials. But this does not hinder them from being good orthodox Protestants ; for your definition excludes only those who believe less, not those who believe more, than the essentials.”

“ Say, then, Protestantism is to believe all the essentials, and that what, and only what, is clearly and manifestly revealed in the Scriptures is essential, or, without essential error, can be believed to be essential. That excludes Catholics, by asserting the sufficiency of the Scriptures, which they do not admit.”

“ But besides the essentials, are the non-essentials, which may without essential error be either believed or disbelieved, to be the word of God ? ”

“ That is what I contend.”

“ But they who believe them to be the word of God must believe them to be essential.”

“ Why so ? ”

“ Toby and his dog have answered that question very effectually. He who believes a thing to be the word of God must either believe it essential, or else believe that it is no essential error to disbelieve God. Can I, without essential error, believe it is no essential error to disbelieve God ? ”

"No, for that is tantamount to making him a liar, since there is no essential difference between believing that it is no essential error to disbelieve God, and actually disbelieving him."

"Then they who believe the non-essentials to be the word of God must believe them to be essential, or else virtually make God a liar ?"

"That follows."

"But it is essential error to believe any thing to be essential which is not essential ?"

"So I have implied."

"Then it follows, does it not, that he who believes any of the non-essentials to be the word of God errs essentially ?"

"So it would seem."

"All who differ from Presbyterians differ from them either by believing some things to be the word of God which Presbyterians deny to be his word, or *vice versa* ?"

"True."

"If the latter, they err essentially, assuming Presbyterians to be right, by not believing all the essentials."

"Agreed."

"If the former, they err essentially by believing some things to be essential which are not."

"That also follows."

"Then all who differ from Presbyterians in matters of faith err essentially. Therefore, none who differ from them as to matters of faith can be essentially orthodox. If, then, you say none can be essentially orthodox who believe any of the non-essentials to be essential, you exclude all who differ from Presbyterians, make Presbyterianism and Protestantism equivalent and convertible terms, and declare none but Presbyterians are Protestants, which I understand you to deny."

"I do deny it ; for Presbyterians are not the only essentially orthodox Protestants."

"How, then, can you say that Protestantism is to believe the essentials, and that only the essentials can, without essential error, be believed to be essential ? Do you insist on saying this still ?"

"I do."

"Is infant baptism an essential or a non-essential ?"

"A non-essential, as I have told you more than once."

"But Presbyterians believe it to be a revealed command ?"

"They do."

“ Therefore believe it to be the word of God.”

“ Certainly.”

“ Then they believe it essential, and therefore err essentially by believing a non-essential to be essential. Hence, if you insist on saying that they who believe any thing but the essentials to be essential err essentially, you will exclude Presbyterians themselves from the number of essentially orthodox Protestants.”

“ But I have just told you Presbyterians hold infant baptism to be a non-essential.”

“ Then they hold it is no essential error to disbelieve God, which is itself a most essential error, for it virtually makes God a liar, as you have conceded. In either case, then, Presbyterians are excluded ; in the one case, by believing a non-essential to be essential ; and in the other, by believing it no essential error to make God a liar. Do you still insist that it is essential error to believe any thing in addition to the essentials to be essential ? ”

“ I do.”

“ Then you abandon your distinction between the essentials and non-essentials ? ”

“ Not at all.”

“ You still say, there are portions of the revealed word which may be either believed or disbelieved to be the word of God without essential error ? ”

“ I do. To deny this would be to place myself in opposition to the whole Protestant world, from the time of the Reformation down to the present moment. It is by means of this distinction that we have met and repelled the charge which Papists bring against us, that there is no unity of faith amongst us. In non-essentials we have always admitted we do not agree ; but in essentials we have always contended we do agree ; and, therefore, that there is among us substantial unity as to faith.”

“ These non-essentials, as to which Protestants have differed and still differ, have they been held to be non-essentials alike by those who believed and those who disbelieved them to be the word of God ? ”

“ They have.”

“ All have agreed, then, that there is a portion of the word of God which it is no essential error to disbelieve ? ”

“ Such is the fact.”

“ Are you not mistaken ? ”

" I think not."

" Then you hold that the whole Protestant world, from the time of the Reformation down to the present moment, have believed it no essential error to disbelieve God, that it is no essential error to make God a liar ; in a word, you hold that all Protestants always have been, and still are, virtual infidels. Will you still insist on the distinction between essentials and non-essentials ?

" I tell you I cannot surrender that distinction without placing myself in opposition to the whole Protestant world."

" You still say that there are portions of the word which are not essential ? "

" I do."

" And these may be believed to be the word of God ? "

" They may."

" And some who are essentially orthodox do so believe them, or at least some of them, to be the word of God ? "

" They do."

" Yet no one is essentially orthodox who believes any thing but the essentials to be essential ? "

" No one."

" And no one can believe any thing to be the word of God without believing it to be essential, as we have proved in the case of Toby and his dog ? "

" Unless it be no essential error to disbelieve God."

" Some essentially orthodox Protestants believe, then, the same thing at the same time to be both essential and not essential ? "

" That is not possible."

" Then it will be convenient to drop the distinction between essentials and non-essentials, and say that all who believe any thing to be the word of God, except what is clearly and manifestly revealed, err essentially, will it not ? "

" No ; for all that is revealed in the Scriptures evidently is not clearly and manifestly revealed, and it would be absurd to say that a man can err essentially in believing, when what he believes is the word of God."

" Then you will take the ground, that all essentially orthodox Protestants are, and always have been, virtual infidels, believing it no essential error to make God a liar ? "

" Not that, by any means."

" You fall back, then, on your former ground, and say Protestantism is the essentials ; he who believes these, what-

ever else he believes or disbelieves, to be the word of God, is essentially orthodox."

"Very well."

"But the non-essentials, or matters it is lawful to believe or disbelieve to be the word of God, are not the words of men or of devils, but revealed truths, as we agreed in our former conversation?"

"Certainly."

"But to believe the words of men or of devils to be the word of God is, as you have said, essential error."

"True."

"Then, after all, we cannot say that he who believes the essentials is essentially orthodox, whatever else he believes or disbelieves to be the word of God; for this would imply that it is no essential error to add to the word of God the words of men or of devils."

"Say, then, he who believes the essentials is essentially orthodox, whatever else he believes or disbelieves to be the word of God, provided he believes nothing to be the word of God which is not his word."

"Then none of those who believe any thing to be revealed which Presbyterians deny are essentially orthodox."

"I do not see that."

"What they believe which exceeds what you believe, you hold to be either revealed or not revealed. If revealed, *you* are guilty of the sin of infidelity in not believing it; if not revealed, you must hold they err essentially, for you hold they believe that to be the word of God which is not his word. The last is what you do hold, and therefore you cannot hold that they are essentially orthodox Protestants."

"Be it so."

"You must also deny those to be essentially orthodox who believe less than you do. If the matters you believe which they do not are not revealed truths, you err essentially in believing them to be revealed; if they are revealed, you must believe they err essentially in disbelieving them; since in disbelieving them you must hold they disbelieve God."

"That seems to be so."

"Then you exclude from the essentially orthodox all who believe more or less than yourselves; that is, all but yourselves. If, then, you insist on the proviso you have adopted in your definition, and say no one can be essentially orthodox who believes any thing in addition to the word, you must either

give up your distinction, as I have said, between essentials and non-essentials, or else say it is no essential error to disbelieve God; which will you do?"

"Neither."

"But you either believe the non-essentials to be revealed truths, that is, the word of God, or you do not. If you do not, your distinction between them and the essentials avails you nothing, as we have seen. Hence you have insisted that they are revealed truths. But if you hold them to be revealed truths, you must hold them to be not non-essential, but essential, as Toby and his dog have proved to us, since to disbelieve them would be to make God a liar. This you admit, do you not?"

"I have admitted it over and over again."

"Then on no ground whatever can you admit any portion of revealed truth to be unessential, and, willingly or unwillingly, you must abandon your distinction between the essentials and non-essentials, and either say Protestants have been and are virtual infidels in teaching that it is no essential error to disbelieve God, or else that they have never meant that any portion of the revealed word, clearly and manifestly revealed or not, can be disbelieved without essential error. Which alternative do you elect?"

"If either, the latter."

"Presbyterians, then, are the only essentially orthodox Protestants."

"Very well."

"Presbyterians are fallible, liable to be mistaken?"

"We do not, like Romanists, set up a claim to infallibility."

"If they are fallible, it is possible they take that to be the word of God which is not his word, or deny that to be his word which is his word. In either case, they will be guilty of essential error. Consequently, it is possible that Presbyterians themselves are in essential error, and therefore impossible for them to say with certainty that they are essentially orthodox, and therefore they must admit that it is uncertain whether there are any essentially orthodox Protestants at all!"

"But you forget that the essentials are clearly and manifestly revealed, and therefore may be known with all necessary certainty."

"You also forget that we have just agreed that *all* revealed

truth is essential, and that you have surrendered the distinction between essentials and non-essentials. You assumed, as you were obliged, the non-essentials to be revealed, for otherwise they would be simply the words of men or of devils, which it is not lawful to believe to be the word of God ; but the moment you admit them into the category of revealed truths, you must either concede them to be essential, or else that it is no essential error to disbelieve God ; that is, to be an infidel, and make God a liar. This last you could not do ; therefore you were obliged to say all that is revealed is essential. But, if you say this, you must say, either that the essentials are not restricted to what is clearly and manifestly revealed, or else that nothing but what is clearly and manifestly revealed is revealed at all. Which will you say ? ”

“ For the present, that nothing is revealed but what is clearly and manifestly revealed. Almighty God is good, and natural reason suffices to prove that he cannot have made that necessary to be believed which is obscure or doubtful. If he has made his whole word necessary to be believed, the whole must be clearly and manifestly revealed, and what is not so revealed can be no part of his word.”

“ His word, being clear and manifest, cannot be mistaken, or, at least, there can be no difficulty in determining what it is ? ”

“ None.”

“ But clear and manifest are relative terms. A thing may be clear and manifest to you, and not to me. To whom, then, do you say the word is clearly and manifestly revealed ? ”

“ What is clear and manifest is clear and manifest, and can be honestly mistaken by no one.”

“ That is, what is alike clear and manifest to all men.”

“ But I mean what is alike clear and manifest to all men.”

“ The word is revealed in the Scriptures, and in the Scriptures alone, and these alone are sufficient ? ”

“ Yes ; that is what all Protestants assert.”

“ The word is revealed in these alike clearly and manifestly to all men ? ”

“ Yes.”

“ To those who cannot read, as to those who can ? ”

“ There should be none who cannot read.”

“ But nineteen twentieths of mankind, at the lowest calculation, cannot read, and nearly as large a proportion of those who can read cannot read so as to understand what they read.

Do you say the revealed word is clearly and manifestly revealed to all these ? ”

“ Of those to whom little is given little will be required.”

“ That is to say, Almighty God does not require faith in his word of the immense majority of the human race ? ”

“ I say not that. Those who cannot read he instructs by his pastors and by his Holy Spirit.”

“ But if the instructions of pastors and the direct revelation of the Holy Spirit are necessary in the case of the larger part of mankind, how can you say the Scriptures are sufficient ? ”

“ The Scriptures *are* sufficient.”

“ That is, for whom they suffice, and when and where they are not insufficient ! That can hardly be questioned. But let us confine ourselves to those who can read, and who claim to be teachers among Protestants, so called. These all admit the Scriptures contain the whole revealed word ? ”

“ They do.”

“ That they are the sole and sufficient rule of faith and practice ? ”

“ Certainly.”

“ And that the word revealed in them is clear and manifest ? ”

“ Unquestionably.”

“ And that only what is clear and manifest is revealed ? ”

“ Be it so.”

“ Then they all agree as to what the word is ? ”

“ No ; I am sorry to say they do not.”

“ There is disagreement, then, — some saying the word is one thing, others saying it is not that, but something else ? ”

“ But there is no *honest* disagreement ; for the matter is clear and manifest, and none who do not wilfully close their eyes to the truth can mistake it.”

“ Are all parties dishonest ? ”

“ No.”

“ Which is the honest, which the dishonest party ? ”

“ The orthodox party is the honest party.”

“ Which party is that ? ”

“ The one which believes what, and only what, is clearly and manifestly revealed.”

“ So say all parties ; but which is that party ? ”

“ The Scriptures must decide.”

“ But the dispute is as to what the Scriptures teach. They, by the very terms of the supposition, have already been ap-

pealed to, and each party has obtained a decision in its own favor. The question now is, Which is the true answer ? What is the decision of the court ? ”

“ Let the Scriptures be appealed to again.”

“ That avails nothing ; for they decide always in precisely the same terms, and the dispute remains always the same.”

“ But the dispute is not honest.”

“ Be it so. But who is honest, who dishonest, you or your opponents ? You charge them with dishonesty, and say the matter is clear and manifest as you believe ; they retort and say it is clear and manifest as they believe. Which am I to believe ? ”

“ Neither ; but read the Scriptures and decide for yourself.”

“ And suppose I decide against both of you ? There will then be three sects instead of two. Why shall I be counted the honest party rather than you or your opponents, they rather than you, you rather than they, either of you rather than I ? ”

“ But the matter is clear and manifest to all who do not wilfully close their eyes to the light.”

“ With all my heart ; but who are they who wilfully close their eyes to the light ? ”

“ The Scriptures — ”

“ They have given their decision, and nothing is decided, for the dispute is as to what they decide.”

“ Evidently they cannot be good orthodox Protestants who teach doctrines repugnant to those of the Protestant Reformation.”

“ Do you abandon the sufficiency of the Scriptures, then, and call in the aid of Protestant tradition ? ”

“ I do not abandon the sufficiency of the Scriptures, but I maintain that what is clearly and manifestly repugnant to the doctrines of the Reformers cannot be clearly and manifestly revealed in the Scriptures.”

“ Your rule of faith, then, is the Scriptures understood according to the Reformers ? ”

“ I hold the Scriptures alone are the rule of faith, but I compare my understanding of the Scriptures with the teachings of the Reformers.”

“ And if it coincide with what they taught, you hold that you rightly understand the Scriptures, and believe what is clearly and manifestly revealed ? ”

“ Very well.”

“ If the Scriptures alone are the rule, this appeal to the Reformers is, if admissible, unnecessary ; if it is necessary, and you cannot say that you rightly understand the Scriptures till you have brought your understanding of them to the test of the Reformers, you cannot say the Scriptures alone are sufficient, or are alone your rule of faith. You then make the Reformers, not the Scriptures, the test of the word.”

“ I do not make the Reformers the test of the word. I love, honor, and revere the Reformers as great and good men, raised up by God in his providence to deliver his people from the bondage of Rome, to arrest the tide of Papal corruptions, roll back the darkness which was gathering over the world, restore the preaching of the word, and save the Christian religion from utter banishment from the face of the earth ; but they were men, subject to the common frailties of our nature, and I follow them only so far as they follow Christ, who bids me call no man father upon earth, for one is my Master in heaven.”

“ In order to ascertain when and where the Reformers follow Christ, you bring the Reformers to the test of the Scriptures ? ”

“ Precisely. I am to obey God rather than men.”

“ So you subject your understanding of the Scriptures to the test of the Reformers, and the Reformers to the test of your understanding of the Scriptures. If you agree with them, you are right ; if they agree with you, they are right. Thus you prove your understanding by theirs, and theirs by yours ! ”

“ I do no such thing. The Bible is the religion of Protestants, the Bible alone, and I am not obliged to consult the Reformers in order to ascertain what is clearly and manifestly revealed.”

“ Then you have nothing to do with the Reformers, and may at once dismiss them to their own place.”

“ That is, you would say the Reformers, those great and godly men, are gone to hell ? ”

“ If that is their own place, not otherwise.”

“ This is too bad. You know I love, honor, and revere the Reformers, and it is no more than what you owe as a gentleman, not to say a Christian, while conversing with me, to treat them and my own feelings with some little respect.”

“ Very well said, my most courteous and gentlemanly brother. Happy is he who practises as well as preaches.

You know I love and revere the Holy Catholic Church, the Immaculate Spouse of the Lamb, and the joyful Mother of all the faithful ; and yet you have not hesitated to call her the ' Mystery of Iniquity,' ' Antichrist,' ' the Whore of Babylon,' ' a cage of unclean birds,' &c. Where was your regard for *my* feelings ? And what right have you to complain, if there be meted to you the measure you mete ? But you will not receive such measure from Catholics, for they have studied in the school of Christ, and learned, when reviled, not to revile again. I said nothing against the Reformers, offered no opinion as to their final doom. It is not mine to judge them. But if they, Judas-like, betrayed their Master, rebelled against the Church of God, and refused to obey the pastors the Holy Ghost had set over them, and died unrepentant, I need not tell you what is and must be their doom, or that of all who partake in their evil deeds, if they die unreconciled to God. It is no pleasant thought, but you called it up, not I."

" So Catholics send all Protestants to hell ! "

" All good Catholics do all in their power to prevent their Protestant friends and neighbours from sending themselves there. But suppose we waive questions of this sort for the present. We shall be better able to discuss them after we have determined what Protestantism is, and when inquiring whether it is true or false, from heaven or from hell, — is a safe way of salvation, or only the way that leadeth to perdition. It is no idle question, my brother, we are discussing. It involves eternal consequences. If Protestantism be not of God, if it be not that one, true, holy religion which he revealed from the beginning, which he has commanded to be taught to all nations, and which he has promised to be with, to protect, and to bless all days unto the consummation of the world, I need not tell you what must inevitably be your doom, if living and dying where and as you are, or what you have but too much reason to fear is the doom of those you have nursed in your bosom, so tenderly loved, and for whom your tears are still flowing."

" Are you a priest ? You talk like one."

" Perhaps nearly as much of one as yourself."

" Singular ! I never thought of that before. Upon my word, I believe you are a Romish priest, perhaps even a Jesuit."

" If either, you must believe me able to keep my own counsel. It is enough at present for you to see in me plain

Jack Milwood, your elder brother, who, may be, knows a great deal more about you than you do about him."

"I wish, John, you would give me the history of your life since you left home. It must be full of interest, and I should really like to hear it."

"Rather than exert all your wit and skill in defining Protestantism? But when we have disposed of Protestantism, perhaps, — but at present we must return to the question."

"No, no, I insist on the life and adventures of John Milwood, eldest son of the late Jeremiah Milwood —"

"And brother of the distinguished James Milwood, the Reverend pastor of —, and chief of the Protestant League for the conversion of the Pope and the suppression of Popery, and who, when questioned, could not tell what he meant by Protestantism. No, no, brother, let us finish our definition of Protestantism first."

"I have given you definitions enough and more than enough already, and you ought to be able to suit yourself with some one of them."

"But it is not what suits me, but what suits you. Which of these numerous definitions do you finally settle down upon?"

"Protestantism is what and only what is clearly and manifestly revealed."

"And what is that? Is it what you teach or what Mr. Silvertone teaches?"

"Mr. Silvertone is a Socinian."

"What then? Does he not believe all that is clearly and manifestly revealed?"

"No, he does not."

"He says he does; and why am I to believe you rather than him?"

"Read and decide for yourself."

"Then the word is what is clearly and manifestly revealed to *me*; but why what is clearly and manifestly revealed to me rather than to you, or to you rather than to Mr. Silvertone?"

"Mr. Silvertone, I tell you, is a Socinian, and denies what have always and everywhere been held to be the great fundamental doctrines of the Gospel."

"If you say that, you appeal to Catholic tradition. Is your rule of faith incomplete without Catholic tradition? But if you allege Catholic tradition against Mr. Silvertone, he alleges it against you; for the same tradition that condemns him con-

demns you. You cannot say he errs because he teaches what is repugnant to Catholic tradition, without condemning yourself and all Protestants."

"But the points on which he is condemned are fundamental points; those on which we are condemned, if we are condemned, are not fundamental."

"You forget Toby and his dog."

"No more of Toby and his dog."

"Honestly, brother, have so-called Protestants ever been able to agree as to what is clearly and manifestly revealed?"

"In truth, they have not."

"And are as far from agreeing as ever?"

"Apparently so."

"Then, in point of fact, they have never been able to agree among themselves as to what Protestantism really is?"

"Such, it must be owned, is the fact."

"The great reason, then, why you have found it so difficult to tell me what it is, is that what it is has never yet been determined?"

"Possibly."

"Since I would rather relieve than aggravate your embarrassment, allow me to suggest that you define Protestantism to be what all who assert the sufficiency of the Scriptures, and maintain them to be the sole and sufficient rule of faith and practice, agree to accept as clearly and manifestly revealed. This would make agreement the test of clear and manifest, and then you can say the word is that which is clearly and manifestly revealed, and which nobody disputes, which never has been disputed, and is not likely to be disputed."

"There is, undoubtedly, a tendency among those commonly regarded as orthodox Protestants to say this, and several distinguished actors in the recent movement against Rome have proposed that we should say this and make it the basis of our alliance. It has, I own, some plausibility, and one would naturally say what is disputed cannot, while what is not disputed must, be clear and manifest. But though I am far from being a bigot, and would encourage the largest liberty compatible with essentially religious faith, I cannot accept your suggestion. It is the Socinian ground, and would place all sects who profess to be Christians on the same level. The Unitarian, who denies the Holy Trinity and Incarnation, would be as orthodox as he who believes them; and the Universalist, who denies future rewards and punishments, would be as sound

in the faith as they who believe the righteous will enter into life eternal, but the wicked will go away into everlasting punishment. Nor is this all. I am unable to find any distinctively Christian doctrines which all, who would in such a case be rallied under the Protestant banner, really agree in accepting; for I am not aware of a single one which some professed Protestant has not controverted. So, were we to adopt the suggestion, there would be no revealed truth which would not be abandoned as non-essential, and nothing above mere natural religion to be held to be essential."

"So the various Protestant sects, taken altogether, have denied the whole Gospel, and left nothing but mere natural religion undisputed."

"Not even that, in fact, for German and American Transcendentalists question essential portions of even natural religion."

"It is a hard case, brother, and I do not see that I can help you."

ART. II. — *The Fourfold Difficulty of Anglicanism, or the Church of England tested by the Nicene Creed, in a Series of Letters.* By J. SPENCER NORTHCOTE. Philadelphia: M'Grath. 1846. 18mo. pp. 213.

THIS is an American reprint of a recent work by one of the distinguished converts from Anglicanism, and is one of the most interesting and valuable popular works on the Anglican controversy with which we are acquainted. Its tone is earnest and sincere, gentle and strong. It is written in a clear, chaste, and eloquent style, out from the very heart and soul of the author, with a deep sense of the magnitude of the question it discusses, and of the perilous state of those who remain attached to an heretical communion, reject the Church of God, and daily crucify their Lord anew. It gives one a favorable impression of the talents, learning, and Catholic spirit of its author, and, indeed, of the men, in general, who have recently had the happiness of being received from Anglicanism into the Holy Catholic Church. It does ample justice to its subject, and, where dispassionately and candidly read, cannot fail to be regarded as a sufficient refutation of the pretensions

of Anglicanism, and an unanswerable defence of the Catholic Church as the Church brought to our view in the Nicene Creed.

The plan of the work is simple and natural. The Anglican pretends that his communion is at least a branch of the Catholic Church. He professes to believe, — if he is of the High Church party, — that our Lord founded a church, one and catholic, out of which, in the ordinary course of God's gracious providence, salvation is not attainable. But is his communion this church, or at least a living branch of it ; or is this church the one in communion with the See of Rome ? This is the question. How shall it be answered ? There are certain marks or notes by which the Church of Christ may be recognized and distinguished from all other bodies or pretended churches. These notes are enumerated in the Nicene Creed, which the Anglican professes to believe and to hold authoritative, and are Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity, — *Credo unam sanctam, Catholicam, et Apostolicam Ecclesiam*. If all these notes are united in the Anglican Establishment, she is the church of the Nicene Creed, the Church of God, and Spouse of the Lamb ; but if she want any one of them, and certainly if she want them all, she is not that church, is no part or branch of it, and, properly speaking, no church at all. On the other hand, if they are all united in the Roman Church, then she is the church of the Nicene Creed, the Church of God, and only those in communion with her are in communion with Christ or in the way of salvation. The object of the book is to show that none of these notes are the possession of Anglicanism, and that they are each and all the *exclusive* possession of the church in communion with the successor of St. Peter, the supreme and visible Head of the Church and Vicar of our Lord on earth. It shows this in a pleasing and convincing manner, and leaves little to be desired.

The author *proves* very clearly that Anglicanism is neither one nor holy, neither Catholic nor Apostolic, but he seems partially to *concede* at least some degree of *sanctity* to individual members of its communion. "In claiming," he says (p. 63), "this note of sanctity as the *exclusive* possession of the Roman Church, I do not of course mean that there is nothing which might be called by that name to be found in the Church of England ; sanctity, unlike unity, admits of degrees, and I should suppose there is no body of Christians, I had

almost said, no body of worshippers of any religion whatever, among whom there does not exist something which at least seems akin to it." This is rather loosely expressed, and may mean simply, that, though sanctity, truly and properly so called, belongs exclusively to the Church, yet it is not denied that there is that to be found in other communions which has many of its external characteristics, and may be sometimes supposed to be it, but which, in fact, is only its counterfeit ; and so understood, it expresses nothing objectionable. But it may also be construed to mean, that, though sanctity, indeed, in its higher degree, in its *heroic* form, is found only in the Roman Church, yet it is not denied but it may in some of its lower forms, in its elements at least, be found in communions external and hostile to her. That this last is the meaning of the author is probable, since he asserts that sanctity admits of degrees, which he would have had no occasion to do, if he had intended to concede no degree of sanctity to individuals in the Anglican communion. If this be his real meaning, it needs some qualification.

It is no reproach to the author, that he should mistake the Catholic faith or theology on this or that point, or sometimes fail to express himself with strict verbal accuracy. The recent convert — and we speak a good word for ourselves — cannot be expected to be always rigidly exact either in thought or language, and his mistakes, or blunders even, should be regarded with Christian forbearance. But sanctity, though it admit of degrees, is sanctity even in its lowest degree, and, if Mr. Northcote admits that it can in any degree be possessed by persons who adhere to the Anglican communion, he cannot claim it as the *exclusive* possession of the Roman Church. The difference between the two communions in respect of sanctity would, in such a case, be merely a difference of more or less, — a difference simply in degree, not in kind. Moreover, sanctity and salvation go together and are inseparable. Where there is no sanctity, there can be no salvation ; and where there is sanctity, there can be no condemnation. This must be true of sanctity in general, in any and every degree in which it is sanctity ; for no one can pretend that none are saved but those who have attained to that *heroic* form of sanctity which we honor in the saints canonized by the Church. If, then, the author concedes sanctity in any degree to individuals living in and adhering to the Anglican communion, he must concede salvation to be attainable in that communion ; which is *con-*

tra fidem, for it is *de fide* that there is no salvation out of the Church. It should also be borne in mind, that the Church has excommunicated and excommunicates every Protestant body, the Anglican as well as the Presbyterian or the Socinian, and we can hardly suppose that she allows us to concede sanctity to those who are under the ban of her excommunication, as heretics, cut off from communion with Christ; especially since sanctity is the end to be attained, the end for which she, with all her sacraments and ministries, was instituted and exists through all time. We have consulted the authorities within our reach, and we find none of them making the concession in question, but all unanimously contending that sanctity, properly so called, can be predicated only of the Church, whether reference be had to doctrines or to persons.

The author seems to us, also, to be not quite exact in the following passages.

"All Catholic doctrine, as held by the Roman Church, has been the result of one continued law of growth, and has therefore the unity of nature and of life: its development has been like that of the Church itself, 'the least of all seeds, but when it is grown the greatest among herbs'; or, like the growth of grace in each individual soul, 'first the blade, then the ear, and after that the full corn in the ear.'" — p. 53. "The Gospel, it is true, is a divine message. Yet, as the language in which it is made is human, questions may naturally suggest themselves, almost without end, as to the real import of that language; as, for instance, from the brief and mysterious announcement, 'the Word became flesh,' three wide questions, as it has been well said [Newman, *On Development*, p. 50, Amer. edition], at once open upon us; what is meant by 'the Word,' what by 'flesh,' and what by 'became'; and inquiries of this kind have, as you know, from time to time arisen in the Church, more or less supported by Scriptural and traditional evidence. These have gradually gained ground and attracted notice, until the Church has felt herself obliged to pronounce judgment upon them, and thenceforward, according to her seal of sanction or anathema, such *opinions* have either been incorporated into the *Catholic creed*, or denounced as contrary to it; and those bodies which, spite of such anathema, have still clung to the proscribed opinions, have *gradually* become external and hostile to the Church." — pp. 46, 47.

This seems to us to teach or necessarily imply, — 1. that Christian doctrine grows by virtue of human effort; 2. that a revelation cannot be made through the medium of human language, which shall reach the minds of its recipients in the full

and exact sense intended by its author ; 3. that heresies arise, as to their matter, from the incompleteness, *quoad se* or *quoad nos*, of the original revelation, and the honest and necessary endeavours of individuals to complete it ; and, 4. that opinions may be and are made by the Church articles of faith. There can, it seems to us, be no question that the passages quoted express or imply at least these four propositions, and we should suppose there can be just as little as to their objectionable character.

The recent conversion of the author, his evident Catholic intentions, and general soundness of doctrine, would lead us to pass over these points, all uncatholic as they are, with a simple remark calling the attention of our readers to their evident heterodoxy, were they the solitary opinions of Mr. Northcote ; but they are the doctrines of a school, — of a school formed, indeed, at first outside of the Church, but by the conversion of its distinguished founder, Mr. Newman, and his more eminent disciples, now brought within her communion. Mr. Northcote was one of Mr. Newman's disciples, and the fact that he continues to be one, even within the bosom of the Church, leads us to fear the same may be the case with many others. He gives, in the extracts we have made, what we understand, and what we presume he understands, to be substantially Mr. Newman's doctrine of development. If that doctrine is entertained by the great body of those who have recently abandoned Anglicanism for the Church, the question becomes somewhat grave, and we may have, if we are not on our guard, before we are aware of it, a new school springing up in our midst, as dangerous as the Hermesian or that of De Lamennais. These individuals, from their well known talents, learning, and zeal, cannot fail to have a wide and commanding influence on our Catholic literature, and, if they adhere to Mr. Newman's doctrine, it will be diffused beyond the circle of those who now entertain it, and do no little harm to portions even of our Catholic population. The age has a strong tendency to theorizing and innovation, which Catholics themselves do not wholly escape. Let there be brought forward a theory which promises to them an opportunity of combining the love of speculation and novelty with reverence for their religion and zeal for the salvation of their neighbour, and the temptation will be too strong to be in all cases successfully resisted. In this view of the question, it becomes important to examine thoroughly Mr. Newman's *Theory of Developments*, and to

lay open to all its real character. If it really authorize doctrines like those Mr. Northcote sets forth, no Catholic can for a moment, after discovering the fact, entertain it either as true or as harmless.

It is with sincere reluctance we recur once more to Mr. Newman's *Essay on Development of Christian Doctrine*, reviewed last July in the former series of this Journal. We cannot do so without exposing ourselves to much misconstruction and odium, especially since we are a layman and only a recent convert ourselves, a mere novice in Catholic faith and theology. But, occupying the post we do, and which we occupy by the request of those whose requests are commands for us, we are obliged to consult, not what may seem most appropriate to the neophyte or the layman, but what is most befitting the Catholic reviewer. And, after all, there may be less arrogance and dogmatism in speaking, under the supervision of the Church, what and only what she teaches us, and commands us to speak, if we speak at all, than those who are accustomed to speak only from their own heads may imagine. But personal considerations must not be suffered to enter into the account. The man, who, when the purity and integrity of the Catholic faith is attacked by an insidious theory, will remain silent lest his own motives should be misconstrued, or offer an apology for speaking out in clear and energetic tones against the advancing error, has little reason to glory in his Catholicity.

Mr. Newman's book should have been exempt from Catholic criticism, and would have been, if it had been suffered to pass for what it is and professes to be, — the speculations of a man who at best is merely *in transitu* from error to truth. So regarded, — as it was on its first appearance, and still is by the great body of Catholics at home and abroad, whether of the clergy or the laity, — it deserves no censure, and may be read with no inconsiderable interest ; for what it contains that is unsound may be justly attributed to the author's former Protestantism, and what is sound may be taken as the concessions of a great and earnest mind to Catholic truth. So regarded, we read the book as it should be read, — to find what it contains which we may as Catholics accept, not what it contains which we must reject. But we are compelled to regard it in a different light. Some few within contend the book must needs be orthodox, while those without insist that it is a work from which Catholic faith and theology are to be learned. The very eminence of the author gives weight to the conclusions of both.

We are therefore compelled, willing or not, to bring the book to the Catholic standard, and to try it by Catholic principles.

They who, among ourselves, differ from us in our estimate of Mr. Newman's theory, do not, so far as we are informed, differ from us as to the doctrine we oppose to it ; but they think that we do not rightly understand it, and ascribe to the author doctrines he would at once repudiate. What Mr. Newman would or would not repudiate, or what he did or did not intend to teach, is not the question we raise ; for we review, not him, but his book. What esoteric meaning he may have had, we do not inquire. We simply inquire, What does his book, in the obvious and natural sense of its language, actually teach to plain and unsophisticated readers ? If we have misinterpreted or misrepresented what in this sense it actually teaches, let us be set right or condemned ; but if it actually, in the obvious and natural sense of the words used, means what we allege, let it be condemned, whatever hypothesis may or may not be invented to excuse its author. But we trust we may, without offence, entreat those who may be disposed to accuse us of misunderstanding the book, before so accusing us, to take the trouble to read the book themselves, and to be certain that they themselves do not misunderstand it.

Mr. Newman, as is well known, wrote, and in part printed, his essay before he became a Catholic, and, as he personally informed a distinguished friend of ours, — if the eminent prelate who is our informant will allow us to call him our friend, who has more than once proved himself to be really so, — that he wrote the principal part of it nearly ten years before his conversion. It is not strange, then, nor incredible, that it should not be thoroughly orthodox. Never yet was a Protestant book written that could be converted into a Catholic book ; for, with all deference to Mr. Newman, who maintains the contrary, conversion is not simply taking something in addition to what we before had, but consists in putting off, as well as putting on, in “ being unclothed, as well as clothed upon.” It is not likely the work was commenced with the design with which it was completed ; and it requires no very profound examination to discover, that, while the main theory is consistently enough set forth, the book is not all of a piece ; and the hand of the author, retouching it here and there for the press, and striving to give it a more Catholic coloring and expression, is visible enough. That he considered the theory set forth in his book as intimately connected with his

own conversion, that he honestly believed it contained a solid ground on which a man could justify himself in abandoning a sect and seeking the communion of the Church, and that it would or might aid others, especially Anglicans, in removing the obstacles they imagined to communion with Rome, we make no doubt, and it seems to us but natural that he should have so believed. We see in the fact that he so believed, even on the supposition that the book is what we regard it, nothing to induce us to withdraw our high esteem for him as a man and a scholar, or to check the full flow of our gratitude to Almighty God for having, in his great mercy, brought him into the way of salvation.

The *Theory of Developments* is professedly put forth as an hypothesis, as an expedient for removing or getting rid of a difficulty. What is this difficulty, and what is suggested as the means of removing it? The difficulty is presented in two forms, special and general. In the first part of the book, the special difficulty is sunk in the general; in the last part, the general is sunk in the special;—so that, really, the book is written to remove a special difficulty; which is, the obstacle to seeking communion with the Church of Rome, pointed out by the author in one of the earlier numbers of the *Tracts for the Times*, and consists in the assumption that Rome has introduced new gods, new doctrines, or, in simple terms, corrupted the primitive faith.

This difficulty rests on the assumption of differences or variations between the faith presented to us by the history of the early ages of the Church, and the faith as held by the present Roman Catholic Church. But the real difficulty the author appears to hold does not end there, but resolves itself into a more general difficulty. The variations and differences have not occurred in one form of Christianity alone, but have extended to all; so that it is impossible to find any form of Christianity extant which is precisely that which we meet with in the primitive Church. If variation and difference of external form are solid reasons for refusing to seek communion with Rome, they are equally so for refusing communion with any pretended church now in existence. We must, then, conclude, either that Christianity has failed, died out, or that it can exist under certain variations or differences of external representation. The first alternative is inadmissible. Consequently the great inquiry must be, to ascertain how Christianity may continue perfect and unchanged under a variation and dif-

ference of external representation, and to obtain certain *criteria* by which to distinguish historically what is true Christianity from what is not. For the explication or accounting for the variations, the author brings forward his theory of developments ; for determining which or what is the real Christianity of history, and the actual continuation of the Apostolic Church, he introduces his seven tests of a true development, and applies them to ecclesiastical history, more especially of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries.

The variations and difficulties are predicated in the Essay alike of doctrine, discipline, and worship. We confine ourselves, as we did before, to his theory so far only as it affects Christian doctrine, or the *credenda* of the Christian Church, to be received by all with divine and catholic faith ; for we readily concede that much he says is true, if restricted to discipline and worship ; and we have no doubt, that, if the author had been acquainted with the proper distinctions made by Catholic theologians between the former and the latter, he would have avoided the more serious errors of his book, — very likely would not have written it at all.

To proceed to more precise and formal statements ; we may say the author affirms, — 1. That Christianity is a fact in the world's history, and therefore falls itself within the province of history. 2. It must, then, have a history, and be susceptible of an historical representation and verification. 3. But such are the variations and apparent inconsistencies of the historical representation it has received, that, while history enables us to say with ease what Christianity is not, — as, for instance, that it is not Protestantism, — yet it does not, without difficulty, enable us to say precisely what it is. Hence the problem : —

Given, the variations and apparent inconsistencies in the historical representations, how to explain or account for them, so as to be able to use history, our natural informant, in successfully determining, with completeness and exactness, what Christianity, historically considered, really is. — Essay, pp. 11 – 13.

If Mr. Newman had been a Catholic at the time of proposing this problem, he would not have proposed it ; for no Catholic concedes that there is or can be the difficulty he implies. The only variations in respect of Christian doctrine the Catholic admits are, as Father Perrone says, new modes of expression adopted on the occasion of novel errors. But this is

the problem proposed. For its solution, the author assumes a theory or hypothesis is necessary. Several hypotheses have heretofore been suggested.

1. The *quod ubique, quod semper, et quod ab omnibus* of Vincent of Lerins, that Christianity is what has been held everywhere, always, and by all. This rule appears reasonable on its face; is true in the abstract, when fairly applied in the Roman sense; but it is impracticable, especially as understood by English divines; for it admits of a laxer and a stricter application. If enlarged so as to suit the purposes of Anglicans, it includes the present Roman Catholic Church; if contracted so as to exclude the creed of Pius the Fourth, it will exclude that of St. Athanasius, and certain doctrines which Anglicans profess to hold sacred.

2. The second hypothesis is, that Christianity was early corrupted from Oriental, Platonic, and polytheistic sources; but this, however possible in itself, plausible, or sufficient, is *unavailable*; because we must know what the original evangelical message was, before we can say what has been a corruption of it.

3. The Discipline of the Secret, — *Disciplina Arcani*; sufficient as far as it goes, but does not meet the whole difficulty, because the variations continue after this discipline has ceased to be in force.

4. The Theory of Developments, which assumes the fact of variations and apparent inconsistencies, but defends them on the ground that they are legitimate developments, not corruptions of primitive doctrines. Or, to state it with more rigid accuracy, it assumes two classes of variations, one false and destructive, the other true and preservative; the former are false developments, and to be rejected as incompatible with the continued existence of Christianity; the latter are true developments, and necessary to its preservation and influence.

The subject matter of the essay is the *Development of Christian Doctrine*, and *Christian doctrine* is the subject of the developments, as the very title of the work informs us. What, then, is to be understood by *Christian doctrine*? This is our first question; and we answer, evidently, according to Mr. Newman, the view taken or the idea formed by the human mind. He connects the developments of Christian doctrine and the developments of ideas in general, supposes a parity between them, and from the fact and necessity of the latter concludes, at least, the antecedent probability of the former; which

he could not do, if he did not hold Christian doctrine to be an idea. All he says of ideas in general, all the analogies he draws from them to elucidate and establish his doctrine of development, would be irrelevant and unmeaning, if he did not hold Christian doctrine itself to be an idea.

But is the idea the revealed truth itself, or is it the view which the mind takes of the revealed truth? In some passages, the author seems to teach the former. Thus, he says, — "Christianity came into the world as an idea rather than an institution" (p. 59); and he quotes with approbation a passage from Guizot, a Protestant, which teaches that Christianity, as an institution, as a government, has been the natural and necessary result of the action of the idea on its recipients. But, according to Mr. Newman, the idea is not something given to the mind, *ab extra*, already formed, but is itself formed by the mind; for he defines it to be an habitual judgment of the mind, formed by comparing, contrasting, abstracting, generalizing, adjusting, classifying (p. 20). If, then, he takes the first alternative suggested, he must hold, as we showed in our former article, that the revelation itself is an idea formed by the human mind, which is the evident denial of revelation itself.

Mr. Newman, though some passages in his Essay certainly warrant it, will of course shrink from this view. Then he must take the other alternative, and say that Christian doctrine is not the revealed truth itself, but the view taken, or the idea which the mind forms of it. This is clearly taught in the Essay, as a passage which we shall soon quote fully and conclusively proves; it is supposed to be the view most favorable to Mr. Newman, and we have been accused of doing him injustice in alleging that in some passages of his Essay he implies the other; it is evidently Mr. Northcote's understanding of his doctrine, and Mr. Northcote is good authority in the case; and, finally, we have been assured personally by an English gentleman, an acquaintance and friend of Mr. Newman, one who was with him at Littlemore, one of his warm admirers and disciples, and like him a convert, — a man of superior worth and intelligence, — that this is really Mr. Newman's doctrine, and that it never occurred to him that any one could understand him otherwise, or that any body did or could understand any thing else by Christian doctrine. Conceding or assuming, as the case may be, this to be actually what Mr. Newman understands by Christian doctrine, we can without much difficulty seize the more prominent features of his theory.

1. The revealed truth or divine message communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, and consigned to the letter of documents, say the Holy Scriptures ; 2. The view taken or idea formed of it by the human mind operating on it ; 3. The struggles or efforts of the human mind to realize its idea, or to make it an adequate mental representation of the external revealed truth ; and, 4. The developments which result from these efforts or struggles, and of which some are legitimate and tend to preserve, and others are illegitimate and tend to corrupt or destroy, the original idea. Hence, says the author :—

“ If Christianity is a fact, and can be made the subject-matter of exercises of the reason, and impresses an idea of itself on our minds, that idea will in the course of time develop in a series of ideas, connected and harmonious with one another, and unchangeable and complete, as is the external fact itself which is thus represented. *It is the peculiarity of the human mind that it cannot take an object in, which is submitted to it, simply and integrally.* It conceives by means of definition and description ; whole objects do not create in the intellect whole ideas, but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image. There is no other way of learning or of teaching. *We cannot teach except by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing itself which we are teaching.* It may be objected, that inspired documents, such as the Holy Scriptures, at once determine its [their] doctrine without further trouble. But they were intended to create an idea, and that idea is not in the sacred text, but *in the mind of the reader* ; and the question is, whether that idea is communicated to him in its completeness and minute accuracy, on its first apprehension, or expands in his heart and intellect, and comes to perfection in the course of time. Nor could it be maintained without extravagance that the letter of the New Testament, or of any assignable number of books, comprises a delineation of all possible forms which a divine message may assume when submitted to a multitude of minds. Nor is the case altered by supposing that inspiration did for the first recipients of the revelation what the divine fiat did for herbs and plants in the beginning, which were created in maturity. Still, the time at length came when its recipients ceased to be inspired ; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall, as in other cases, at first vaguely and generally, and would afterwards be completed by developments.” — p. 49.

This is to the purpose, and establishes what we have thus far said. Christian doctrine is the idea the mind forms of the

revealed truth. But the idea is at first incomplete, vague, and general, and constitutes no adequate mental representation of its object. Hence the occasion and need of developments. But the process of development is not a process carried on by authority for the mind, but a human process, carried on by the human mind itself. In this process the mind may err, run off into extravagances, and effect false developments which tend to corrupt and destroy the original idea. Hence the necessity of an infallible authority to decide between true and false developments, to say what of that which the mind has worked out may be retained, and what must be rejected. What is permitted to be retained is incorporated into the creed, and is henceforth *de fide*; what it is determined must be rejected degenerates into heresy, and, as Mr. Northcote says, "gradually becomes external and hostile to the Church." Since developments are inevitable and necessary, from the very nature of the human mind, and, to say the least, antecedently probable from the character of the revelation itself, they must have been designed and provided for by the Author of the revelation. Then he must have established the infallible authority proved to be necessary. This infallible authority can be predicated of no other body than the Roman Church. Therefore, the Roman Church is infallible. Then she is the true Church, the Church of God, in whose communion alone salvation is to be sought. Here is the Theory of Developments from the point of view we have taken it up, and here is the argument of the Essay. The argument is no novelty, and if, instead of saying developments are necessary and must be provided for, we say, such is the perversity of the human intellect and will, that men will not be simple believers, but will strive to comprehend the faith, master it by subjecting it to human forms, as Mr. Newman's main endeavour is to show it should be, and therefore *errors* do and will arise, and must be guarded against, it is the argument used by every Catholic theologian from the first, and suggests itself naturally to every man of ordinary intellectual cultivation. It was hardly necessary to go so far, and to run such risks, to obtain an argument which might have been obtained without any journeying or risk at all. But we are most of us like the Syrian who came to the prophet to be cured of his leprosy, greatly scandalized if the prophet merely tells us, — "Go wash in the Jordan seven times, and be clean." But, letting the argument go for what it is worth, we object to the theory of Christian doctrine as set forth.

1. It degrades Christianity to the level of human and heretical doctrines, and denies all *differentia generis* between them. This follows necessarily from its assumption of a parity between Christianity and philosophy, human polity and ideas in general (p. 19). The author everywhere illustrates and confirms his doctrine of developments by what he terms "parallel instances," taken from philosophy, politics, and heresy, and, after describing the state into which the Nestorian and Monophysite communions have fallen, adds, — "Such might have been the condition of Christianity, had it been absorbed by the feudalism of the Middle Ages" (p. 48). He takes the developments which Methodism, an heretical sect, and subject, to say the least, to the simple natural laws of the human mind, as illustrative of those he contends for in Christian doctrine. But all this would be absurd, if he supposed Christian doctrine, as doctrine, belonged to a different order. Moreover, he expressly admits the objection. "Nor can it," he says, "fairly be made a difficulty, that thus to treat Christianity is to level it in some sort to sects and doctrines of the world, and to impute to it the imperfections which characterize the productions of man." — p. 49. This is sufficient, for it concedes that the author's manner of treating Christianity does degrade it to the level of human and heretical doctrines, and imputes to it the imperfections which characterize whatever is human.

The author, indeed, tells us that the divine message was, or may have been (p. 19), communicated to the world once for all; but this makes no difference; for, as we understand him, it was not communicated as *materia formata*, but simply as *materia informis*, on which the mind may operate, and to which, by operating, it gives form or idea. The doctrine is the form which the human mind gives to the *materia informis*. As to this informal matter, it is indeed divine, but as reduced to form, made doctrine, it is human. But this must also be said of all heresies, for they are only the form which sectarians give to the revealed facts on or about which they exercise their reason. They, then, are not essentially or generically distinguishable from Christian doctrine itself, and it is clear from Mr. Newman throughout, that he does not distinguish them from it, except in the fact that they are less adequate mental representations of their object; that is, use up or reduce to form. a less quantity of the informal matter revealed, are less successful in reducing the wild and weltering chaos to order. Hence, —

"The Catholic creed is for the most part the combination of separate truths, which heretics have divided among themselves, and err in dividing. So that, as a matter of fact, if a religious mind were educated in some form of heathenism or error, and then were brought under the light of truth, it would be drawn off from error into truth, not by losing what it had, but by gaining what it had not; not by being unclothed, but by being clothed upon, that mortality may be swallowed up in life."—p. 46.

Nor does the case essentially alter when we come to philosophy, or human doctrines formed for the explication of nature. Nature here is the *materia informis*; but nature is divine as well as grace, and philosophies, though human as doctrines, are yet divine as to their matter. The only difference between philosophy and Christian doctrine, then, is, that philosophy is the human form of divine matter naturally supplied, while Christianity is the human form of divine matter supernaturally supplied. The one, then, *in quantum est doctrina*, does not differ, generically, from the other. Hence the author says, very consistently with this view,—“Christianity differs from other religions and philosophies in what it has in addition to them, not in kind, but in origin; not in its nature, but in its personal characteristics.”—p. 49. It is true the author says this cannot fairly be made a difficulty; but, with his leave, we think it a very grave difficulty to degrade Christianity “to the level of sects [heresies] and doctrines of the world, and to impute to it the imperfections which characterize the productions of man.”

2. The doctrine Mr. Newman sets forth denies that there is, properly speaking, any such thing as Christian *doctrine*. It is a contradiction in terms to call that the doctrine which is not the thing taught, but the view, or idea, or judgment, which the mind forms of it. Doctrine means, by the very force of the word itself, that which is *taught*, and *formally* taught too; for all teaching is necessarily formal, and can never be made to mean either the *materia informis* submitted to the mind, or the form the mind gives to it, or judgment it forms of it. Hence, in representing the Christian revelation, objectively considered, as the mere informal matter of doctrine, and making the doctrine the form which the mind gives it, Mr. Newman denies that there is or can be a Christian doctrine. This he might have suspected when he was reducing Christianity to the level of the sects; for, properly speaking, the sects have no doctrine, since what each believes is merely his own view of what is submitted to his mind.

3. The theory excludes the *Ecclesia docens*, or teaching authority of the Church. The Catholic holds that the faith is what, and only what, God reveals and the Church teaches or proposes. The faith is everywhere and always in the Church. Hence, there must be everywhere at every moment of time a teaching authority in the Church, everywhere and always, from the Apostles to the consummation of the world, actively proposing the faith. This is what we call the Church teaching, and is composed of all pastors and teachers in communion with the successor of St. Peter, — all of whom teach with infallible authority, when teaching what, and only what, they have been taught and commissioned to teach. Individuals here and there may err through ignorance or perversity ; but our Lord is himself supernaturally present with the Church, universally and permanently, and by his gracious providence takes care that the whole do not err, and that no considerable number do, from one cause or the other, or from any cause whatever ; and if individuals, through the pride of their own reason, seek to bring in profane novelties, the *Ecclesia judicans*, passive except on such occasions, declares infallibly what is the law which, on the points in litigation, has been promulgated from the beginning, and condemns the errors and their adherents and abettors. Thus has the faith been infallibly taught and preserved from the Apostles to us, and thus it will be from us to the consummation of the world ; for He who can neither deceive nor be deceived has said it. But this universal, indefectible, and permanently active teaching church Mr. Newman's theory denies. Of course, the teacher is denied in the denial of the doctrine ; for there can no more be a teacher without doctrine than there can be doctrine without a teacher ; since teacher [doctor] and doctrine are correlatives.

If there be a church teaching, she must teach Christian doctrine, and Christian doctrine must be what and only what she teaches. But Christian doctrine must be either the revealed truth itself, or the idea the mind forms of it. Then the Church must, if she teach at all, teach either the one or the other of these. But not the revealed truth itself, because that would make it the doctrine, and not merely the *materia informis* of doctrine ; not the idea, for that would deny that it is formed by the mind operating on the revealed truth. In either case, then, the supposition of the Church teaching contradicts the theory. Consequently, the theory contradicts the Church teaching, or, as we say, excludes the *Ecclesia docens*.

4. It excludes the *Ecclesia credens*, or denies that there is any faith believed. This follows from the denial of the Church teaching. The faith is what, and only what, God reveals and the Church proposes. If there be no church teaching, there is no faith proposed ; and if none is proposed, none can be believed. But the theory denies the Church teaching, therefore denies that any faith is taught ; therefore that any is believed. So there can be no church believing. "*Fides ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Christi. . . . Quomodo credent ei, quem non audierunt ? Quomodo autem audient sine prædicante ? Quomodo vero prædicabunt nisi mittantur ?*" — Rom. x. 17, 14, 15.

5. It excludes the *Ecclesia judicans*. Mr. Newman, in words, asserts the infallible authority of the Church, and on this fact founds his claim to Catholicity. But the Church is infallible in three distinct, though inseparable, functions, — believing, teaching, and judging. The first two Mr. Newman's theory denies, and he nowhere even in words asserts them. In their place he substitutes an *Ecclesia discens*, or, in plain English, a church learning, which likens the faithful to those whom the blessed Apostle characterizes as *semper discentes, et unquam ad scientiam veritatis pervenientes*. But to stop here would be obviously absurd ; for the Church, in learning or developing the faith, *in quantum est Ecclesia discens* or *evolvens*, is not infallible, may err, run off into extravagances, effect false developments as well as true, and therefore lose, instead of preserving, the deposit of faith. Hence the necessity of an infallible authority. But this infallible authority can, after the exclusion of the Church teaching and believing, be only the Church judging, or deciding between true and false developments, — what of that which the Church learning has worked out is to be retained as dogmatic truth, and what is to be rejected as refuse and suffered to degenerate into heresy ; and it is only in this sense that we find the author asserting the infallibility of the Church, or arguing its necessity ; for — and the point is capital — the authority does not precede the fallible action of the mind of the Church, effect and authoritatively *propose* the development, but follows that action, and gives to the developments effected, as Mr. Northcote expresses it, "her seal of sanction or anathema." The truth to be sanctioned is elicited by the controversy which precedes the decision of authority ; and consequently the action of authority, as such, must consist in op-

posing the truth so elicited to the contradictory error ; that is, determining which of the litigants is the faithful development. Obviously, then, the infallible authority can be only the judicial authority, that is, the *Ecclesia judicans*.

But no *Ecclesia judicans* can be legitimately asserted where there is no church teaching ; for the church teaching is the *conditio sine qua non* of the church judging. The office of the judge is to judge of the infractions of law. But where there is no law, there are no infractions of law, and there is no law where none has been promulgated. The judge, therefore, necessarily presupposes the promulgation of the law as the condition of his own existence. But where there is no teacher, there is no promulgation of the law. The judge, *in quantum est judex*, does not promulgate the law, but simply declares what, on the points in litigation, is the law which has already been promulgated. Consequently, where there has been no teacher to promulgate the law, or simply where there is no teacher preceding the judge, there can be no judge. Therefore the theory excludes the Church judging.

Again. The judge, *in quantum est judex*, does not *promulgate* the law ; he only *declares* a law previously promulgated. Now, on the points in litigation, which the judge is called upon to decide, he either declares the law truly or he does not. If he does not, he is not infallible, and the assertion of a judge avails the author nothing. If he does, then it is infallibly certain that on those points there had been a law previously promulgated. If so, the alleged development is no development, but the simple declaration or application of the preëxisting law. In point of fact, this last is what the Church always alleges when deciding a controversy of faith. She uniformly alleges, that she is only opposing to the novel error what is and has been the faith taught and believed, or law promulgated, from the first. From the first, then, she assumes the law on the point litigated to have been formal, for it is absurd to say an informal law, in so far as informal, is a law promulgated. But if the law or the faith from the first has been formal, of course it can have had no developments. But the Church, in declaring the law, which she applies to the point litigated, has been promulgated from the first, is either fallible or infallible. If fallible, Mr. Newman has no infallible church. If infallible, he cannot assert developments. But he does assert developments. Therefore, he can assert no infallible church. So both his theory of Christian doctrine and his the-

ory of developments alike exclude the infallible Church judging, and reduce his theory to that of mere *private judgment*.

6. It excludes even the possibility of faith, by denying, *quoad nos*, the possibility of an infallible revelation. This we saw in the beginning was Mr. Northcote's understanding of Mr. Newman's theory. Mr. Newman says, — "It is the peculiarity of the human mind that it cannot take an object in, which is submitted to it, simply and integrally. . . . Whole objects do not create in the intellect whole ideas ; but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, a perfect image. There is no other way of learning or of teaching. *We cannot teach except by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing itself we are teaching.*" — p. 49. This is clear and conclusive, if words are allowed to have their ordinary meaning ; for it is assigned as the reason why we cannot, on its first apprehension, form to ourselves an adequate mental representation of the revealed truth, and are able to complete it only in the course of time by developments. But what is thus affirmed of the communication and reception of the original divine message may and must be affirmed, for the same reason, of the decisions of the infallible authority, — supposing it to exist. "Whole objects do not create whole ideas in the intellect." But the decision or definition of an objective authority is a whole object, and therefore cannot create a whole idea, be taken in simply and integrally, but must be "thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image." Suppose a new decision, and the same process must be repeated, and so on *ad infinitum*. "We cannot teach except by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing itself we are teaching." If not identical with it, in so far as not identical, they must be diverse from it. Then, if the thing itself be truth, they must be more or less untrue ; consequently, it is impossible to teach the truth without some admixture of error. Then no infallible revelation can be made to the human mind, as we inferred from Mr. Northcote ; if no infallible revelation, then no infallible faith ; and if no infallible faith, then none at all ; or, if no *infallible* revelation, then no revelation, for God cannot teach error,

quoad se or *quoad nos* ; and if no revelation, then of course no faith. Consequently, faith is impossible.

These are some of the grave objections to which Mr. Newman's theory of Christian doctrine is exposed, if, as we have conceded, it assumes Christian doctrine to be not the revealed truth itself, but the mind's idea of it. But, if it be denied that it does so assume, and contended that it assumes the doctrine to be the revealed truth itself, it becomes, if possible, still more objectionable ; for it is undeniable that it assumes the doctrine to be *idea*, and *idea* to be, not something already formed communicated to the mind *ab extra*, but an habitual judgment formed by the mind itself. This would reduce Christianity, in respect both of its matter and of its form, to the level of philosophy, and be an absolute denial of the supernatural revelation even of its matter, that is, of supernatural revelation altogether. The moment Christian doctrine is assumed to be an idea formed by the mind, an habitual judgment, whatever is assumed to be its object, Christianity, in any sense in which a Catholic can recognize it, is absolutely denied. No man can be a Catholic, who does not hold that Christian doctrine is the revealed truth itself, and that this truth is infallibly proposed to the mind, and infallibly received by it. If the revealed truth cannot be so proposed and so received, it is idle to talk of faith or of a divine message. The real question Mr. Newman raises is, not the possibility of developments, but the possibility of revelation.

Thus far we have confined ourselves chiefly to Mr. Newman's view of Christian doctrine ; we proceed now to his view of developments. It will not be difficult to determine what he means by developments, for they are determined by his view of the doctrine, not the doctrine by them. His view of the doctrine is the basis of the developments, the principle from which they are deduced, and they therefore are to be understood in that sense only in which it is the ground on which they may be logically accounted for and justified.

The historical facts assumed to be developments, — except in the few instances in which the author is not historically exact, — we readily admit *as facts*, but not as *developments*. The Catholic Church of to-day, whether regarded as a government, as a body of doctrine, or as a *cultus*, Mr. Newman says, is the *development* of the Apostolic Church, and, being such, is the true Church. But is the present Catholic Church,

under the relation of doctrine, the development of the Apostolic Church, or is it identically it, without any development or shadow of variation? We say, *under the relation of doctrine*, by which we mean the faith objectively considered and formally proposed; for there is a broad distinction to be marked between the faith and the Church under the relation of government and worship. In government, or discipline, and *cultus exterior*, we have no difficulty in conceding developments. When the Church was confined to the Apostles, and a small company of believers at Jerusalem, she could hardly present the same appearance externally, or exercise all the governmental faculties, at least in their varied applications, as when she included all nations under her dominion; and all the capabilities of her worship could hardly be developed when the faithful were few, without temples, unable to worship in open day, and obliged to conceal themselves in private chambers, in caves, and in catacombs, any more than they can be with us in a hostile community, in the midst of poverty and destitution. Yet in both of these respects her faculties must always be the same, and it is necessary, in order to establish her identity and fidelity, to show that she has always exercised her faculties according to their normal intent, and that she has exercised no faculties but those with which she has been endowed from the beginning. But if this be done, all is done that is necessary for her complete vindication under the respective heads of government and of external worship. Thus far we have no controversy with Mr. Newman.

But with regard to doctrine the case is different. The doctrine is the *revelata* or *credenda*, which God reveals and the Church proposes, and is the fundamental law of the Church. In this, developments are not admissible, for they would imply a growth of doctrine, which in its turn would argue either a deficiency in the Apostolic doctrine as formally taught, or an excess in the doctrine formally proposed by the Church now. Developments of the law must be understood either in the sense of new enactments, or in the sense of new applications, or applications of the law to new cases which arise in the course of time and the progress of events. In the first sense, they cannot be admitted without assuming a progress in the law itself, which is only another form of saying it was imperfect in the beginning, contrary to the uniform teaching of Catholic theologians, who are all agreed that the law was perfect from the first, and can neither be enlarged nor diminished.

In the second sense mentioned, what are called developments are not developments. *All development implies a change of some sort* ; but the application of the law to a new case implies no change in the law, either in respect of its matter or in respect of its form. If you mean only these new applications by developments, you have no right to call them developments of doctrine. The identity of the doctrine materially and formally remains ever unaffected, whatever the variation of the cases to which it is applied.

This is so obvious, that it can escape no one of ordinary intelligence, and, in principle, it has not escaped Mr. Newman. But he does not — and the point must not be overlooked — hold the doctrine to be the law. The law of the Church, he admits, must be identical, unchanged, and unchangeable, both as to space and time. The law, properly speaking, according to him, *developes*, but is not *developed*. But he means by the law not law in the forensic sense, but in the animal or vegetable sense, — a subjective inherent law of growth, like that in the acorn, which *developes* it into the oak, — the law of the animal in the embryo, which *developes* it into the full-grown animal of its species, — the *forma*, or *idea*, of the Platonists. This law is the informative or informing power of the Church, and, just in proportion to its life, vigor, activity, pushes out branches and foliage in all directions, effects new developments in doctrine, in discipline, and worship, till the Church, under all these aspects, and under every possible particular aspect of these general aspects, has in the course of time come to maturity, or the perfection of its species. These are Mr. Newman's own illustrations, and this is his theory of development. Evidently, then, the faith, objectively considered, is not, in his view, the law which the Church obeys, and which determines her developments, as the law of the animal economy determines the developments and growth of the animal.

This is further evident from his use of the word development. Sometimes he means by developments the process of development, sometimes the result ; sometimes the practical effects of faith and worship on the life of individuals, communities, society at large, sometimes the reaction of these effects on faith and worship themselves ; sometimes the simple application of the recognized law to new cases which occur, sometimes the evolution of new dogmas from the original divine message as embodied in Scripture or as latent in the un-

defined consciousness of the Church ; sometimes true developments, sometimes false developments ; sometimes developments of Christian doctrine, and sometimes developments by it. Yet all these several classes of facts, so diverse and heterogeneous to the Catholic theologian, he throws into the same category, traces to one and the same generic principle, and calls by the same common name. This is a singular fact. Hear what he himself says : — “ The word is commonly used, and *is here used*, in three senses indiscriminately, from defect of our language ; on the one hand, for the process of development, on the other, for the result ; and again, either generally for a development true or not true, or exclusively for a development deserving the name.” — p. 26. What more perplexing to the reader ? What scientific writer ever before defined his terms so as to make “ confusion worse confounded ” ? With all respect for Mr. Newman, this confusion does not arise “ from the defect of our language,” but from his own ideas. These things are confounded in his theory, and according to that theory are to be regarded as homogeneous. If his theory be true, his classification is rigidly scientific.

Christian doctrine — and by Christian doctrine he means Christianity, whether regarded as government, as dogma, as ethics, or as worship — is the human form of the revealed truth or divine message submitted to the action of reason. Hence, the formative power or informing law of the Church is not in the Revealer, is not in the revelation, but in the mind of the recipient. It is simply the human intellect and heart operating on and with the idea formed of the revelation submitted to them. The developments predicated are all the results of this operation. Consequently, whether they be developments in doctrine, in discipline, or in worship, true or false, they all have the same generic principle, and fall of themselves into the same category, and are rightly and scientifically called by the same common name. The defect of language is nothing but its inability to supply common names which, implying a whole class, yet imply only a part of it, — a defect, we apprehend, common to most languages.

Mr. Newman's whole theory of developments, as a theory, rests on the assumption, that our holy religion, under all and each of its aspects, is divine matter under a human form ; that is, it is efficacious *ex opere recipientis*, not, as we are taught, *ex opere operato* ; or that Divinity is the matter, humanity the form, — the Divine the passivity, the human the activity.

"Certainly," he says, "it is a degradation to consider a divine work under an earthly form ; but it is no irreverence, since the Lord himself, its author and owner, bore one also." — p. 49. Christianity is "externally what the Apostle calls an 'earthen vessel,' being the religion of men. And, considered as such, it grows in wisdom and in stature ; but the powers which it wields, and the words which proceed out of its mouth, attest its miraculous nativity." — p. 50. Yes, as to its matter, but not as to its form, — to say nothing of the doctrine implied, that the Incarnation was the simple exhibition of the Divinity under an earthly form, which, if we understand by the form idea, and by idea an habitual judgment, as the author defines it, implies the assumption of the Divine by the human, and not of the human by the Divine, if the analogy relied on be illustrative of the doctrine in question.

We by no means assert, or believe, that Mr. Newman would now, or when writing his book, maintain consciously, intentionally, this abominable formula to which his Essay is reducible ; but his theory rests upon it, necessarily implies it, if we are not utterly incapable of understanding our mother tongue on a subject with which we are not unfamiliar ; or if it does not, it is either unintelligible except to the few who may have the word of the enigma, or it is a splendid illustration of the *ignorantia elenchi*. From beginning to end, it seems to us to rest on the assumption, that Christianity is nothing to us but mere words, save so far as we realize it in our intellect and heart. To *realize*, if applied to ideas, means to make the ideal real ; if to matter, to make that which is informal and potential, formal and actual, as the seal impressed gives form to the wax, or as the sculptor brings out the figure from the block of marble. View it in what light you will, the formative power is the human agent, and therefore what in Christianity is divine must be regarded as the matter on and with which the human agent operates, — the precise doctrine we ascribed in our former article to Mr. Newman, and identified with Neander's, and which is readily developed into Socinianism on the one hand, and, perhaps, into justification by faith alone on the other, according to the special point of view under which it is taken up. This doctrine makes the Divine passive ; and the only exceptions to the universal passivity of the Divine in our religion and its effects, which Mr. Newman seems to us to recognize, are exceptions as to the original revelation itself, and in deciding,

when the mind of the Church has worked them out from her implicit feelings, what are to be retained as true developments, and what are to be rejected as false. But this occasional active interference of the Divine militates nothing against the formula in the sense we give to it. It is true, in applying, though not in stating and establishing, his theory, the author speaks of "the mind of the Church," where we say the *human mind*. But by the mind of the Church he can mean only the collection of individual minds, operating on and with the original idea of the divine message submitted to them. This idea is the human form of the divine message, and, though divine as to its matter, or as to its passive element, is yet human as to its form or active element; and therefore, whether we say the human mind or the mind of the Church, the meaning is one and the same. It is true, also, that he speaks of the mind of the Church working out dogmatic truth from implicit feelings, under secret supernatural guidance. But this amounts to nothing, in any sense in which, as a Catholic, he is at liberty to understand it. To amount to any thing, this secret supernatural guidance must be *gratia inspirationis*, and that would imply that the Church is inspired, and that each of her members is inspired, which, in both of its parts, is untrue; for the Church is not inspired, but assisted. If he means by this secret supernatural guidance only *gratia assistentiæ*, it is not to his purpose. This, in the sense of Catholic theologians, must be either assistance in keeping and proposing what has been taught and believed from the first, or it must be the *donum fidei*, or supernatural assistance to believe what the Church proposes. He cannot say the former, because he does not mean by the mind of the Church the *Ecclēsia docens*; not the latter, because it is only assistance to believe what is formally proposed. Let him mean by the supernatural guidance what he will, he must assume it either as teacher or as believer. As believer he cannot, for the object must be proposed before it can be believed, and the object is not proposed, for the very supposition is, that it is to be evolved or worked out. If as teacher, it can, according to the formal doctrine of the author, teach only in so far as that which it teaches is subjected to a human form, — its teachings must be subject to the condition of all teaching, no less than the original divine message itself. Whatever, then, he may mean by secret supernatural guidance, unless he either contradicts himself or the uniform teaching of all Catholic theolo-

gians and asserts that the Church is inspired, he can mean nothing which militates against the doctrine we have ascribed to him.

Assuming now what we have sufficiently established to be Mr. Newman's doctrine, express or necessarily implied, consciously or unconsciously on his part put forth, it follows, that the idea which the human mind formed, on the submission of the divine message to its action, is the inherent or subjective law of the Church, and the whole life and action of the Church consists in the full and perfect realization of this idea under all and each of its aspects, in each and all of its capabilities, in the intellect and heart of individuals and of nations ; that is, if we may so speak, the full and perfect reproduction of the divine message under a human form, or rendering the human idea the full and complete representation of the divine idea. This idea being that with which she starts, she must obey it, preserve it, as the acorn obeys and preserves its law in becoming the oak. We must, then, conceive the Church to have been in its beginning the embryo or the germ of what she now is. Nothing can be in her in maturity but what was in the germ, or has been assimilated in the process of growth. But if the germ of all is in the beginning, it is only the germ. Every doctrine, every discipline, every rite, every observance, we now find in the Church was in the Church in the Apostolic age, but only as the oak is in the acorn, the chicken in the egg. All is there, but there in an embryonic state.

The process of growth includes, like all growth, a process of evolution and a process of assimilation. "The idea," says the author (p. 40), "never was that throve and lasted, yet, like mathematical truth, *incorporated nothing from external sources*. So far from the fact of such incorporation implying corruption, as is sometimes supposed, *development implies incorporation*." This is decisive ; and the only question we need now ask is as to the fact, whether Mr. Newman does predicate growth, development in this general sense, of doctrine properly so called. That he does in other respects, and in all other respects, no one will deny ; but does he of doctrine in the specific sense in which we use the word ?

In answer, we remark, — 1. The developments are predicated generally of Christian doctrine, in the very title of the book, and are throughout the whole Essay predicated of Christianity in general, without any note or mark of distinction. 2. The problem the author set out to solve includes doctrine,

as well as discipline and worship. 3. He concludes the antecedent probability of developments in Christianity from the developments of doctrine effected by divine inspiration under the old law. 4. His theory requires him to assert development of doctrine in like manner as other developments. 5. He expressly asserts development and growth of doctrine, whether regard be had to the original revelation or to our idea of it. Out of the multitude of passages we might quote to prove this, which, by the way, needs no proof, after what we have established, the following will suffice : —

“ When we turn to the consideration of particular *doctrines* on which Scripture lays the greatest stress, we shall see that it is absolutely impossible for them to remain in the mere letter of Scripture, if they are to be more than mere words, or to convey a definite idea to the mind of the recipient. When it is declared that ‘ the Word became flesh,’ three wide questions open upon us on the very announcement, — what is meant by ‘ Word,’ what by ‘ flesh,’ and what by ‘ became.’ The answers to these *involve a process of investigation, and are developments.* Moreover, when they have been made, they will suggest a *series of secondary questions*; and thus at length a multitude of propositions will gather round the inspired sentence of which they come, giving it externally the *form of doctrine*, and creating or deepening the idea of it in the mind.” — p. 50.

This of itself is decisive. Revelation does not tell us what is meant by “ the Word,” what by “ flesh,” nor what by “ became,” and we can answer these questions only by a process of investigation ! Was Christianity a revelation only for men who have the ability and the leisure to undertake and carry on processes of investigation ; or will not the faith of the poor servant-girl or the poor slave suffice for the scholar and the philosopher ? But the author goes on, and after enumerating several particulars in which, he says, so far as we know, the original revelation, on matters of great and pressing moment, is incomplete, adds : —

“ As far as the letter goes of the inspired message, there is not one of us but has exceeded by transgression its *revealed provisions*, and finds himself in consequence thrown upon those infinite resources of divine love which are stored in Christ, *but have not been drawn out into form in its appointments.* Since, then, Scripture needs COMPLETION, the question is brought to this issue, — **WHETHER DEFECT OR INCHOATENESS IN ITS DOCTRINES BE OR BE NOT AN ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY OF A DEVELOPMENT OF THEM.** ” — p. 51.

Can any man ask any thing more than this ? Here is a plain assertion, if taken in connection with what immediately precedes, that the Sacrament of Penance was not included in the formal appointments of the inspired message ; which corresponds with what the author elsewhere says, namely, that Penance is a development of Baptism, as Purgatory was a later development as a form of Penance due for post-baptismal sins. But here is another passage : —

“In whatever sense the need and its supply are a proof of design in the visible creation, in the same do the *gaps*, if the word may be used, which occur in the structure of the original *creed* of the Church, make it probable that those developments, which grow out of the truths which lie around them, were intended to complete it.” — p. 52.

One more extract will suffice on this branch of the subject : —

“And it is plain that what the Christians of the first ages anathematized included *deductions* from the articles of faith, that is, developments, as well as those articles of faith themselves. For, since the reason they commonly gave for using the anathema was that the doctrine was strange and startling, it follows that *the truth which was its contradictory had also been unknown to them hitherto* ; which is also shown by their temporary perplexity, and their difficulty of meeting heresy, in particular cases.” — p. 162.

These extracts settle the fact that Mr. Newman does assert positive developments of Christian doctrine in the sense alleged. But can a Catholic admit them ? Certainly not. Christian doctrine is simply and exclusively the revealed truth proposed by the Church to be believed. We have consulted as high living authorities on the subject as there are in this country, and they all concur in saying that the Church can propose only what was revealed, and that the revelation committed to the Church was perfect. If there be any thing in which Catholic theologians are agreed, it is in these two points, — that the revelation in the beginning was perfect, and that nothing can be proposed by the Church to be believed, *fide divinâ*, not revealed from the beginning. Developments of doctrine, then, are possible only on condition that the Church has neglected her mission as a teacher, which cannot be assumed, even by way of hypothesis. Her commission was, — “Going, teach all nations . . . to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.” It is essential to Catholic faith to believe that

she faithfully, at all times and in all places, discharges this commission. Then she must always and everywhere teach the whole faith, and then developments are inconceivable ; for though there may be implicit believing, there is, properly speaking, no implicit or informal teaching.

To this effect we quote the illustrious Bossuet, who is, at least, as high authority in regard to Catholic faith and theology as Mr. Newman. Bossuet, in his *History of the Variations of Protestantism*, assumed, as the basis of his argument, that the truth, divinely revealed, has its perfection at once, and never varies, and that variation in doctrine is a proof of error. Thus he says in the Preface : —

“ When, in the expositions of faith, variations were seen among Christians, they were ever considered as a mark of falsehood, an inconsequence, so to speak, in the doctrine propounded. Faith speaks with simplicity ; the Holy Ghost sheds pure light, and the truth he speaks has a language always uniform. Whoever is but the least conversant with the history of the Church must know she opposed to each heresy appropriate and precise expositions, which she never altered ; and if we attend to the expressions by which she condemned heretics, it will appear that they always proceed by the shortest and most direct route to attack the error in its source. She acts thus, because all that varies, all that is overlaid with doubtful or studiously ambiguous terms has always appeared suspicious, and not only fraudulent, but even absolutely false, because it betrays embarrassment, with which truth is unacquainted. But whilst heresies, always varying, agree not with themselves, and are continually introducing new rules, that is to say, new symbols of faith, Tertullian says, that ‘ in the Church the rule of faith is unalterable, and never to be reformed.’ It is so, because the Church, which professes to speak and to teach nothing but what she has received, does not vary ; and, on the contrary, heresy, which began by innovating, daily innovates, and changes not its nature. *The Catholic truth, proceeding from God, has its perfection at once ;* heresy, the feeble offspring of the human mind, can be formed only by ill-fitting patches.”

This, of itself, is conclusive, so far as the authority of Bossuet goes ; but he does not stop here. The Protestant minister Jurieu attacked the principle laid down, and undertook to prove, as does Mr. Newman, that the truth comes to perfection only gradually and in the course of time. Bossuet replies in his *Premier Avertissement aux Protestants sur les Lettres du Ministre Jurieu contre l'Histoire des Variations*, which, by a change of name, might serve in many respects as an appropri-

ate *admonition* to the admirers of the *Essay on Developments*, and from which we will make a few quotations : —

“What,” says Bossuet, “the Minister finds insupportable is, that I dared assert that faith in the true Church never varies, and that *the truth, proceeding from God, has its perfection at once*. He affects to be astonished, as if I had invented some novel prodigy, instead of faithfully repeating what our Fathers have said, that the Catholic doctrine is that which is everywhere and always, *quod ubique, quod semper*. This is what says the learned Vincent of Lerins, one of the lights of the fifth century, what he lays down as the principle of his celebrated *Admonition*, in which he gives the true character of heresy, and a general method of distinguishing true doctrine from false. The orthodox had always reasoned on this sound principle; heretics had never dared openly reject it, and had obscured rather than denied it; but when I advance it, M. Jurieu cannot endure it. ‘I am tempted,’ he says, ‘to believe that M. Bossuet has never even cast his eyes over the history of the first four ages.’ It is the doctrine of the first four ages, the most beautiful period of Christianity, he undertakes to show was uncertain and variable. ‘How,’ he continues, ‘could a learned man be able to exhibit such profound ignorance?’ I am not only grossly ignorant, but my temerity is a prodigy, and goes even to impiety. ‘We know not,’ he says, ‘whether we are disputing with a Christian or with a Pagan; for precisely thus might reason the greatest enemy of Christianity.’ He accuses me of delivering Christianity, bound hand and foot, over to infidels, because I have dared say that the truth proceeding from God has its perfection at once,—that is to say, was well understood and *happily explained in the beginning*. ‘It is,’ he continues, ‘precisely the contrary that is true, and one must have a brazen front, or be grossly and surprisingly ignorant, to deny it.’ Then, according to the Minister, in order to speak truly, one must say that the truth was neither well known nor happily explained in the beginning. ‘The truth of God,’ he adds, ‘has been known only by *parcels*’ [only by *particular aspects*, says Mr. Newman]. Christian doctrine has been composed piecemeal; it has had all the changes, and the most essential of all the defects, of human sects; and to give it, as I have done, this beautiful character of having its perfection at once, as pertains to a work proceeding from a divine hand, is not only not to understand it well, but is a prodigy of rashness, a most extraordinary error, the lowest degree of ignorance, a manifest impiety!’

This is pretty strong. But Bossuet proceeds to establish his thesis, and quotes Vincent of Lerins still further : —

“But this Father not only establishes, as fundamental, the truth

I have laid down, but he does it by the same principle, namely, that the truth proceeding from God, as a divine work, has its perfection at once. 'I cannot,' he says, 'be enough astonished that men can be so carried away, so blinded, so impious, so prone to error, as not to be content with the rule of faith once given to the faithful and received from all antiquity, but must every day seek novelties, be always changing something in religion, adding something to it, or taking something from it; as if the *celestial dogma* which was once revealed were not *sufficient* for us, but were a *human institution*, to be brought to perfection only in being reformed, or rather, by detecting in it each day some new defect.'* Here is an astonishment very different from that of the Minister. This holy doctor is astonished that men can even think of varying in the faith; the Minister is astonished that they can say the faith has never varied. The holy doctor treats as blind and impious those who will not acknowledge that religion is a thing from which nothing can be taken away, to which nothing can be added [it grows by incorporating, says Mr. Newman], and in which nothing can be changed, in any time whatever. The Minister, on the contrary, imputes to blindness and impiety the unwillingness to acknowledge either *change or progress*."

Mr. Newman's friends may say that his thesis and Jurieu's are not the same. Be it so. Nevertheless, this shows Bossuet's general doctrine on the subject. But, on one point at least, the two do actually maintain one and the same thesis. Mr. Newman says (p. 82),—"There was no *formal* acknowledgment of the doctrine of the Trinity till the fourth century"; and again (p. 166),—"So the effort of Sabellius to *complete* the Mystery of the Ever-blessed Trinity failed; it became a heresy; grace would not be constrained; the course of thought could not be forced; — *at length, it was realized in the true Unitarianism of St. Augustine*." The Minister Jurieu, speaking of this same mystery, says, as quoted by Bossuet,—"This mystery is of the last importance, and essential to Christianity; yet every body knows how *unformed* [*informis*] it remained till the first Council of Nice, and even till that of Constantinople." Here Mr. Newman and the Minister, undeniably, assert one and the same thesis. Let us hear Bossuet's indignant reply:—

"The Mystery of the Trinity, my brethren, *unformed*! Could you have believed it possible ever to have heard that word from

* Vinc. Lirin. *Commonitorium*, I., c. 21.

any mouth but that of a Socinian? If from the beginning one only God was distinctly adored in three equal and coeternal persons, the Mystery of the Trinity was not unformed. But according to your Minister it was unformed, not only till 325, when the Council of Nice was held, but even fifty years later, till the first Council of Constantinople, held in 381. Then the first Christians, in the greatest fervor of religion, and when the Church brought forth so many martyrs, did not adore distinctly one God in three equal and coeternal persons; St. Athanasius himself, the Fathers of Nice, did not well understand this worship, — the Council of Constantinople has given to the worship of Christians its *form*. Even till the end of the fourth century, Christianity was not formed, since the Trinity, so essential to Christianity, was not. Christians shed their blood for a religion not yet formed, and knew not whether they adored three Gods or only one!

Bossuet continues, goes over much of the ground traversed by Mr. Newman in the application of his "Tests," and proves from the express testimony of Fathers and Councils, that the uniform doctrine of the Church is, that the faith cannot vary, that what is taught is always that which has been taught from the first. He goes farther still, and, in answer to the Protestant Minister, proves historically that the faith on the principal points on which Mr. Newman asserts developments was clearly and explicitly taught from the beginning. Mr. Newman undertakes to show historically, that the doctrine opposed by the Council of Chalcedon to the Eutychian heresy was, till the Council defined it, generally unknown through all the East, and that its adoption was forced upon the Church by St. Leo, aided by the civil power. He also assumes throughout his Essay, that the faith remains unformed, vague, and general, till authority defines it against the opposing heresy. "There was," he says, as we have seen (p. 82), "no formal acknowledgment of the doctrine of the Trinity till the fourth century. No doctrine is defined till it is violated." And again (p. 162), — "It follows that the truth which was its contradictory had been unknown to them hitherto," that is, prior to the rise of the heresy anathematized. On these two points, let us listen to the illustrious Catholic Bishop of Meaux.

"Can there be, my brethren, a greater illusion than wishing to make you believe that the faith of the Church has been *formed* only on occasions of heresies which arise and make express decisions necessary? *So far from this, decisions have been made only by proposing the faith of past ages.* For instance, your Minister tells you, that the faith of the Incarnation was formed only after

the disputes of the Nestorians and Eutychians had occurred [Mr. Newman implies as much], that is to say, at Chalcedon; but this is not what the Council itself thought. From what point did this venerable assembly set out? From what point did St. Leo, its conductor, set out? Perhaps by saying, that this Mystery, hitherto, had not been well understood; that the sense of Scripture had not been sufficiently explored? God forbid! They began by making it appear that the holy doctors had always understood it as they understood it, and that Eutyches had rejected the doctrine of the Fathers. There St. Leo began, as you may see by his divine Letters, which the Council admired; there the Council itself began, and it approved St. Leo's letter, only because it conformed to St. Athanasius, St. Hilary, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Ambrose, St. Chrysostom, St. Augustine, St. Cyril, and the others whom St. Leo cites.

"But perhaps the Fathers of Chalcedon thought they would add to it the perfection which the preceding Councils had not given it? Not at all. For they begin by reporting them at length, and taking them as their foundation. 'This holy assembly embraces and follows the rule of faith established at Nice, that which was confirmed at Constantinople, that which has been set forth at Ephesus, that which St. Leo follows, an Apostolic man and Pope of the Universal Church, and it will neither add nor diminish.' The faith was *perfect*, and if any one had taken it into his head to say to these Fathers, as your Minister does, that it was *unformed* before their decision, they would have cried out against his rash speech as against a blasphemy. Hence they begin their definition by saying, — 'We repeat the infallible faith of our Fathers at Nice, at Constantinople, at Ephesus, under Celestine and Cyril.' Why, then, have they themselves made a new definition? Because that of the preceding Councils was not sufficient? On the contrary, they continue, — 'It is sufficient for a *FULL* declaration of the truth; for in them is shown the *PERFECTION* of the Trinity and the Incarnation of the Son of God. But, because the enemies of the truth, in dealing out their heresies, have invented novel expressions, some in denying the Holy Virgin to be the Mother of God, and others in introducing a prodigious confusion in the two natures of Jesus Christ, this great and holy Council, teaching that the preaching of the faith from the beginning is always immutable, has ordained that the faith of the Fathers *REMAIN FIRM*, and that nothing be added to it, as if any thing were wanting to its perfection.' Thus the definition of the Council was nothing new, except a new declaration of the faith of the Fathers and preceding Councils applied to new heresies."

If language has its ordinary meaning, or any meaning at all, this is decisive proof that Bossuet knew the theory of developments only to condemn it. He has, as we have seen,

quoted Vincent of Lerins, whom we venture to quote again as express to our purpose. The holy doctor is commenting on the text of the Blessed Apostle, — "*O Timothee, depositum custodi, devitans profanas vocum novitates.*"

"Quis est hodie *Timotheus*," he asks, "nisi vel generaliter universa Ecclesia, vel specialiter totum corpus Præpositorum, qui integram divini cultus scientiam vel habere ipsi debent vel aliis infundere? Quid est *depositum*? id est quod tibi creditum est, non quod a te inventum; quod accepisti, non quod excogitasti; rem non ingenii, sed doctrinæ, non usurpationis privatæ, sed publicæ traditionis; rem ad te productam, non a te probatam; in qua non auctor debes esse, sed custos; non institutor, sed sectator; non ducens, sed sequens. *Depositum*, inquit, *custodi*; Catholicæ fidei talentum inviolatum illibatumque conserva. Quod tibi creditum, hoc penes te maneat, hoc a te tradatur. Aurum accepisti, aurum redde. . . . Eadem tamen quæ didicisti doce, *ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova.*" — *Comm.*, I., c. 22.

Language can hardly be more precise and express against developments. But this learned doctor continues: —

"Sed forsitan dicit aliquis: Nullusne ergo in Ecclesia Christi profectus habebitur religionis? Habeatur plene, et maximus. Nam quis ille est tam invidus hominibus, tam exosus Deo, qui istud prohibere conetur? Sed ita tamen ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio. Siquidem ad profectus pertinet ut in semetipsum unaquæque res amplifietur; ad permutationem vero, aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur. Crescat igitur oportet et multum vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius Ecclesiæ, ætatum ac sæculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, sed in suo duntaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia. Imitetur animarum religio rationem corporum: quæ licet annorum processu numeros suos evolvant et explicent, eadem quæ erant permanent. Multum interest inter pueritiæ florem et senectutis maturitatem, sed iidem tamen ipsi fiunt senes qui fuerant adolescentes; ut quamvis unius ejusdemque hominis status habitusque mutantur, una tamen nihilominus eademque natura, una eademque persona sit. Parva lactantium membra, magna juvenum, eadem ipsa sunt tamen. Quot parvulorum artus, tot virorum; et si qua illa sunt quæ ævi maturioris ætate pariuntur jam in seminis ratione proserta sunt; ut nihil novum postea proferatur in senibus quod non in pueris jam ante latitaverit. Unde non dubium est hanc esse legitimam et rectam proficiendi regulam, hunc ratum atque pulcherrimum crescendi ordinem, si eas semper in grandioribus partes ac formas numerus detexit ætatis quas in purvulis Creatoris sapientia præformaverat. Quod si humana species in aliquam deinceps non sui

generis vertatur effigiem, aut certe addatur quippiam membrorum numero vel detrahatur, necesse est ut totum corpus vel intercidat, vel prodigiosum fiat, vel certe debilitetur; ita Christianæ religionis dogma sequatur has decet profectuum leges, ut annis scilicet consolidetur, dilatetur tempore, sublimetur ætate, incorruptum tamen illibatumque permaneat, et universis partium suarum mensuris cunctisque quasi membris ac sensibus propriis plenum atque perfectum sit, quod nihil præterea permutationis admittat, nulla proprietatis dispendia, nullam definitionis sustineat varietatem." — *Ib.*, c. 23.

Mr. Newman has himself quoted a part of this passage, and evidently had the whole passage in his mind when framing his theory, which at first view may seem to be supported by it; but we find it sustaining us rather than him, for it evidently does not concede that the dogma, *in quantum est dogma*, gains something in the course of time, but contends the contrary. The dogma is as one of the arteries or properties, which must be the same in the old man as in the child, and the gain is in a clearer understanding not of what it is, but of what it is not, in its relations to what is not of faith, as the language used may be understood, and must be, unless we make the holy doctor inconsistent with himself. Bossuet is here again our authority, and in the *Avertissement*, from which we have already quoted, fully sustains us.

"If it be asked with the Minister, How, then, can it be true to say that the Church has profited by heresies? St. Augustine replies for us, that 'each heresy introduces into the Church a new doubt, against which the Scriptures are defended with more care and exactitude than they might have been without such necessity.' Observe, are defended with *more care*, not that they are better understood at bottom. The celebrated Vincent of Lerins also takes our cause in hand, when he says, — 'The gain of religion consists in gaining in the faith, not in changing it'; that 'we may add to it intelligence, science, wisdom, but always in its own kind,' that is to say, '*in the same dogma, in the same sense, in the same sentiment*'; and, what settles the whole dispute, that dogmas may receive, with time, 'light, evidence, distinction, but must *preserve always* THEIR PLENITUDE, INTEGRITY, AND PROPERTIES.'* That is, as he explains it, 'the Church changes nothing, diminishes nothing

* "Fas est etenim prisca illa cælestis philosophiæ dogmata processu temporis excurentur, limentur, poliantur; sed nefas est ut commutentur, nefas ut detruncantur, aut mutilentur. Accipiant licet evidentiam, lucem, distinctionem, sed retineant necesse est plenitudinem, integritatem, proprietatem." *Ubi supra.*

ing, adds nothing, loses nothing of her own, receives nothing from abroad.' Who, after this, will tell us the faith varies?

"But, if we are still pressed to say in what new decisions have profited the Church, the same doctor answers for us, — 'The decisions of Councils have done nothing but transmit by writing to posterity what the ancients believed by tradition alone; include in a few words the principle and the substance of the faith; and often, to facilitate the understanding of it, express by some new but proper and precise term the doctrine which had never been new.' Or, as he had just explained, that, in sometimes saying things in a new manner, nothing new is ever to be said, — *ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova.*"*

This is amply sufficient to show, that, whatever Vincent of Lerins may have meant by the gain religion acquires in the course of time, he cannot have meant any thing corresponding to the view of developments to which we have objected. His whole meaning seems to us to be comprised in these few words of St. Augustine: — "*Multa quippe ad fidem Catholicam pertinentia, dum hereticorum callida inquietudine exagitantur, ut adversus eos defendi possint, et considerantur diligentius, et intelligentur clarius, et instantius prædicantur; et ab adversario mota questio, discendi existit occasio.*"† "Many things pertaining to the Catholic faith, being agitated by the feverish uneasiness of heretics, in order that they may be defended against them, are considered more attentively, understood more clearly, and inculcated more earnestly, so that the moving of the question by the enemy becomes the occasion of learning."

* "Christi vero Ecclesia sedula et cauta depositorum apud se dogmatum custos, nihil in his unquam permutat, nihil minuit, nihil addit, non amputat necessaria, non apponit superflua, non amittit sua, non usurpat aliena; sed omni industria hoc unum studet, ut vetera fideliter sapienterque tractando, si qua sunt illa antiquitus informata et inchoata, accuret et poliat; si qua jam expressa et enucleata consolidet, firmet; si qua jam confirmata et definita, custodiat; denique quid unquam aliud Conciliorum decretis enisa est, nisi ut quod antea simpliciter credebatur, hoc idem postea diligentius crederetur, quod antea lentius prædicabatur, hoc idem postea instantius prædicaretur, quod antea securius colebatur, hoc idem postea sollicitius excoleretur? Hoc inquam semper, necque quicquam præterea Hereticorum novitatibus excitata, Conciliorum suorum decretis Catholica perfecit Ecclesia, nisi ut quod prius a majoribus sola traditione susceperat, hoc deinde posteris etiam per Scripturæ chirographum consignaret, magnam rerum summam paucis litteris comprehendo, et plerumque, propter intelligentiæ lucem, non novum fidei sensum, novæ appellationis proprietate signando." — Vinc. Lirin., *ubi supra*.

† *De Civitate Dei*, Lib. 16, c. 2.

But the occasion of learning what ? The faith, as to what it is in itself considered ? Assuredly this thought never entered into the head of St. Augustine or of a single Father of the Church. It is precisely here where Mr. Newman seems to us to have mistaken the sense of the Fathers. He supposes them to teach that there is a growth in the understanding, not merely of what is not the faith, but of what is the faith, — not merely of what it is in relation to what it is not, but of what it is in relation to itself. No one can have read his Essay without having perceived that he holds large portions, at least, of the faith may and do lie latent in the Scriptures, or in the undefined traditions or vague consciousness of the Church, till the occasion calls them forth, and reduces them by the decisions and definitions of authority to formal and dogmatic statements. The faith is virtual, but not actual ; and development is the process of reducing it from its virtuality to actuality, — from vague and undefined sentiment, from intense or implicit feeling, to formal dogmas.

“ Thus,” he says, “ the Apostles would know *without words* all the high doctrines of theology, which controversialists after them have piously and charitably reduced to formulæ, and developed through argument. Thus, St. Justin or St. Irenæus might be without any digested ideas of Purgatory or Original Sin, yet have an intense feeling which they had not defined or located, both of the fault of our first nature and the liabilities of our nature regenerate.” — p. 44. “ So far may be granted, that *even principles* were not *so well understood* and so carefully handled at first as they were afterwards. In the early period, we see traces of a conflict, as well as of a *variety*, in theological elements, which were in the course of combination, but which required adjustment and management before they could be used with precision as one. In a thousand instances of a minor character, the statements of the early Fathers are but tokens of the multiplicity of *openings which the mind of the Church was making into the treasure-house of Truth*, — real openings, but incomplete or irregular. Nay, the doctrines of even heretical bodies are indices and anticipations of the mind of the Church. As the *first step in settling a point of doctrine is to raise and debate it*, so heresies in every age may be taken as the measure of the existing state of thought in the Church, and of the movement of her theology ; they determine in what way the current is setting, and the rate at which it flows.” — pp. 164, 165. “ The deep meditation which seems to have been exercised by the Fathers on points of doctrine, the debate and turbulence, yet lucid determination, of Councils, the *indecision* of Popes, are all in differ-

ent ways, at least when viewed together, portions and indications of the same process. The theology of the Church is no random combination of various opinions, but a diligent, patient *working out* of one doctrine from many materials. The conduct of Popes, Councils, Fathers, betokens the slow, painful, anxious *taking up of new elements into an existing body of belief*." — p. 166. "Evidently the position of Baptism in the received system was not the same in the first ages as in later times; and still less was it *clearly ascertained* in the first three centuries." — p. 190. "Here a serious question presented itself to the minds of Christians, *which was to be wrought out*." — p. 191. "Thus we see how, as time went on, the doctrine of Purgatory *was opened upon the apprehension of the Church*, as a portion or form of penance due for sins committed after baptism. And thus the belief of this doctrine and the practice of infant baptism would grow into general reception together." — p. 192.

We might multiply similar quotations from Mr. Newman's Essay to almost any extent, and they all show that he regards portions, at least, of the faith as remaining at first, so far as concerned either the formal teaching, or the formal belief of the Church, in a merely latent or virtual state, and that it has been subsequently, or is still to be, realized by developments. Unquestionably he does not mean to assert that there is *any* thing in the developed doctrine not *meant* or promised by the doctrine as it was in the beginning, any more than there is that in the chicken which was not meant or promised by the egg; but he does mean that the faith is developed by the spontaneous process carried on by the mind of the Church herself, under the influence of what he calls the sacramental principle, and which he misapprehends, and also by fierce and protracted controversies, and developed in reference to what it is as positive dogma, as well as in reference to what it is not, in its positive aspect, as well as in its negative aspect. And here is precisely his error. When the Fathers speak of attaining to a more clear understanding, to more explicit and distinct apprehensions of the faith, and to the consolidation of doctrine, it is always as it is opposed to or opposed by heresies. The new explications and definitions do not make it more clear and explicit in what it is as matter to be positively believed, but simply as the contradictory of the errors those new explications and definitions condemn. It is only in this sense that the assertion of the Council of Chalcedon, that the faith was already sufficiently explained, can be reconciled with its act of giving a new definition, — or with the uniform declara-

tion of the Church, in defining the faith against novel errors, that she simply opposes to the error the faith which has been taught and believed from the beginning. Moreover, this is the express assertion of St. Thomas: — “In doctrina Christi et Apostolorum veritas fidei sufficienter explicata. Sed quia perversi homines Apostolicam doctrinam, et cæteras doctrinas, et Scripturas, pervertunt ad sui ipsorum perditionem, ideo necessaria fuit temporibus procedentibus explicatio fidei contra insurgentes errores.” * Certainly St. Thomas understands no developments of Christian doctrine, except new explanations *contra insurgentes errores*; that is, clearer expositions, not of what it is, but of what it is not. He does not, save in this negative sense, allow us to say that “no doctrine is defined till it is violated”; or that it is latent in Scripture or tradition till a heresy arises to controvert it; for his sense evidently is, that the whole doctrine was *sufficiently explained* in the beginning. No doctrine is defined as the contradictory of an error before the error has arisen, it is true; but that it is not explicitly taught and believed before, as to all that it is as a positive dogma or a revealed truth, is not true; and we fall back on Bossuet, St. Thomas, St. Leo, the Council of Chalcedon, the Council of Ephesus, all the Fathers, and all the Popes, uniformly declaring that the new definition is only the express application of the preëxisting faith to a novel error, for our authority.

If there be any thing uniformly taught by our theologians, it is that the faith of the Fathers was perfect, that the revelation committed to the Church was complete and entire, and that the Church has, from the first, faithfully, infallibly, taught or proposed it. If this be true, as it would at least be temerity to question, there can be, there can have been, no latent or merely virtual doctrine waiting for heresy and controversy to call it forth, and to render it formal and actual. There is implicit belief, — for individuals may be ignorant, some on one point, and some on another; but there is, save in a very restricted sense indeed, no implicit teaching. All teaching is formal, and what is not formally proposed is not proposed at all. Revelation, *in quantum est revelatio*, must be formal. Each revealed dogma may imply more than appears or is apprehended; but the truth implied, if not formally revealed in the truth explicitly revealed, is not a *revealed* truth, and therefore

* *Summa*, 2. 2, Q. 1, a. 10.

is not and cannot be a portion of the Catholic faith, unless we assume for the Church *gratia inspirationis*, which she has not, and does not claim. Her commission was not, to reveal truth, but to keep, believe, and teach the truth already revealed, — “Going, teach all nations to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.” Under the old law there was development, and Christianity itself is, in some sense, a development of Judaism, but not a development effected by human agency. In the one case it was a development effected by the immediate agency of our Lord and inspired Apostles, and in the other by inspired prophets, inspired to *reveal* truth, not merely to keep, teach, or believe it. Here is an important fact which Mr. Newman has undeniably overlooked, and which vitiates all his arguments drawn from the fact of developments under the old law, in favor of the antecedent probability of developments under the new law. There is no parity in the case ; for under the old law there was *gratia inspirationis*, but under the new law there is only *gratia assistentia*. St. Thomas expressly denies developments under the new law similar to those which took place under the old law. He objects to the necessity of a new edition of the Symbol : — “Nova enim editio symboli necessaria est propter explicationem articulorum fidei. Sed in veteri testamento articuli fidei magis ac magis explicabantur secundum temporum successionem, propter hoc quod veritas fidei magis manifestatur secundum maiorem propinquitatem ad Christum. Cessante ergo tali causa in nova lege, non debet fieri major ac major explicatio articulorum fidei.” To which the holy doctor replies, in the body of the article : — “Respondeo dicendum, quod nova editio symboli necessaria est *ad vitandum insurgentes errores*” ; and specially to the objection, what we have already quoted : — “Dicendum, quod in doctrina Christi et Apostolorum veritas fidei sufficienter explicata. Sed quia perversi homines Apostolicam doctrinam, et cæteras doctrinas, et Scripturas pervertunt ad sui ipsorum perditionem, ideo necessaria fuit temporibus procedentibus explicatio fidei contra insurgentes errores.” * Here, the principle of the objection is conceded, and the reason assigned for the new explication is not that the faith may be more and more explicit, but that errors which arise may be avoided. Mr. Newman has evidently fallen into the error into which we ourselves fell, when, in the first number of this Journal, we wrote as follows : —

* *Summa, ubi supra.*

"The true *theory* of the Church is, I believe, that, through all the successive stages of its existence, it is Apostolic, retaining always and everywhere the same authority over faith and discipline which the Apostles themselves had; and that its mission is not merely to preserve the *memory* of a work done, *completed*, but to *continue* and carry on to perfection a work *commenced*. It has indeed received the *law* from which it can in no wise depart, but a law which it is to *develope* and apply, by virtue of its own *continuous inspiration*, — received from the indwelling Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth, — to all new questions that come up, and to all old questions coming up under new forms or under new relations. ITS MISSION IS THE CONTINUED EVOLUTION AND REALIZATION IN LIFE OF THE TRUTH CONTAINED IN THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHRISTIAN DISPENSATION, which evolution and realization constitute the continued progress of mankind. Now I am far from pretending that the Church, in point of fact, has altogether overlooked this theory; . . . but she seems to me to have asserted it with too much feebleness and timidity, and with numerous and almost suicidal concessions to the spirit which finally broke out in the Protestant schism. Instead of boldly asserting her high prerogatives as the Body of our Lord, and maintaining her right and her duty to *develope* and apply the truth, according to the exigencies of time and place, she has left it to be believed, that the Gospel, *instead of being given her merely in germ*, to be subsequently developed and applied, was given her as a perfect code, drawn out in all the minuteness of detail, and that her sole mission is to preserve the original deposit unaltered, unenlarged, undiminished." *

We confess we are unable to discover any essential difference between the theory here stated and the one developed in Mr. Newman's Essay. Even the problems are virtually the same, with this difference only: — Mr. Newman wished to be able to accept past developments, and we wished to secure the right to future developments. But we, at least, knew that our doctrine was repugnant to the formal teaching of the Church. Therefore we wrote, very consistently, — "I am free to confess that I accept the general theory of that Church [the Roman Catholic] as the true theory of the Church of Christ; but that theory itself prevents me, in the present state of the religious world, from seeking to unite myself with the Roman Catholic communion." The theory, as well as some of the developments we subsequently gave of it, were sufficiently refuted in the *United States Catholic Magazine* for March, 1845, after we had ourselves renounced it.

* *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, Jan., 1844, No. I., pp. 10, 11.

No Catholic can defend the theory we put forth ; for all our theologians unanimously agree that the Church does not and cannot propose as Catholic faith any thing not either explicitly revealed, or at least *formally* contained in what is explicitly revealed ; as, *Christ died for me*, is formally contained in the revealed proposition, *Christ died for all men*. What is revealed only as the effect in the cause, or as the property in the essence, though true theologically, and its denial would be *erronea*, is yet no part of that which the Church teaches as revealed truth, to be believed *fide divina et catholica*. When the contradictory is condemned by the Church, its assertion is indeed *heresy*, not because it is itself matter of faith, but because its assertion involves the denial of the infallibility of the Church, which is of faith, because formally revealed. Assuming this, the Church may *apply* the truth, according to the exigencies of time and place, to the condemnation of all new errors which come up, and to all old errors appearing under new forms or under new relations ; but it must be the truth deposited with her, not deductions discursively drawn from it, if she condemns them as opposed to the faith.

We cannot understand why it should be more correct to assert a growth in Christian doctrine than in the science of morals. If there are developments in Christian doctrine, there is a growth of doctrine, and it could be better learned from the moderns than from the ancients. But that morals can be better learned from the moderns than from the ancients is a condemned proposition. Morals are simply practical theology, and theology finds its principles or *data* in faith, or Christian doctrine. A progress in either Christian doctrine or theology would imply the possibility of progress in the science of morals. Why, then, should not a denial of the possibility of the latter be equally the denial of the possibility of the former ?

But the point is sufficiently clear. Christians always believed that our Lord was not only true God, but a real man, and had a real body ; but before the rise of the error of the Docetæ, which asserted that his body was a body only in appearance, they may not have considered what they believed, distinctly, in the light of the contradictory of that error. They believed, as explicitly before as afterwards, all that the faith asserted, but did not consider so attentively, nor perceive so distinctly, all it denied. The same may be said of all other points of faith, and their contradictory errors. The faith was

known, but all that could or could not oppose it was not clearly and distinctly known and considered. But whenever the error appeared, it was seen to be repugnant to the faith, and there was a universal outcry against it ; the whole Church looked with horror on the impious wretch who dared broach it, and compelled him instantly to retract it, or to go out from her communion, under the ban of her anathema. This is evident from the whole history of the Church, and from the fact that it is always the error that is new and startling, and never the contradictory truth the Church opposes to it. The cities are illuminated, triumphal processions await the Fathers, and all the world rejoices, from Ephesus to Alexandria, when it is known that the Council has condemned the Nestorian heresy, and declared the Holy Virgin to be the Mother of God, as all were conscious of having always believed.

In the sense of this distinction between positive and negative developments, we understand the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon ; the uniform declaration of the Church in every age, that she does but oppose the faith already believed to the errors which arise ; St. Augustine, Vincent of Lerins, St. Thomas, Bossuet, and all our theologians, whenever they speak of the faith as gaining clearness, evidence, distinctness by the condemnation of new errors and heresies. In this sense we understand the learned author of *Symbolism*, when he speaks of Catholic theology as having gained in clearness and precision by the controversies with the early Reformers. Catholic theology, in so far as it is the explicit negative of those errors of Protestants which were new or which appeared under new forms or in new combinations, has gained in clearness and precision by those controversies ; but in other respects we are sure it has not. So of the language of the early Fathers, which Mr. Newman regards as often careless and inexact. That it is often inexact, regarded solely as excluding what is not of faith, may be conceded ; regarded as including what is of faith, it is not.

What we have said is sufficient to establish the fact that Catholic theology is a stranger to positive developments ; but some, presuming Mr. Newman must have been substantially orthodox, and judging from what he ought to have said rather than from what he actually has said, may be disposed to think, that, after all, he may really mean by developments in Christian doctrine only those negative developments which all Catholic theologians admit. There are, we own, portions of his

book which may be understood in this sense ; but, as far as language can go, we have proved, that, though he may mean these, he also means positive developments. If he intended only the ordinary Catholic doctrine on the subject, why did he not say so in plain words ? If this was all he meant, what was the need or bearing on his conclusion of his theory of Christian doctrine ? Why did he lay down, and with great care and labor establish, a theory of development, which authorizes positive developments on the largest scale, as well as negative developments ? Why did he allege the positive developments under the old law as rendering similar developments under the new law antecedently probable, if he did not contend for similar developments under the new law ? How could he have supposed the positive developments in philosophy, in human polity, in sects, in ideas generally, could be illustrations of those he was contending for in Christianity, if he was contending only for negative developments ? How, if this was all he meant, could he have felt it necessary to degrade Christianity to the level of sects and doctrines of the world, to impute to it the imperfections which characterize the productions of man, and to go into an elaborate, ingenious, and profound defence of error and heresy ? Could he have ever dreamed that an all but successful defence of error and heresy is the only defence of the Church in condemning them ? The supposition is absurd. Mr. Newman may err, and in our judgment has erred gravely, but his errors are those of a full-grown man, of a ripe scholar, and a disciplined mind, not those of the schoolboy who has hardly completed his humanities. But whatever the view he may take of the actual developments he contends for, his view of Christian doctrine is sufficient to condemn his Essay as essentially repugnant to Catholic faith and theology. This last we recommend to the consideration of those who are disposed to regard the theory as *extra fidem* and indifferent, — a theory which a Catholic may or may not hold, according to his own individual convictions.

As for the problem the author set out to solve, it was a problem only in his Protestant prejudice. If it were a real problem, there could be no solution of it but in the rejection of the Church ; and just so far as the author assumes it to be real, he yields the whole question to the Protestant. The Church of God never varies, and the only variation a Catholic can concede in Christian doctrine is the greater clearness and

distinctness as to what it is not, which results from presenting it so as explicitly to condemn novel errors as they arise ; which is no variation in the substance or in the form of the doctrine, and at most only a variation in the expression or mode of presenting it as the contradictory of the error. The variation is *apparent*, not real ; and the solution of the difficulty, if difficulty it be, is not in a theory of developments which assumes the variation to be real and undertakes to defend it, but in showing by historical criticism, as our theologians have always done, that the alleged variation is only in appearance, and in reality is no variation at all ; or, in other words, in showing, not that it is a development, as Mr. Newman contends, nor a corruption, as Protestants allege, but a simple primitive doctrine merely defined against a novel error, as the Church alleges, and all our theologians maintain. There are, in point of fact, no variations in doctrine presented by the history of the Church ; and the variations, defects, and apparent inconsistencies in the historical representation, which Mr. Newman undertakes to account for, were all in his Protestant spectacles, and he will look in vain for them when he comes to read the history of the Church with the eyes of a Catholic. We say this on the authority of the Church herself, which is sufficient for a Catholic ; on the authority of the fact, that the most learned Protestants, deeply interested in the question, have been trying these three hundred years to find an instance of real historical variation of doctrine and have not succeeded, which is sufficient for a Protestant ; and, finally, on the authority of the Essay we are criticizing, which contains conclusive evidence that the developments alleged are not developments, but simple primitive doctrines, and this is sufficient for Mr. Newman.

But we must bring our remarks to a close. We own we have subjected Mr. Newman's Essay to what many will regard as a severe criticism ; but, in our own estimation, we have treated it with great forbearance, and might have made out even a stronger case against the author than we have. Yet we have said enough, we trust, to put the faithful on their guard against a work which, under the guise of a defence of our religion, is one of the most insidious attacks, though not so intended by its author, on religion, which we remember ever to have read, and that is saying much. In fact, the author himself, in his closing paragraph, pronounces, if it be considered, as severe a judgment on the work as our own. " Such,"

he says, "were the thoughts concerning the 'blessed vision of peace,' of one, while as yet his eye was dim, his breast laden, and he could but employ reason in the things of faith." What nonsense, to suppose a man, while his eye is dim, his breast laden, and he has nothing but reason to work with, can write an orthodox book ! The sentence is the condemnation of the book by a competent judge, — unless it contains the germ of a school not many years since condemned at Rome.

It will most likely be alleged, as it has been, that we have misunderstood Mr. Newman, — as is commonly alleged against all who reject a novel theory. So said the Jansenists, when the doctrines of their master were condemned ; so said the Hermesians, when the speculations of *their* master were condemned. We never yet heard of a novelty that was rightly apprehended by its opponents, if its adherents were to be believed. But it is possible that the very reason why new doctrines are embraced by the one class is because they are *not* understood, and why the other class oppose them is because they *are* understood. It is possible that we have misapprehended Mr. Newman ; but if so, it is not our fault, for we have done our best to understand him. His theory, if words may be trusted, is substantially what was at one time our own theory, and which, though not in our writings, was in our own mind as fully and as scientifically developed as it is in the Essay. We gathered the theory in part from philosophers, in part from Mr. Newman's school of Tractarians, and in part from our own excogitations. We understood it well, and had renounced it as a thing to be abhorred, before the appearance of this Essay. We therefore had some preparation for understanding Mr. Newman, and it is not very probable that we have misunderstood him. If, however, we have, the man who sets us right, in whatever tone or temper he may do it, shall have our hearty thanks, and we will lose no time in making all the atonement in our power.

It may be that we have shown ourselves over-zealous, for a recent convert, and have taken too much upon ourselves. If so, let our offence receive its merited punishment. We have had some experience in theorizing, and still suffer from the wounds received from it. We remember with some vividness the injury we have done to thousands who placed confidence in us, by our vain and impious speculations ; and, while we have no lack of charity for others who may in like manner

speculate, we have no toleration for their speculations. Our zeal, if culpable, is not unaccountable. We cannot but feel deeply on a subject which is associated in our minds with recollections of the most painful character.

But we could not accept Mr. Newman's Essay, even if its theory were susceptible of a satisfactory explanation. It deserves to be excluded from every Catholic library for its unorthodox forms of expression, as scandalous, even if not as heretical, erroneous, or rash. Words are things, and used improperly by men of eminence, or with inexactitude, become the occasion of error and heresy in others. Not a few of the errors which have afflicted the Church have come in under shelter of loose or inexact expressions, which great and sometimes even saintly men have suffered to escape them. The vain, the restless, the proud, the disobedient, seize on them, ascribe to them a sense they will bear, but not the one intended by their authors, and lay the foundation for "sects of perdition." Sometimes even better men are deceived and misled, as we see in the case of Fénelon. One cannot be too careful to be exact in expression, or to guard against innovation in word as well as in thought, especially in this age, in which there is such a decided tendency to abandon the scholastic method for the rhetorical. The scandalous phraseology of the Essay is no charge against its author, writing when and where he did, but is a grave charge against the Essay itself.

Finally, we repeat, from our former article, that we object to the Theory of Developments the very fact that it is a theory. We see no call and no room for theories in the Catholic Church, — least of all, for theories concocted outside of her by men whose eyes are dim, and who have nothing but their own reason to work with. From the nature of the case, they are theories, not for the conversion of their authors, but for the conversion of the Church, — framed to bring her to them, not them to her. They can do no good, and may do much harm. It is natural for us to concoct them when out of the Church, for then we have, and can have, nothing but theories, and can do nothing but theorize; but, if we are wise, we shall not attempt to bring them into the Church with us. The more empty-handed we come to the Church, the better; and the more affectionately will she embrace us, and the more freely and liberally will she dispense to us her graces. She needs nothing, and the greatest and best of us can offer her nothing but our sins and uncleanness. Naked, or all-defiled with the

filth in which we wallowed while away from her maternal care, must we come, and implore her to be our mother, to cleanse us in the laver of regeneration, and to cover our nakedness with the white robe of charity. So we must come, or we come not at all ; and when we have so come, when we have reposed the wearied head on our MOTHER's bosom, we feel she is our true, our own blessed MOTHER, and all we ask is to believe, love, obey.

ART. III. — *The People.* By M. MICHELET. Translated by G. H. SMITH, F. G. S. New York. 1846.

M. MICHELET is a Professor of History in the *Collège Royal* of France, and is pretty well known as the author of several historical works, and of two or three publications against religion, which have been favorably received by the Protestant community in general. He is not deficient in natural endowments, and appears to be a scholar of respectable attainments. As a writer, though wanting in dignity, he is lively, brilliant, and sometimes even eloquent. His historical works can be cheerfully recommended to all who wish only to become acquainted with his theorizing, poetizing, and sentimentalizing on history, but they are not indispensable to those who would study history itself. His work against the *Jesuits* is mere frothy declamation, without any coloring of fact or argument ; his *Le Prêtre et la Femme de Famille* is a compound of ignorance, infidel malice, prurient fancy, and maudlin sentiment ; and the work before us is the author himself. " This book is more than a book ; it is myself, . . . it is I." Indeed, whatever the author may appear to be writing, it is always himself that he writes.

The book we have introduced to our readers is of no great intrinsic value. It throws no certain light on the condition of the people, and makes no important suggestion for their improvement. The only thing we can say in its favor is, that it proves the mass of the French people are less immoral than they are commonly represented, and shows that the modern system of industry has not so many advantages over that which

it has superseded as is commonly imagined. But the work mainly interests us as an exponent of the spirit of the Anticatholic world. The author considers himself a fair representative of the age, and, so far as the age is not Catholic, he appears to us to be so. They who study the age in him will not be likely to mistake its dominant tendencies. He is carrying on a war against religion, and has published this work to enlist his countrymen on his side. It may, therefore, be taken as an index to the kind of appeals the enemies of religion are making to the people, and to the ground on which they are to be met and routed. We no sooner open it than we perceive the bold and direct denials of religion, made by the infidels of the last century, are not now continued. The age of absolute negations appears to have gone by. The present age shrinks from the direct issue, — religion or no religion, — and returns to the old device of attempting to oppose Christianity in the name of Christianity herself, and to seduce the people from their love and fidelity by substituting something real and positive in her place, and something, too, which she apparently approves and consecrates.

What is this something? Christianity represents the divinity on earth, and to oppose it is to oppose God and all that pertains distinctively to the divine order. In the nature of things, then, they who oppose it can oppose to it nothing divine, nothing positive, in fact, but MAN himself, or what is simply human. The enemies of Christianity must oppose to it either man or nothing. In the last century, for a time, they really opposed nothing, and relied on simple hatred to religion itself. But hatred is spasmodic, unnatural, and short-lived. Only the Devil himself can make it a universal and permanent principle of action. The bulk of mankind are not bad enough for that. They must have something positive to love and strive for; and they will not act long steadily and energetically, unless for something they love and wish to possess. But when God is opposed, when Christianity, the Church in which he resides and dispenses his grace, is discarded, nothing is left to love and strive for but man, and what pertains to him as man. Hence, we find M. Michelet opposing man to God, and seeking to draw off our love from God by means of our love for the human.

This, in principle, is no new device. It is precisely what the Protestant Reformers themselves did. They rebelled against God; and as God cannot be divided and set against him-

self, they were forced to fall back on what is simply human for their support. They asserted sometimes the supremacy of the state against the supremacy of the Church ; but this was only a human authority ; for the state is human. They asserted, also, the supremacy of the Scriptures, taken on and interpreted by a human authority. But this, again, was only asserting the supremacy of man ; for the Scriptures, so taken and interpreted, are only a human authority, and impose no faith but what each interpreter chooses to find in them. They asserted, in fine, the right of private judgment. But this all the world knows is human ; and no one who has analyzed their movement doubts for a moment, that, reduced to its general formula, it is, — **MAN IS SUPREME, AND IS TO US IN THE PLACE OF GOD.**

Nor was this the device of Protestantism alone. There was very little originality in the Protestant movement. It proceeded on the principle common to all movements, no matter in what age or country, against the City of God, and did but continue the *protest* which our first parents, through the seductions of the Serpent, made in the Garden. There may be development and modification of external representation from age to age, or from place to place ; but there is no substantial change. The principle is always the same. It is always in the name of man, always under pretence of bringing up and out the human element, that religion is opposed. The effort is always to create an antagonism between the love of God and the love of man, or to subordinate God to man. "Ye shall be as *gods*, knowing good and evil." That is, if we may paraphrase it, — "The command you suppose God has given you, and which you suppose you must keep, is tyrannical ; it degrades your nature, cripples its energies, enslaves its affections, and hinders the development and growth of its god-like faculties. If you were free, or if you had the courage, to eat the forbidden fruit, your eyes would be opened ; you would not need to see by another's eyes ; you would know good and evil, and not with another's knowledge, but with your own knowledge, for yourselves, in like manner as God himself knows in and of himself, without another to teach him. Has God said, Ye shall not eat, lest ye die ? Nonsense. Believe no such thing. Can God wish to keep you children and slaves for ever ? What pleasure can he take in the homage of those who have no mind, no will of their own, who dare neither think nor act but as they are bid ? No ; God loves the

free, bold, *manly* spirit, that acts from choice, affection, not from compulsion. Would you be acceptable to him, you must entertain more worthy notions of him, divest yourselves of your idle fears, of the silly notion that God requires you to submit to a command that would keep you for ever weak and puny slaves. There is a soul within you ; let that speak ; listen to that ; follow it, and be free, be great, be noble, be gods." So spake the serpent ; Eve was charmed, and no doubt fancied that the best way to render herself acceptable to God would be to disobey him. But be this as it may, the temptation which seduced her from her allegiance was the elevation of the human, the glory and dignity of man.

The same temptation is repeated in our days. The Church is opposed from the same motives that Satan urged in the beginning. What hear we ? " The Church is dangerous to the state ; it is hostile to liberty ; it obscures the dignity of human nature ; it does not respect the rights of man ; denies private judgment ; tyrannizes over the freeborn mind ; and is in the way of intellectual and social progress." All the popular charges the age prefers against the Church are reducible to these several heads, and therefore all oppose man to God, the human to the divine. It were easy to prove this by reference to the literature of the day, to the movements and boasts of the age ; but the fact is so salient that it is not necessary.

The real characteristic of the Antichristian, that is, Anticatholic, world is, in brief, the SUPREMACY OF MAN. It makes man its God, its master, the end for which it must strive, and the fountain from which it must derive its light and strength. It is man against God. There can be no denial of this fact. Whoso wars against the Church wars against Christianity, and whoso wars against Christianity wars against God. Let no one deceive himself on this point. Christianity is not an abstraction nor a dead letter ; it is a living organism, the Church, and without the Church it is not, — is inconceivable. The distinctions you imagine between Christianity and the Church — the Roman Catholic Church, we mean — are mere moonshine. No such distinctions are possible. God did not first give you a Christianity, and then build up, or leave you to build up, a Christian church around it, to embody and express more or less of it. He gave the Church in the beginning, and gave you nothing but what is included integrally in it. When you oppose the Church, you oppose the religion of God, and God himself. You cannot

do otherwise, if you would. There is no middle course for you. You must either say, God, and man for the sake of God, or, Man, and God, if at all, for the sake of man. There is no need of words or wry faces. Here is the plain, indisputable fact. There is no medium between the two possible in the nature of things. You are on the Lord's side, or you are against it. If you are on his side, you are on the side of the Church in which he is universally and permanently present unto the consummation of the world; if you are on the side opposed to the Church, you are on the side opposed to God. No verbiage, no sophistry, no art or ingenuity, can alter this fact; and the sooner you become convinced of it, and look this fact steadily in the face, the better will it be for all of you who are carrying on your unhallowed war against God's Holy Church.

But, assuming the fact to be as we state it, what have the enemies of religion to offer us? In general terms, they offer us man, represented in the family, native land, and universal brotherhood. M. Michelet opposes to the Church simply, if we abstract his verbiage, family and native land. These are the means and end of man's existence. These are M. Michelet's religion. "France," he says, "is a religion." These he would substitute in the place of religion, and he would educate solely in reference to them. He opposes the Church because she insists on educating for God, and subordinating family and country to God, and teaching us they are good and holy only when sought or loved for God's sake. Others add to family and country, or, one may almost say, substitute for them, universal brotherhood, and place the supreme excellence of moral character in *PHILANTHROPY*. These are philanthropists, and test all things by their schemes for the general improvement of mankind. They do not ask, Is the Church divine, is she from God, commissioned by God himself to teach us what we shall believe and do? But they ask, Is she an abolitionist, a teetotalter, a radical, a socialist?

Now we certainly respect family, native land, brotherhood, and hold them to be sacred, when elevated by religion to her own order, and referred to God as the end for which they are, and are to be loved and sought. So viewed, we have as much to say in their favor as have the Antichristian reformers themselves, and perhaps more too. The madness of these reformers does not consist in their devotion to them, but in their devotion to them for their own sake, as detached from

God, the end for which they are, and made to be ends in themselves. This is their madness ; and it is precisely here where lies their power of deception. Religion consecrates all these terms. The Gospel pronounces marriage holy, and makes it a sacrament ; what do I, then, when I extol it, but what the Gospel itself does ? The Gospel enjoins patriotism ; when I present the claims of native land, and ask that all be trained to love it, am I not following out the Gospel ? The Gospel declares that love is the perfection of the law, that he who loveth dwelleth in God and God in him, for God is love ; when, then, I proclaim the excellence of love, make love the basis of my system, and call upon all to love one another, and to live as brothers, what do I but follow both the spirit and the letter of the Gospel ? This looks plausible, and the uninstructed and unwary may not at first sight perceive wherein lies the sophistry, or wherein they who reason thus are opposed to Christianity.

Marriage, when blessed by the Church, is a sacrament, and when sought for God's sake, is indeed holy, but not otherwise. Patriotism is a duty, and is meritorious, when we love and serve our country from love of God, not when we love and serve it simply for its own sake. Love is the perfection or fulfilling of the law, when understood in the Gospel sense for charity ; not when it is understood in the human sense for philanthropy. The error lies in the neglect of these distinctions, and in predicating of marriage, patriotism, love of mankind, when referred simply to what is human as the end, what may with truth be predicated of them when they are referred to God. The enemies of the City of God say, because family, native land, brotherhood, when referred to God, are sacred, and to seek them is a religious act, to seek them is a religious act when they are not so referred ; because to love our neighbour as ourselves, for the love of God, is a precept of the divine law, — to love him for his own sake, without reference to the love of God, is the fulfilling of that precept ; and because whoso loves God must love his brother also, God is loved in man, not man in God.

Now all this makes man the end, and supreme, and, if our modern reformers were not stark blind, they could not fail to perceive their absurdity. There is a solemn truth burnt into the heart of every man who has had some little experience of life, that man never suffices for man, and therefore that nothing human is ever sufficient for itself. The good to be derived

from marriage, from native land, from universal brotherhood, is never attainable when they are sought for their own sake, and not for the sake of God. When sought for his sake, there is all the good derivable from them which our reformers allege ; but by no means when sought for their own sake, as all experience proves.

The age prates everywhere of love, of woman, and of family. Nothing is more remarkable than the rank assigned to woman, and the reliance that is placed on her for whatever good is looked for. She is made the Church, and men nowadays ask from her what in the ages of faith they asked from the Immaculate Spouse of the Lamb ; and the worship we pay to the Blessed Mother of God is, in more instances than one, taken by persons out of the Church to be symbolical of the worship due to the sex. M. Michelet tells us, man is man only when with a wife, with whom he is married or not married ; and Frederika Bremer, the popular Swedish novelist, whose works even the *Dublin Review* has commended, with only a faint whisper of dissent, confounds the sentiment of two passionate lovers for each other with the love of God, apparently regarding it as one of the purest and highest forms of charity. It would not be difficult to trace the same doctrine through no small portion of that literature which at once forms and expresses the age. All this may be very fine and charming in one of love's paroxysms, but the love of man for woman, and of woman for man, taken in its most honest sense, never suffices for itself ; and pure and hallowed as may be woman's gentle influence, when she herself loves God supremely and exclusively, it can never be safely appealed to when she does not so love him. Her influence, when religion is wanting, is more fatal than that of man himself. What is said of her, the appeals made to her, and the flattery bestowed on her by this age, only mark its luxury and gross corruption.

We may love, should love, — but God only. All else that is loved must be loved in him and for him. This is as true in relation to the mutual love of husband and wife, of parents and children, as in relation to any other love. And when this is forgotten or neglected, the love is full of misery and wretchedness. Our novelists delight to picture two young lovers, all and all to each other, living only one for the other, unable to live one without the other, seeing their heaven in each other's eyes, and shocked at the bare thought that either could find a heaven hereafter, save in the presence of the other. Ade-

laide, in one of Miss Bremer's novels, believing herself to be dying, consoles Alaric, her lover, with the assurance that he will soon follow her, and that they will meet in heaven, which would be no heaven to her without him. Never was Love more worshipped than in our days ; never were more pains taken to enlist all imaginations in his favor, and to introduce him into every heart of the least susceptibility. Yet what is the complaint which we everywhere hear ? The heart is not met ; we have a power to love which is not called forth ; the heart is lonely, sad, and sighs for some one to love, some one it *can* love, which will fill its capacity to love, and on which it may lavish all its wealth of love. But in vain. There is no such object. We try one, then another, then still another, all to no purpose. No one comes up to our idea ; no one understands us ; no one enters into all our feelings, and responds to all our nice sensibilities. Our deep and rich affections, longing to overflow and fertilize a kindred heart, are repulsed, forced back upon their source, and stagnate and rot. Such is the tone of the complaints we hear. Indeed, the very age itself is a lovesick maiden. It believes in love, celebrates it in prose and rhyme, and sighs and whimpers that it can find nothing to love. All this is natural and inevitable. Love, left to itself, is madness, and cannot be satisfied with love. It is never for two successive moments in the same mood ; and it is never, when obtaining, the same as when demanding. Nothing can satisfy it. No human being can meet its caprices, or appease its cravings.

Now, all this comes, not from the fact that love is sought, or is regarded as a good, but from the fact that it is sought for its own sake ; subordinate love to religion, love only in reference to God ; seek the love, the peace, the tranquillity of the family for God's sake, and not for the sake of the family itself, and the whole tone and temper change. There is no less love, no less generous or tender affection, no less sensibility, no less of all that which in love is lovable ; but the love is controllable, is no longer a madness, is rational ; for it now lives not on itself alone, feeds not by devouring itself, but is nourished, sustained, directed by something higher, nobler than itself, — something nor time nor change can affect, and which keeps it as fresh and vigorous, when age and care have furrowed the cheek or frosted the brow, as in the heyday of youthful beauty. Nothing in this world more needs religion than does love itself. Only the religious can truly love, or find love a

blessing. It is only where God is loved supremely and exclusively that there is real marriage, — marriage in the Christian sense of the word. They only receive the fruits of the Sacrament of Marriage who are married in God, and love each other with infinite tenderness for the love of God. Then are they indeed no longer twain, but one, — made one by the true medium of union, the living and lifegiving God. Their union is perfect and living, and is indissoluble till death. There is no return upon self, no asking if one loves or is loved, whether one understands or is understood, appreciates or is appreciated ; each looks to God, finds the other in him, and is satisfied. Where it is thus, there may be family in its true sense. Husband and wife, parents and children, love each other, for they all love one another in the one love of their Father in heaven. There is no discord, no division, for they are all one in this higher love. Such family is sacred, is holy ; its sweet affections, its peace, its solitudes, its troubles, are all religious, and acceptable offerings to God. Infirmities are borne with, personal qualities do not impair affection, and toil, and want, and suffering do but endear the members the more to one another, and make them the more indissolubly one. Yes, there is religious family. The error is not in extolling family, is not in exalting the virtue and peace of domestic life, when referred to God, but in detaching the family from religion, in making it in itself religious, and in seeking it for its own sake. Seek God and him only, and you may find the family ; and then, but only then, will it be all you desire it.

The principle we have asserted in relation to love, marriage, and the family, holds good throughout every department of human life. Philanthropy, in our days, is a high-sounding word, and it is regarded as a high compliment to a man to call him a philanthropist. But philanthropy, in itself considered, is a mere human sentiment, and brings good neither to its subject nor to its object. It has never effected any thing great or good for the race. It has been the mainspring of none of those noble institutions which have more or less flourished in every age of the Church, and from which mankind have derived so much advantage. Moved by a simple love of humanity, men may talk finely, use charming words, and vent much exquisite sentiment ; but they effect nothing, unless it be to aggravate the evils they undertake to cure. Philanthropists are the most useless race of mortals, as well as the most disagreeable, that it is easy to imagine. Their heads are full of

kinks and crotchets, and there is no living with them. They intermeddle with every thing, and mind every body's business but their own. They seem to fancy that their trade of philanthropy gives them the right to trample on all the laws of good-breeding, to outrage every honest feeling, and to make themselves supremely offensive. Poor creatures ! they are just a-going to effect something great and glorious ; but, alas ! it is always they are *just a-going* to do it.

Our age teems with philanthropists of all sorts, sizes, and colors. It claims to have a large share of generous sympathy for man. It is socialist. It is terribly pathetic over depressed humanity, especially the poorer and more numerous classes. Never before has man understood the value of man ; never before has he felt for man as man. Now, for the first time in the world's history, man sees a brother in his fellow-man, and a man in the humble, toil-worn laborer, as well as in the lordly noble. An ocean of love for the oppressed and indigent is now stirred up from its depths, and the race, after its sleep of six thousand years, awakes to a sense of the duty it owes to each of its members. Take courage, ye poor and neglected, ye wronged and outraged, ye oppressed and down-trodden, ye perishing classes, one and all ! It is the glorious nineteenth century, the century of light, of love, of humanity. Now blessed are the poor, for now shall they have the Gospel preached. All men are brethren. Man measures man the world over ; hear it, ye poor and outcast, and lift up your heads ; hear it, ye rich and proud, whose eyes stand out with fatness, and tremble. A new age commences. The great order so long foretold, so long and so ardently desired, now descends from heaven, and the Saturnian years begin. Oppression shall end, slavery shall cease, the captive shall go free, the bruised spirit shall be healed, and all men shall be as brothers, and love one another. Admirable ! But how ? What a question ! Up start a thousand schemers and projectors ; each has a sovereign remedy, and there is a confusion of tongues, as if Babel had come again. Such muttering, sputtering, chattering, vociferating, pulling and hauling, clatter and racket, that one is glad to escape with a whole skin ; and unless he has a large share of grace, must wish it had pleased Heaven to have given him his birth in some other than this enlightened and philanthropic nineteenth century.

Now, with all deference to our enlightened philanthropists, we must express some doubts whether this age is so original as

it imagines. Some go so far as to deny it originality altogether, and it has been publicly declared that it has not done so much as to "invent even a new humbug." This may be saying too much; but, after all, it has not falsified the word of God, which declares there is nothing new under the sun. It was not left to this age to be the first to preach the Gospel to the poor, or to discover the real worth of man as man. The antics which people play, the capers they cut, when they get a new idea into their heads, are often as much a proof of their ignorance as of their knowledge. Many is the fledgling philosopher or philanthropist who fancies the world is rapidly advancing, because he has learned something to-day of which he was ignorant yesterday. Sometimes we fancy we are making discoveries, when we are only learning what the scientific take it for granted every body knows, as was the case with Bacon in regard to the Schoolmen.

No Christian has ever needed to be taught the very commonplace truths which so inflate our modern reformers, for every Christian has learned them in his catechism. The Christian needs not this flood of light which the nineteenth century boasts. What it calls a flood of light is to him but the last flicker of a farthing-candle, and he wonders where these enlightened reformers came from, that so small a light so dazzles their eyes and turns their heads. Surely they are birds of the night, owls or bats, and no eagles, accustomed to gaze on the sun. Certainly every man must deplore the condition of the millions of our race unblest by the light of the Gospel, perishing for lack of the bread of life; certainly every Christian must and does deplore the physical wretchedness of vast multitudes in all countries, — but chiefly for the moral destitution which too often accompanies it. He feels with and for the poor and destitute, and does all in his power to relieve their wretchedness. Not he stands indifferent to suffering humanity, or in the way of relief. But there is a great distance between that love for the masses which originates in the simple love of man for his own sake, and that which originates in the love of God and loves them in and for him. The one we call philanthropy, the other charity, and the age makes such a fool of itself in regard to the former simply because it wants the latter. Philanthropy turns its head because it is ignorant of charity. We grant the age philanthropy, the love of man, for it sets up man against God; but this, instead of being its glory, is its shame. It boasts the less, because it has not the greater.

In nothing is the absolute insufficiency of man for himself more striking than in the philanthropic efforts of the day. Whether our philanthropists have for their object to relieve the indigent, to liberate the slave, to check a prevalent vice, to remodel the state, or reorganize society, they proceed as madmen, prove utterly impotent, save to unhinge men's minds, to unsettle what is fixed, and to throw into chaos what has been reduced to order. Never was more breath or ink wasted over the indigent classes ; never was a greater variety of splendid schemes devised for their relief ; and never was there a period in the history of the world when they were more in need of help and when they received less. What is now done for them only increases their disquiet, their intense longings for what they have not and cannot get,—only sharpens their sensibilities, and augments their sufferings. The evils of poverty are more than half relieved, when you have removed from the poor the craving to be rich, and made them contented with their state in life. Philanthropy cannot understand this ; she cannot conceive a good for them, unless they are placed in another rank in life ; and all her tears over them, all her exhortations to them, only increase their craving to be other than they are, and deepen the sense of their misery.

So it is, and so it must be, when we rely on philanthropy, and mistake it for that love which the Blessed Apostle says is the perfection of the law. When we do so, we begin at the wrong end, and seek God in man, instead of man in God. Man out of God can do no good, can receive no good, — that is, no good in any deep sense of the word. The true course is the reverse ; it is to begin in God, and to find all in him. The love we should have for our neighbour, and which his good, as well as our true worth, requires us to have, is, not that human sentiment beginning and ending in man which our philanthropists contend for, but that blessed charity which loves God above all things, with the whole heart and soul, because he is infinitely amiable and deserving of all love, and our neighbour as ourselves for the love of God. Not by any means is it wrong to love our neighbour ; not by any means is the love of mankind to be discountenanced ; but it must, through religion, be made infinitely more than philanthropy, or it will inevitably be less. As we said of the love of the family, so say we of the love of mankind. The merely human sentiment has never its complement in itself, is always weak and whimpering, and evaporates in words, sighs, and

tears. We have no true and solid love one of another, unless one love the other not in himself but in God. Only in God can the brotherhood of the race be found. Men must be carried up to the Father, before they can be seen and loved as brethren. So far from the love of God being antagonistical to the love of man, it is only in loving God that we really do or can love man. We love the child because we love the Father.

We do not love our fellow-men less because our love is charity instead of philanthropy, but we love them from a higher and a stronger motive, with a purer, richer, and more enduring love. Having found our neighbour in God, we can then find God in our neighbour, and live or die for our neighbour; for it is not for him, but for God. Those who, in what Protestants call the dark ages, from pure love of God, associated themselves for the redemption of captives, and, when their funds failed, sold themselves as the ransom of the slave, probably loved the slave not less than do our modern Abolitionists, who, at a convenient distance, declaim against his master, and gain the praise of philanthropy by making speeches against slavery, and by their incendiary proceedings riveting the chains of the slave all the firmer. Philanthropy never did and never will loosen the bands of the captive. Let philanthropy go, let the slave go, let humanity go, — but let the heart be touched by divine charity, let each love God and him only, live for God, and desire nothing but God in heaven or on earth, and the prison-doors will fly open, the fetters drop from the slave's feet, the bowed down will be raised up, the whole race will be free, their hearts will be one heart, beat with one love and one hope, and bound with one joy.

We open here a great subject, which we would gladly, if our space permitted, pursue still farther. We may, perhaps, resume it hereafter. The age would do well to weigh it as it has not weighed it; and it would do well to contrast what charity did in the ages of faith, and what it does now where men are not ashamed to be Christians in their deeds, with the puny and abortive efforts of philanthropy, — Rome, for instance, with London, or England of the fourteenth century with England of the nineteenth. The principle we contend for has no exceptions. There is only God we can seek and not miss. Whatever else we seek we gain not, or, if we gain it, it turns out to be worthless, or worse. God is the Supreme Good. We must seek him, and leave all subordinate goods to follow

or not follow, as he pleases. If they follow, it is well, be thankful ; if they do not, still be thankful, for it is just as well. He who has God has all. The possession of secondary goods adds nothing, their loss diminishes nothing. They are goods only in so far as they are included in him. " Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you " ; for, in so far as they are for his glory and your good, they are included in his gift of himself. If he gives himself, what good thing can he withhold ?

We have written not to depress the human, but to show its impotence when abandoned to itself or sought for its own sake. The great rule to be observed is to deny the human, or to seek it only in God, where it ceases to be human, and becomes divine. This is the self-denial taught us by our holy religion. We must utterly renounce ourselves, crucify our nature, as the only possible condition of obtaining any thing good. " He that will save his life shall lose it." But this crucifixion of nature, this self-renunciation, is moral, not physical. Nature remains with all its capacities, and self remains with all its faculties, but not as an end, not as that which is to supply the motive or reason of acting. We annihilate ourselves for God, live for him only, and we live for ourselves only in him. We exercise still all our faculties, and retain the same sensibility to pleasure or pain ; but we retain not the sensibility, and exercise not the faculties, for their own sake. We cease to be our own. We are the Lord's. Yet in this we lose nothing, but gain every thing. " He that shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." We give ourselves to God, to live only for him, to have no will but his, no thought but for him ; and in return he gives us himself, and in himself gives us the Sovereign Good, all conceivable good, yea, more than is conceivable. All good is ours, moral, spiritual, physical. The secondary goods, the elevation of the individual and of society, the freedom of the captive, and the unloosing of the bound, so far as they are goods, follow in the train ; and we are sure to find, that, in giving up all for Christ, we receive in return a hundred-fold in this life, and the promise of that which is to come. Christian asceticism is the only path to true good, individual or social.

ART. IV. — *Natural and Supernatural. Remarks on a Letter from a Protestant Minister.*

THE writer of the following Letter is a minister of the *Christian* denomination, — a Protestant sect which originated in this country between forty and fifty years ago, with Elias Smith and Abner Jones in New England, and two or three others at the West and South, whose names we forget. They deny the Most Holy Trinity and Incarnation, but seem inclined to admit the doctrine of Redemption, and in this last respect differ from the Unitarians, with whom, however, they maintain friendly relations. The Letter was not intended for publication, but, as we have no leisure to reply to it in a private communication, and as it opens a subject on which Unitarians and so-called Liberal Christians generally appear to want clear and distinct views, we trust the writer will pardon the liberty we take of inserting and replying to it in the pages of our Journal. With the writer himself we have but a slight acquaintance. He has called on us once or twice, and we have been led to think very favorably of his natural ability and disposition. He has evidently received only a limited education, and his mind appears to be undisciplined ; but he has great intellectual activity, and is candid and ingenuous. We believe him, when he says his aim is at truth, and we have no doubt but he is prepared to follow his convictions, whithersoever they may lead him. May Almighty God, through his great mercy, grant him the unspeakable happiness of finding the truth as it is in Jesus !

“ MY DEAR SIR, — I have frequently thought of our conversation at your house the other day, in which I was much pleased and interested. I have looked at the subject-matter of your propositions more analytically than I then did.

“ I think that an important point was lost sight of, — that is, the point of contact between the natural and the supernatural, which must exist, let the mediums and teachers of the supernatural be what and as many or as few as they may. This is an important point ; and the *capacity* of the natural to apprehend, to contain, and to realize the supernatural is another. On these all the difficulties turn.

“ One of your propositions was, ‘ Salvation belongs to the supernatural.’ It is beyond the range of nature. ‘ The knowledge and the power by which we understand and experience salvation are

also supernatural.' This was substantially another. And without going over the whole ground of your other propositions, I understand the main thing at which all aimed was, that with our human powers we cannot get at the supernatural, we cannot know nor obey the supernatural. Now I bespeak your patience while I give some of my reflections.

" I take two things for granted. 1. Human beings have no other than human faculties. 2. Man cannot, under any circumstances, receive that for which he has not a *receptive capacity*. On these, men of reason will not quarrel.

" Well, in salvation there are at least three things, distinct: the subject, the object, and the instrumentality; or, the Saviour, the saved, and the instrumental action by which the Saviour acts upon the saved. Now the Saviour is supernatural, the means by which he acts on the object are supernatural, but the saved is not supernatural; and prior to salvation the Saviour and the saved are apart, at a distance from each other. Also, in salvation there must be a contact between the saving cause or causes and man, or, in other words, a contact between the natural and the supernatural, which you believe as well as I.

" Now if the saved is the natural, on what principle is salvation possible? Only on the principle, that the natural may receive, may know, and do the supernatural. If the natural may not know the supernatural, then salvation is impossible. To say that the power to receive the supernatural must be given by the supernatural is only to repeat the same difficulty; for the supposed power to receive, if given, must be itself received, which, if supernatural, would be again impossible. The fact, that salvation has ever occurred in any one case, is infallible proof that in human nature are powers which can realize the supernatural.

" Now, I affirm, that, if the supernatural exists in human language, man by the use of his own powers can get at it. If it is accessible by any means, the individual man can get at it.

" In nature we see the supernatural flowing into the natural, into the ultimates and particles of all things. God is supernatural. He is not nature, and nature is not he; yet he pervades all things; he is omnipresent *in* nature. Here, then, is a living proof that the *unthinking, unintelligent* natural receives and contains its measure of the supernatural. But this is not the fact I am upon.

" Now, man has what nature beneath him has not, — a soul; and I argue that it has powers like the Eternal Mind, to the extent that the Eternal Mind may be understood. 1. From the fact, that the thought and love, by nature displayed, we unconsciously recognize as being like (in nature) our own. 2. From the fact, that man can know God only through kindred powers. Why could not Newton's dog know Newton? Because he had not the kin-

dred powers, and without those powers could not know his master. Nor can we, any more than Newton's dog, know the God who made us, without natural and kindred powers. Did any man, in the Church or out, ever know God? If so, this position is proven. Man may know the supernatural, if he has kindred powers.

"Now, if man by nature cannot know the supernatural when it lies before him, then he cannot know it at all. For he must either know the supernatural by natural means or by supernatural. If by natural, my view is sustained. If by supernatural, he must understand his means or he cannot use them. If he gets at salvation supernaturally, then he gets at the supernatural by his own powers, using them as a means. How may I understand Jesus and all inspired minds? They, you say, utter the supernatural. I grant it. But how am I to get at it, if I cannot by my own powers understand the supernatural? Can the Church remove the difficulty? What she gives must also be either natural or supernatural, for these contain all true teachings in the universe. If she gives me the natural, it is what I had before. If she gives the supernatural, by which to aid me, I cannot understand her without giving demonstrative proof of my ability to know the supernatural. If the Church gets at the supernatural, she faces the same difficulties. If individual man has no powers by which to understand the supernatural, neither has man in the aggregate; for in one man lie all the faculties found in all men. The more I think, the more I believe that any man may, with an honest heart, come to God and know his will. If man alone cannot, neither can a million. But I must close. I have given these remarks, that you may see the turn my thoughts have taken. I think the above is logical. But my mind is open to any argument you may think proper to give. Please show me any essential flaw in the reasoning I have adopted. I aim at truth, as I believe that you do. I may fail in seeing; but when I see, I will never dodge logical sequences, let them be what they may. I am, dear Sir, very truly yours."

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The Letter gives but a confused statement of the ground we assumed in the conversation to which it refers. The minister undertook to demonstrate that the Church is unnecessary and useless. To this end he contended, 1. Natural reason is competent of itself to decide, from their intrinsic character, what are, and what are not, doctrines of revelation. 2. When once the means of salvation are ascertained, the Church cannot be needed; and, 3. These means can be ascertained as well without the Church as with it; because the Church is only an aggregate of individuals, and has no faculty for dis-

covering and determining them not possessed by each individual himself.

We replied, 1. Whether the Church, as an aggregate of individuals, does or does not possess faculties for determining the means of salvation, not possessed by each individual himself, has nothing to do with the question. The faculty of the Church to teach does not depend on the fact that the whole is wiser than a part, or that men taken collectively are wiser than men taken individually ; but on the fact that she has the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost. This assistance we predicate of her as a whole, in her organic capacity, as a corporate individual, because it is only in that capacity our Lord has promised it to her. The ground of our belief of the Church is, not the numbers aggregated, — although that is much, when the question turns on the value of a purely human authority, — but the promise of our Lord to be always supernaturally present with the Church, leading her into all truth, and enabling her to teach infallibly whatsoever he has commanded her. The question is not, whether one man be or be not equal to many men or all men, as a teacher ; but simply, whether our Lord has commissioned the Church to teach, and promised her infallible assistance in teaching. If he has, she, as teacher, must of course be preferred to the individual, to whom no such assistance is promised.

2. The conclusion, that, after the means of salvation are ascertained, the Church cannot be needed, is premature. Salvation belongs to the supernatural order, and natural reason cannot determine what are the necessary means of gaining it. The means, as well as the end itself, can be known only by supernatural revelation ; and till we are supernaturally informed as to what they are, we cannot say whether, after ascertaining them, the Church will or will not be needed. For aught we can say beforehand, these means may be communion with the Church and the graces received only by a faithful attendance on her ministries and the reception of her sacraments.

3. The assumption, that natural reason is competent to decide, from the intrinsic character of a doctrine, whether it be a revealed doctrine or not, is unauthorized. Revealed doctrines, as to their intrinsic truth, pertain to the supernatural order, and therefore lie out of the range of reason. Natural reason can judge only of matters which lie within the order of nature, and therefore cannot judge of the intrinsic truth of what transcends that order. The fact of revelation is also a super-

natural fact, and requires a supernatural witness. Reason of itself cannot say what God will reveal, whether what is alleged to be revealed is revealed or not, or whether it is true or false. It can only determine whether an alleged revealed doctrine does or does not contradict a principle of reason. If it does, it may reject it as false ; if it does not, it by its own light can neither affirm nor deny it. To contend otherwise would be to contend that natural reason can exceed the ability of natural reason, which is a contradiction in terms.

The minister replied by denying, 1. That the truths revealed pertain to the supernatural order ; and, 2. By contending that salvation lies within the order of nature. But he soon abandoned these positions, and agreed that both pertained to the supernatural order. The conversation then turned on the question of salvation. We contended, that, since salvation belongs to the supernatural order, it cannot be determined by reason alone whether there be such a thing as salvation ; if there be, what it is, or what are the means of attaining it ; and, therefore, that these three points, if known at all, must be known supernaturally, and all we can know of them is what, and only what, is supernaturally taught us. This, at first, he denied, but finally conceded, and it was agreed, that to salvation supernatural instruction or knowledge is necessary. But salvation, it was agreed, involves not only an end to be known, but an end to be gained, and therefore, if assumed at all, requires action as well as knowledge, — something to be done as well as to be known. But salvation belongs, as an end, or object to be gained, wholly to the supernatural order. Then the action by which it is to be gained must be supernatural ; since no natural act can, in the nature of things, attain to a supernatural end. The act cannot go out of its own order. If it is purely natural, it is restricted to the order of nature. But the end to be reached by the act is in the supernatural order ; consequently the act, if it is to reach its end, must be supernatural. But a supernatural act requires a supernatural actor, or power to act. Consequently, to salvation it is necessary, as appears from reason itself, that we have, 1. supernatural knowledge to disclose the end and the means ; and, 2. supernatural power or ability to act in reference to that end.

The minister, without expressly denying the necessity of supernatural power, contended that knowledge of the end and means is itself the ability to gain the end ; that the knowledge is the supernatural revelation contained in the Scriptures, inter-

preted by each one for himself ; and therefore whoever has the Scriptures, studies them diligently, and understands them according to the best of his ability, has all the knowledge and power necessary to his salvation.

To this we replied, 1. In the natural order, knowledge of the means and end is not necessarily the ability to gain the end, and that it is so in the supernatural order cannot be affirmed on the authority of reason, and can be affirmed on no authority but that of positive revelation ; 2. That the Scriptures contain a supernatural revelation, that they are to be interpreted by each one for himself, that whoever studies them diligently and understands them according to the best of his ability has all the knowledge and power requisite to salvation, are all matters which lie out of the province of reason, and can be affirmed or denied only on the authority of revelation itself. Till you have determined that you have a revelation, and have settled the question as to what it is and what it teaches, you are not at liberty to assume any one of these points.

The minister answered, that he was authorized to assume them by the authority of the Scriptures themselves.

We added, that this is begging the question ; and, moreover, 1. As a matter of fact, the Scriptures do not assert either that the knowledge is the power, or that they are to be privately interpreted ; 2. Private interpretation can be proved from them only by private interpretation ; which, as it is merely proving the same by the same, is very bad logic ; 3. The Scriptures, till proved to be the word of God by a supernatural authority, are themselves no supernatural authority for saying they contain a supernatural revelation. Without the Church, you are obliged to take them on, and interpret them by, a merely human authority ; and when so taken and interpreted, they are only a human authority ; for their divine inspiration is a fact which lies out of the province of reason, and can be affirmed only by a supernatural authority.

On this last point our conversation was continued, but broke off before it was fully settled. The minister, however, after strenuous efforts to maintain the contrary, finally conceded that he had no authority but natural reason on which to assert the inspiration of the Scriptures, and that their inspiration was a supernatural fact, of which reason was not in itself a competent judge, — thus to our understanding, though it seems not to his, conceding the whole matter in dispute.

Such is the substance of the conversation to which the letter

refers. Salvation, it was mutually agreed, is eternal life, and belongs wholly to the supernatural order ; and our argument was, then it must be unattainable without a supernatural knowledge and a supernatural ability, because man naturally cannot know the supernatural, or perform a supernatural act. The minister saw very clearly, that, if he conceded these points, we should by one or two moves more compel him either to give up salvation, or to admit the necessity of the Church as the supernatural teacher, and of the assistance of grace as the supernatural power ; and then, perhaps, of the Sacraments, as the channels of grace. In his letter he undertakes to escape the difficulty by proving that man must have the natural ability to know and do the supernatural, or else not be receptive of supernatural assistance, either in knowing or doing. His argument rests on the assumption, that the capacity to receive is the ability to do. Reduced to form, it is, — Whatever man has the natural capacity to receive he must have the natural ability to know and do. But he has the natural capacity to receive the supernatural, or else no supernatural assistance — without supposing an infinite series of supernatural assistances, which is absurd — could ever be granted him. Therefore, he must have the natural ability to know and do the supernatural.

“Human beings,” he says, “have no other than human faculties, and man cannot, under any circumstances, receive that for which he has not a receptive capacity.” But he must receive the supernatural or not be saved. “In salvation there are at least three things distinct, — the subject, the object, and the instrumentality ; or, the Saviour, the saved, and the instrumental action of the Saviour on the saved.” This is not correctly expressed. The saved, or one to be saved, is the subject, the salvation is the object, and the instrumentality is the means the Saviour furnishes the subject for gaining the object, and is, properly speaking, himself, who is at once the salvation and its medium. Thus corrected, the minister’s sense is, the salvation and the Saviour are both supernatural, but the subject is natural, and, prior to salvation, is at a distance from the Saviour. The two cannot be brought together, and the subject be saved, without the supernatural being brought into contact with the natural, and acting upon it. Therefore, — “Salvation is possible only on condition that the natural may *receive*, may *know* and *do*, the supernatural.” It is clear from this that the minister assumes that the natural

capacity to be assisted by the supernatural is the natural ability to know and do the supernatural, which implies that the capacity to receive is identically the ability to do.

But this is not sound philosophy. The simple receptive capacity is very distinguishable from the ability to know and do. A man may have the capacity to receive a thousand pounds with which to pay his honest debts, and yet, before receiving them, no ability to pay a single cent. A man undertakes to raise a weight which exceeds his ability, and asks you to help him. "No, my good man. You either have the capacity to receive assistance, or you have not. If you have not, I cannot assist you; if you have, you have the ability to do, without my assistance, all you can do with it, and therefore do not need it." The poor man, we apprehend, would respect your philosophy as little as your neighbourly feeling.

The minister's argument sins, in the first instance, by a bad major; in the second instance, by a conclusion too broad for the premises. All he establishes in his premises is, that the supernatural must come in contact with, and act upon, the natural; from which all he is entitled to conclude is simply the capacity of the natural to be affected or acted upon by the supernatural. The capacity to receive an action is not, as we have seen, precisely the ability to perform an action; there is a difference between striking and being struck. Consequently, from the capacity of the natural to be affected or acted upon by the supernatural, it cannot be logically concluded that the natural has the ability, without the supernatural, to know and do the supernatural. That the natural has the capacity to receive the action, or to be acted upon by the supernatural, we grant, if the reception be taken passively, not actively. The active reception of the supernatural is itself supernatural, and the ability to receive it actively is included in the *donum* or supernatural gift, — is part of the supernatural assistance itself. The minister must prove, in order to prove any thing to his purpose, that the supernatural cannot reach the natural, unless there be, on the part of the natural, prior to its reception, the ability to recognize it as supernatural, and to receive it by a supernatural act, which he cannot prove, and which the nature of the case does not necessitate; since all that is requisite on the part of the natural, in order to render man capable of being supernaturally assisted, is the naked capacity to be acted on by grace. The moment the grace reaches him, it becomes itself immediately, by its own virtue, a supernatural assistance,

and the first act of the subject under it may by its means be a supernatural act. The grace thus received, if not resisted, not only becomes a supernatural assistance to the subject, but may enlarge his capacity to receive more and more grace.

If "salvation has ever occurred in any one case, it is infallible proof that in human nature are powers that can realize the supernatural." Not at all. It only proves that man has powers which may be supernaturally elevated to the plane of the supernatural. To be able to *realize* the supernatural, if the phrase has any meaning, is one thing; to be capable of being supernaturalized, or of receiving supernatural assistance, is another thing. To be the subject of supernatural assistance requires, as we have seen, only the naked capacity in the natural to be affected by the supernatural; to *realize* the supernatural requires the ability to perform a supernatural act. The reasoning of the minister proceeds on the supposition that Almighty God himself cannot elevate man above the natural order, and, indeed, can raise him to nothing to which he has not the natural ability to raise himself. Is it thus we are to set bounds to Omnipotence?

"If the supernatural exists in human language, man can by the use of his own natural powers get at it." That is, if the supernatural exist in the natural, or, in other words, if the supernatural be natural, man, by the use of his own natural powers, can get at it. Possibly; and yet even of that we are not quite certain. The whole of nature has not yet been explored, and she contains secrets that man, by the use of his natural powers alone, to say the least, cannot *easily* "get at." But perhaps we mistake the thought of the minister. Perhaps he means, that, if the supernatural is expressed in human language, so far as it is so expressed, we by our natural powers can apprehend it; if so, we have no objections to offer. All revealed propositions are, as propositions, or as proposed for our belief, apprehensible by our natural powers. But this is not the question. Are they in fact *revealed* propositions? Are they *true*? These are questions which we can answer only as supernaturally taught. Perhaps, again, the minister means to say, that the supernatural revelation, if made through the medium of the Holy Scriptures, or if recorded in them, can be ascertained by the simple exercise of our reason. This, if true, would by no means meet the whole difficulty; for not the *hearers*, but the *doers*, of the word are blest, and by our own strength alone we cannot do what the

word requires, as is evident from the fact that the work to be done is supernatural. But it is not true, as is evinced by the doubts and perplexities of commentators, and the multiplicity of contradictory doctrines deduced from the Scriptures by those who take them as their sole rule of faith. Protestants have been at work for three hundred years to "get at" the sense of Scripture, and their disagreement among themselves proves that they have not as yet succeeded; and there is no great rashness in asserting, that, if they have not been able in three hundred years to succeed, they never will. Three hundred years are long enough for an experiment, and any experiment that has been faithfully tried for that length of time, without success, may be set down as a total failure. Moreover, even if one by his natural powers could ascertain all the doctrines contained in the Scriptures, it would not help him; he would have nothing supernatural in them, unless he had a supernatural authority on which to assert their inspiration.

"If it is accessible by any means, the individual man can get at it." The design of the minister in this is to say, that, if the Church can get at the supernatural, the individual may. He wishes to establish it as a fact, that the Church has no powers but those which she derives from her individual members. His notion is, that the Church is a mere collection of individuals, and that the individuals are the same whether out of the Church or in it. This is the notion of all Liberal Christians, so far as our knowledge extends, and proves them to be ignorant of the mere alphabet of our holy religion. The Church derives nothing from individuals; but they derive every thing from her. Her powers are from God, are supernatural, and it is only through union with her that individuals are supernaturally born; for she is the Mother of all the faithful. Because through her men may get at the supernatural, it does not follow that they can without her. "If the supernatural is accessible by any means, the individual man may get at it." Granted, if he adopt the *proper* means, — not if he neglect them, and take improper means. The supernatural, through grace, is accessible to all men, but only in the way God has prepared. If we scorn that way, and seek to get at it by a way of our own, we shall not find it accessible.

"In nature we see the supernatural flowing into the natural, into the ultimates and particles of all things. God is supernatural. He is not nature, and nature is not he; yet he

pervades all things, — is omnipresent in nature.” Our Protestant minister does not appear to understand what is meant by *supernatural*. His supernatural does not transcend the order of nature. God, as manifested in or by nature, though distinct from nature as the cause from the effect, is still in the order of nature ; for, thus manifested, he is simply the God of nature, or nature’s God. Supernatural is that order which transcends the order of nature, and it is only as author of an order above the order of nature, that is, the order of grace, and as manifested in it, that God is supernatural in the theological sense of the term. This appears to be a fact which has escaped the minister’s attention, and the singular confusion of his statements and reasonings results from his not having duly considered it. The simple truth is, he has no conception of the supernatural, or at best does not admit it at all in the sense we understand it, as it were easy to infer from his attempt to prove that it lies within the range of our natural faculties. We may dismiss, then, to his private meditations what he says about the capacity of unthinking and unintelligent nature to receive the supernatural.

“ Man has powers like the Eternal Mind, to the extent to which the Eternal Mind may be known.” Natural powers to the extent to which the Eternal Mind may be *naturally* known, we grant ; to the extent to which the Eternal Mind may be *supernaturally* known, we do not grant, for it is the point in dispute. “ Man can know God only through kindred powers.” Kindred powers are powers of the same order. The proposition of the minister, then, is, that the subject knowing and object known must be of the same order. This is precisely what we maintain, if restricted to the ascending scale. The higher order may know the lower, but the lower cannot know the higher. Then, since the natural and supernatural are different orders, the supernatural above the natural, it follows the natural cannot know the supernatural, which is what we allege. “ Why could not Newton’s dog know Newton ? Because he had not the kindred powers.” Newton’s dog very likely did know his master, and could know him, so far as Newton came within the order of the dog’s nature. But he did not know Newton in the sense in which he transcended that order, and could not for the reason assigned, namely, — “ he had not the kindred powers,” was not himself of the same order as Newton. This is what we say. No one can know naturally above the order of his nature, and therefore no

one can know naturally the supernatural. But will the minister deny that Almighty God, if he had chosen, could, by a special act of his power, have so elevated the dog's powers as to have enabled him to know his master in the full sense in which one man may know another? To do so implies no contradiction. Then, God could have done it. Then, Newton's dog, according to the general argument of the minister, had the natural ability to know his master!

"Nor can we, any more than Newton's dog, know the God who made us, without natural and kindred powers." The conclusion contains more than is contained in the premises. The premises contain *kindred* powers only, not *natural* and kindred. We, no more than Newton's dog, can know the God who made us, without kindred powers, that is, powers of the same order, we grant; without *natural* and kindred powers we cannot know him *naturally*, we also grant; cannot know him *supernaturally*, we deny; for our natural powers may be made of the same order by being supernaturalized.

"Did any man in or out of the Church ever know God? If so, this position is proven." What position? If any man has ever known God, the position that God may be known is proven, but not that God *as supernatural* may be known by our *natural* powers. The reasoning of the minister himself proves the reverse. Man can know God only so far as he has kindred powers, or so far as he is like God. He can, then, know God, by virtue of his natural likeness to God, only to the extent of that natural likeness. That natural likeness ~~is~~ natural, therefore in the order of nature; and therefore by it man can know God only in the order of nature. But man can know God only to the extent of his likeness to God. Then, to know God as supernatural, he must have a supernatural likeness to God. Then, either God as supernatural cannot be known, or man's natural likeness to God may be supernaturally elevated. The minister, then, must either admit the necessity of the supernatural elevation of our powers, or else deny the possibility of knowing the supernatural.

"Man may know the supernatural, if he have kindred powers." Unquestionably. But from the fact that man has a natural likeness to God, and may by his natural powers know God in the order of nature, we cannot conclude that he has a natural likeness to him as supernatural, and may know him in the supernatural order. We have, if you will, kindred powers in the natural order; but natural powers can be kin-

dred only to the natural. Since the minister says we can know only by virtue of kindred powers, it follows that we can know the supernatural only by supernatural powers ; for only the supernatural is kindred to the supernatural. The minister, therefore, refutes himself, and assigns an unanswerable reason against the natural ability of man either to know or to do the supernatural. His mistake, however, is not in his logic, but in his premises, in his notion of the supernatural. If he had understood what we mean by supernatural, he would either have admitted our positions at once, or denied the supernatural altogether.

“ If man cannot by nature know the supernatural, when it lies before him, then he cannot know it at all.” This conclusion follows only from the false assumption, that the capacity to be supernaturally assisted is the natural ability to know the supernatural. This assumption, after what we have said, cannot be insisted upon. Setting this aside, the true conclusion is, if man’s nature cannot be supernaturally elevated to the level of the supernatural order, then he cannot know the supernatural, which we grant. That he can be so elevated implies no contradiction ; and we know God, who is omnipotent, can so elevate him, if he chooses. What is meant by the supernatural lying before us we do not know. The natural lies before us ; but the supernatural, so long as we are in the natural order only, does not. If all that is intended be, that we, by our natural powers, can apprehend the propositions of the supernatural revelation, when placed before our minds, we do not object ; but even if we could not so apprehend them, we should not concede that we could not apprehend them at all ; for nothing hinders God from elevating us supernaturally to their apprehension, if he pleases.

“ For he must know the supernatural either by natural means or by supernatural. If by natural, my view is sustained. If by supernatural, he must understand his means, or he cannot use them.” If by natural means, his view is sustained, we grant. But the supernatural cannot be known by natural means, as we have proved, even from his own principles. Therefore his view is not and cannot be sustained. If by supernatural means, he must understand his means, or he cannot use them. Conceded. *Quid inde ?* Then he must understand them by his natural powers ? This does not appear. For aught that appears, the supernatural means may bring with them the supernatural ability to understand them. The minister,

had he succeeded in proving that to be receptive of supernatural assistance necessarily involves the natural ability to know and do the supernatural, would have been entitled to this conclusion ; but this he did not succeed in proving, and cannot prove, as we have shown. Moreover, by the very supposition, the means are supernatural, and the minister makes understanding of the means a part of the means. Then the understanding itself must be supernatural. *Implicat in terminis*, to say the understanding as a means is natural, when the means are assumed to be supernatural.

“ If man gets at salvation supernaturally, then he gets at it by his own powers, using the supernatural as a means.” By his own powers supernaturalized, *transeat*, by his own powers unelevated by the supernatural, we deny it, for reasons already assigned. The minister forgets, that, in his analysis of salvation, commented on some pages back, he has assumed that the supernatural acts on the natural. In that analysis he undertakes to show that the supernatural must come in contact with and act upon the natural, as the necessary condition of salvation. He now reasons on the supposition, that the natural must come in contact with and act upon the supernatural, that the supernatural is merely passive matter, on and with which the natural is to operate. This is not what we have been taught. Grace is not passive, but active, and acts on us before we act with it. The first act towards salvation is an act of grace. It is not we who get at the supernatural, but it which gets at us. The Saviour comes to seek and to save the sinner. Grace seeks us, finds us, reaches us where we are, and, the instant it reaches us, is the power of God within us to will and to do whatever he requires of us. It is the means of salvation, and of apprehending and using, as we are taught them, all the means requisite to salvation. We are not helped to the means by what we do prior to grace, or without it ; for no works contribute to salvation but those which grace operates within us, and we perform through grace. The minister would get rid of his difficulty, if he would bear in mind that the supernatural is given us, not obtained by us.

“ How may I understand Jesus and all inspired minds ? They utter, you say, the supernatural ; I grant it. But how am I to get at it, if I cannot by my own powers understand the supernatural ? ” What our Lord says in person or by inspired organs is the Christian revelation. The minister’s question is, how he is to get at this, if he cannot understand

the supernatural by his own powers. If, by getting at this, he means apprehending it when properly proposed, he can get at it with his own powers ; but in so doing, he does not by his own powers understand the supernatural ; for Christian doctrines, humanly apprehended, are, *quoad nos*, only human doctrines. To get at them, in the sense required for divine faith, requires the supernatural elevation of our faculties by the grace of faith. God can, if he chooses, so elevate them. Consequently, it is not impossible to get at the revelation without being able by our own powers to understand the supernatural.

“ Can the Church remove the difficulty ? ” The difficulty the minister imagines, we have shown, does not exist. That difficulty is, that the capacity to receive the supernatural implies the ability to know and do the supernatural. Therefore, if you deny the natural ability to know and do the supernatural, you deny the capacity to receive supernatural assistance. This must apply also to the Church. If, then, you deny to the individual the power to understand the supernatural, you deny the ability of the Church to help him. She either gives me the natural or the supernatural. If the natural only, she gives me only what I already have. If the supernatural, she encounters the same difficulty, for she can give it only on condition that I am able to understand the supernatural ; which you deny. But we have seen that it does not require the previous ability, without supernatural assistance, to understand the supernatural. Consequently this difficulty vanishes. It is idle to pretend that God cannot elevate us by grace above our natural capacity and ability. The minister professes to believe in supernatural inspiration. The inspired must have had the natural capacity to be inspired, or else they could not have been inspired ; but had they, therefore, the natural ability to know without the grace of inspiration all that God by inspiration revealed through them ? And could not God possibly inspire them to reveal truths which transcended the reach of their natural ability ? If he could not, will the minister tell us wherein the matter of revelation, or the mysteries of faith, differ from the matter of human philosophy ? If he admits that God ever inspired any man to reveal what could not have been reached by the human intellect unassisted, he yields the whole question.

The only difficulty there is in the case the Church can remove, if she be what she professes to be. If she has received

the deposit of faith, if she is commissioned and supernaturally assisted to keep and faithfully propose it, she can remove the only real difficulty there is to be removed ; for we know then that what she proposes for the word of God is his word, and therefore infallibly true. And here is the only open question, the only question proposed to our natural powers. Has Almighty God instituted the Church, and authorized her to teach in his name ? If you postpone the question as to what is taught, till you dispose of the question, Who or what is the teacher ? your difficulties will soon vanish. This, too, is the only reasonable course. The Church comes to us as an ambassador from God, and if she comes from him, she comes with credentials, and we should examine her credentials before examining her message. If her credentials are satisfactory, if they prove that God has sent her, then we know that her message is from God, and that we are bound to receive it, be it what it may. If her credentials are such as to prove beyond the possibility of a reasonable doubt that she is from God, reason requires me to believe her message, however unpalatable I may find it, unintelligible, or apparently unreasonable ; for I can have no higher reason for declaring her message unreasonable than I have for believing her from God, and nothing is more reasonable than to believe God. If you seek, you will find her credentials all that your reason can ask. You will find them accrediting her beyond the possibility of a reasonable doubt, as the ambassador of God, sent to treat with you in his name. Then, whatever she proposes in his name is infallibly true. Then, after this, you have only to listen, as a child to his mother, to her instructions, and she will tell you what else you want, and how you may get it, and render you all needed assistance.

We agree with the minister, that " any man with an honest heart may come to God," but only in God's way, and as God draws him. " No man can come unto me except the Father draw him." But if we refuse to come in God's way, if we will not suffer him to draw us, we shall not find him, though he is not far from every one of us. The minister greatly misconceives the Catholic doctrine, if he supposes it renders the approach to God more difficult. The contrary is the fact ; and, according to it, it is every one's own fault if he remain at a distance from God. The Church is provided expressly to bring him to God, to afford him that precise help he needs to enable him to come to God. Hence her glory, and the tender love we have for her.

We have touched upon all the points in the letter which have struck us as important. The minister must be on his guard against impatience and hasty conclusions, rely on God rather than on himself, and be willing to pause and let God speak. We are all more ready to instruct the Almighty than we are to let him instruct us; and no people in general use reason more unreasonably than they who declaim the most vehemently for the use of reason. Nothing is more reasonable than to believe God on his word, or unreasonable than to distrust the teaching of one he has commissioned to teach in his name. We should beg of God to give us true docility, a childlike willingness to follow him, to believe what he says, and then sit down calmly, patiently, and with all our powers to inquire if he has commissioned any one to speak to us in his name. He may have done so; and if he has, that is the one to whom we must listen. And he has done so. The Blessed God has not left himself without a witness on the earth. We own that it seems almost too good to believe; but nothing is too good for our God to do. Men disbelieve the Church, in reality, because they have but low notions of his goodness, because they do not believe him good enough to provide so liberally for our darkness and our weakness. How should they, when they have no conceptions of the kingdom of grace, none of the supernatural? O, if they could once rise above nature, and catch but the feeblest glimpse of the glory of God as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ, they would never again distrust his goodness, or believe any thing too good for him to do! He is better than we can think, has provided more liberally for us than we have ever dared wish, or been able to conceive. O God, who would not love thee, that but beheld thy love and mercy, of which the Church, after all, in this earthly state, is but a feeble manifestation? Thy love is too great for us; it overpowers here on the way; what will it be when we get home, and behold thee face to face, as thou art in thyself?

ART. V. — *Dunigan's Home Library.* Nos. I. to VII.
New York: Edward Dunigan. 1846. 18mo.

MR. DUNIGAN's design in issuing this series of neatly executed little volumes is to furnish Catholics with useful and as-

tractive reading, which may lessen their temptation to resort to the light and mischievous literature with which the press is flooding the country. This design does him great credit, and he spares no pains or expense in its execution ; but its execution is a matter of no little difficulty and delicacy. The works published must be attractive, and in some degree adapted to the prevailing taste, or they will not be read by those for whom they are more especially prepared ; and must be moral, Catholic in tone and influence, or they will not be preferable to the literature it is hoped they will supersede. But to produce books which combine at once both of these qualifications requires a combination of piety, talent, and genius, which is not always to be had for the asking. Yet, when the intrinsic difficulties of the design are considered, we are bound to say that it has thus far been executed with much more success than was to have been anticipated. All is not done that we could wish ; but much has been done, for which we are grateful to Mr. Dunigan and the contributors to his series.

These contributors appear to have regarded the religious novel as the literary form the best adapted to their purpose ; and in this they may not have judged unwisely. The religious novel is just now the fashion ; it is a form of composition which allows the author a large degree of liberty, enables him to make an attractive book without a too heavy drain on his learning or his thought, and permits him to discourse on matters and things in general, without confining himself to one thing in particular any longer than he finds it convenient, and to be grave or gay, to appeal to reason and learning, or to imagination and sentiment, according to his humor. But something may also be said against it. It in general is made up of two dissimilar parts, and it may be questioned whether the graver part, when read for the sake of the lighter, the religious for the sake of the sentimental, is likely to produce so much effect as the author contemplates.

Most Catholic novels which have fallen under our notice are made up of two distinct and separable portions, the sentimental story, and the grave religious discussion. The latter, which is the more important part, is in general what may be found in any of our elementary works intended for those disposed to inquire into the claims of our holy religion, and is often copied *verbatim* from them ; and the sentimental portion, as far as it goes, is very much what is found in novels in general. Now these works are designed for Catholics, for Protestants,

or for both together. If for Catholics alone, this graver portion is hardly needed, for they know it already, and the novel will interest and attract them only in so far as it is light and sentimental. If they are designed for Protestants, to instruct them in our faith, to remove their prejudices, and to induce them to examine into the claims of the Church, they contain too little solid instruction, pass over too many important points, and dismiss in too summary a manner the real difficulties to be solved. If for both together, they fail, in failing to meet the peculiar wants of either. They offer a certain quantity of light and sentimental reading, on condition that one consents, without a wry face, to take a certain dose of theology, which, if he is well, he does not need, and which, if he is sick, is not enough to do him any good. Moreover, it may be set down as a general rule, that they who are seriously disposed would prefer taking the theology by itself, and those who are not so disposed will skip it. The one class will regard the light and sentimental as an impertinence; and the other, the grave and religious as a *bore*.

The authors of religious novels seem, in general, to take it for granted that the appeal to the sentimental, to the class of passions and interests appealed to by novelists in general, is harmless, if made in juxtaposition with an argument for religion. But we cannot but regard this as a mistake. Is not this appeal essentially the same, whether made by a Catholic or a Protestant? Wherein is a Catholic, in so far as he relies on the sentimental for the attractiveness of his work, better than the Protestant who does the same? The sentimental is the sentimental, let who will employ it; and it is to the employment of it at all, as the source of interest in a literary work, that the moralist objects, not to the naked fact that he who employs it is out of the Church. The age in which we live is a sentimental age, and sentimentalism is the deadliest enemy to true piety, and to all real strength or worth of character. It enervates the soul, subverts the judgment, and lays the heart open to every temptation. The staple literature of our times, the staple reading of our youth of both sexes, is sentimental novels and love-tales, and the effect is manifest in the diseased state of the public mind, and in the growing effeminacy of character and depravation of morals. Nature herself has made ample provision for the passion and the sentiment of love, and they cannot be excited to an unnatural activity by the charms of imagination and the magic of poetry, without involving the

most grave consequences. The early Christians chanted the praises of virginity, and employed their imagination and poetry to win souls to God, not to madden two young persons with a blind and often a fatal passion for each other, and we do not well in departing from their example.

All books which seek the sources of their interest in the passion or sentiment of love are to be distrusted, and so indeed are all which, no matter in what degree, foster a sentimental tendency. The more delicate and refined the sentimentality, and the more apparently innocent and pure it may be, the more really dangerous it is. Works which are grossly sensual disgust all in whom corruption has not already commenced ; but works which studiously avoid every indelicate expression or allusion, which seem to breathe an atmosphere of purity itself, excite no alarm, are read by the innocent and confiding, insinuate a fatal poison before it is suspected, and create a tone and temper of mind and heart which pave the way for corruption. Corruption generally, if not always, begins in the sentiments, and in sentiments which in themselves are free from blame, and which apparently cannot be too strong or active. The Devil, when he would seduce us, comes, usually, disguised as an angel of light. If he came in his own shape, in his real character, we should at once recognize and resist him ; but coming disguised under the appearance of something which is held to be innocent and worthy to be encouraged, he is able to destroy the equilibrium of the character, to produce a morbid state of the affections, and to take from us all power to resist in the hour of trial.

We speak not, of course, against genuine warmth of heart, real tenderness of feeling, and strength of affection. Nay, we are pleading their cause. The sickly refinement, the morbid sentimentality, which the popular literature of the day has such a direct tendency to foster, is no less fatal to them than to piety and charity. Your inveterate novel-reader cannot love, in any worthy sense of the term. Her heart is *blasé* before she is out of her teens. Her whole being, body and soul, heart and mind, inside and out, from top to bottom, is diseased, full of wounds and putrefying sores. She has no health, no soundness, no strength to bear even the application of a remedy. She may talk charmingly, vent much exquisite sentiment, but if you want to find true warmth of heart, genuine affection, or a noble and disinterested deed, go not near her. It is this morbid sensibility, this enervating and corrupting sentimentali-

ty, which the popular literature of the day encourages, that we oppose, and every enlightened censor of morals does and must oppose.

Now, the question seems to us pertinent, whether religious novels themselves, in so far as they are sentimental, do not, in their degree, tend to produce the very evil to which we refer, and which they are designed to cure. They contain in general, we grant, sound doctrine, and, so far as formal teaching is concerned, correct morals ; but do they, as a rule, concentrate the interest on the doctrine or the morals ? Does not the interest, for the most part, turn on the sentiments and passions and fate of the principal personages introduced, and is it not precisely of the same order as that of novels in general ? Is not a love-story a love-story, when told in connection with an argument for Catholicity, as much as when told in any other connection ? And, so far as it is a love-story, are not its effects precisely the same ? Is there not truth as well as point in the remark which some one makes, that religious novels are usually wretchedly dull as novels, and miserably defective as moral essays or theological treatises, wanting the chief attractions of the popular novel, and obnoxious to most of the objections urged by moralists against it ? We confess we cannot see how one is improved by reading a so-called religious novel, when he is induced to read it by what it contains of the sentimental, more than he would be by any other novel, — or how, in proportion to the quantity of sentimentality it contains, he is less injured by it.

We regard it, moreover, considering the end for which we need a popular literature, as a defect in the works which have fallen under our notice, that they nearly all appear to be written on the principle, that they must be filled with arguments for the Church, or have a good Catholic moral tacked on to the end, or they will not be recognized as Catholic. But, unless we are very much mistaken, a book may be recognized as Catholic by its spirit and temper, by the kind of interests it appeals to, the emotions it excites, and the general impression it leaves on the reader, as well as by its formal teaching. We have in our mind, just now, a very neatly executed little work, recently published, which contains an unanswerable argument for the Church, and yet contains not a sentence which a Protestant, having one or two of our more widely circulated elementary works before him, could not have written, if so disposed. One does not like polemics everywhere, and on

every occasion. Why can we not have books which shall be attractive to the general reader, and be strictly Catholic, too, in their tone and influence, but which shall nevertheless be free from polemics? A book may be as truly Catholic by what it leaves out as by what it takes in, by refraining from appeals to those passions and interests which our religion teaches us to subdue or subordinate, as by its pitched battles for the faith. The *Tales* of Canon Schmidt, so far as we have examined them, are illustrations of our thought. The *Tears on the Diadem*, by Mrs. Dorsey of Baltimore, in its general design, though not in its execution, is a specimen of the kind of religious novel we have in our mind, and would like to see flourishing among us. It seems to us we might have novels and popular tales which should have a high moral aim, a really Catholic influence, and be made sufficiently attractive by appeals to those interests and affections which the Church approves and consecrates, without set arguments for religion. They could and would be read with pleasure and profit by those who are not quite zealous enough, nor quite serious enough, if you will, to be always delighted with religious controversy.

Good books in defence of our holy faith, adapted to all tastes and capacities, are no doubt desirable; but whether a work, one half of which is a sentimental tale, and the other a brief, imperfect, and one-sided argument for Catholicity, comes within the category of such books, may be fairly questioned. Nor is this all. Desirable as such books are, they are not the books which we most want. We want books for those who are within as much, to say the least, as for those who are without. In this reading age, Catholics must and will read, and, if they do not find reading to their taste in the Church, they will be tempted to seek it out of the Church. The class of Catholics, whose welfare is in this respect to be especially consulted, are not the earnest, serious, and devout members of the Church, who are prompt to their duties, and find in religion itself all they need even to amuse them; but that large class who think very little of any thing beyond the passing moment, and find no interest in moral lectures or religious discussions. We want books for these, even more than for the conversion of those who are without. Catholic literature should be written primarily for the Catholic community, and adapted to its wants. Living as we do in a Protestant community, where the wealth, the influence, and the worldly re-

spectability are in great measure on the side of those who, unhappily, are opposed to the Church, we are prone to underrate our own importance, and to place too little reliance on our own people. We should be glad to see Protestants converted, but for their sake, not for ours. They have nothing to give us, nothing we want, and our first duty is not to them, but to our Catholic population. Indeed, the best and speediest way of bringing about their conversion, and of making this country truly Catholic, is for us to rely, after God and Our Lady, on ourselves, and to consult, and as far as we are able provide for, our own wants. We have enough in the simple fact that we are Catholics to be thankful for. This simple fact gives us a wealth and a nobility which make all else in comparison poor and mean. Let us know, that, with God's blessing, we are sufficient for ourselves, and think full as much of the importance of providing for the wants of those who are liable to stray away from us, as of meeting the wants of those who are already opposed to us.

Our readers must not understand us as intending to imply that the little works included in *Dunigan's Home Library* are doing nothing to meet the wants of these. They do much, perhaps all that we could reasonably expect, but they do not do all we wish. They do not seem to us to be sufficiently adapted to those among us who are thoughtless and giddy, trifling and vain, and careless of what is serious and holy. We want books which these will be induced to read, and which they may read without injury, and perhaps now and then with profit. We do much when we keep them out of harm's way, out of the way of temptation, or of that which would be likely to corrupt them. Mr. Dunigan's publications, excellent as they may be in their way, look rather to the conversion of Protestants than to the preservation of Catholics, and therefore, though looking to a good end, do not look to that which is at present perhaps the more important and pressing. A Catholic young lady wrote us the other day to send her some books to read. She is sufficiently instructed in her faith not to need the more elementary books written to explain and teach it, and not sufficiently devout to read only ascetic books. What were we to send her, which would supply for her the place of the popular literature of the day? This case explains precisely the want to be supplied. But how this want is to be supplied we know not, and that it can be at once supplied from among ourselves, without borrowing

largely from the literature of other nations, we very much doubt, as we have said on a former occasion.

We trust to the good sense and good nature of our readers not to misunderstand or to misapply our strictures. We are not insensible to the merits of the excellent men and women who are laboring assiduously in the cause of Catholic literature, and our real motive is not to discourage but to encourage, not to depreciate but to aid them. We have not devoted the last twenty years to literary pursuits without learning how easy it is to find fault, and how difficult it is to attain to real excellence ; and though we fill the critic's chair, we are not exactly without a human heart. We know something of what it is to struggle, and have not forgotten how hard it is to have one's honest and earnest efforts treated lightly, or to be told, after one has done his best, how much better he might have done, if he had had the ability. It is easy to suggest an ideal ; it is not always easy to realize it. But, if we have the matter in us, even the severe handling we receive from the critic, good-natured or ill-natured, will do us no harm. No man, says Dr. Johnson, was ever written down, but by himself. We think, however, our authors, even those we are most disposed to censure, have the power in them to give us something better than we get, and that, if they would change somewhat the character of their productions, they could easily render them more excellent. We do not ask them to drop the religious novel, for it is perhaps, notwithstanding our strictures, the most convenient literary form which can now be adopted. But we do wish them to forbear seeking to reconcile opposites in the same work. The religious will not neutralize the sentimental, and the sentimental is the worst possible preparation for the religious. They who would profit by the grave portions of the religious novel do not need the sentimental ; and they who cannot be drawn to read religious controversy without the aid of the sentimental will not be drawn by it ; for the sentimental of itself indisposes them to whatever requires steady thought and sober judgment. We would, therefore, recommend the discontinuance of such religious novels as seek to entice, through interests which centre in love, to the meditation of what is serious, pious, and holy. Let the love-story be omitted, and the appeal be made, not to interests which it excites, but to interests and affections which Catholic piety and charity do not require us to subdue. The love-story is the chief thing for which young people read

a novel, and, if retained in the religious novel, it will be the chief thing for which the religious novel itself will be read. The religious novel, then, becomes only a mere vehicle of sentimentalism.

Love and marriage are important matters, no doubt ; but they are not the whole business of life, nor are they so essential to usefulness or happiness as novels in general lead the inexperienced to imagine. Undoubtedly there must and will be marrying and giving in marriage, and this is well enough ; but there are men and women, — very respectable people, too, — with warm and loving hearts, who continue to live, without love and marriage, very useful, and apparently very happy, lives. They remember their Creator, their Redeemer, their neighbour ; and the poor bless them, the orphan clasps his tiny hands in prayer for them, and God loves them ; and they have joy in hoping, though hoping in fear, that they may at last be received into mansions prepared for them eternal in the heavens. There is not less to attract, to charm, to fix attention, in the love and espousal of the soul to her heavenly than to her earthly lover. Leave out, then, the earthly, and confine yourselves to the heavenly.

We have read in our day a few novels, perhaps more than a few ; but we have found a higher and a more intense pleasure in the lives and legends of the Saints than we ever did in the novels even of the Magician of the North ; and it was a pleasure which we enjoyed without finding ourselves wearied and jaded in our feelings, ill at ease, and looking upon ourselves as in a false position, without place or duty in this low work-day world, and with no opportunity to bring out the power within us ; but which refreshed and invigorated us, made nothing seem mean or low, every place the right place, every duty the proper duty, every hovel a palace, every dunghill a throne ; for in it we felt God was everywhere present, could be loved everywhere, in one place or from one position as well as from another, and that every place could be made sacred, every duty be ennobled, every soul be heroic, royal. There was no occasion for shifting one's position, or changing one's state in life. Communion with the Saints very soon teaches one that he may be above or time or place, and while in this mutable and transitory world, in some sort, live in the Eternal and Im-mutable. Can our writers find nothing here to enliven their works, to attract, charm, and elevate their readers ?

But this it may be said is too high, too grave, and it is

necessary to descend to the earth, and appeal to a lower order of interests. We grant it. But cannot this be done without becoming sentimental? Amusement, relaxation, has its place, and may be innocent and salutary. But the sentimental is no relaxation, is no amusement. It kills amusement, and substitutes the heart's grief for the heart's joy. Why not give us the heart's laughter instead of its tears? Better, far better, to laugh than to sigh and mope. Old Chaucer, who belonged to England unreformed, to "Merry England," is too broad, and by no means free from grave faults, but his faults flow from his exuberance of life and health, and his influence is a thousand times less immoral than that of your Bulwers, D'Israeli, L. E. L.s, Tennysons, and Nortons. There is always hope of the heart that can laugh out and overflow with mirth. It is the heart oppressed with sadness, overclouded with gloom, that starts back with horror from a little fun and frolic, that is to be dreaded, both for its own sake, and that of others.

The Catholic is serious, for he sees a world lying in error and wickedness, — serious, for he has his own sins to lament, his own soul to save, and he sorrows; but never does he sorrow as one without hope, and his sorrow is less of the sensibility than of the will, less in what he feels than in what he wills. He is always free, calm, rational, possessing his soul, and overflowing with health and gladness. His free and joyous spirit he impresses on his literature. Catholic literature is robust and healthy, of a ruddy complexion, and full of life. It knows no sadness but sadness for sin, and it rejoices evermore. It eschews melancholy as the Devil's best friend on earth, abhors the morbid sentimentality which feeds upon itself and grows by what it feeds upon. It may be grave, but it never mopes; tender, affectionate, but never weak or sickly. It washes its face, anoints its head, puts on its festive robes, goes forth into the fresh air, the bright sunshine, and, when occasion requires, rings out the merry laugh that does one's heart good to hear. England is sad enough to-day, and her people seem to sit in the region and shadow of death; but in good old Catholic times she was known the world over as "Merry England." It is on principle the Catholic approves such gladsome and smiling literature. It is only in the free and joyous spirit that religion can do her perfect work; for it is only such a spirit that has the self-possession, the strength, the energy requisite for the every-day duties of life. Mrs. Dorsey has admirably illustrated this in her *Sister of Char-*

ity, in the contrast she draws between the sisters, Cora and Blanche Lesley. Cora is all light and life, never sad, always joyous, and always prepared for whatever is to be done, and able to do it ; while poor Blanche is so full of sentiment, feels so much, that she is never able to do any thing that is painful or disagreeable.

The contrast between Catholic literature and Protestant is striking. There is deep melancholy that settles upon the world as it withdraws from Catholicity. All Protestant nations are sad. Their literature is dry and cold, or the wail of the stricken heart, whose ever recurring burden is, "Man was made to mourn." Their epic is one long monotonous plaint of woe, or unearthly howl of despair. Read Milton, read Byron, read whom you will, it is always a lamentation. There is no laughter, but the frightful Ha ! ha ! of the maniac. There is no bounding of the heart, no sparkle of the eye, — unless over the wine-cup ; no fulness of life, no exuberance of health, no glorious heaven above, no flowery earth beneath, no sweet music from the grove. All is cheerless and dark. Man's life is short and full of care and trouble. Whence comes it ? Why is it ? Whither tends it ? — How could it be otherwise ? How should they chant in hope who hope have not ? How should they exult in joy who joy have none ? Even the Protestant ascetic literature is cold and forbidding, makes one feel that God is hard and austere, cruel and tyrannical, taking pleasure only in the sufferings of the creatures he has made and hates. It presents us no Father's love, awakens no filial affection, never invites us to run with open hearts and joyous faces to our Father's arms, to hang on his neck, and in our childish prattle tell him all we think, all we feel, all we fear, all we wish. The very thought of doing so would scandalize it. Just as if the more tender, the more affectionate, the more familiar and self-forgetting our confidence, the less respectful it is, — and as if naturalness, simplicity, confidence, familiarity, are not what our good Father most loves in us !

Now against this pagan gloom, doubt, despair, and this morbid sentimentality, not pagan, but of modern growth, the curse of the literature of the age, it is necessary to be on our guard, both as authors and readers. If we must have a literature for those who are not serious, for the weak and vain, let us have it, but let it be free, healthy, and joyous. Let it laugh out from the heart, the free, unconstrained laughter of innocence and gladness. Let it throw the sunlight over all the re-

lations of life. If it will unveil the heart, let it be the heart's mirth, not its grief ; and if it will parade the merely human sentiments, let it deck them in gala robes and crown them with fresh-gathered flowers. Let it beat the tambour, sound the trumpets, ring out the merry peal, and go forth with fun and frolic, in the exuberance of joyous spirits, if it will ; but let it, in the name of all that is sacred, never sigh, and mope, and talk sentiment.

We have reserved but brief space in which to speak of the little works before us. The first four numbers have been noticed in the former series of this Journal, and need not to be noticed again. The best which has yet appeared is *Zenosius*, the first of the series, by the Rev. Dr. Pise, of New York, and is not obnoxious to the strictures we have made. It is what it professes to be, and the interest it excites is of the same order as its formal teaching, and the heart and understanding of the reader are moved along together to the same end. There is no linsey-woolsey in it. Its author is one of our best writers. His works are always sure to be chaste and gracefully written, sound in doctrine, pure in sentiment, and healthful in their influence. We regret that they are so few, and yet, with the author's known devotion and fidelity to the calls of his sacred profession, sufficient for any ordinary man, we are puzzled to understand how they can be so many.

The *Sister of Charity*, Numbers V. and VI., is by Mrs. Anna H. Dorsey, of Baltimore, a talented lady, and a convert to the faith, who appears to devote all her time and thought to the cause of religion. The work has some faults ; the only ones worth specifying are that it contains a love-story, and, what is worse, the lovers are cousins, and apparently first cousins, and are married without even a hint that their marriage must be null. The work, however, is in the main free from sentimentalism, for the main interest of the story is not concentrated on the lovers. It is written with a good deal of power, and is highly creditable to the excellent authoress, and to the *Home Library* in which it appears. The character of Cora Lesley is admirably conceived and well sustained throughout. She is a character worthy to be a wife, or, what is more yet, a SISTER OF CHARITY. Excepting the matter of the cousins, we recommend it very cordially to our readers, whether old or young ; they will find its perusal pleasing and not unprofitable.

The seventh number is entitled *Julia Ormond, or the New Settlement*. We do not know the author or authoress. It deserves a respectable rank among works of its class. The controversial part, however, is not felicitously managed; and the work would better please us, if Abel had been converted without first falling in love with Julia, and if he had become a priest from a higher motive than that of his admiration of an excellent young lady, and his determination to prove himself worthy of having been her proselyte. We know not on whose corns we may be treading, nor how many smart gallants will spring up to challenge us, and we do not pause to inquire; but this mixing of love and piety, and employing beautiful and fascinating young ladies for the conversion of sentimental young men, the common practice of lady-theological writers, is not altogether to our taste or to our judgment; and we think the effect of the work would have been better, if Abel's objections had been silenced by the father's logic, instead of the daughter's beauty.

ART. VI.—LITERARY AND MISCELLANEOUS NOTICES.

- 1.—*Reasons for acknowledging the Authority of the Holy See of Rome.*
By HENRY MAJOR. Philadelphia: For the Author. 1846. 12mo.
pp. 248.

MR. MAJOR is a recent convert from Episcopalianism. We know little of his personal history and character, except that he was an Episcopal minister highly esteemed by his own denomination, and at the time of his conversion the pastor of an Episcopal congregation in Philadelphia, and is now, we believe, Professor of Hebrew in the seminary of St. Charles Borromeo, the diocesan seminary of the Bishop of Philadelphia. The work before us is the account which he has judged it not improper to render to the public generally, and to his former friends specially, of the important step which, through the grace of God, he has been permitted and enabled to take, or the answer he has to give to those who may be disposed to ask, *Why have you become a Catholic?* The late hour at which we received the book has deprived us of the pleasure of studying it as thoroughly as such a work should be studied, in order to do full justice to the subject and to the author; but from the hasty perusal of it which we have made, we cannot but regard it as a valuable contribution to our controversial literature. It is written in a clear, forcible, but simple and unpretending style; the argument is conducted with skill, ability, and erudition; its tone, though firm and uncompromising, is mild and winning; and the work appears to us, taken

as a whole, to be the best popular defence of the Papacy against Anglicanism which has recently been made. It proves that the author has studied his subject calmly, patiently, and impartially, and that he is a man of a high order of mind, and ripe scholarship, as well as of most attractive sincerity and modesty.

Mr. Major writes with great earnestness and singleness of purpose, and his work must carry conviction wherever it is seriously and candidly studied. No Episcopalian can read it with any degree of candor, without feeling in his heart, whatever he may profess with his mouth, that the author's reasons fully authorize the important step he has taken. These reasons seem to us to settle the question, and to leave nothing to be said for the clear and full understanding of the matter in controversy. They fully explode the pretensions of Anglicanism, expose its sophistry, and drive it from every ground on which it can even attempt to plant itself; and they fully and triumphantly establish the claims of the Holy See, — prove almost beyond the possibility of cavil even, that the Church in communion with the Holy See is the Church of God, and that no individual or body of individuals not in that communion is in communion with God's Church. The work, therefore, is a refutation, not only of Episcopalians and Anglicans, but of Protestants in general.

We like Mr. Major's book for its thorough-going character. It proves that the author is really and truly a convert, and able to write with Catholic simplicity, freedom, and directness. He is gentle, meek, humble, as should be every Catholic writer; he studies to say the truth in a manner as little likely to offend as possible; but he shows no disposition to *whittle* Catholicity down to the narrow aperture of the prejudices of its enemies. He sees that there is an essential difference between the Church and the sects, and he is neither afraid nor ashamed to say so. We like this. The spirit of the Church is always to insist, with special earnestness and firmness, on the special point which her enemies attack with the most violence; and we may always regard as the point to be the most strenuously asserted and defended, at any particular time and place, the point which is at such time and place the most offensive to those without, and against which they direct their principal attacks. When the hostility is especially against keeping pictures, images, and relics, and paying them due honor, then the true Catholic is sure to fill his house with them; when it is directed against the Real Presence, then the Church institutes the office of the Holy Sacrament, and carries the Adorable Host in triumphal procession; when controversies arise as to the change of the Elements, and men profess to be willing to admit the change, but do not like to call it *Transubstantiation*, she insists on the word itself. So, when the Papacy is regarded as the greatest difficulty in accepting the Church, it should be placed in bolder relief, and the authority of the Holy See be asserted in the fullest and strongest terms that the truth will warrant. We are glad, therefore, that Mr. Major, in the true Catholic spirit, that never compromises, and that loves a doctrine all the more for its being assailed by the enemies of the Church, has made his first appearance before the public as a Catholic in an unanswerable work in defence of the Holy See. To the clamors of our countrymen against the Pope, the dangers of Papal authority, and all that, he replies, that the Papacy is the Church, the Pope the Vicar of our Lord Jesus Christ on earth, and, if you war against the Pope, it is either because you would war against God, or because you believe God

can lie. If you believe God has commissioned the Pope, and that God will keep his promise, you must believe his authority is that of God, and can be no more dangerous than would be the authority of our Lord, were he present to exercise it in person.

We are also pleased to find that Mr. Major is a simple-minded convert, who comes to the Church to be taught, not to teach, and is willing to take the Church as she is, and on the grounds on which she has hitherto been taken. He brings her no theory or ingenious hypothesis of his own, and, laying it at her feet, modestly assures her that it will give him great pleasure to find his thoughts on the same subject coincident with hers. We like this. Indeed, we like the book, so far as we have examined it, not a little. It has given us a most favorable impression of the author, as a man of ability, as a scholar, and as a Catholic, and we bless God, for his sake and for ours, that he has been gathered into the fold of the true Shepherd.

2. — *Père Jean, or the Jesuit Missionary. A Tale of the North American Indians.* By JAMES MCSHERRY, Esq. Baltimore: J. Murphy. 1847.

THIS is Number IX. of *Murphy's Cabinet Library*. Of the preceding numbers of the Library we cannot speak, as the publisher has not seen proper to send them to us. This little work appeared first in the pages of the *Catholic Magazine*, where we read most of the chapters, as they came out, with interest and pleasure. The tale is high-wrought, and contains scenes sketched with great vividness and power. The character of the North American Indian, in many of its traits, is happily seized, though perhaps in others à la Cooper rather than à la Nature. The character of the Missionary seems to us drawn to the life, unless it falls short of the truth. It is impossible to exaggerate the meekness, humility, self-immolation, disinterestedness, ardent love of souls, and patient endurance of every privation and torture, of the early Jesuit missionaries among our North American savages. Imagination cannot come up to the reality, and fiction but weakens and renders credible the truth. If Mr. McSherry had just selected one of these early missionaries, or a Jesuit missionary even now in a savage country, and given a plain, unvarnished biographical sketch, he would have given us a work of more thrilling interest than even *Père Jean*. We shall hope to meet the author again in the field of literature, into which in this little volume he enters with so much promise.

3. — *Pauline Seward. A Tale of Real Life.* By JOHN D. BRYANT. Baltimore: Murphy. 1847. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE have received only the first volume of this work, the second being, we presume, not yet issued. We must wait the reception of the second volume, before we commence reading the work, and therefore

must reserve to a future occasion the expression of any opinion we may form concerning its merits or defects. It is a religious novel, not by a lady, which circumstance is not a presumption against it. We have heard it well spoken of, and we have no reason for thinking it is not a work of solid merit. We hope it has no love-story, and that it avoids seeking in the *tender passion* the wings on which to soar to heaven.

- 4.—*A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language; to which are added Walker's Key to the Pronunciation of Classical and Scripture Proper Names, much enlarged and improved; and a Pronouncing Vocabulary of Modern Geographical Names.* By JOSEPH E. WORCESTER. Boston: Wilkins, Carter, & Co. 1846. 8vo. pp. lxxvi. and 956.

MR. WORCESTER'S character as a lexicographer is well known, and has for some years been highly esteemed in this community; and we have no hesitation in saying that he has here furnished us decidedly the best dictionary of our language for common use which has yet appeared. As a defining dictionary, it may not deserve the highest rank, though it deserves a very high rank; but in relation to the vocabulary of the language, to its orthography and pronunciation, it is all that can be asked. The marking of Americanisms, provincialisms, and words obsolete in some of their senses, or not in good usage, will be found a great convenience, even to those who have no mean critical knowledge of the language; and the addition of Walker's Key, and the Pronouncing Vocabulary of Modern Geographical Names, greatly enhances its value. We cannot say any thing more in its praise than that we keep it lying on our desk when writing, and, however much we may be disposed to differ from the author as to the precise meaning of a particular word or mode of pronouncing it, we always feel bold and sure when we have him on our side. The work will, unquestionably, very soon become throughout the country, for ordinary use, the standard dictionary of the language, and settle it so far as a living language can be settled.

- 5.—*A Comprehensive Lexicon of the Greek Language, adapted to the Use of Colleges and Schools in the United States. Third Edition, greatly enlarged and improved.* By JOHN PICKERING. Boston: Wilkins, Carter, & Co. 1846. 8vo. pp. 1456.

WE have been disappointed in not receiving a critical notice of this improved edition of Pickering's Greek Lexicon with English definitions, and can in our present number only announce it. Mr. Pickering's name, however, is a guaranty that it is a work of learning and research, and well adapted to the purpose for which it is specially prepared. We have been assured by competent judges, that it is a work of solid merit, and for the use of schools and colleges is the best Greek lexicon within the reach of the English or American scholar. We like the plan of studying Greek through the medium of our own language; for in studying a foreign language, whether dead or living, it is of great importance that we take care not to lose the idiom of our own.

6. — *The Daily Exercise: consisting of the Holy Mass and Vespers; with Morning and Evening Prayers. To which is added a Selection of Hymns and Prayers for Confession.* Revised by the Rt. Rev. Dr. KENRICK. Boston: Donahoe. 1846. 32mo. pp. 192.

THIS is an excellent little prayer-book, the contents of which are correctly set forth in the title-page. Among the Hymns, we missed, not unwillingly, the Protestant hymns which we occasionally find in our collections. It has a singular effect to hear in a Catholic church a hymn sung, which we have been accustomed to give out when an heretical minister, and for the moment we seem to be carried back to the meeting-house.

7. — *Life of Stephen Decatur, a Commodore in the Navy of the United States.* By ALEXANDER SLIDELL MACKENZIE, U. S. N. Boston: Little & Brown. 1846. 16mo. pp. 443.

THE author of this volume has gained an unenviable notoriety, and we confess to taking up his life of Commodore Decatur with a strong prejudice against him. We find no fault with the decision of the court which acquitted him of the charge of murder in the Somers tragedy; but we have never been able to find any justification of his conduct in that tragedy, but his unofficer-like panic. We do not suppose him to have been actuated by any felonious intent or improper motives; but we have never been able to persuade ourselves that the summary execution of young Spencer, Cromwell, and Small had the least plea in necessity, or the least excuse in any real danger of a mutiny. The mutiny was probably the mere talk of a wild and rattle-headed young man, and the joke which was played off upon a timid lieutenant. Nevertheless, in spite of our opinion of the Somers tragedy, and our strong prejudice against Captain Mackenzie, we must admit that he has here given us a well written and exceedingly interesting volume. We are not well enough informed on many of the topics he introduces to be able to say whether he is or is not always correct; but he appears to have aimed at truth, and, so far as we can judge, may be relied on. He has a tendency now and then to attempt fine writing, and to sentimentalize; but in general his narrative is simple and flowing, his reflections are pertinent, and his suggestions worth considering. He writes with warm admiration for his subject, and with deep attachment to the navy. Of Commodore Decatur we have nothing to say. There is no American that is not proud of his name, and that does not regret his untimely death. He was almost the first to give character to our navy, and he is the most brilliant of its heroes. We are glad that this book has appeared at the present moment, and we are glad that it incidentally says so much in favor of the navy. We hope to see our navy increased, till it shall at least equal one half of that of Great Britain; and we think it will be found good economy and a peace measure so to increase it. But we have no space to discuss the subject. Our readers will find many helps to its discussion in the work before us, as well as a noble tribute paid to one of the bravest, most brilliant, and accomplished of our naval officers, by one who, so far as this book goes, appears to be well qualified to ap-

preciate his character. We cheerfully recommend the work to our readers, as, with one or two exceptions, the most interesting Life, for a Catholic, which has yet appeared in the new series of Sparks's American Biography.

8. — *Chambers's Cyclopædia of English Literature: a Selection of the Choicest Productions of English Authors, from the Earliest to the Present Time, connected by a Critical and Biographical History. Elegantly illustrated.* Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. Number I. 8vo. pp. 84. Price 25 cents.

WE have not much to say of this work, for it is unnecessarily offensive to Catholics. Yet it is got up with a good deal of literary talent and taste. The edition of which the first number is before us is well printed on good paper, and the illustrations are neatly executed.

9. — *Scriptural Temperance. A Sermon, delivered in the Hollis Street Meeting-house, Boston, on Thanksgiving Day, November 26, 1846.* By DAVID FOSDICK, Jr., Minister of Hollis Street Society. Published by Request. Boston: Clapp & Son. 1846. 8vo. pp. 26.

THE author of this sermon is a Unitarian minister, the successor of Mr. Pierpont as pastor of the Hollis Street Society in this city. With Mr. Fosdick we have no personal acquaintance, and, till we read this sermon, we knew not to which section of the Unitarian party he belonged, — the Centre, the Right, or the Left. The sermon proves that he does not belong to the Mountain, and that he is far from being willing to acknowledge Mr. Theodore Parker for his leader. It is not to be expected that a sermon by a Unitarian minister will meet entirely our approbation; but we have read this sermon with a good deal of interest and pleasure. It is able, and contains more sound sense and just thinking than we are accustomed to look for in Unitarian productions. With the main thought which runs through the sermon we heartily agree. Mr. Fosdick perceives the dangerous elements at work among us, — that principles are contended for and acted on which are incompatible, not only with Christianity, but with social order itself, — and that, unless something can be done to arrest the radical tendency which has become so strong of late, it will be necessary to give up, ere long, religion, society, and morals. His sermon may be regarded as the sign of a reaction in the Unitarian body against the tendency to NO-WHITHER it has for some years been obeying, and of an effort to return to something which has, at least, the appearance of decency. There was a time when our Unitarians, in the human sense, were moral and respectable, when there was a certain sobriety in their views touching morals and society. But the younger generation of their ministers have lost the conservative spirit of their fathers, their moderation and decorum, and seem to be rushing headlong into the wildest radicalisms of the day, and to suppose that the

more zealously they espouse every humbug that comes along, the more true will they prove to the Author of our religion. Mr. Fosdick appears to be a man of soberer views, sounder judgment, and more just thought; but we must express our doubts whether he will meet with a very hearty response from any considerable number of his own denomination. He cannot arrest the tendency he deplores; for, after all, it is the legitimate tendency of Unitarianism itself, and one must either accept it, or cease to be a consistent Unitarian. Nevertheless, we thank Mr. Fosdick for his discourse, and hope it is the promise of an upward tendency in himself.

10. — *The Goethean Hall, or the Anniversary of Goethe's Birthday, August 28, A. D. 1846, in Mercersburg.* Chambersburg, Pa. 1846. 8vo. pp. 47.

THIS pamphlet is interesting, inasmuch as it relates to the movement that is in progress among the Reformed Germans in Pennsylvania, — a movement of which we shall say something at our earliest opportunity. It is rather amusing to find Luther and Calvin regarded as the successors of St. Bernard and St. Thomas.

11. — *The Metropolitan Catholic Almanac and Laity's Directory for 1847.* Baltimore: F. Lucas, Jr.

THIS almanac, for 1847, has appeared in due season, and is, as usual, filled with interesting matter for the Catholic public. Every Catholic family, of course, will make it a point to procure it.

12. — *The Investigator and Advocate of Independence.* Edited by JOSIAH F. POLK. Monthly. Washington, D. C. December, 1846.

WE quote the title of this rabid Presbyterian magazine, for the sake of saying to the conductors of the Anticatholic press who honor us with their attacks, that we do not hold ourselves bound to notice any attack, unless it comes in a separate work from a respectable source, or in a periodical not published oftener than our own; and, moreover, unless the matter alleged against us is entitled to consideration. The editor of the *Investigator* would do well to verify his facts, before reasoning from them. M. Chevalier, of whom he speaks, was no Catholic when he wrote his *Letters* on this country. He was a Saint-Simonian, and had been a Saint-Simonian missionary. What he is now we do not know. It is easy to make out a case, where one has the manufacturing of his facts and principles. By the way, the writers in the Anticatholic papers,

in general, have little difficulty in establishing their conclusions. There is one in this city who, it is said, has completely annihilated us, by means of a principle which permits him to reason as if a demonstrable truth and a private opinion were one and the same thing; and therefore, if private judgment be insufficient to settle the question whether there are inhabitants in the moon, we can have no sufficient authority for saying there was such a man as Julius Cæsar, or that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Rare men are these Anticatholic writers.

- 13.— *A Selection of Songs and Ballads from Anglo-Irish Literature.* Boston: Patrick Donahoe. 1846. 16mo. pp. 164.

THIS appears to be a very judicious selection of songs, adapted to favorite Irish airs. The songs are chiefly from Erin's favorite bard, Thomas Moore, who, though he has written much that must be condemned by the moralist, has yet roused the world to a sense of the wrongs inflicted on his countrymen, and by his *Irish Melodies* has well earned the title of patriot. As a poet, he has proved that our language in melody and liquid sweetness, in the hands of a master, is not surpassed by any modern language, not even by the Italian. What would, then, have been his song, if he had sung in native Irish, — the mother-tongue of music and eloquence?

- 14.— *The One Progressive Principle.* By G. T. HEADLY. Delivered before the Literary Societies of the University of Vermont, August, 1846. New York: John S. Taylor. 1846. 8vo. pp. 32.

WE notice this address out of regard to the literary societies before which it was delivered, and the university with which they are connected. Of Mr. Headly we do not think much. He is a sort of male sentimentalist, and has more show than substance. His "one progressive principle" is mere moonshine, and his reading of history is all in his eye. The principle of progress cannot be itself progressive, but must be immovable, and the author's slightest error is that of mistaking the effect for the cause. We go as far as any man in defence of liberty, but we are yet to be convinced that the progress of liberty is to be measured by the destruction of its guaranties. Democracy and liberty are not necessarily coincident, nor is the will of the people always wise or just. What we want, whatever the form of the government, are safeguards for liberty in the shape of checks on power. Absolute governments are always an evil, and the wisdom of the statesman consists in the adoption of methods for their limitation.

. WE send out here the first number of our new series, with the compliments of the season to all our old friends, and to all the new friends it may find or make. As for enemies, being ourselves an enemy to no one, we take it for granted that we have none. The new series will follow in the track of the former, since the first volume. We enter upon the third year of our Catholic life, with the same heart and hope we did upon the first. We have made no important discoveries since, and have not been so fortunate as to get any new kink or crotchet in our head. The time has gone by that was set for our relapse into Protestantism, and as it has done so without our relapsing, we trust that the public will make up their minds to let us live and die a Catholic. We find ourselves very well satisfied with the Church, and with our Catholic friends; and ask nothing but the boon,—and it is a great one,—to be permitted to devote what may remain to us of life and strength to the cause of the Church. Would that we had known the Church earlier! from many a pang would it have saved us. The world is too poor to pay the price of one hour of Catholic life.

In conducting our Review, we aim to speak freely, plainly, directly; but we do not aim to trample on any one's feelings, or gratuitously to offend the most delicate sensibility. We cannot always commend; we are obliged sometimes to censure; but our readers need not suppose that to censure is more to our taste than to commend. We aim to make our Review Catholic, and as little unworthy of the Catholic community as in our power. Would, both for their sake and for ours, that it were less unworthy still! but we can do no more than we can; and Almighty God can, if he choose, make even a weak instrument mighty for good, and the most powerful, without his blessing, is only an instrument of evil. All rests with him, and on him alone should any of us place reliance.

Some of the Journals which have kindly noticed us seem to have inferred, that we intended to enlarge our Review this year to the size of the *Dublin Review*. Such has not been our intention, but we hope before a great while we may do it. We are not yet prepared, for we are not as yet sure of assistance enough from contributors to enable us, to do it. Such as it is, we send it forth to the public, and may they receive it with the indulgence with which they have heretofore been in the habit of receiving our well-meant efforts. If it tend in any degree to direct the attention of our countrymen to the great questions it discusses, or if, under God, it becomes instrumental in leading one soul to faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, as manifest in his Church, our labors will be amply rewarded.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1847.

ART. I. — *The Two Brothers ; or, Why are you a Protestant ?* — Continued.

V. PROTESTANT controversialists are well hit off in Lessing's Fable of the *Poodle and Greyhound*. " 'How our race is degenerated in this country !' said one day a far-travelled poodle to his friend the greyhound. 'In those distant regions which men call the Indies, there is still the genuine breed of hounds, — hounds, my brother, (you will not believe it, and yet I have seen it with my own eyes,) who do not fear to attack the lion and grapple with him.' 'Do they overcome him ?' asked the prudent greyhound. 'Overcome him ! Why as to that I cannot exactly say ; but only think, a lion attacked !' 'But,' continued the greyhound, 'if these boasted hounds of yours do not overcome the lion when they attack him, they are no better than ~~we~~, but a great deal more stupid.' " Only think, the Church attacked ! Attack her boldly, with or without success, and you are sure of the admiration of all — the poodles.

When the infamous Danton was asked by what means the pitiable minority he headed were able to maintain their Reign of Terror and paralyze the millions opposed to them, he answered, — "By audacity, *audacity*, AUDACITY." Protestant leaders understand very well the advantages of audacity, and that, if one is only bold and unprincipled enough to throw out grave charges against the purest and noblest cause which ever existed, he will not fail of multitudes to credit him. Groundless objections, if not susceptible of an easy or a popular refutation, are as much to their purpose as any. They serve to

attack the lion, to put Catholics on their defence, and that is the same as a victory. A child may start an objection which the ablest and most learned divine cannot answer — to the child. A very ordinary man may urge an objection to some article of faith which will demand, in him who is to receive the answer, as well as in him who is to give it, for its refutation, the most rare and extensive erudition, and familiarity with the deepest principles and nicest distinctions of scholastic theology and philosophy. No small part of the objections urged against the sacred mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Eucharistic Sacrifice, the Real Presence, and Transubstantiation, are objections which an ordinary mind may understand, but which it is impossible to answer to the general reader, — especially if the general reader be a Protestant. Such objections are exactly to the purpose of the Protestant controversialists, and gain them the applause of — the poodles.

These controversialists it is not to be presumed are ignorant that all the objections of past and present times to the Church have been refuted, and unanswerably refuted ; but, from the nature of the case, they have, in numerous instances, been refuted only to the professional reader. The nature of the objection, though itself popular, precluded a popular reply. In all such cases, Protestant controversialists have only to deny that any reply has been given, or to assert that the one given is inconclusive, and they come off triumphant. This is their common practice. Nothing is more common than to meet, in Protestant controversial works, objections, which have been refuted a hundred times, reiterated without a hint that any reply has ever been even attempted, and urged in a tone of confidence, as if Catholics themselves conceded them to be unanswerable. The impudence of Protestant polemics in this respect is notorious and undeniable.

That this method of conducting a controversy, on matters in which no one has any real interest in being deceived or in deceiving, is fair, honorable, or just, it is not presumed any Protestant is silly enough to pretend ; but, filled with an inveterate hatred of the Church, and having decided that it is the church of Antichrist, Protestant leaders, apparently, regard themselves at liberty to make use of any means for its overthrow which promise to be successful, and have no scruple in resorting to artifices which would shock the moral sense of an ordinary heathen. The Catholic writer, who should give a faithful account of their nefarious conduct in their war

on the Church, would find it harder to sustain himself with his friends than against his enemies ; and he would hardly fail to be condemned by his own communion as a calumniator. Their conduct is so foreign to all the habits and conceptions of a simple-minded, honest Catholic, that one needs to have been a Protestant a great part of his life to be able to conceive it possible for beings having the human form, and pretending to some respect for religion and morals, to be guilty of so wide a departure from all that is true, just, and honorable. Hence the great tenderness and forbearance with which Catholics usually treat Protestants, and the undeserved credit they are accustomed to give them for a partial degree, at least, of fairness and candor.

At first view, one is at a loss to account for the sudden rise and rapid spread of the Protestant rebellion in the sixteenth century. Knowing by infallible faith, that the Church is of God, the Immaculate Spouse of the Lamb, and that she has truth, wisdom, justice, sanctity, reason, evidence, on her side, the Catholic is astonished at so singular a phenomenon ; but as he penetrates deeper into that mystery of iniquity, and becomes familiar with the character of the rebel chiefs, and the means they adopted, his astonishment ceases, and his wonder is, not that the success was so great, but that it was not greater, — that the revolt was so soon arrested and confined within limits that it has not as yet been able to pass. He sees nothing marvellous in the success of these rebel chiefs, but he is struck with the manifest interposition of Divine Providence to confound their language, to divide their counsels, to defeat their plans, to arrest their progress, to protect his Church, to show his unfailing love for her, and to augment her power and glory. Protestantism, as it concerns Europe, is actually confined within narrower limits than it was fifty years after the death of Luther, while the Church has gone on enlarging her borders, and never at any former period was the number of the faithful so great as it is now.

They who attack existing institutions, especially if those institutions are wise and salutary, may always count on the admiration and applause of all the poodles. Fixed and authoritative institutions are offensive to the natural man. They are a restraint, and no man, save so far as assisted and subdued by grace, loves restraint ; and there is no one that has not a natural repugnance to whatever curbs his lawless desires and licentious passions, or interposes an obstacle to his living

as he lists. In every community, — because in every natural man, — there is always a predisposition, more or less manifest, to rebel against the existing order, and to welcome and adhere to those who are prepared to war against it, especially to credit whatever may be advanced to its prejudice. They who attack the existing order, appealing to this predisposition, have the appearance of attacking tyranny and oppression, and of being champions of freedom and justice. This fact renders them respectable, almost sacred, in the eyes of the multitude. Their position, moreover, permits them to assume a bold and daring tone, to make broad and sweeping assertions, and to forego clear and exact statements, and close and rigid logic. They can declaim, denounce, be impassioned, and affect all the eloquence of virtuous indignation. The eloquence of denunciation is the easiest thing in the world to command ; for it appeals directly to those elements of our nature which lie nearest the surface and which are the most easily moved, and weak men prefer it and seek to possess it.

But he who defends authority labors always under a disadvantage. He has an unpopular cause. To the superficial, — and they are always the great majority, — he is the advocate of tyranny, the enemy of liberty, warring against the best interests and true dignity and glory of his race. He can appeal to no popular passion, use no burning words, and pour forth no strains of indignant eloquence. He cannot speak to the multitude. He must speak to sober sense, to prudent judgment, and aim to convince the reason, instead of moving the sensibility, or inflaming the passions. His words, to all but the few, are cold and spiritless, tame and commonplace. For the foaming tankard or sparkling goblet, with which the popular declaimer regales his auditors, he has only simple water from the spring. He must be subdued in his tone, measured in his speech, exact in his statements, rigid in his reasoning, and few only will listen to him, and fewer still can appreciate him. He who for years has been on the side opposed to authority, and by his bold and daring declamation roused up a whole ocean of popular passion, and at every word brought an echo from the universal heart of humanity, no sooner finds himself on the other side, than all his marvellous eloquence is lost, and he is pronounced, by the very public which had hailed him as a second Cicero or Demosthenes, cold and weak, a Samson shorn of his locks and grinding in the mill of the Philistines. No matter how true and just his

thought, how deep and searching his wit, how wise and prudent his counsel, how lucid and exact his statements, how clear and cogent his reasoning, he can excite no passion, move no sensibility, and bring no popular echo. The spell is broken; his magic is over, and his power to charm is gone for ever. He is no Indian hound, fearing not to attack the lion, and the poodles see nothing to admire.

Then, again, the poodles regard the lion attacked as the lion vanquished. They hold every objection boldly and confidently made to be true, till it is proved to be false. In this fact, in the tendency of the great majority to regard every objection made to existing authority as well founded till the contrary is shown, lies the secret of the Protestant Reformation. To this the Reformers owed their brilliant success. They well understood that their objections to the Church would be credited by multitudes, till refuted. It was a matter of little importance, so far as their success was concerned, whether their objections were true or false. What they wanted was simply objections easily made, but not easily refuted, — susceptible of being proposed in a popular form, but not susceptible of a popular answer. Such objections they employed their wit in inventing, and their skill and activity in circulating. A lie, happily conceived, adroitly told, and well stuck to, was in their case hardly, if at all, inferior to the truth; and it must be conceded that they had a marvellous facility in inventing lies, and in adhering to them when they had once told them. Whoever coolly examines their objections to the Church will readily perceive that they are all framed with respect, not to truth, but to the difficulty of refutation, and on the principle that a lie is as good as the truth till it is contradicted. Gloriously did they chuckle, we may fancy, when the “Father of lies” helped them to a popular objection, to which no popular answer could be returned. Boldly, or with brazen impudence, they threw it out, sent it forth on its errand of mischief, and then laughed at the heavy answer which, in process of time, came lumbering after it. The objection was made in a few words, on a loose sheet, and wafted by the wind of controversy through every land, town, village, and hamlet, to every door, and became universally known; the answer followed in a ponderous quarto or folio, all bristling with scholastic formulas and scholastic distinctions, formidable even to the professional reader. Its circulation was necessarily limited; few only heard of it; fewer

read it ; and still fewer were able to appreciate it. The authors of the objection safely ignored it, or, if they could not, they misrepresented it, denied its conclusiveness, and even made it the occasion of a new triumph with their followers. Or, when they could neither conceal the fact of the answer nor its conclusiveness, they could still count on all the poodles, who would insist that there must have been something in the objection, or else it would not have required so elaborate and so learned a refutation. The lion had been attacked, — and that was something.

“ Where there is much smoke, there is some fire,” says the popular proverb. Surely there must be something wrong in the Church, or so much would not, and could not, be said against her. Whether, therefore, the objections actually urged be precisely true or not, it is evident the Church is not unobjectionable, and if not unobjectionable, we are justified in rejecting her. So reason the poodles, — forgetting that our Blessed Lord himself was everywhere spoken against, was called a glutton and a drunkard, the friend of publicans and sinners, a blasphemer, a seditious fellow, a fool, said to be possessed of the devil, and finally crucified between two thieves as a malefactor. Here was smoke enough, — was there also some fire ? Here were objections enough raised, charges enough preferred, — was there also some truth in them ? Where is the blasphemous wretch that dare think it ? If they have called the Master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household ! If so they have accused the Lord himself, how much more his Church ! To one competent to reason on the subject, the grave character and multiplicity of the objections alleged against the Church are an evidence that she is God’s Church. “ Will you tell me what books I may read to become acquainted with the Catholic faith ? ” said, the other day, an intelligent Protestant lady to the writer. “ I am wholly ignorant of the Catholic Church, but I hear, everywhere, so much said against it, that I cannot help thinking there must be something good in it, and that possibly it is the true Church.” This young lady, brought up a rigid Calvinist, through God’s grace, had learned to reason far more justly than she had been taught by her Protestant masters, and, if true to the grace she has received, will ere long be admitted into the “ Communion of Saints.” But she is not one of the poodles ; and the Reformers preferred, and their successors prefer, the

admiration of these to the approbation of the sober and prudent greyhounds.

The policy of the Reformers was indicated by Luther, when he took the discussion of theological questions out of the schools and from the tribunal of professional theologians, and brought it before the unprofessional public. I picked up, the other day, in a steamboat, a flaming quack advertisement. It appeared that the advertiser had, as he alleged, discovered an entirely new medical system, which placed all the regular medicens, from Æsculapius down, quite in the wrong. He had challenged the regular practitioners to a discussion of the merits of their respective systems. The challenge had been accepted, but on condition that the discussion should be before a jury of medical men. The advertiser scorned this condition. It proved that the "regular doctors" had no confidence in their own system; for if otherwise, they would not shrink from a public discussion. It was an insult to the public, and he would not submit to it. He was ready and anxious to discuss the question; but he would do it before no prejudiced jury of professional men; he would do it openly before his free and enlightened fellow-citizens, who were the only proper tribunal. He trusted his fellow-citizens, the free and enlightened public, would appreciate his motives in refusing to be a partner in offering so gross an indignity to their intelligence and impartial judgment, and would be at no loss to understand why the regular practitioners had annexed to their acceptance of his challenge so insulting a condition.

Now here am I, said I to myself, throwing down the advertisement, at least a fair average of the popular intelligence. I have even studied, with considerable attention, several branches of medical science; and yet how utterly unqualified I should be to sit as judge on the respective merits of rival systems! I might listen to the statements of either party, but I am too ignorant of the general subject to be able to perceive the bearing and real value of the statements of one or the other. I might, indeed, if such should happen to be the case, perceive that this pretended discoverer silenced his opponent; but I could draw no inference from that, for nothing is more common than for a man to triumph through impudence, or because too ignorant to be refuted. The proper judges of a controversy like the one here proposed are medical men themselves, as lawyers are the proper judges of law questions. Indeed, the very fact, that this advertiser refuses to argue his

case before an audience of professional men, and appeals to the unprofessional public, is to me full proof that he is a quack, and sufficient to decide me, without further examination, against him. If I need medical advice, I am sure I shall not call him in, any more than I would a miserable pettifogger in an important and intricate law case. I can confide my health and that of my family to no practitioner whose science and skill are not superior to my own, and vouched for by those who know more of medical matters than I do, and are far better judges of medical systems than I am.

Just so would I have reasoned, if I had been present, when Luther made his appeal to the unprofessional public. Why did he make such appeal? Because the public at large are the proper tribunal for professional questions? Because they can really judge better, discriminate more accurately, and decide with more wisdom and justice, than they who by their profession are at least somewhat acquainted with the matters in controversy? Because he really believed them the best qualified to be judges? No one can be so simple as to believe it, so senseless as to pretend it. Luther knew that loose statements, confident assertions, bold allegations, and impassioned appeals would avail him nothing before a jury of theological doctors. He knew that there he could not lie with impunity, and that his "bellowing in bad Latin" would win him no laurels. He may have persuaded himself, or suffered the Devil to persuade him, — and if we may believe his own statements, his colloquies with the Devil were frequent and intimate, — that the Church was wrong; but he must have known that the particular objections he brought against her were groundless, and that it was only by disregarding the established rules of reasoning, and resorting to falsehood and sophistry, confident assertions and bold and daring denunciations, that he could sustain himself or his party. And these could avail only with the unprofessional public, who could never understand the exact points in question, perceive the bearing, or feel the force, of strict logical arguments. With them eloquence would pass for reason, and invective for argument. This he knew, and hence his appeal from the schools to the public at large. Hence have his followers continued to appeal to the multitude, and to leave truth and justice to take care of themselves.

This policy, however, is not without certain drawbacks. It answers admirably while the party adopting it have nothing

of their own, and are mere Bedouins of the desert, free to attack when and where they please. But when and where they have acquired a partial success, and wish to abandon their wandering life and predatory warfare, and settle down in fixed dwellings, with something established and permanent of their own, they find it unavailing. Men, as Carlyle remarks, cannot live without clothes, and surely in this bleak, wintry world it is not convenient to go naked. They must and will have something to cover their nakedness, — some sort of institutions for their protection. They will cover themselves with aprons of fig-leaves, and build them a hut with broken branches, seek out a cavern in the rocks, or a hole in the earth, if they can do no better. They must and will have something they call religion, some established mode of communion, real or not real, with the Invisible. Even the atheist fabricates to himself a god of nature, and renders it a species of worship, and the skeptic seeks to convert his skepticism into a creed. It is horrible to feel one's self alone in the world, abandoned to the blind workings of the elements, with no Father in heaven, no brothers on earth, standing on a mere point, surrounded by a universal blank. We cannot endure it. Nature recoils from herself, and the soul shrieks out, "O thou Great Unknown, save me from myself! leave me, O, leave me not to the solitude of my own being!" There is a God, and a God to be worshipped, is written in golden letters on all nature, and engraven as with the point of a diamond on every heart. In vain would man tear himself away from his Maker. Go where he will, be and do what he will, sleeping or waking, the God that made him and seeks his heart woos him with his love, or pursues him with his justice. The boldest recoil from his justice, and quake before the undefined dread of his vengeance, and seek some medium of yielding the love, or of providing a substitute for the love he solicits.

Protestants went on gloriously, while they aimed at nothing but to attack the existing ecclesiastical order. The means they had chosen were just fitted to their purpose. But when a large number had been seduced from their allegiance, and found themselves homeless, and shelterless, and naked in this bleak world, a new class of wants sprung up to be provided for. Some substitute for what had been thrown away in their madness was to be sought out. Now their old arts and methods were useless. As soon as they had something with which they were unwilling to part, something, in a word, to defend,

the weapons they had forged were no longer adapted to their purpose, and could be turned against them with murderous effect. Thus short-sighted and self-destructive is iniquity ever.

Poor James experienced the truth of this, the moment he was called upon to answer why he was a Protestant. The question was a novel one, and he soon found that he was wholly unprovided with a satisfactory answer. He had sought long and earnestly for specious objections to the Church, but he had entirely neglected to furnish himself with arguments for Protestantism as distinguishable from Socinianism or infidelity. Nay, he was unable even to tell, save in a negative sense, what he meant by Protestantism. Adopt what definition he would, it would include either too much or too little. It was too bad. Yet his natural pride would not permit him to yield to the obvious truth, that he must either be a Catholic or reject all revealed, if not all natural, religion. With the multitude he might, indeed, sustain himself. There his audacity and his eloquence would serve him, but they were lost upon his cool and logical brother. John was no poodle, that was certain, and could never be made to regard the lion attacked as the lion overcome, or even to admire the rashness of an attack where there could be no victory. What was to be done ? Give up the point ? That would never do, and he the virtual chief of the Protestant league for the conversion of the Pope and the suppression of Popery ! What then ? Surely he was the equal of his brother in acquirements, and he had always, in their school days, been regarded as his superior in natural gifts. He would not believe that he had the weaker cause. His failure, thus far, must be owing to his yielding the management of the argument to his brother, and his not having been sufficiently on his guard against his sophistry and Jesuitical cunning. Could he not correct this ? Could he not contrive to change the issue, and throw the burden of proof on the Catholic ? He pondered the matter for several weeks, and finally concluded, that, if he could not define and establish Protestantism, he might at least disprove Catholicity, and thus justify the Reformers in separating themselves from the Church.

VI. As soon as James had come to this sage conclusion, an opportunity was found of renewing the discussion. This time it was John who opened it.

"Well, brother, he said, have you succeeded in finding a definition of Protestantism to your mind?"

"I wish to consider Protestantism, now, only as a protest against the errors and corruptions of Popery. Here you affirm and I deny, and consequently the laboring oar is in your hands."

"Not exactly, my prudent brother. You affirm Catholicity is corrupt. You are, then, the accuser, the plaintiff in action, and must set forth your charges and sustain them. The principle of law is, every man is to be presumed innocent till proved guilty. The Church must, therefore, be presumed innocent till the contrary is made to appear."

"The Church claims to be an ambassador from God, and to have the right to command me in his name. She must bring credentials from God, before I can be held to hear or obey her. I demand her credentials."

"All in good time. But not too many things at once. You shift the question before you get it fairly stated. You begin by charging the Church with being corrupt, and, without offering any proofs of her corruption, you proceed immediately to demand her credentials as the Ambassador of God. This will not do. Corruption implies integrity; and the plea that the Church is corrupt concedes her credentials, and merely charges her with exceeding her authority, or with having abused it. This plea concedes her authority; but the demand for credentials denies it. You cannot, therefore, plead, at one and the same time, want of authority, and corruption or abuse of authority. You must elect one or the other, and confine yourself to the one you elect."

"I am no lawyer, and do not understand special pleading."

"But you are an educated man, and are to be presumed to understand, at least, the ordinary rules of logic, and therefore that the same thing cannot be both conceded and denied in the same breath. You cannot say that the Church is corrupt, has abused or misused her authority, and yet deny her authority. When you deny that she has ever received authority from God, you declare her, *in quantum est Ecclesia*, a nullity from the beginning, and to allege the corruption of a nullity is absurd."

"Be it so. The Romish Church never received authority from God, or, in other words, was never divinely commissioned."

"Possession is in law *primâ facie* evidence of title. The

Church is in possession, and has been so from time immemorial. The presumption is, therefore, in her favor, and you must admit her title, or set forth good and valid reasons for contesting it."

"Prescription does not apply in the case of the Church."

"It is admitted in law, and therefore, by the reason of mankind, as a general principle. If you deny its application in the case of the Church, you allege an exception to the general rule, and must show a reason for it."

"Prescription does not give an absolute title, but simply a presumptive title against adverse claimants. It presupposes the existence of the estate to be conceded, the title of which is vested in some one, and presumes it to be in the possessor, unless the contrary is shown. But where the existence of the estate is the matter in question, it is idle to plead possession or prescription. What is not cannot be possessed. The estate, in the present case, is the divine commission. Supposing it conceded that such a commission has at some time been issued, possession may, I grant, be pleaded as *prima facie* evidence of title in the possessor. But I deny that such a commission as the Romish Church claims to have received has ever been issued. You must prove, therefore, the fact of such commission, before you can plead possession or prescription."

"Possession implies the object possessed. Evidence of the possession is, therefore, evidence of the existence of that which is possessed. Consequently, just in proportion as there is evidence that the Church has possessed, or claimed and exercised, with the general consent, the commission in question, and as her having claimed and exercised it with this consent is presumptive proof of title against adverse claimants, is there presumptive proof that the commission has been issued."

"*Quod nimis probat, nihil probat.* Your argument, if it prove any thing, proves too much. A pagan or a Mahometan may say as much."

"If either paganism or Mahometanism claims a similar commission, and can, as the Church, be said to be in possession, the fact is, in like manner, presumptive evidence of title till the contrary appears, I both concede and contend. Nothing can generate nothing. The claim to a divine commission must have had some origin, and, on the principle of law, that every man must be presumed innocent till proved to be guilty, must be presumed to have had a good origin till

the contrary is proved. False religions imply the existence of the true religion, as counterfeit coin implies the genuine. The claim to divine commission, if it be really made by either paganism or Mahometanism, is therefore *primâ facie* evidence that at some time, to somebody, a divine commission has issued. If no such commission had ever been given, it is not conceivable that it could have been claimed. No one would ever have falsely claimed to be an ambassador from one court to another, if no genuine ambassador, or nothing in the same order, had ever been known or heard of; and the sending of ambassadors must have become a general custom, before any one, not duly commissioned, could have conceived the project of palming himself off as one, or could have hoped for any success in the attempt to do it. The fact of possession, where it could be pleaded, would be a presumption of title in the Mahometan or the pagan, in like manner as it is in the case of the Catholic. Hence the Church, where she has never been in possession, when presenting herself as an *adverse claimant*, always produces her credentials, and gives good and valid reasons why the present occupant should be ousted and she placed in possession. I admit, therefore, all that the argument implies, and deny that it proves too much."

"But admit it, and every mad enthusiast who claims to be divinely commissioned must be presumed to be so till the contrary is shown."

"Not at all. His claim to a divine commission is, if you will, a presumption that at some time, to somebody, a divine commission has issued; but not that it has issued to him; for he is not and never has been in possession. He must show a reason for *his* claim, before it can be admitted."

"At least, the principle applies to Protestants as well as to pagans and Mahometans, and you can no more plead prescription against us than against them."

"I have admitted the plea of prescription, in the case of paganism and Mahometanism, on the supposition that they are really in possession,—a fact, however, which I let pass, but do not concede. But Protestants cannot plead prescription, because they are not and never have been in possession, and because they do not even claim to be, since you, in their name, deny that the commission in question has ever issued."

"But conceding that there was a presumption in favor of the Church at the epoch of the Reformation, and that the

Reformers were not at liberty to separate from her without cause, this cannot be said now. The Church is not now in possession. The Reformers gave good and valid reasons for separating from her communion, and she has been condemned as a usurper by the judgment of mankind. The question is not now on ousting her from a possession which she has held from time immemorial, but on reversing the judgment rendered against her, and readmitting her to a possession from which she has been ejected by due process of law."

"When was the judgment you speak of rendered? and where is the record of the court?"

"The fact is one of public notoriety, and all the world now laughs at the ridiculous pretensions of Rome."

"Do you include in *all the world* the pagan and Mahometan worlds?"

"Why should I not?"

"It may be doubted whether the question has really ever come before them in such a shape that they can be said to have pronounced judgment upon it; and as they reject Protestantism, whenever it pretends to be Christian, no less than Catholicity, they might possibly be as unsafe witnesses for a Presbyterian as for a Catholic, — perhaps even more so."

"Let them go. I mean by *all the world* all the Christian world, Christendom so called."

"You mean to assert, then, that Christendom has pronounced judgment against the Catholic Church?"

"Yes, against the *Romish* Church."

"You distinguish without a difference. The Church in communion with the Church of Rome, acknowledging its Pontiff for its supreme head on earth, is the only Church which, by the consent of mankind, is or ever has been denominated the *Catholic* Church."

"She should be denominated the mother of harlots."

"So that Protestant communions could claim to be her daughters. But no more of this. Have Catholics, who remain in her communion, pronounced judgment against the Church?"

"Perhaps not."

"And they are as two, if not three, to one of all who bear the Christian name."

"I am sorry to say they are."

"And I am not sorry, and would to God there were none but Catholics on the earth!"

“ That is, you would, if you could, exterminate all Protestants.”

“ Yes, if making them sincere and humble Catholics were exterminating them. But if Catholics are the great majority of Christendom, how can you tell me that Christendom has pronounced judgment against the Church ? ”

“ I do not reckon Papists among Christians.”

“ And I regard what you call Papists as the only true Christians ; and I have, to say the least, as much right to my reckoning as you have to yours. You mean, then, by Christendom those who protest against the Church ? ”

“ You may have it so.”

“ Then your position is, the Church is condemned by all by whom she is condemned ! This may be granted. But these are a small minority, a mere handful, of those who bear the Christian name. By what right do you pronounce their judgment the judgment of mankind ? ”

“ Protestant nations are the more enlightened and advanced portion of mankind.”

“ Is that a conceded fact ? ”

“ Is it not ? ”

“ Do Catholics concede it ? ”

“ Perhaps not.”

“ They are the great majority, and, as they deny it, how can you put it forth as generally conceded ? ”

“ The denial of Catholics amounts to nothing, — the fact is as I allege.”

“ In whose judgment ? ”

“ In the judgment of all who are competent to judge in the premises.”

“ Who says so ? ”

“ I say so.”

“ On what authority ? ”

“ The fact is evident, and cannot be questioned.”

“ But it is questioned and denied by Catholics, who are as five to one to your Protestants.”

“ They will swear to any thing their priests tell them. Their denial is not to be counted. They are not to be permitted to testify in their own cause.”

“ As much as you in yours. Their denial is as good as your assertion, till you show some reason why your assertion is to be preferred.”

“ I tell you Protestant nations are the most enlightened and advanced portion of mankind, as is well known.”

" To whom ? To themselves ? "

" Yes, if you will."

" By what right are they both witnesses and judges in their own cause ? "

" By the right of being the most enlightened and advanced portion of mankind."

" What is it to be truly enlightened and advanced ? "

" Those nations are the most enlightened and advanced that are the most enlightened and advanced in what is of the greatest importance and utility to man."

" And what is that ? "

" Religion, the ' one thing needful. ' "

" True religion, or false ? "

" True religion, of course."

" The most enlightened and advanced nations are, then, those who are the most enlightened and advanced in the requirements of true religion ? "

" They are ; and therefore I claim Protestant nations as the most enlightened and advanced."

" And therefore beg the question. If Protestantism be the true religion, you are right ; if Catholicity be the true religion, you are wrong. Consequently, you must determine which is the true religion, before you can determine which are the more enlightened and advanced nations."

" But it cannot be denied that Protestant nations are more intelligent, more industrious, and better instructed in the science and art of government."

" What you say may be questioned ; but even conceding it, it amounts to nothing. Because a man is a good cobbler it does not follow that he is a good sculptor. Because a nation is enlightened in mere earthly matters, it does not follow that it is in religious matters. It would be a solecism to say the Athenians were a more enlightened and advanced nation than the Jews, or that a Socrates is better authority on religion than David, Solomon, or Isaias."

" But I have always considered it undeniable that Protestant nations are in advance of all the others."

" If to advance consists in shaking off Christian civilization and in returning to that which it superseded, you may have been right ; otherwise, the probability is, that you have been altogether wrong. You must prove Protestantism to be true religion, before you can claim Protestant nations as the more enlightened and advanced nations ; and till you can so claim

them, you cannot claim their judgment as the judgment of mankind, even if you could then ; and till you can claim their judgment as the judgment of mankind, you cannot say the judgment of mankind has condemned the Church. This you have not yet done. Consequently, you cannot say the Church has been ejected from her possession by the judgment of mankind. She is, as it appears, from the fact that the overwhelming majority of those who bear the Christian name continue, as they have always continued, to adhere to her, still in possession. She has lost nothing, and you have gained nothing, by the lapse of three hundred years. The question stands to-day as it did in 1517, and she may plead the *olim possideo*, as she could then, and with even additional force ; and you must set forth in your declaration good and valid reasons for ejecting her, before you can compel her to plead any other title than that of prescription."

" But you forget that the Reformers did set forth such reasons."

" I cannot have forgotten what I never knew. But whatever reasons they set forth, the presumption is that they were insufficient ; for they have been so regarded by Christendom generally, since the Church continues in possession, and the great majority of all who are called Christians still adhere to her communion."

" But they were in reality sufficient, and ought to have been so regarded."

" That is a point to be proved. What were those reasons ? "

" The first in order, if not in time, was, that our Lord founded no authoritative church such as the Romish claims to be."

" We have seen she was in possession, and the presumption was in her favor. What you state was an allegation which needed to be proved."

" The Reformers proved it."

" By what evidence ? "

" By the word of God."

" Had they the word of God ? "

" They had."

" Did the Church concede that they had it ? " -

" They had the Holy Scriptures, and she admitted that they were the word of God."

" That the mere letter was the word of God, or the sense in which the Holy Ghost dictated them ? "

“ The sense, of course ; for words are nothing without their sense.”

“ Did she admit that the Reformers, in having the letter of Scripture, had its sense, which is the word of God ? ”

“ She did not.”

“ Was, according to her, the Holy Scripture the word of God, if understood in any sense different from hers ? ”

“ No ; she claimed the right to declare its sense.”

“ Did the Reformers adduce the words of Scripture, in support of their allegation that our Lord had founded no such church as she pretended to be, in the sense she gave them ? ”

“ They did not ; for she explained them in her own favor.”

“ Then she did not admit that what they adduced in support of their allegation was the word of God. Then, as the burden of proof was on them, they were bound to prove that it was his word.”

“ They quoted the Scriptures, and they were the word of God.”

“ In the sense of the Church, not otherwise. The Reformers pleaded the word of God in support of their allegation. The Church replied by denying that what they set forth as the word of God was his word. Her reply was sufficient, unless they proved that it was his word.”

“ But their plea was evident on its face, for they alleged the very words of Scripture.”

“ That they alleged the very words of Scripture may be denied, for in point of fact there are no words of Scripture which say that our Lord did *not* found such a church as the Catholic Church claimed and claims to be ; but let that pass for the present. They pleaded the word of God, and the word of God is not the words, but the sense, of Scripture. To adduce the words, therefore, availed them nothing, unless they proved that the sense of the words, as intended by the Holy Ghost, was what they pretended ; for till then they could not assert that they had adduced the word of God.”

“ But the matter was so plain, that there could be no question as to the genuine sense of the words adduced.”

“ But there was a question as to the sense, by your own admission. The Church attached to them one sense, and the Reformers another.”

“ But the words themselves necessarily mean what the Reformers asserted.”

"We cannot go into that question at present. The right to declare the word of God is included in the possession of the Church, and the fact that she denied the Reformers' sense is *primâ facie* evidence in her favor and against them."

"I do not admit that."

"You have admitted it; for you have conceded that prescription was in favor of the Church, and is *primâ facie* evidence of title. You must, therefore, admit the word of God as the Church declares it, till you can assign a good and valid reason for not doing so."

"The fact that the express words of Scripture are against her is such a reason."

"The express words of Scripture you cannot allege; because, as a matter of fact, no such words are to be found; and because, if there were such words, they still could not be adduced against the Church, for the Scriptures are in her possession, and denied to have authority save as she understands them."

"That would be to deny that the Scriptures are legitimate evidence in support of an allegation against the Church."

"That is not my fault. The Reformers could not, of course, legitimately quote the Scriptures as the word of God against the Church, save in the sense she authorized, unless they succeeded in removing the presumption she derived from prescription, and in getting themselves in legal possession of them."

"I do not admit that. The Scriptures were the law, to which the Church and all were accountable."

"As declared by the Church, *transeat*; but that they were the law in any other sense the Reformers were bound to prove."

"But the Reformers had the word of God as well as the Church, and therefore were not bound, even presumptively, by the sense she declared."

"Had they *legal* possession of the word of God?"

"I care nothing about that. They had the Scriptures, and that was enough; for they had in them the rule of faith, both for them and for the Church."

"But you must care for that; for it is conceded that the Church was in possession, and, being in possession, she had the presumptive right to declare the law; and they were bound to take it from her, unless they could prove that they had legal possession of the word."

"They received the Scriptures from God himself."

“ They were, then, the legal depositaries of the word ? ”

“ Yes, as much as the Church.”

“ Had they the right to declare its sense ? ”

“ Why not ? ”

“ If you say that, you concede the point you dispute. You allege against the Church, that our Lord founded no such church. The essential character of the Church, so far as concerns the present controversy, is, that she has the word of God, and is its legal keeper and expounder. If, then, you say the Reformers had legal possession of the word, and were authorized to keep and expound it, you make them essentially such a church as you assert our Lord did not found. You contest the claims of the Church on the ground that our Lord founded no church with the authority she exercises ; you must, then, unless you would concede what you deny, disclaim that authority on the part of the Reformers.”

“ I do disclaim it on their part.”

“ Then you grant, in the outset, that they had no legal possession of the word, and were not its authorized keeper and expounder ; therefore, that they had no word of God which they had authority to quote against the Church. What they had not they could not adduce. Consequently, they did not, for they could not, adduce the word of God in support of their allegation.”

“ But they had the Scriptures, as a matter of fact, and could read and understand them for themselves.”

“ They had the Scriptures as a private citizen has the statute-book, it may be ; but as they were not the authorized keeper and expounder of the word of God, their understanding of it was without authority, and not to be entertained.”

“ They had the right from God himself to read and understand the word for themselves.”

“ Then they were authorized to keep and expound it, at least for themselves.”

“ They were.”

“ But I understood you to deny that any body was authorized to keep and expound the word.”

“ I do not say so. Almighty God, in revealing his word, has authorized every one to keep, read, and expound its sense.”

“ Then, so far from its being true, as you have alleged, that our Lord has founded no church with the authority the Catholic Church claims, he has constituted each individual a

church with the same authority. Decidedly, brother, you must give up this, or withdraw your allegation. If you admit that our Lord has anywhere authorized any body, individual or collective, to keep and expound the word of God, you admit that he did found, essentially, such a church as your allegation denies. You cannot deny such authority to the Church on the ground that no such authority was ever given, and then claim it for each and every individual."

"Be that as it may, I do claim it for each and every individual."

"That is a bold stand for a Presbyterian, but necessity sometimes compels us to be bold. But did the Church admit this ?"

"No, she denied it."

"Then the Reformers were bound to prove it."

"They did prove it."

"By what authority ?"

"The word of God."

"By what the Church admitted to be the word of God ?"

"No matter what she admitted. They proved it by the word itself."

"Who says so ?"

"They said so."

"On what authority ?"

"On the authority of God's word."

"On what authority did they say that that was the word of God which authorized them to say so ?"

"The word itself."

"But by what authority did they prove the word itself ?"

"The word of God is the word of God, and is in all cases supreme. Would you deny the word of God ?"

"But as the Church denied what they adduced as the word of God to be his word, they were then bound to prove that it was his word."

"What did Almighty God give us his word for, if it was not that we should read and understand it for ourselves ?"

"Your first business is to prove that he has given *you* his word. The Church asserts that he has given it to *her*, and that she permits the faithful to read the Scriptures for their edification, but always with submission to her authority, and the reservation that no doctrine is to be deduced from them which she does not authorize."

"There she is wrong."

"That is for you to prove."

"God proposed to teach mankind by writings, not by a body of men."

"That, also, is for you to prove."

"It is evident from the word itself."

"You must prove that *you* have the word, before you can introduce it as evidence."

"No one can read the New Testament and believe otherwise."

"Not true in fact ; for the great mass of all who do read the New Testament actually believe otherwise. But you must get legal possession of the New Testament, and establish your right to interpret it, before you can quote it in a sense the Church denies. Till then, the denial of your assertion by the Church is *primâ facie* evidence against you."

"I do not care for the Church. I deny her authority."

"I know that ; but her authority is to be presumed, till reasons are set forth for denying it. You are not at liberty to deny it without a reason."

"I have given a reason."

"What is it ?"

"Why, I tell you she is condemned by the word of God."

"You *tell* me so, but that is not enough. You must *prove* that it is so."

"You do not suffer me to do so. You will not suffer me to quote the Bible against her."

"No such thing. When you have proved that the Bible, in the sense you adduce it, is the word of God, you may quote it to your heart's content."

"Why, I have told you again and again that the Church herself admits the Bible to be the word of God, and therefore it is not necessary, in arguing against her, to prove that what I adduce from it is the word of God."

"The Bible *plus* her interpretation, or rather in the sense she authorizes, she admits to be the word of God, I grant ; *minus* that interpretation, or in any other sense, she denies it to be the word of God. Consequently, since you would adduce it in a sense she does not authorize, if you adduce it at all, she denies what you would adduce is the word of God. You must, then, prove that it is, before you can legally adduce it."

"But you will not let me prove it."

"I do not hinder you."

"I offer to prove it by the word itself."

"That is not logical; for it *assumes* the word to prove the word."

"Not so. Here are the Scriptures, admitted by the Church, when taken in their genuine sense, to be the word of God. I simply propose from them and by them to show what is their genuine sense; and if I do so, I prove by an authority which she herself concedes all that I am required to prove."

"You cannot do that, because in doing it you assume that the Church is not the authorized interpreter of the word, which is the point you must prove; and that you are the authorized interpreter, which is also a point you must prove. The Church simply admits that the Scriptures, taken in the sense she authorizes, are the word of God. This is the full extent of her admission. But taken in another sense, she denies them to be the word of God; for the word of God, as we have agreed, is not the words, but the sense, of the Scriptures. Consequently, before you can allege them in a sense contrary to hers, nay, before you can go into any inquiry as to their sense, you must, on the one hand, dispossess her of her prescriptive right to declare their sense, and establish your own authority as their interpreter. Till you have done one or the other, the sense of Scripture is not an open question, and you cannot open it without assuming the point in dispute."

"That denies absolutely my right to quote the Scriptures against the Church."

"Not absolutely. You may quote them in her sense against her, if you can; and in your own sense, when you have proved it to be the word of God."

"But the first would be of no avail, because she has taken care to explain the Scriptures in her own favor; and I cannot prove them to be the word of God in any other sense, unless I am at liberty to explain them by themselves."

"That is, you cannot prove your point, unless you are at liberty to prove the same by the same! Prove that you are authorized to declare the sense of Scripture, and then you will have no difficulty."

"But I cannot prove that I am, save from the word itself."

"That is to say, unless you are at liberty to assume and exercise the authority to declare the sense of Scripture, as the

condition of proving that you have such authority ! That will not do, brother. It would be proving *idem per idem*, the same by the same, which is bad logic."

"How, then, am I to proceed?"

"That is your affair, not mine."

"The Church spreads her claim over every thing, and leaves me, according to your principles of logic, no possible means of adopting any line of argument against her, which does not, in some sense, assume the point to be proved. So subtle and crafty is her tyranny, that it leaves absolutely nothing to those who would resist it. This to me is only another evidence of her wicked origin and pernicious influence."

"So you are of opinion, that, if Almighty God should establish a church, he would take good care to leave it open to attack, to give its enemies a fair and solid ground on which to carry on their operations against it ! I am of a different opinion, and predisposed to believe the Almighty to be more than a match for the Devil, and that, if he should establish a church, he would so constitute it that no attack could be made upon it which should not recoil upon those who made it, — no argument be framed against it which should not serve to demonstrate the folly and absurdity of its framers. It is unquestionably a very difficult matter to make an action lie against the Church, or to find a court in which an action can be legally commenced against her ; but I have yet to learn that this is her fault. The Church is in possession of universal and supreme authority under God, has a *prescriptive* right to that authority, and must be presumed to have a *valid* right to it till the contrary is shown. You cannot *assume* the contrary, but are bound to *prove* it. Now, you must prove it without authority, or with authority. Without authority you cannot prove it ; for proofs which are sustained by no authority prove nothing. You must, then, prove it with authority, or not prove it at all. That it is difficult to find any authority whose assertion does not assume the nullity of the supreme authority which is to be presumed, is undoubtedly true. You wish to arraign the actual possessor of the supreme authority, but you cannot do so unless you have some court of competent jurisdiction. But any court which should claim authority to issue a precept against the possessor of supreme authority, and summon him to answer at its bar, would assume authority over him, and by so doing prejudice the case.

This is in the nature of things, and cannot be avoided ; but whose is the fault ? The Reformers, if they had been lawyers, would have seen that what they attempted was against law, and a *prima facie* crime on their part, for which they were liable to suffer the full vengeance of the law. If they had been even tolerable logicians, they would have seen that they could urge no argument which did not assume what was in question. But surely the Church is not to be censured, because they were miserable pettifoggers and shallow sophists."

" But there is a court competent to institute proceedings against the Church."

" What court ? "

" The court of conscience."

" You must prove that conscience is supreme, before you can say that ; for the Church, as the vicegerent of the Almighty, claims and possesses jurisdiction over conscience, and is supreme judge *in foro conscientia*. This is an integral part of her possession to which she has a prescriptive right. You must dispossess her, before you can compel her to plead at the bar of conscience."

" But she is at least bound to answer at the bar of the Bible, interpreted by private reason."

" Not till you dispossess her, or place the Bible interpreted by private reason in possession ; for she possesses jurisdiction over them."

" At the bar of reason, then."

" Reason has and can have no jurisdiction in the premises ; for the question turns on a supernatural fact, lies within the supernatural order, and therefore out of the province of reason."

" The general sense of mankind."

" That is against you, and in favor of the Church, as we have already seen, and is conceded in the fact that the Church is allowed to plead prescription."

" Then to the written word, interpreted and its sense declared by the Holy Ghost."

" Establish the fact of such a court, and she will not refuse to appear and answer. But she claims to be that court herself, and is in possession as that court ; you must dispossess her by direct impeachment of her claims, or by establishing, before a competent tribunal, the rights of an adverse claimant, before you can allege such a court."

" The Reformers were aided by the private illumination of

the Holy Ghost, and what they did, they did in obedience to his commands."

"That was for them to prove."

"They did prove it."

"How?"

"From the written word."

"But they could prove nothing from the written word, for they had no legal possession of it."

"They had legal possession of it. The Holy Ghost gave them legal possession."

"What and where was the evidence of that fact, if fact it was?"

"In the Scriptures."

"That is, they proved by the Holy Spirit that they had legal possession of the Holy Scriptures, and by the Holy Scriptures that they had the Holy Ghost! But this was to reason in a vicious circle."

"The Reformers set forth other and conclusive reasons for rejecting the Church, which I will reproduce on another day; but you must excuse me now, for I have some parochial duties to which I must attend."

"So you give up the first reason, namely, our Lord founded no such church as the Catholic?"

"Not by any means. I may have erred in bringing that forward before the others. I ought not to have departed from the example of the Reformers. They did not allege that reason first, and I see now that they were wise in not doing so. They first proved that the Church had forfeited her rights, by having abused her trusts. Having thus ejected her, they took possession of the word, and easily and clearly demonstrated that she had been null from the beginning, by showing that our Lord never contemplated such a church."

"That is, they dispossessed themselves by acquiring possession. Very good Protestant law and logic."

"You may spare your sneer, for perhaps it will soon be retorted with seven-fold vengeance."

"O, not so bad as that, I hope."

"We shall see. I will, God willing, prove that the Reformers were rigid reasoners and sound lawyers."

"An Herculean task. Clearing the Augean stables was a fool to it."

"The Reformers were great and glorious men, rare men, the like of whom will not soon be seen again."

“ Some consolation in that.”

“ To call such men miserable pettifoggers and shallow sophists is ——”

“ To use soft words, which turn away wrath.”

“ To outrage common sense and common decency.”

“ Why, would you censure me for not calling them by harder names ? I might have easily done so, but I wished to spare your prejudices as much as possible.”

“ I tell you, John, that, in becoming a miserable idolatrous Papist, and drunk with the cup of that sorceress of Babylon, the mother of every abomination, you seem to have lost all sense of dignity, all self-respect, and all regard for the proprieties of civilized life.”

“ Because I do not rave and rant, every time I have occasion to allude to the chiefs of the Protestant rebellion ? ”

“ No ; you know that is not what I mean. You degrade yourself in speaking so contemptuously of the glorious Reformers.”

“ And what does my most excellent, amiable, polite, and sweet-spoken brother do, when he calls God's Holy Church the sorceress of Babylon, &c., and brands the members of her holy communion with the name of idolaters ? ”

ART. II. — 1. *Religious Dissensions : their Cause and Cure.*

By PHARACELLUS CHURCH. New York : Gould & Newman. 1838. 12mo. pp. 400.

2. *The Catastrophe of the Presbyterian Church in 1837, including a full View of the recent Theological Controversies in New England.* By ZEBULON CROCKER, Delegate from the General Association of Connecticut to the General Assembly of 1837. New Haven : B. & W. Noyes. 1838. 12mo. pp. 300.

THESE works, published some nine years ago, may seem in these days, when all with our Protestant neighbours is in commotion and changes under the very eye of the spectator, to be quite out of date, and to have lost all their interest and importance for our contemporaries ; but if all with heretics is perpetually changing, all remains ever essentially the same. They are ever learning, and never able to come to the knowl-

edge of the truth ; ever seeking unity, and never finding it, — uniformity, but always departing farther from it, and involving themselves anew in the same old discussions and dissensions. These works are therefore, in reality, as fresh and as important as if they were still damp from the press, and may well be made the text for a few observations which we wish to offer on Protestant dissensions, and appropriately drawn upon for proofs and illustrations of those dissensions as they have been manifested in our own country, especially by the high-toned and arrogant Presbyterians, — the most bigoted and the most influential of all the sects in the United States.

The dissensions and countless divisions, to which the so-called Reformation, by carrying out its fundamental principle of private judgment, has given birth, have been the standing reproach of Protestantism from its commencement, and must, assuredly, at no very distant day, lead to its total disorganization and ruin, unless some effectual means are soon discovered of bringing its discordant elements into harmony, or at least of retaining the *soi-disant* Evangelical sects under their respective standards of orthodoxy. Aware of their position, and alarmed by the progress of this cancer, which, under every conceivable form of dissent, eats into the vitals of the “glorious Reformation,” the Evangelicals, from time to time, have devised various plans of harmony and union ; but every plan they have been able to devise has, thus far, proved utterly insufficient to arrest the evil they deplore.

The arrogant assumption of church authority by the original authors of the “godly Reformation” was resisted by subsequent innovators, who contended that they had as much right as any to read the Bible for themselves and exercise private judgment in the investigation of truth, and that they were at perfect liberty, when arriving at different conclusions, to reform the Reformation according to their own views of what the Gospel teaches. This right could not be denied without violating the cardinal principle of the Reformation itself, and its exercise has led to the formation of innumerable discordant sects among its deluded followers, each professing to be guided by one and the same infallible rule of faith, — “THE BIBLE, AND THE BIBLE ALONE.” Finding, however, that the Bible alone — or rather the Bible as interpreted in Luther’s Commentaries and Calvin’s Institutes — was insufficient for the preservation of *the faith once delivered to the Saints*, — of the Reformed stamp, — they had recourse to “Confessions

of Faith," by subscription to which they hoped that both preachers and people would be held together in the bonds of peace. Vain hope! Their confessions of faith being composed by fallible men, and confessedly destitute of all claim to infallible authority, were only so many ropes of sand. They contained different doctrines and systems of church government, which it seemed impossible to reconcile with the essential unity of the **ONE FAITH** of the Gospel; and it became necessary, from time to time, to amend them, and, finally, to leave them to the private judgment of each individual, who, it was admitted, had a perfect right to examine for himself, and receive or reject each and every article, as it should or should not seem to him to harmonize with the "law and the testimony" to which he appealed. Under such circumstances, it was impossible to preserve unity of faith, and consequently the several sects were reduced to the extreme necessity of "agreeing to differ," not only one sect from another, but also as to the individual members of each, so long as they should hold what were termed, in general, the *essential* articles of the Christian faith. But even this expedient did not avail; for they could not agree among themselves what doctrines were to be held as essential to the soundness and integrity of the Christian faith. Hence it came to pass, that doctrines, held to be essential by one sect, were set aside by another as unessential; and even among the Evangelical denominations themselves, there is not one in which differences and dissensions do not obtain respecting what are considered *essential* doctrines, and parties are formed under the distinctive appellations of Arminian and Calvinistic, New School and Old School, High Church and Low Church, &c.

These sects and divisions create discord and dissensions in the Christian community, and not only disturb social order, but inevitably tend to destroy all faith in divine revelation; for, as Lord Bacon justly observes, — "Divisions in religion, where they prevail, are the cause of atheism." Such being the lamentable effects and tendency of sects and divisions among nominal Christians, it must be to the Protestant a subject of interest to investigate the cause of these scandalous dissensions, with a view to discover a cure before the evil becomes irremediable, and draws down upon our common country the curse of atheism, with all its dreadful consequences. To the Catholic the cause and cure of dissensions in religion are so manifest, that he can hardly conceive how men, who have read

the history of Protestantism, can be so blind as not to see them. But unfortunately, the Protestant commences the inquiry by taking for granted that the foundation on which his whole system rests is sound and of divine institution, and he looks elsewhere for the cause of the evil which he is desirous to eradicate. But though he may discover secondary causes, they are of such a nature, that even their removal — were that possible in our present fallen state — would not effect the cure of the spiritual malady under which his system labors, except at the sacrifice of all the prerogatives of divine truth, and the establishment of latitudinarian principles and practice, which would render divine faith a matter of no moment, — a word of no meaning.

The history of the dissensions in the Presbyterian Church in the United States is, with slight variation, the history of the schisms and divisions of other Reformed communions in this and other countries where they have prevailed; and it serves to exemplify and illustrate the remarks we have made on the general tendency of Protestantism. That we may not be suspected of partiality in our sketch, we shall avail ourselves of the authority of the Calvinistic author of the *Catastrophe* for our facts.

“The Presbyterian Church in the United States,” says Mr. Crocker, “was originally composed of Presbyterians from Scotland and Ireland, and Congregationalists, chiefly from New England. The Congregationalists were, at first, the majority, and the two denominations united on the common ground of a belief in the great doctrines of the Bible, and of saving faith in Jesus Christ. This union was continued for a period of twenty-five years, without any written confession or form of government. In 1729, the synod of Philadelphia passed an act, *not, however, without considerable opposition*, adopting the Westminster Confession of Faith with the Assembly’s larger and shorter Catechism, ‘as being, in all the *essential* and *necessary* articles, good forms of sound words, and systems of Christian doctrine.’ By this act, a declaration of assent to the Confession and Catechisms was required, ‘in all the essential and necessary articles,’ by members of the synod and candidates for the ministry; at the same time it was provided, that, ‘in case any minister of this synod, or any candidate for the ministry, should have any scruple with respect to any article or articles of said Confession or Catechisms, the presbytery or synod shall, notwithstanding, admit him to the exercise of the ministry, if they shall judge his scruple or mistake to be about articles *not essential and necessary*, in doctrine, worship, or government.’ ‘The synod also do *solemnly* agree, that none

of us will traduce or use any opprobrious terms of those that differ from us in those extra-essential and not necessary points of doctrine; but treat them with the same friendship, kindness, and brotherly love, as if they had not differed from us in such sentiments.'

"Two facts are strikingly exhibited in the adopting act from which these quotations are made. One is, that *diversity of sentiment existed in the members of the synod of 1729*; the other is, that, in the exercise of a catholic [Protestant] spirit, they were ready to overlook minor differences of opinion, and make an agreement, *in substance of doctrine*, the basis of union. They declared, that 'we do not claim or pretend to *any authority* of imposing our faith upon other men's consciences; and utterly disclaim all legislative power and authority in the Church, being willing to admit to fellowship in sacred ordinances all such as we have grounds to believe Christ will at last admit to the kingdom of heaven.' For nearly twenty years, the Congregationalists and Presbyterians, thus united, maintained general harmony; the exercise of Christian catholicism [Protestantism] preventing *serious* contentions and unhappy divisions. *A difference of views*, however, respecting presbyterial order and ministerial qualifications distinctly marked *two* parties in the Church; and *so widely did they differ in sentiment and feeling*, that there was needed only a sufficiently exciting cause to produce a *separation*. That cause was furnished by the labors of Mr. Whitfield. The strict Presbyterians regarded Mr. Whitfield and his friends as 'ignorant and extravagant enthusiasts.' The other party, called the *New Side* or *New Lights*, viewed their opponents as 'Pharisaical formalists.' Animosities increased, until the synod of Philadelphia, after *violent* controversy, was *rent asunder*, and two rival synods were formed, viz., New York and Philadelphia.

"These synods, after remaining divided for seventeen years, at length, in 1758, were united. The evils which they had experienced by division taught both parties salutary lessons respecting forbearance and toleration; but *diversity of opinion on many important subjects was not removed*. The Scotch and Irish Presbyterians, and their descendants, in general, were *Old Side* still; while those of New England origin and sentiments were *New Side*, and almost as distinctly marked as ever. These two parties have formed the basis of the two great parties which now divide the Presbyterian Church. The Old School and New School are the Old Side and New Side,—the old divinity and new divinity men of former times. The nucleus of each of the present parties not only existed in 1704, but has ever since existed, the same thing as ever, and now essentially determines the character of the agglomerated mass. Liberal Presbyterianism, being of New

England origin, and wearing the impress of New England sentiments, is the object of attack with the Old School party; and hence the present struggle in the Presbyterian Church relates primarily to New England opinions and influence. For the suppression of these opinions, and the removal of this influence, the majority of the General Assembly of 1837 adopted their revolutionary measures. Here is found the cause of the abrogation of the Plan of Union, and the proceedings connected with that act." — *Catastrophe*, pp. 47–53.

These extracts show, that, though the Presbyterians in this country commenced operations, in 1704, with the "Bible alone" as its standard of faith, it was still necessary, in 1729, to adopt a confession of faith, with a smaller and larger catechism. But as they "disclaimed all legislative power and authority in the Church," they very modestly agreed not to "traduce or use any opprobrious terms" of those that might happen to differ from them in "extra-essential and not necessary points of doctrine." As, however, they did not declare what points of doctrine were "essential and necessary," they left a very wide margin for men to agree to differ on, without forfeiting their claim to orthodoxy; but, at the same time, any point of doctrine on which they should happen to entertain different views might be represented as essential and necessary, and those who rejected it might be assailed and cut off from the communion of the Church, as guilty of denying fundamental articles of faith. We need not be surprised, therefore, to find that the Westminster Confession and Catechism, which they required the members of the synod and candidates for the ministry to subscribe and assent to, with certain reservations in compliance to the right of private judgment, proved insufficient to hold the members together in unity of faith. It is true, we are assured, that, by the exercise of a spirit of "toleration," — to which the Catholic Church has been ever opposed in matters of faith, and which to call "Catholic" is a gross perversion of language, — ministers were allowed to put their own private construction on the articles, and expound them as they pleased, and no "serious contentions or unhappy divisions" occurred for nearly twenty years. Still there were *two* parties in the Presbyterian Church, "widely differing in sentiment and feeling," who applied to one another most opprobrious epithets, by which their mutual animosities were increased, and the synod, after a violent controversy, was rent asunder into two separate and rival synods. The separation lasted

seventeen years, after which the synod became reunited externally, though the elements of discord and dissension remained ; and, notwithstanding the " Plan of Union," formed with the General Association of Connecticut in 1801, the New School divines and churches were finally, in 1837, declared by a majority of the General Assembly to be " out of the ecclesiastical connection of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, and that they are not, in form or fact, an integral portion of said Church."*

The doctrinal disputes and religious dissensions that prevailed, and, to a considerable extent, still prevail, in the Presbyterian Church, clearly demonstrate the insufficiency of the " Bible alone " as the rule of faith, and that a " standard of orthodoxy " cannot give an exposition of doctrine which its adherents will feel themselves bound to receive in its integrity, but leaves them free to profess or reject particular points, so long as they adopt the whole as containing, in substance, " all necessary and essential " articles. To subscribe to the Confession of Faith, with these limitations, does not restrict the right of private judgment ; for each individual minister and member is at perfect liberty to qualify or explain away any particular doctrine to which he may happen to take exception, and yet persuade himself that he has not rejected any necessary or essential point of doctrine, or set aside the authority, such as it is, of the confession of faith.

Acting on this principle, the New School divines, while professing the most unlimited obedience to, and confidence in, " the Bible alone," as the only rule of faith, deemed themselves justified in promulgating opinions at variance with some of the doctrinal views of the confession of faith, which they believed to be repugnant to Scripture. But, though neither the Bible nor the Confession of Faith designated any particular articles of faith as essential, the divines of the Old School did not hesitate to pronounce their doctrines *heretical*, as containing fundamental errors concerning essential and necessary articles of faith. (p. 78.) " The sentiments advanced [by the New School] were represented as Socinian, Pelagian, Arminian, pantheistical, atheistical," &c. (p. 87) ; and " *a memorial on the present state of the Presbyterian Church*," signed by twenty ministers and one hundred elders, was presented to the General Assembly of 1834, remonstrating and testifying against

* *Minutes of the Assembly of 1837*, p. 444.

the "errors declared to be held and taught within the bounds of the Presbyterian Church." (p. 93.) This memorial was referred to a committee, whose report, though opposed to the views of the memorialists, was adopted by a considerable majority of the Assembly. But, although the supreme judicatory of the Church had thus pronounced judgment against the views of the Old School, the minority did not consider themselves bound by its decision. They protested against it, and published an "Act and Testimony," addressed to the ministers, elders, and private members of the Presbyterian Church, in which they declare that they are constrained to appeal to its members, "in relation to the *alarming errors* which have hitherto been connived at, and now at length have been countenanced and sustained by the acts of the supreme judicatory of the Church." In conclusion, it recommends to the churches "to refuse to give countenance to ministers, elders, agents, editors, teachers, or to those who are, in any other capacity, engaged in religious instruction or effort, who hold *the heresies* which it condemns." (p. 96.)

This document, subscribed by a numerous and influential body of ministers and ruling elders, was extensively circulated throughout the Presbyterian Church, and contributed not a little to create such an excitement in relation to the spread of heresy among them, as enabled the Old School to return a majority of the members of the General Assembly which met in 1835. By this means the decisions of the former Assembly, in regard to some of the leading points in controversy, were *reversed*, and the doctrinal errors, alleged to be prevalent in the Church, were pronounced to be of a "dangerous and pestiferous character." (p. 99.) The Old School party, however, did not rest satisfied with this decision, by which the sentiments of the opposite school were virtually branded with the name of *HERESY* by the highest judicatory of their church. They determined to suppress them altogether, or cut off the errorists from their communion. With this view, they filed articles of impeachment for heresy against the prominent advocates of the New-School divinity, — among others, Dr. Lyman Beecher, formerly of this city, who was tried on "charges of heresy, slander, and hypocrisy" (p. 106), tabled against him by the Rev. Dr. Wilson of Cincinnati. But failing in the end to obtain a verdict against these men, and to cast them out of the church, they, at length, resolved — to repeal the Act of Union of 1801 ; — to cut off the synods of *Utica, Geneva,*

Genesee, and the Western Reserve ; and to exclude the American Home Missionary Society and the American Education Society from the Presbyterian Church. Having a majority in the General Assembly of 1837, they carried these measures through with a high hand, and thus consummated that violent act which Mr. Crocker designates *The Catastrophe of the Presbyterian Church*. Thus "the Assembly of 1837 used its unrivalled authority in such a manner as to affect the rights, the privileges, and the opinions of a large portion of the inhabitants of this nation. In addition to the dismemberment of its own body, it struck a blow at benevolent institutions ; . . . and it aimed not only to destroy existing relations in the churches under its care, but to sever the bonds of union, which for many years had existed between itself and other ecclesiastical bodies, as the ground of friendly intercourse and cheerful co-operation in the work of spreading the gospel ; no wonder, then, that its proceedings have agitated the mass of the people, and produced an uncommon excitement throughout the length and breadth of the land." (p. 2.)

We regret that our limits will not permit us to follow Mr. Crocker through the historical developments he furnishes of the nature and progress of theological controversy and religious dissensions among the self-styled Evangelical Orthodox in New England, which occupy the larger portion of his work. They may afford us the materials of an article, if, at some future time, we should take occasion to review Dr. Gardiner Spring's *Dissertation on Native Depravity*, which occupies so prominent a place in the New England controversy. Our readers will scarcely be surprised to learn, that the man who had the hardihood to proclaim, in the presence of a public meeting in the City Hall of New York, that he would prefer Voltairian infidelity to Catholic Christianity, "denominates those from whom he differs least as *Pelagians*, and sets up his own individual opinion as the standard of orthodoxy." (p. 221.)

Such was the disorganized state of the Presbyterian Church in 1837, so bitter the *odium theologicum* and controversial warfare which raged within its bosom, that a premium of two hundred dollars was offered for "the best tract or treatise on Dissensions in the Churches." This liberal offer called forth twenty-seven writers on this prolific theme, whose manuscripts were formally submitted to a committee composed of three learned doctors of divinity, by whom the pre-

mium was awarded to Mr. Church, for the work which stands first on our list, and which was subsequently published as the *Prize Essay*. If any Protestant writer be capable of assigning the *cause* and indicating the *cure* of religious dissensions on a Protestant basis, we may presume Mr. Church is the man, and that his Essay offers us the best and most satisfactory solution of the problem to be obtained. If his theory be unsound and impracticable, we may safely conclude that this besetting sin of Protestantism is incurable. That he was well qualified for the task he undertook cannot be doubted. He had previously disciplined his mind for this work of Christian charity by writing a treatise on the "Philosophy of Benevolence"; and he had especially prepared himself for its execution by "long continued thinking and much careful observation." The handsome premium awarded to him, among so many competitors for the prize, by a committee of learned divines, attests his ability and the superior excellence of his treatise. It may be taken, therefore, as unfolding the best plan hitherto devised, by which the children of the Reformation may be brought into union, and made of "of one heart and one mind."

The arduous nature of the task he assumed, and the meagre prospect of realizing the object contemplated, seem to strike the author forcibly on the very threshold. He opens his *Introduction* with this painfully humiliating acknowledgment:—

"The difficulties of the subject before us are felt by the writer to be above what any mortal, unguided by divine light, can surmount. Nor, under any circumstances, can more be expected than the suggestion of trains of thought that *may* lead to other trains of a more lucid character, and so *commence* the process of approximation to that most desirable state when all the family of God on earth shall be of one heart and of one mind. Nothing, in our view, short of a miracle upon human nature, can promise such a result; but the clear exhibition of those *causes* of dissension which all parties and sects have only to see to reprobate, together with those *principles*, the practical adoption of which, without interfering with any one of their present honest convictions, would in the end produce all the harmony that can be expected among imperfect beings. Bare exhortation to union, though eloquent and forcible as an angel could use, till some method is pointed out which will lead to it without contravening what different portions of the church feel to be sacred and inviolable, will be powerless and vain. To array ourselves also against the spirit and measures of any specific portion, as the sole or principal *cause*

of dissensions, when it may, *perhaps*, embody as much that is pleasing to God as any other, would foreclose with them the success of our endeavour, would exasperate unkind feelings, and, though it might please, could produce no better results upon those who should be spared the lash of our rod. Besides, all such partial representations are not true in fact, as every accurate and candid observer upon the course of human events must be convinced. The upas-tree of dissension strikes its roots alike into every division of the Christian world, drawing from each, in degrees more nearly equal than may be imagined, its means of nourishment and growth."

As the Essayist does not probably recognize the Catholic Church even as one of the "divisions of the Christian world," and assuming his statement to apply exclusively to the *Evangelicals*, for whose special benefit the Essay was designed, we will not gainsay the truth of what he here asserts. Otherwise, we should consider it our duty to protest against his sweeping denunciation of the Christian world, and to show that the great body of professing Christians, included within the pale of the Catholic Church, are now, and have been for ages, of "one mind and of one heart," on all points of doctrine, and have none of those differences and dissensions among them that exist among the miserable sects cut off from her communion, and who are commonly known by the name of the heresiarch from whom they derive their system of doctrine or church polity. It is to these sects Mr. Church addresses his arguments and expostulations throughout his Essay; — of them he speaks at the close of the first section of his introductory remarks, where he informs us that the object he has in view is "to pave the way, *if possible*, for an adjustment of those differences among *Christians* [sectarians] which are so revolting to Heaven, so prolific of scandal to the worthy name by which they are called, so much a matter of triumph among the enemies of the cross, and so painful to every correct sensibility." (p. 19.) He does not presume to indulge the hope of a speedy termination of those scandalous differences among his Christian, or rather sectarian, brethren. He even leaves it doubtful whether it be possible to pave the way to the adjustment, at some future period, "of all their most considerable differences." He has not a word of comfort for the "family of God," who now reap the whirlwind of dissension, as the natural product of the wind of false doctrine, sowed by their forefathers in their lust of innovation. The Evangelical Chris-

tians of the present generation, he affirms, "must probably leave their carcasses in the wilderness, before one born under better influences, and devoted to holier and enlightened training, can enter upon the land of Christian peace and plenty. But though doomed to war ourselves," he adds, "is it any reason why we should not seek a more peaceful inheritance for our children?" (p. 40.) Certainly not. Seek, gentlemen, a more peaceful inheritance than Luther and Calvin have bequeathed to you in their misnamed Reformation; but the experience of three centuries ought to teach you that it cannot be found out of the communion of our one, holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church.

Mr. Church's plan of Christian union, by which he hopes it may be possible to obviate religious dissensions among Protestants, differs essentially from the scheme devised by other writers on the same subject, who were as anxious as himself to organize an *Evangelical Alliance*, which should present the appearance, at least, of unity and union among the various Reformed sects. Seeing that the zeal with which the several denominations contended for their respective sectarian peculiarities was the chief cause of dissension and the great obstacle to union, these religious peacemakers recommended that those sects which agreed in fundamental and essential articles should "agree to differ" on all other points of doctrine. This scheme of union our Essayist rejects, as tending to latitudinarianism; for, he observes, "by making it appear that each party is bound to concede that all others are right, on condition of their returning the compliment, would be a fearful stride towards the profane indifference of skeptical philosophy. Moreover," he adds, "it would be a violation of the oft-repeated apostolic injunctions to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the Saints." (p. 41.)

A more serious objection to the hitherto prevailing theory on this important subject, our author contends, is, that, even admitting its practicability, it would tend rather to aggravate than to remedy the evil. As to the distinction between essential and non-essential doctrines, he does not hesitate to pronounce it prejudicial to the cause of Christian union, and calculated to produce the most unhappy results. Our readers may, perhaps, — after what we ourselves advanced in our Review for January last, — be curious to learn by what process of reasoning a *Protestant* writer explodes this favorite theory of Protestant *unity*, and thus divests his system of all pretension

to that acknowledged mark of the true Church ; we give his argument in his own words.

“ We conceive that the union of Christians can never result from conventional arrangement. Even should the denominations be induced thus to unite in the same ecclesiastical organization, and yet the present principles of religious inquiry were left unbroken and undestroyed, it would, like healing a wound with the core still in the flesh, only provide to have the whole break out in new and more malignant forms than ever. Nor would the secession of a portion of each denomination to form a *union party* be attended with any better results. So long as the germs of the evil remain in our habits of thought and feeling, such a measure would have no other effect than to add another to the list of competitors for the popular favor. We have parties enough already ; and the addition of new ones, like bringing a *corps de reserve* to the battle’s point, never fails of incensing the deadly affray.

“ Owing also to our inability to fix the line between essential and non-essential, substantial and un-substantial Christianity, or to the want of those clear and satisfactory views of the subject which others seem to have obtained, we have omitted this distinction as of little account in our plan for uniting Christians. We apprehend that the work of distinguishing between that portion of the Christian scheme which is essential, and that which is not so, would produce very dissimilar views, and thus would incense, rather than extinguish, the spirit of dissension. Certain positions would, in the view of some, fall on one side of this line, and in the view of others they would fall on the other side of it, and endless war would arise about what is essential and non-essential.

“ Not only so, but this distinction itself will be found to involve results which no Christian, it seems to us, can fully contemplate without alarm. Essential ! to what ? To the salvation of a soul ? Is it the object to retain among the things which are essential only those parts of revealed truth which must have access to a sinner’s mind, in order to his regeneration ? But who is able to determine how small an amount may contribute to this result ? If we retain only so much as was in the mind of that person to whose conversion the lowest possible degree of divine knowledge contributed, our essential or substantial Christianity would, we imagine, be compressed into exceedingly narrow limits. How few and simple must have been the inspired truths which effected the conversion of the thief upon the cross, and the thousands of others, who, in the first age of Christianity, believed and were baptized, upon hearing their first sermon from apostolic lips ! But even admitting such to be our definition of essential truth, how indeterminate must be our conceptions, since it lies not within the prov-

ince of any man to fix the lines of religious knowledge, below which a saving effect cannot be produced !

“ And equal uncertainty will attend our thinking, if we make it consist in those points which are common to the Evangelical sects. To ascertain the points which they have in common at this moment would be a most difficult task ; and even if it were done, we should be left, at any future period, in great doubt concerning the changes which the fluctuations of opinion in those sects may have produced. Our standard of orthodoxy, being the points of doctrine and practice which are common to these sects, would be subject to all the mutations which are so characteristic of poor, erring, human nature. Such a definition of substantial Christianity would suspend the revelation of Heaven, and the last hope of man, upon the brittle thread of our own dark and misguided reason.

“ If we mean, however, by substantial or essential Christianity, not only that portion of inspired truth which is necessary to the conversion of a sinner, but also to perfect the work of his sanctification, then we see not how we could exclude any part of that to which God has affixed the seal of inspiration. Is it not all essential to the perfecting of the saints, to the edifying of the body of Christ ? Dare we omit any thing which God has not omitted ? If our idea of essential or substantial, therefore, as applied to God’s truth, comes any thing short of the whole revealed subject-matter, it will have an effect to increase rather than diminish the obstacles to union among Christians, and, at the same time, will impose the hazardous task of determining what portion of that to which God has affixed his own infallible impress we must retain, and what portion we may sacrifice. We confess our fear of going an inch in this direction.

“ But we imagine that the distinction of essential and non-essential has been introduced into this subject, either with reference to the opinions of men, or to the different degrees of importance which attach to the different portions of inspired truth. Now, if it be applied in the former sense, then we say that all merely human opinions, or all over and above the meaning conveyed by ‘ the words which the Holy Ghost teacheth,’ as legitimately interpreted, are alike non-essential, while *the whole* of that meaning is essential. This is an easy distinction, so long as we make no reservations for merely human opinions, and no exclusions of the inspired subject-matter. Or if we apply this distinction to the different degrees of importance in the truths dictated by the Spirit, then we have only to say that the terms which we employ to express our meaning are not well chosen. Because one inspired truth is less important than another, is it therefore unessential ?

“ But we confess that it is easier to show what will not unite the spiritual family, than to obviate the barriers to this most desirable object. Nor do we conceive it possible, as before hinted, for the ingenuity of man to devise any other than prospective measures for their removal. It must be done by turning Christian feeling, investigation, and effort into channels that shall produce an ultimate confluence.” — pp. 43 – 46.

The line of argument traced out in this extract differs but little from that usually adopted by many of our controversial divines, when combating the latitudinarian principle it refutes. But now that the erroneous character and skeptical tendency of that principle have been exposed, in a Protestant prize essay treating *ex professo* of the subject to which it relates, we presume Protestants, at least of any note, will not venture, henceforth, to adduce it in proof of their absurd pretensions to unity in fundamental and essential doctrines, to which they have heretofore laid claim, notwithstanding the many important points of doctrine on which they differed. Like the vain and almost impious chimera of an *invisible church*, which they invented as a plausible subterfuge when pressed to show where their church existed before Luther's time, but which they have long since discarded as an untenable position ; so we trust they will also surrender this imaginary stronghold of Protestantism, when they discover, as they must ere long, that the ingenious device by which they attempted to preserve the appearance of unity, where there was none in reality, has proved one of the most fruitful causes of dissension, and created a formidable obstacle to the establishment of Christian union itself.

The removal of the barriers that prevent the spiritual family of the Reformation from uniting together, and forming one body and one fold, can be effected, according to Mr. Church, only “ by turning Christian feeling, investigation, and effort into channels that shall produce an ultimate confluence.” Now, the question is, what are these channels ? As a consistent Protestant, the author is obliged to contend that the Bible is the *sole* medium through which the “ *primitive Christian conception*,” as he calls it, of “ the truth as it is in Jesus ” can be reached. But all Protestant sects have for centuries made use of this channel to arrive at the knowledge of the divine truths of revelation ; yet they do not agree in their views of the primitive Christian conception. Mr. Church not only admits this humiliating fact, but even contends that they

have perverted the inspired sense in consequence of "modelling that sense by mental philosophy, natural religion, or human science, and determining what *is* from our ideas of what *ought* to be." The estimate he forms of the boasted orthodoxy of all these sects, and the picture he draws of the social evils resulting from their divisions, are worthy of note as coming from a Protestant minister.

"*There is not, in our view, a form of Christianity in the universe that answers to the primitive model.* We do not allude to the imperfections common to human nature of those who hold them, but to the *principles* and practices which are component parts of these systems themselves, and which a man must adopt, if he makes them his guide in matters of faith and duty. That *some* of them do not accord to the primitive conception all admit; but every one would make an exception in favor of his own denomination. He believes that *his* denomination, or at least the basis of its organization, is a perfect fac-simile of the primitive model,—that all others must come and bow down to it, as the family of Jacob did to young Joseph in Egypt, before the latter-day glory can dawn; and hence, he is fired with the zeal of an apostle to proselyte all other portions of the Christian world to his own measure of thinking. Thence arise endless wars; the laboratory of Christian thinking is made the armory of pointless and ineffectual polemics; the press groans under a burden of controversial lore; those woes of afflicted, ignorant, degraded humanity, which the Church is required to relieve, are left unmitigated; the enemies of the heavenly kingdom make the welkin ring with joyful acclaim at the civil commotions with which it is rent; and the ferment which is kept up in the social state is most dismal and disastrous. And all for what? Why, simply, to secure the perpetuity and preëminence of certain combinations of religious thought and practice, all of which, we pledge ourselves to make appear, are as remote from the primitive Christian conception as they are from each other. Dark and portentous would be the glare of the millennial church, if its model should correspond to the best of them!" — p. 48.

It is here frankly confessed that all the various sects of Protestants are as far removed from the primitive Christian model as they are from each other, though they all profess to take the Bible as their only rule and guide in matters of faith and practice. To bring them back to the *ONE FAITH*, and "to secure uniformity in their views of the revealed system of faith and duty, two things are necessary," observes Mr. Church: "the first is to give the study of the Scriptures its

due position in the world of mind and in our plans of education ; and the other is to conduct this study on those principles of induction which guide our inquiries in other departments of knowledge." (p. 54.) So it appears the Reformers and their spiritual progeny have been reading and studying their Bible for the last three hundred years without obtaining correct views of faith and duty ! Though learned commentators have spent their lives in the study of the sacred volume, and filled whole libraries with their notes and expositions, they have not succeeded in discovering the inspired sense of the oracles of God. They hardly contain a paragraph upon which *different* constructions have not been placed. Indeed, says our Essayist, " could the plain matter-of-fact men, who wrote the New Testament, read the commentaries on the text they furnished, which have been written in view of the modern systems of divinity, they must lose the consciousness of their own identity, before they could be made to believe that the construction put upon their words is the meaning they intended to convey." (p. 86.)

Mr. Church not only confesses that Protestants have thus far utterly failed to seize the true doctrine of our Lord, but he contends that they are not even in a condition to do it, and that the attempt to draw up a statement of it would only tend to increase and perpetuate dissension.

" We assume, that, as nothing has been accomplished for the peace of the Church by schedules of Christian doctrine and practice, so nothing is to be hoped from them in future. We therefore make no attempt to draught one of a more lucid character, which shall be adapted to awaken in all the same convictions. So far otherwise is the fact, that these pages assume that the influences under which our habits of religious thinking have been formed, like magnetic steel in a watch, disturb all the movements of our minds, and so give us a result somewhat different from the truth. And hence, should we attempt to separate the pure gold from the alloy in our forms of Christianity, so as to make a new form, to embody all the excellences of the old, and none of their defects, we should, in our present state, mistake the one for the other, and our extract would have as much foreign admixture, perhaps, as any one now before the public. Can any man, who is competent to judge in the matter, pretend that the forms of a more recent date have advantages in this respect over those which have been longer in the field ? Those who think it so easy a matter to disencumber themselves of the ten thousand influences which have sprung up, since the angel of inspiration took his final flight from

our sphere, to corrupt the sources of our religious thinking, know little of the human tissue, or of the difficulty of extracting from it what has been so thoroughly wrought into its texture. The subject-matter of the Bible has not yet succeeded to its due position in the intellectual world,— *we are not holy enough*, — our thinking is not sufficiently immersed in ‘Siloa’s brook,’— and our passions and prejudices are too much enlisted in the existing parties, — to admit of our taking in at once the whole primitive Christian conception, unchanged and unmutated.” — pp. 52, 53.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the Essay is that in which the author sets forth the influences which disturb the Protestant in his study of the Bible, and induce him to misinterpret it. The Scriptures must be understood, and in the sense intended by the Holy Ghost, or they are not the word of God.

“ It should always be considered, that the truth revealed is distinct from the language through which it is conveyed, and must remain as inaccessible as if not revealed at all, unless we have the means of extracting it from the crude elements of words, phrases, and idioms in which it lies imbedded. The existence of an order of public instructors, in connection with the inspired economy, appears to have found its basis in this fact. It began immediately upon the return of the remnant from Babylon, when the Jews first lost the pure Hebrew through intercourse with foreign nations, and when they were cut off from all connection with the thought of their sacred writings, except as they were made acquainted with it by competent interpreters. It appears to have been from this germ, that a permanent order of uninspired teachers in the Christian Church sprang. Its establishment seems to have arisen from the necessity of some further aid in bringing inspired thought into contact with the mass of mind, than the simple record of it in one or two languages. By thus regarding the necessity and the intention of this institution, therefore, the people may learn what kind of teachers to select, and what to expect from them; and the incumbents of the office are admonished to confine themselves, more exclusively, to documentary Christianity. Their business is not to originate or concoct new matter, but simply to explain so clearly, that God’s own thoughts shall blaze before the public eye, and burn upon the public conscience.

“ Our illumination from the word of God is exactly in proportion to the degree in which we enter into the spirit and meaning of the language employed. The cant, whining, and sanctimonious manner in which the sacred pages are often glanced over by those who are more concerned to appear religious than to be instructed, or who desire to be so, but mistake the mode, while it

imposes on the weak and credulous without improving them, leads the more discerning, but equally thoughtless, to treat the Bible with neglect, as having no meaning at all, or none worth the labor of digging from the rubbish under which it lies buried." — pp. 176, 177.

But the Protestant, in endeavouring to ascertain the sense of the sacred text, is subject to numerous and powerful disturbing influences. The Gospel itself, though it often does produce, is not exactly adapted to produce, uniformity of opinion. (p. 71.) It was not intended to do so, and could not.

"Nor could the Gospel attain the end of producing a perfect uniformity of judgment, either upon religion or any other subject, without induing us with the power of arriving at unerring conclusions. Before this is done, we must all seize, in every case, upon the same facts, place them in the same order, give each of them the same bearing in our process of reasoning, and that must be the exact bearing of truth, or the result will not be the same. In one word, our minds must be made on the same scale of strength and clearness, expansiveness and vigor, and this must be the scale of infallibility like God, or the end cannot be attained of producing between us a perfect uniformity of judgment." — pp. 74, 75.

The great difficulty lies in the insufficiency of language as the medium of revelation.

"Though the Gospel aims at effecting a lodgment of the same thoughts in every mind, or the same subject-matter, yet, from the character of the human understanding, and the medium of their transmission, we should presume that the saving influence might exist with *very considerable error*, confusion, and darkness in judging of the precise nature of what is revealed. If language is sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes, it is by no means an infallible vehicle for the transmission of knowledge. It probably renders us more liable to false impressions than any one of our organs of sensation. This is true of a living language, as it falls from the lips of a living speaker, but applies much more forcibly to one that long since ceased to be spoken.

"But a dead language labors under still greater disadvantages in regard to being understood, since the meaning of its words can only be determined from the fragments of it which have survived the ravages of time. And how difficult is it to recall the ten thousand circumstances, physical, moral, political, or religious, from which the writer's conceptions took their mould! How much of the force and beauty even of the elegant pages of the unknown Junius, who wrote in our own language less than a cen-

tury since, are now lost, on account of the oblivion which has come over many of those features in the posture of the political world, or those characters and events, upon which he animadverts ! It is difficult to place ourselves in his condition, so as to feel the influences which operated to give shade to the meaning of his language. And it must be still more difficult to place ourselves in the circumstances of a man who lived thousands of years since, in a different country from our own, and in a state of society now so completely extinct as to leave scarce a wreck behind. And yet we must be able to do it, or we cannot be expected, in every minute particular, to do justice to his meaning. The ever-varying circumstances, therefore, which give rise to different combinations of thought in the mind, together with other causes, must have buried, beyond the hope of resurrection, no small share of every literary relic of antiquity." — pp. 84, 85.

But besides this alleged natural and inevitable obstacle to a just understanding of the Scriptures, the Protestant approaches them not with a simple mind, solely for the purpose of ascertaining their sense. He has certain preconceived notions, certain intellectual systems of his own, by which he would interpret them, and to which their sense must be made to conform.

"The human understanding does not admit of such perfect uniformity in interpreting any document, ancient or modern. There will be errors in different minds, arising from mistaking the proper force of words, from omitting some material item in their conception of the subject as a whole, from an inaccurate arrangement of the ideas expressed, from giving some too much and others too little prominence, or from other sources. Previous habits of thinking, also, will impart their own hues to every new subject that may arise. Let all the facts of the New Testament be spread out before two men of ordinary capacity, the one a pagan and the other a Mahometan, for instance, and the ideas which they would derive from them would be distinctly marked by the notions previously derived from their respective religions." — p. 88.

"*Absurd notions* of interpretation do much to close the avenues of the mind against inspired thought. These notions are variously modified by the systems which different classes of Christians have, from first to last, adopted. But in the general characteristic of assuming that the sense of Scripture is to be rested, not wholly upon the language employed, but upon the analogy of faith, or something independent of the laws of philology, they are all alike. Few, indeed, have run these notions up to the same extreme with the neologists of Germany, who aver that reason alone can decide in matters of faith, that the authority of Scripture is to be allowed only when it coincides with our convictions,

and that it is nothing more than a human book, 'in which noble and wise men of former times have laid up, entirely in the ordinary manner, the results of their own reflection.'* But just so far as we allow the system of faith which we have adopted, or any thing else, to influence us in attaching to the words of Scripture a meaning which they cannot bear, when legitimately interpreted, just so far we verge towards this dismal extreme. For, the moment we vary the meaning, in the slightest degree, from what God intended to communicate, we act on a principle which, pursued up, would lead to the wildest extremes.

"That no denomination in this country are willing to avow such principles of interpretation, we admit; but that every denomination is more or less influenced by them is the only fact that will account for the diversified systems which they contrive to extort from the inspired pages. Can it be supposed that God speaks to us in language so indeterminate as to admit of all these constructions? Would it not be an imputation upon his wisdom and veracity to indulge such a thought? That there should be diversities of opinion, to some extent, in regard to the meaning of the Bible, is to be expected from the constitution of the human mind and other causes, as we have before shown; but it is hardly to be supposed, that the conflicting systems of faith and practice, which have so long competed for the public favor, could have been deduced from the inspired text, unaided by false principles of interpretation. How happens it that the millions of minds, who have first and last advocated these respective systems, should hit precisely upon that track of thought, in reading the sacred pages, unless some common influence operated upon them to produce this result?

"Though all men, even with correct principles of interpretation, might not deduce the same meaning from 'the language which the Holy Ghost teacheth,' yet it is hardly to be supposed, that one or two millions of each generation should hit upon the same system of faith and practice; another million or two should hit upon the same system, though different from the first; and so, that the social state should be split up into masses, according to definite lines of religious demarcation; unless the same cause acted upon all the individuals, in each of these respective divisions, to produce in them the same habits of thought, feeling, and action. A uniformity of effect determines the cause to be uniform. Hence, the individuals pursuing each of these different lines of religious thinking and conduct must act under a common influence.

"This question being settled, therefore, we are prepared for another, — Whether this influence, in the case of each of these

* Kant, as found in *Biblical Repository*, Vol. I., p. 122.

great divisions, is found in the Bible itself *as legitimately interpreted*, or in sources wholly extraneous to its pages? And the very proposal of such a question, we imagine, will show every one that it comes from sources extraneous to the Bible. That is, these different bodies of Christians are each under influences, in judging of the meaning of the Divine Word, for which that word is not accountable, and by which their differences among themselves are produced. If they have all drawn more or less from the Bible, they have drawn enough from other sources to conduct them to widely different theoretical and practical results. And the individuals of each of these bodies are willing to admit this fact of those in the others, but not in its application to themselves. We think, however, that it would be easy to show that each and all of them, so far as they are swayed by those systems to which they have attached themselves, entertain unphilological and erroneous views of the faith once delivered to the saints. The reason is, that they have all been concocted under influences, in judging of the word of God, which must necessarily lead to a distortion of its specific statements, as well as foreclose an impartial view of its teaching as a whole. Hence, all the systems, which give to Christianity its diversified forms in every generation, embody, with considerable truth, so much foreign matter as to prevent the different classes attached to them from meeting on the simple ground of revealed thoughts. Brethren in Christ, this may seem sweeping, and perhaps we err; but we entreat you to work out the problem of our divisions candidly and impartially, and if the data of reasoning with which we are furnished from facts and truth do not give you this result, we must confess ourselves greatly disappointed.

“Each of the systems, whether that of Calvinism, Arminianism, Pelagianism, or any other, rely for their support, not upon the Bible as a whole, but upon a certain class of passages and facts, of which they take such a view as makes it necessary for them to explain away, soften down, or variously modify another class of passages and facts that seem to look another way.”—pp. 177–180.

But we are exceeding our limits, and have room for only one or two more extracts. The Protestant cannot consistently take the Bible as the word of God on the authority of the Church. He is therefore obliged to rely chiefly for the evidence of its inspiration on its intrinsic character. But in the course of his inquiry he meets with passages which seem contradictory, and to which infidel writers appeal in their attempts to assail the authority of the Bible. These he considers it his duty to attempt to reconcile; but the attempt, Mr. Church tells us, is often fatal.

“ O, could we read the fate of former adventurers in this region, we should doubtless find among them thousands, of the most flattering early promise, who have terminated their career in vice and atheism. After searching long for the grounds of harmony and coincidence between different revealed truths, they have at length discovered the impossibility of succeeding ; but, alas, mistaking still the proper province of human knowledge, they have confounded that impossibility with the certainty that the Bible is false, and so have snapped the cords by which it bound them to virtue, and, like lions escaped from their cage, have gone to and fro seeking whom they might devour.

“ Others still, being less competent to judge of the difference between what they know and what cannot be known, have fallen into the supposition that they had discovered the secret connection and harmony of these irreconcilable truths, and thus have given battle to those whose superior discernment qualified them for controverting their positions, and, under a pretence that Christianity itself was equally concerned with themselves in the contest, have rallied all their forces only to make their defeat still more decisive and disgraceful.

“ And in addition to the former classes, there is another to whom Christianity is too dear to be sacrificed on account of their inability to reconcile its seemingly adverse statements ; and hence, the ill effects of attempting it are confined chiefly to the time wasted upon that attempt, the distraction of mind which it occasions, and to its influence in diverting them from more important researches and more useful labors. But the worst consequence of supposing it necessary to ascertain the grounds of harmony between the facts of religion is its influence in incensing and perpetuating the spirit of controversy.” — pp. 101, 102.

Is it possible to read these extracts, and believe that the author has any confidence in the Bible alone as an available rule of faith ? If we are to believe him, the very attempt to reconcile the apparent contradictions of the Scriptures and to harmonize their doctrines is time thrown away ; is to incense and perpetuate the spirit of controversy, — that is, dissent ; to prepare one's self for a more decisive and disgraceful defeat, or for the plunge into vice and atheism ! What more could he concede to the enemies of the Bible ? What more ample concession could he, as a Protestant, make to the unbelievers in our holy religion itself ?

The “ disturbing influences ” he points out are inherent in the nature of the case, and inevitable. No man can possibly escape them in his efforts to interpret the Bible. The mind must be formed, before it can approach the sacred text as

a competent interpreter ; and if it is, it will have its habits, its doctrines, its preconceived notions, through the medium of which, by a law of its own nature, it must contemplate whatever it reads. Only the new-born babe is free from prepossession and the disturbing influences enumerated ; but, unhappily, the new-born babe wants the positive qualifications indispensable to a Biblical interpreter. What, then, is the remedy for sectarian dissensions ? If we understand Mr. Church, his remedy resolves itself into abstinence from all attempts to form from the Scriptures a body of Christian doctrine, to take the Scriptures as they are, philologically explained, and to prepare, by doing good in an uncontroversial way, for understanding their simple sense, and being contented with it.

The great cause of dissension, he says, is in the efforts to obtain a body of coherent and self-consistent doctrines from the Bible. The controversy does not turn on the simple facts or statements of Scripture, but on the conclusions which men draw, or the doctrines they attempt to deduce from them. But conclusions or deductions of reason from revealed *data* are not revealed truths, and should not be imposed or regarded as matters of faith. Therefore, they should not be drawn, or, if drawn, should not be insisted on as matters of faith. But however valid this reasoning might be in the mouth of a Catholic, who has already a body of faith drawn up and imposed by divine authority, it cannot be adopted by a Protestant ; for the simple reason, that he has no way to determine the revealed truth, but by conclusions or deductions from the written word. If he is denied the right to regard these conclusions and deductions as articles of faith, he has and can have no articles of faith at all. His belief becomes a mere vague belief in certain detached and incoherent statements or isolated and barren facts. This is evident from what the author himself says : —

“ And one has only to look over the history of controversies among the people of God [sectarians], to convince himself that a large proportion of them have arisen from enforcing uniformity upon subjects which cannot be so perfectly settled by the Scriptures as to produce, in all cases, an identity of conviction. They have oftener had respect to deductions from the facts of the Bible than to the facts themselves. The point at issue has not been, whether this or that fact is stated in the Bible, but whether this or that principle is a legitimate deduction from those facts and statements which are alike clear to all. Take, for example, the con-

troversies which have existed in reference to the person of Christ, (and who can estimate the extent of talent and labor which, from the time of Arius to this day, have been exhausted upon it ?) and it will be found that they have not so much regarded what the Bible speaks, as the use to be made of its testimony. Let a Socinian and Trinitarian of common capacity sit down to the task of reading together the statements of the New Testament concerning Christ, taking them one by one, and their understanding of them, unless previously determined by their systems, would be very nearly the same. That Jesus was baptized of John in the Jordan, — that the Spirit in the form of a dove descended and abode upon him, while a voice from heaven proclaimed him the Son of God, — that he was tempted forty days and nights in the wilderness, — that he raised Lazarus from the dead, — and that the words and works ascribed to him by his four biographers were spoken and wrought as represented, they would both agree. But let them undertake to make out from these facts what sort of a being Christ was, *whether God, or man, or both, or neither, and they would be instantly thrown into the heat of controversy.*" — pp. 59, 60.

Now, what sort of faith in Christ is that which leaves it undecided whether he was God, or man, or both, or neither ? Does Mr. Church suppose that men will consent to be mocked by having that called a revelation which reveals nothing ? Can the human mind be contented to say two and two, two and two, without adding, *are four* ? He knows little of the human mind if he does. The abstinence he contends for is impracticable, and would be fatal, on the Protestant principle, to all theological belief, if it were not, and if it were observed.

Nor has the author more to hope from philology. Suppose he succeeds in raising the Scriptures to their "due position in our plans of education," and has them interpreted by grammar and lexicon only, has he secured the interpreter against the disturbing influences he so well describes ? Who will guaranty him that the grammarian and lexicographer have had no prepossessions, no preconceived notions, no favorite doctrines, they wished to advance ? The character of the first edition of Johnson's dictionary of the English language is not unknown, and the Hebrew of Gesenius is almost another language from that of the Buxtorfs. Nor is this all. What will guaranty him the purity and integrity of the sacred text ? The text can be settled only by criticism ; and is he sure that the critic is free from all bias, and that his preconceived notions have had no influence in leading him to adopt one various reading and to reject another ? Philology is, no doubt, well

in its place ; but what it may do, when too exclusively relied on, we are taught by German exegetics, which end in frittering away the word into — nothing.

Mr. Church would have the Bible explained philologically, and its statements regarded as ultimate facts, which may serve as the basis of an inductive theological science, and this, too, as one of the conditions of union, after he had shown that drawing conclusions from its simple statements is the great cause of disunion ! Does the learned author know what induction means ? What is it, in fact, but the very thing he condemns ? But he is charmed with the boasted magic of induction in the natural sciences. He is a Protestant, and is bound to be so. But will he tell us what induction has done in the field of natural science ? Observation and experiment have done something there, we concede ; but that induction has done any thing we shall be prepared to believe, when we find a natural *science*, so called, that is any thing more than a mere hypothesis, or even when we find all naturalists consenting to adopt one and the same hypothesis.

The last resort is equally hopeless. Men by doing good may, undoubtedly, be prepared to relish the truth ; and our Lord himself teaches us, that, if any man will do the will of his Father in heaven, he shall know of the doctrine. But our Lord said this on the supposition that there was a teacher present to tell what the will of the Father is. Mr. Church adopts the doctrine, that do good and you will be prepared to know the truth. He must have holiness of life, and active benevolence, before he can be *prepared* to know the truth. But how, before he knows the truth, can he know what is good ? or how, without the truth, have true holiness of life ? If he can be holy without a knowledge of the truth, what matters it whether he know the truth or not ? Let him follow out the doctrine he lays down under this head, and he will find himself in that very latitudinarianism he condemns.

Mr. Church is, however, a man of ability, and these absurdities and contradictions belong less to him than to his system. His work is a complete and unanswerable demonstration of the impossibility of harmony and union on the Protestant principle. Harmony and union are, in the nature of things, possible only in the truth, and in some uniform and infallible means of ascertaining it. His work frankly confesses that Protestants have not the truth, and it sets out on the assumption that it is yet to be found, and that they

must be subjected to a long course of judicious discipline, before they can be *prepared* to find it, or to recognize it when they find it. Uniform and infallible means of ascertaining it they have not, and the author proves they cannot have. Hence, he supposes it impossible to avoid mingling "very considerable errors" with the word. Why, then, talk of harmony and union? Why seek for them on the Protestant principle? Why not boldly accept the scandalous dissensions and divisions of Protestants, unblushingly assert that they are grateful to God and profitable to men; or else frankly acknowledge that Protestantism is not only a crime, but a blunder,—that it has failed, and ever must fail, of its purpose? Do be consistent. If you will adhere to the Protestant principle, do so manfully; take it with all its necessary consequences, and do not try to deceive yourselves. Three hundred years you have tried your experiment; you have thoroughly tested your principle, and you know as well as ever you can know its practical workings. You can get no different results, unless you change one or both of your factors. There is no error in the process. Why, then, be ashamed of the results? If your principles are good, your results are good, and should not be disowned. If it is good to sow the wind, it is good to reap the whirlwind. If it is good to sow to the flesh, it is good of the flesh to reap corruption. If it is good to serve the Devil, it is good to be damned. Do not be ashamed of your wages. Do not add to the sin of rebellion the disgrace of cowardice. Avow your master, and acknowledge yourselves contented with his pay. If you recoil from the scandalous results of Protestantism, blame not the results, but your system, and abandon it. If ye will not be Christians, at least, for the honor of our common humanity, be MEN.

Nothing seems to us more ridiculous than these efforts of our Protestant friends to effect harmony and union. Nay, we can hardly view them without a species of contempt. Yet we check ourselves. We, after all, see in them a ground of hope. They prove that Protestants are not wholly given over. They prove that they are not satisfied with their present state, and that they feel they have not as yet realized even their own meagre conception of Christianity. The late *World's Convention* in London was a striking proof of this. All Protestantism is said to have been represented there, and, if so, the whole Protestant world there solemnly confessed to all man-

kind, that hitherto Protestantism has proved a failure, — a total failure. What else assembled that convention? What other fact did it symbolize? And is it nothing that universal Protestantdom should make this confession? The fact is, Protestants are heartily ashamed of the workings of their system; and they feel, that, unless they can do something to secure a result different from what they have hitherto obtained, it is all over with them. They feel that they are not the Church of God; that not for such results as they have obtained did Almighty God establish his kingdom on the earth; and they would fain confer together, and, if possible, devise ways and means to become what they are sensible they are not. But, as says a homely old proverb, "It is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear." Poor men! while we rejoice that the consciousness of a need of religion assembled them together, we cannot but compassionate them in their hopeless task. They are condemned to roll the huge stone up the steep hill, and ever to have it come down with thundering rebound. Unhappy Titans! why would they make war on heaven? Wretched prodigal sons! why must they starve in a strange land, when in their Father's house there is bread enough and to spare? They will, some of them, conscious as they are growing of their famishing condition, yet ask this question, and arise and return, and be welcomed as the lost that is found, as the dead that is alive.

ART. III. — *The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, containing the Confession of Faith, the Catechisms, and the Directory for the Worship of God; together with the Plan of Government and Discipline, as ratified by the General Assembly at their Sessions in May, 1821, and amended in 1833.* Philadelphia: Haswell & Co. 1838.

In the articles inserted in the former series of this Journal on Presbyterianism, we attacked that system in its very foundation, and proved that it has no support but the imagination and sophistry of its authors. This, in reality, is all that is necessary for its complete and entire refutation; for when the foundation is taken away, the superstructure must fall of

itself. Nevertheless, in order the better to expose the folly and absurdity of sectarians, we will go farther, and take up and refute the several Presbyterian doctrines in detail. This, though not absolutely necessary, may not be altogether useless.

In our present article, we shall select for examination the Presbyterian dogma of predestination and fatalism. The errors heretofore refuted, with insignificant exceptions, are common to all classes of Protestants ; but this error is very nearly peculiar to Presbyterians, and that by which they are chiefly distinguished from other sects.

If there be any theology current in the lower regions, it must be the Calvinistic doctrine of election and reprobation ; and among religious societies on earth, they who adhere to it may well be compared to the *Dragons de Mort*, in the late Continental wars, — so called because they offered and received no quarter, but unfurled the black flag, the sure signal of death. The excessive harshness of this theology has revolted most religious minds, and even Presbyterians themselves are not unanimous in its maintenance. In fact, only a portion of their community still retain it ; for, not to mention the celebrated quarrel between Gomar and Arminius, which so impaired the strength of Calvinism, the great schism, in 1837 and 1838, — of which we have spoken in the foregoing article, — and which divided the Presbyterians into two very nearly equal camps, originated chiefly in a difference of opinion in regard to the doctrine of election and reprobation. The New School Presbyterians repudiate, in the main, the cruel and impious teaching on this article of Calvin, and other rigid predestinarians ; while the Old School still retain it, rally under the black flag, their hereditary colors, and swear to prove true *dragons of death* to the last. If, therefore, the doctrine is abandoned by a part, there is still another part that upholds it, and renders its discussion not altogether superfluous.

In the present article, we shall depart, to some extent, from the method we have heretofore pursued, and, instead of taking up chapter and number as we find them in the *Confession* itself, we shall bring together the several propositions which relate to the same subject, that we may preserve unity and connection in our discussion, and dispose of the whole subject at once. We will give, — 1. A clear and faithful statement of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, and show, that, however disguised or mitigated, it is really contained in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith ; 2. We will examine and refute the

proofs which Presbyterians adduce in its support ; and, 3. Set forth and establish the Catholic doctrine which is opposed to it.

1. The Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, simply stated, is : God from all eternity determined to create some men for the purpose of making them happy and glorious, and others for the purpose of making them unhappy, and consigning them over to eternal torments. The former he created that he might manifest his goodness ; the latter, that he might glorify his justice. If one object, that it does not appear how such a determination can glorify God, and that to create men for the purpose of torturing them savors of cruelty and injustice, it is replied, that the objection is impertinent. Is not a man free to take of the same tree a portion for his fire, and another portion to be made into an ornament for his house ?

2. This theology asserts that God from all eternity decreed to bestow certain favors and graces on those elected to manifest his goodness, and to cause the others to commit sin and run into every excess, that he might glorify his justice in their punishment. That is, God does not merely permit the sins of the wicked, as Catholics allege, but positively decrees, ordains them, urges their commission, and actually produces them. In other words, God, in order to secure the execution of his decree concerning the election of some and the reprobation of the rest of mankind, imposes on the former the necessity of being good, and on the latter the necessity of being wicked ; or, to use a comparison which is no exaggeration of the doctrine, God makes, on the stormy ocean of this world, some sink, and others float, by giving to the former a leaden jacket which weighs them down, and to the latter a buoyant jacket, a sort of *life-preserver*, around their waists, which keeps them up. Or, rather, to represent still better the present state of men since original sin, God has concealed under the life-preserver a bag of salt, so that, at first, all sink alike ; but after a while the salt melts away, the life-preserver prevails, and they who are favored with it rise to the surface, while those who have the leaden jackets do not. Notwithstanding this, Calvinists tell us, with a grave face, that God is not the author of sin ! First, because, as they say, it is not God, but the leaden jacket, that causes the wicked to sink ; second, because the wicked sink willingly, that is, in going down they will to go down, and take pleasure in so doing ; third, if it be urged that the sinking should be imputed, not to the leaden jacket, but to the agency that

fastens it around their waists, still God is not the author of sin, for he binds on the leaden jacket from a good motive, namely, to show forth his power and justice. That is to say, God is not the author of sin, because in issuing his decree he is not actuated by improper motives, does not ordain the sin as an end, but as the means to an end ; and, moreover, because there can be no sin for him, since sin is the violation of a law, and he is above all law.

3. The numerous necessary consequences and developments of this doctrine are clearly set forth and accepted by Calvinists. An obvious corollary from it is, that man has no free will, no power to act or not to act, to do good or to do evil, and that every thing in him proceeds necessarily from the decrees of God, in such a manner that it is not his will that chooses, but God's decree that necessarily and inevitably makes him act. Some Calvinists, indeed, admit, in words, the existence of free will in man ; but they mean by it merely that man wills what he does, without having any power to do the contrary. If a stone be dropped from a tower, all readily conceive that its falling to the ground is the necessary effect of gravity, and that the stone has no power to rise or to stop. Still, admitting it to have knowledge and will, it would fall voluntarily, willingly, and even delight in falling, according to the law of its nature. This sort of will would proceed from necessity, and it is all the free will Calvinists do or can concede to man. Or take another example. No one who reflects on numbers but must yield his assent to the assertion that two and two make four. A Calvinist will say that this assent is *free*, because voluntary. But persons not versed in Calvinistic subtilties will contend that this is not an example of free will, since we are not free not to yield the assent in question.

4. Other consequences no less remarkable follow, such as that salvation is possible, not to all men, but to the elect only, and though some others may be called externally, they cannot attain to salvation, because the Almighty has predestinated them to evil ; that Christ has redeemed, not all men, but merely the elect, and therefore the graces necessary to assist our free will, so strongly inclined to evil since the fall of Adam, are granted to the elect only, and totally withheld from the reprobate ; that the grace which is given to the elect imposes on them the necessity of doing good, since, according to Calvinists, it would be impious and blasphemous to assert

that men may resist divine grace, and yet the grace offers no violence to their will, but makes them yield voluntarily, as we yield to the proposition, two and two make four ; that the commandments of God are, in many instances, impossible both for the just and the wicked, — for the wicked, in consequence of their predestination and destitution of all grace, and for the just, because God would keep them humble by causing them to fall into sin. All these consequences are clearly contained in the Calvinistic premises, and the statements we have just given comprise the sum and substance of the Calvinistic theology, as laid down by Calvin himself, and as set forth in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, in its “ratified and amended” edition. We have taken no other liberty with it than to divest it of the disguises under which its adherents seek to conceal its hideousness.

5. Now, the very first proposition we take up in the Confession of Faith is, that God has made some men for eternal life and the rest for eternal death. In chapter third, which contains most of the Calvinistic tenets on predestination, it is clearly and explicitly asserted, that “God from all eternity did unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass,” and that, “by the decree of God for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained unto everlasting death.” Again, “Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life God hath chosen, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them. The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.” The doctrine that God has made some men and angels for the purpose of making them miserable is here unequivocally taught. The effort to conceal it under the phrase “pass by,” so that its harshness should not revolt the unprejudiced reader, — a phrase which Calvin would have stigmatized, as invented to disguise a wholesome doctrine, — is fruitless. The whole context exhibits substantially all the tenets of Calvin, and the miserable verbiage adopted fails utterly to conceal them. The Scriptural passages quoted at the bottom of the page are the very ones adduced by the Genevan theologian, with the exception of a few additional texts which have no bearing on the question ; and we may, without fear of contradiction, assert, that the

Confession plainly and undeniably teaches the doctrines we have set forth as the Calvinistic.

II. We proceed now to examine and refute the proofs which Presbyterians in their Confession adduce in support of their doctrine. The first proof we will consider is 1 St. Pet. ii. 8,—“Being disobedient; whereunto also they were appointed.” The Westminster divines find in this text an express warrant of that leaden jacket with which the Almighty clothes the wicked to make them sink. Here, say they, we find that certain persons were *appointed* by God to be disobedient, unbelievers, reprobates. But it is not said in the text, whether they were appointed by God or by their own malice, through their own free choice; and, for aught that appears, the meaning of the text may be the reverse of what Presbyterians, following Beza, their leader, suppose. They suppose that St. Peter intends to teach that God makes certain men disbelievers that he may send them to hell, which is to make God play the part of the most cruel tyrant. But the text may be rendered,—“Some stumble at the word (the Gospel), being disobedient to that for which they had been appointed.” That is, the Gospel had been appointed for the Jews first,—and it is to the Jews St. Peter addresses his Epistle,—and our Saviour commanded his Apostles to preach it to them first, and to announce it to the Gentiles only when the Jews should have rejected it. What mockery, then, to adduce this text as a proof of the blasphemous doctrine that God predestinates men to sin! Erasmus, who cannot be suspected of undue partiality to Catholics, gives the interpretation we have given, and even the English translation will bear the same sense, by making *whereunto* relate, not to the *disobedient*, but to *the word*. It will then simply teach that the scandalous Jews were disobedient to the Gospel which had been destined for them. Hence, the text shows merely that God designed the Gospel to be preached first to the Jews. It is sufficient for our purpose to show that the text *may* receive a consistent sense, according to the rules of grammar, without including the Presbyterian dogma. It is for Presbyterians to show, not only that it *may*, but that it *must*, have the sense they give it, before they can use it as a proof of their cherished doctrine.

The second text, among those adduced in the Confession, which we will consider, is from St. Jude. “For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old *ordained* to this condemnation; ungodly men,” &c. Here we

cannot mistake the cloven foot. The English translators were so determined to find predestination to sin, that they let slip no occasion of introducing it unawares, as crept in those heretics of whom St. Jude speaks. The text is mistranslated. The Douay version reads, "who were *written* of long ago unto this judgment"; for in the Greek it is not "before of old *ordained*," but *before written*. That is, St. Jude says it had been previously written, foretold, and announced, that there would be heretics in the Christian community. It had been written by St. Paul, St. Peter, by the Evangelists in the name of Christ himself, who tells us to beware of wolves in sheep's clothing, and by the prophets of old, who threaten false prophets with the severest judgments of God. It is not necessary, then, to deduce from this text the abominable doctrine, that God ordained the men of whom St. Jude speaks to the impieties mentioned, and did it that he might condemn them. St. Jude, in the remark so eagerly seized upon by Presbyterians, seeks merely to forestall a difficulty which might arise in the minds of the faithful, namely, If these men creep in *unawares*, how shall we avoid them? He answers, that Christians have been warned beforehand, and that those heretics have been described already by our Lord, the apostles, and the prophets.

The third text we notice appears to be selected with more skill than the two we have just dismissed; but it can afford Presbyterians no support. "The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil." Prov. xvi. 4. If we may believe Calvin and others of his school, this means that God has made the wicked for the purpose of consigning them to eternal damnation, or the day of evil. But Presbyterians cannot adopt this interpretation, without supplying many things not found in the text. They may, indeed, pretend to have the Spirit to direct them in the interpretation of the Bible, but this, whatever it may be for themselves, is nothing to others, and they must sustain their interpretations by arguments which can be addressed to others, before they can expect them to be adopted. The text under consideration is susceptible of a different interpretation, and which requires less to be supplied.* "The Lord has made every thing for himself,

* "Jehovah has ordained every thing for its end;

Even the wicked for the day of evil." — *NORRIS*.

"There is not only a wise arrangement and correspondence in good things, but also in evil things; for the evil of punishment follows the evil of guilt; the evil day is appointed for the evil-doer." — *GAOTIUS*.

and therefore the wicked shall fall into the evil day." This is the translation of Vatable, who is not unpopular among Protestants, and who cannot be suspected of partiality. Solomon means that every thing turns out for the glory of God, even the punishment of the wicked ; but this is something very different from saying that he makes the wicked fall into iniquity for the purpose of punishing them. It is one thing to say that God is glorified in the punishments which he inflicts on the wicked ; it is another thing to say that he makes men wicked that he may be glorified in their punishment. The former is compatible with the most perfect justice and goodness ; the latter is compatible only with the grossest injustice and cruelty.

The last text we shall examine, and, indeed, the principal text adduced in the *Confession* in support of the doctrine in question, is taken from Rom. ix. This is the great war-horse ridden by Calvin and his associates, and Presbyterians introduce it everywhere, and use it for every assertion, as cooks use salt for every dish. Their use of it shows clearly how shamefully the Scriptures may be perverted, and how dangerous a weapon they may prove in improper hands, as well as why St. Peter said that St. Paul had written in his Epistles things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest to their own destruction. We quote the passage entire.

"The children [Jacob and Esau] being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth ; it was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger : as it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. What shall we say, then ? Is there unrighteousness with God ? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So, then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. For the Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say, then, unto me, Why doth he yet find fault ? For who hath resisted his will ? Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God ? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus ? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor ? What if God, willing to show

his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction ; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy which he had afore prepared unto glory, even us, whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles ? ”

Here, we are told, is the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, clearly and expressly stated. God predestinated Jacob and damned Esau before either could perform any action whatever. Neither the election nor the reprobation comes through the will or the works of its subject, but through the decree of God, who shows mercy on whom he pleases, and whom he will he hardens. For life eternal or for eternal damnation, we are as clay in the hands of the potter. God hardened the heart of Pharaoh for the very purpose of showing forth his power in him. But this is the doctrine of Calvin and his school, not of St. Paul. For,

1. The words quoted, if taken without any restriction, involve an evident absurdity. If God rewards or punishes just as he pleases, without respect to desert, and if our eternal lot in no sense depend on our will or works, he might hurl St. Paul himself from his seat in heaven into the deepest hell, merely for the purpose of showing his power, and proving that works have nothing to do with election or reprobation. But this is absurd, and even Calvinists themselves would shrink from the bare supposition of its possibility. To show power by condemning at random, at mere will, is the office of a tyrant, and of a tyrant only, as all men, not deserving a strait-jacket or a lunatic asylum, must necessarily admit.

2. There is a whole class of Scriptural expressions congenial to the peculiar genius of the Hebrew language, and of the Jewish people, which have a harsh, and indeed a false sense, when translated literally into our modern tongues. In the case of these the *letter* indeed *killeth*, and hence the folly of making private judgment the test of Scriptural truth. *I have hated Esau* means in the text merely that *I have loved him less* than Jacob. *Whom he will he hardeneth*, means simply, *whom he will he suffers to harden himself, or leaves in his hardness*. Thus our Lord says, St. Luke, xiv. 26, “ If any man come to me and *hate* not his father and mother, &c., he cannot be my disciple.” These words can only signify that we are to love father and mother, &c., *less* than we do Christ, not that we are positively to *hate* them ; for his law forbids us to hate even our enemies, and therefore could not command us to hate our nearest relatives. In Genesis xxix. 31,

it is said that Jacob hated Lia his wife ; but, from the context, and from the well-known disposition of Jacob, who was a just man, it is evident that this can only mean that he loved her less than he did Rachel. So again, Matt. ix. 13, "I will have mercy and not sacrifice," means, not that God rejects sacrifices, for he himself instituted and rigorously prescribed them, but simply that he *prefers* mercy to sacrifice. In the same way we must restrict the assertion, that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh. According to the genius of the Hebrew language, this means only that God *suffered him to harden himself*, or *left him in his hardness*, which Pharaoh had brought on himself by his own malice. That Pharaoh did harden himself is certain from the Scriptures themselves, Ex. viii. 15, "But when Pharaoh saw that rest was given, he *hardened his own heart*." And in the following chapter, Pharaoh, softened by the divine punishments, is represented, verse 27, as saying, — "I have sinned this time also" ; but as soon as the judgments cease, it is added, verse 34, "He sinned yet more, and *hardened his heart*, he and his servants." In perfect harmony with this mode of speaking is it that David said, the Lord had commanded Semei, 2 Kings xvi. 10, to curse him, — meaning merely, that he regarded the afflictions which he suffered as a punishment from God, not indeed that Semei had received a revelation or a positive command from God to curse him ; for if so, Semei would merely have done his duty, and David would not have ordered him to be punished for it as he did, when giving his last instructions to his son Solomon.

3. If what we have now said be duly considered, the passage from St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans will present no difficulty, and will be seen to have no bearing on the question of predestination, of election or reprobation *in reference to the life to come*. St. Paul speaks expressly and solely of the election of the Gentiles to be the people of God, instead of the Jews, who as a nation had hitherto been that people, or the true church ; and he at the same time asserts positively that both Jews and Gentiles, if they choose, may belong to the new society which our Lord founds as his kingdom on earth. To set this forth is the great, almost the sole, purpose of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, and also of several of his other Epistles. The great objection he had to meet and answer from the Jews, who opposed him everywhere, was, that Christianity could not be the true religion, because the true

religion had been found and still was to be found only among the Jews, since they alone had received the promises. That the purpose of the passage in question is to meet this objection is evident from the fact, that the whole of it is given in answer to the question raised in verse 6 of this same chapter, "Not as though the word of God had taken no effect; for they are not all Israel which are of Israel." Having asserted this, he proceeds to prove that the true Israel are not now the Jews as such, but the Christian people, and that, in substituting the Christian people for the Jewish nation as the people of God, no injustice is done to the Jews; since the true Israel, or Christian people, are collected indiscriminately from both Jews and Gentiles, — "Even us (Christians), whom he hath called not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles." ver. 24. This understood, all the passages which to a superficial reader seem to be pure Calvinism have an easy and natural interpretation, conformably to the Catholic doctrine, and even demanded by the context.

Jacob was chosen to be the head of the people of God, and the father, according to the flesh, of the Messiah, in preference to his elder brother Esau, and before either was born or had done any action good or evil, solely and purely because such was the pleasure of God; not from the evil or sin of either Jacob or Esau, but from God's own will or mercy. No injustice in the choice of Jacob to be, and the rejection of Esau from being, the people of God is done to Esau, because the Messiah could not be born of both, and the favor of being chosen to be the father of the Messiah was due to neither; and therefore God could freely bestow it on which he pleased, without the other having any right to complain of being rejected. God every day bestows on some natural favors of genius, wit, riches, &c., which he withholds from others, and without injustice; for no one can claim these favors as his due. But the election of Jacob and the rejection of Esau had nothing to do with the eternal life of one or the other. Esau, though rejected *as head of the people of God*, was still able and bound to worship God, and by doing so could secure eternal life. So his posterity, though shut out from making any part of the chosen people, were not deprived of the ability nor of the obligation to worship God. Hence the words, "I have loved Jacob and hated Esau," are to be understood of them as chiefs of nations, and it is only when they receive a *national* application that they are

verified, as is evident from the fact that they are quoted from Malachias i. 3, who says, — “ I have loved Jacob and hated Esau, and have made his mountains a wilderness, and given his inheritance to the dragons of the desert,” and from the fact that, though it was said “ the elder shall serve the younger,” Esau in person never served Jacob, but on the contrary was always treated by him as his superior.

As to the personal salvation of Esau, the text says absolutely nothing. Hence some commentators have inferred that he is saved, as also Ismael the son of Abraham, who also was rejected from being the head of the chosen people. It is very probable that Esau repented of his early cruelty to his brother, and did not die a reprobate. This will appear at least not unlikely to one who reads Gen. xxxiii., which shows us Esau forgiving his brother with frankness and sincerity; and that the reconciliation which took place proved to be permanent may be gathered from the fact, that many years after, when Isaac died, we read, “ his two sons, Esau and Jacob, buried him.” They who know how bitter and lasting are in general the feuds and animosities of near relations will not think lightly of the disposition Esau manifested when he forgave his brother, and we may gather from the words of our Lord, “ Forgive, and ye shall be forgiven,” a ground of hope that Esau is not lost. His posterity, though excluded from being the people of God, were not excluded from the chance of salvation. They even had their saints and elect; for it is the common opinion that holy Job was a descendant of Esau.

But to return to the Epistle to the Romans. The Apostle adds another reason why the true religion has departed from the Jews as a nation. They hardened themselves as did Pharaoh, and Almighty God suffered them to remain in their hardness. If the Jew persisted, and asked why God had suffered them to harden themselves, the Apostle answered, that no one has the right to put such a question to God, and the clay has nothing to reply against the potter. Moreover, that they have no ground of complaint; for God has already done more for them than strict justice required, inasmuch as he had borne with long-suffering their hardness before rejecting them; and he now would show his justice and power in punishing their obduracy, and his mercy in adopting the Christians as his chosen people, into the number of which people the Jews had the first offer of entering, and might still enter, if they would, as well as the Gentiles. Thus the comparison

drawn from the power of the potter over the clay extends, in the reasoning of the Apostle, only to the power which God has over those who have already hardened themselves, and should be extended no farther ; otherwise we might from it contend that God may hurl the saints into hell, and raise the reprobate to glory. As a general rule, comparisons are not to be urged in every point.

St. Paul is supposed by Calvinists to favor their notion, when, from Ex. ix. 16, he states that God raised up Pharaoh for the express purpose of showing his power on him for his obduracy ; but such an interpretation of the words used betrays only the grossest ignorance of Scriptural language and of the Hebrew idiom. The phrase merely means, that in consequence of Pharaoh's obduracy God showed his power on him ; and on reading the passage in Exodus, it will be found that it was not till after Pharaoh had hardened his heart that the words were spoken. The same principle applies also to the concluding words of the passage under consideration. "What if God, willing to show his wrath and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath ?" The sense is not that God endured the vessels of wrath for the purpose of showing his wrath, for the endurance was an evidence of his long-suffering and mercy ; but, "What — who has a right to complain — if God now, since he has endured the vessels of wrath, — the Jews as a nation, — be willing to show his wrath and make his power known in rejecting them as the depositaries of the true religion ?"

It is evident from these remarks that this famous passage has no reference to predestination, or even to future events, but treats of a fact accomplished in the time of the Apostle, namely, the rejection of the Jewish nation as the people of God, and the substitution of the Christian people taken from both Jews and Gentiles. Of this the Jew had no right to complain, since, as the same Apostle teaches us in his Epistle to the Galatians, the Jews were originally chosen to be the people of God only for a time, which time expired at the coming of Christ, in whom the law of which they had been the depositaries received its fulfilment ; because the promise made to Abraham, on which the Jew relied for the perpetuity of his nation as the chosen nation, was to his seed, which is Christ, in whom no national distinctions are recognized ; because the Jew had no claim in justice to the prerogative he had enjoyed, since his nation was not chosen in consequence of any merits of its own,

or of its progenitors, for the choice was made while the children were yet unborn, and before either had done good or evil, and of course taking away a prerogative to which he had no claim in justice could be no act of injustice to him ; because the Jewish nation had hardened their hearts, and rejected the Gospel, which was offered to them first, and therefore God could justly leave them in their obduracy and turn for his people to the Gentiles ; and finally, because the new people of God were not selected in reference to national distinctions, but to faith in Christ. The Jew was deprived by this rejection, individually, of no advantage, but could still be reckoned among the people of God, if he chose, as well as the Gentiles. The Gentiles became the chosen people only by faith in Christ, and the Jews could continue to be his chosen people in the same way, if they willed ; but seeing they did not so will, they could not complain, if God, who had borne so long with their obduracy, should, to show his wrath and to make his power known, now punish them for their obduracy by leaving them in it. Understood in this way, the argument is clear and conclusive, and the detached texts which Calvinists wrest in their own favor have a free and natural meaning, without affording any countenance to the shocking impiety and blasphemy, that God predestinates men to sin that he may have the glory of damning them. Their interpretation is, to say the least, perfectly gratuitous, and it is sufficient for our purpose to show that the passages in question will bear a different interpretation.

III. We proceed now to the Catholic doctrine, which stands opposed to the Presbyterian. The Church teaches that God desires the salvation of all men, and that, so far from having made a portion for the express purpose of condemning them to eternal fire, he puts into the hands of all sufficient and abundant means of salvation ; that the real author of sin is the criminal will of man, who freely and of his own malice, which he has the power to reject and expel, chooses evil ; that Christ has redeemed all men, and obtained graces for all men, by corresponding to which all can obtain heaven ; that divine grace imposes no necessity on the human will ; and that the commandments of God are possible to all men, the just and the unjust, since God permits no one to be tempted above his strength. These views, to say the least, are in accordance with what our reason spontaneously teaches us of that infinitely perfect Being whom we call our Father.

Such is the general statement of the Catholic doctrine on

the questions involved, but for the present we shall consider it only so far as it is the direct contradictory of the article of Presbyterianism, which we have just seen is unsupported by the texts alleged. The rest will come up in order, after we have examined the evidence Presbyterians adduce in support of the second article of their doctrine, on the "Divine decrees."

The article we have been considering is, that Almighty God predestinates some men to sin, that he may glorify his justice in condemning them to hell. We have seen that the texts quoted to prove this horrid doctrine do not necessarily teach it, and, in fact, have no reference to it. This leaves the doctrine unproved, an unsupported assertion. Against this doctrine stands the Catholic doctrine, that God wills the salvation of all men, and has furnished all with sufficient and abundant means of salvation. If we prove this, we disprove the Presbyterian doctrine by proving its contrary.

That Almighty God has created no one for the sake of condemning him to hell follows so closely and so necessarily from the most obvious and natural conceptions which we have of the Supreme Being, that the attempt to prove it seems ridiculous, indeed, blasphemous. As the punishment of parricide was not found in the laws of Solon, because the crime was not supposed to be possible, so it may be thought such a thesis as this should be banished from Christian theology, as combating a theory which can have no advocates. But—we are ashamed to be obliged to say it—Presbyterians have transcended all bounds, and are even worse than the old Manicheans; for these, at least, excluded cruelty and malice from their conception of God by introducing two principles of things, one good and the other evil. This unquestionably was a madness, but a very reasonable madness in comparison with that of attributing an evil property to Him who is the author of all good, of ascribing cruelty to Him whom the Scriptures, and hence all Christians in their public hymns, praise as the merciful and patient Lord, filling the earth with his mercy and loving-kindness. "The Lord is sweet to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works." Ps. cxliv. 9. Calvin, however, has made this discussion necessary, and on him and his followers must rest its responsibility and its blasphemy. Happily, the proofs of the Catholic doctrine, that God has made no one for the sake of damning him, nay, that he desires the salvation of all men, not of the just only, but of all others also, are so numerous, clear, and convincing, that they

do not and cannot fail to place the cruelty, madness, and absurdity of the Calvinistic doctrine in a clear and strong light.

The sacred Scriptures furnish so many texts expressly to our purpose, that it is impossible for us to quote them all, and it is difficult to make a selection. But we may take *Ezech. xviii. 23*, as clear and unequivocal. "Is it my will that the sinner should die, saith the Lord God, and not that he should be converted from his ways, and live?" The prophet proceeds to argue against those who contend that the ways of the Lord are not right, and declares, verse 30, "Therefore will I judge every man according to his ways"; and concludes the chapter, verse 32, with the assurance, that "I desire not the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God; return ye, and live." Is not such language in reference to the impious clear and conclusive? What more could we desire to prove that Almighty God made them, not for the sake of condemning them to hell, but, on the contrary, that they should do good, repent after having sinned, and live?

The same declaration of God's will occurs again, *xxxiii. 11*, confirmed by a solemn oath. "*As I live*, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." It is evident from this, that the real cause of the loss of the wicked is their own criminal will, and not the desire or the decree of God to consign them to eternal punishment. The prophet *Osee, xiii. 9*, says as much:—"Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in me"; or, as the Protestant Bible has it, "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thine help." Hence the destruction and the ruin of the wicked come from themselves, from their own malicious course, and the ill use they make of their free will; but the Lord has given them his help to preserve them from the destruction they bring on themselves by their own malice. Also in the same prophet, *xi. 9*, the Lord says he will moderate the punishment of the wicked Ephraimites, or Samaritans, "because he is God, and not man"; thus showing that it is the essential property of God to remain ever within the bounds of a just punishment. What horrid impiety, then, to assert that he creates some men for the sake of making them sin and burn eternally for it!

The prophet *Isaias, xxviii. 21*, calls vengeance and punishment "a work strange to him," that is, a work foreign to his nature, and to which he resorts only when our iniquities and malice compel him to chastise us. But on Calvin's theory,

vengeance is the prime mover and first cause of the eternal ruin of the wicked, and therefore should not be called his "*strange work*," but a congenial work, and a work in which he took particular delight from all eternity. When God brought the waters of the flood upon the earth, we are told, Gen. vi. 6, that he was "touched inwardly with sorrow of heart," and that "it repented him to have made man." Are not such expressions ridiculous, and even hypocritical, if we are to assume that God made man expressly in order that he might fall into sin and suffer temporal and eternal punishment for it? Is not that "internal sorrow," said to exist in the heart of God, as conclusive proof as could be desired, that God did not make man for the purpose of damning him, and that his original design has been disturbed and set aside by the folly and wickedness of sinners?

We conclude our quotations from the Old Testament with a passage from the book of Wisdom, which sums up what precedes, and in which the will of God to save all and to damn none is clearly asserted. "Seek not death in the error of your life, neither procure ye destruction by the works of your hands. For God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living. . . . But the wicked by works and words have called it to them." i. 12-16. "Thou [O Lord] hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things, and overlookest the sins of men for the sake of repentance. For thou lovest all the things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made; *for thou didst not appoint or make any thing hating it.*" xi. 24, 25. No writer could condemn the Calvinistic dogma in more express or stronger terms.

We proceed now to the New Testament. This furnishes passages which, if possible, still more clearly and conclusively condemn the impious dogma of Calvin, and prove the opposing Catholic dogma. Our divine Saviour, of whom it was said that he came not to destroy souls, but to save them, St. Luke ix. 56, at the conclusion of the parable of the man who, having ninety and nine sheep in the fold, runs after the hundredth that has strayed, to save it from destruction, adds this maxim, which is the death-warrant of Calvinism:—"Even so it is not the will of your Father who is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish." St. Matt. xviii. 14. If, then, one perish, it is contrary to the will of God, and not in consequence of that will, as predestinarians contend. 2 St. Pet. iii. 9 establishes

the same conclusion. "The Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but beareth patiently for your sake, *not willing that any should perish, but that all should return.*" The reason, then, why God does not punish all the wicked immediately is because his will is that none should perish, but that all should return to him by penance, and live. Hence, they perish only because of their own free will they go against his will to save them.

Many other passages might be quoted to our purpose, such as those in which it is asserted that Christ came "to take away the sins of the world" (St. John i. 29), is the propitiation for the sins not only of the just, but of the "whole world" (1 St. John ii. 2), and "died for all men" (2 Cor. v. 14, 15); but leaving by the way, for the present, the consideration of the fact that Christ died for all, we will close our quotations with a few remarks on St. Paul's doctrine on the subject in question. Presbyterians would fain introduce this holy Apostle as teaching that God hates and hardens whom he will, making some for hell, as the potter makes some vessels for ignoble purposes; but he, in fact, teaches in the clearest and most decisive manner the doctrine that God hates no man without demerit in him, nay, wills the salvation of all men, even of the wicked. In this very Epistle to the Romans, in which Calvinists fancy they find authority for their revolting dogma, he plainly teaches that the judgments of God fall only on those who draw them down on themselves by their own evil doings, that God bears with them, and invites and exerts them to penance, and that it is their own obdurate and impenitent heart, and not the will of God, to which they owe their condemnation. "We know," he says, "that the judgment of God is *according to truth*, against them that do such things; and thinkest thou, O man, that judgest them that do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judgments of God? Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and patience, and long-suffering? Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance? But according to *thy hardness, and impenitent heart*, thou treasurest up wrath against the day of wrath, and the revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to every man according to his works." Rom. ii. 2-6. The passage from beginning to end is the condemnation of Presbyterianism. The goodness, the patience, the long-suffering, the benignity of God, that lead the wicked to penance, must be to all, not wilfully blind, a convincing proof

that God desires the salvation of sinners, instead of compelling them to sin after having foreordained them to everlasting death, as Presbyterians blasphemously allege.

The following passage addressed to his son Timothy is still more to our purpose. "I desire, therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all men, for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." 1 Tim. ii. 1-4. Comments on such a text as this are unnecessary, and would only weaken the impression it irresistibly makes on the reader, that God wills the salvation of all, and that Christ gave himself a ransom for all. What a contrast between this obvious doctrine of the blessed Apostle and that of the Confession, that "by the decree of God some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained unto everlasting death"! *

Moreover, it is to be remarked that St. Paul often declares that "with God there is no respect of persons." Rom. ii. 11; Col. iii. 25. The same declaration is also to be found in other parts of the Sacred Scriptures, particularly 1 St. Peter i. 17. "You invoke the Father, him who without respect of persons judgeth every man according to his work." What can be the meaning of such declarations in the view of Presbyterians? These words, we grant, do not imply that God bestows his graces and favors upon all in an equal degree, for the contrary is seen every day in the natural order; one has a remarkable natural facility for the acquisition of knowledge, another is naturally dull. The words do not imply, that, in things not of necessity but of liberality, God may not prefer one to another. If I choose to give alms to one beggar, and not to another, I am not an acceptor of persons, for the favor I bestow is due to neither. God bestows spiritual favors on some

* We cannot refrain here from relating, that, when the editor of this journal was about joining the Presbyterian Church, many years ago, he objected to this article of the *Confession*. "So do I," answered the pastor of the church. "It is repugnant to the word of God, and revolting to human reason; and last year, when I was in the General Assembly, I did all I could to get it struck out or modified, but was not able to secure a majority in favor of my motion. However, you need not let it trouble you. What we ask you to believe is not this *Confession*, but the Bible, and we only put this *Confession* into your hands as an excellent summary of what we believe to be the teaching of the Bible, without, however, binding you to believe it in opposition to the word of God."

which he does not on others, but without respect of persons. He chooses and calls one to high dignity in the Church, and leaves another in the lowest ranks of the laity ; but in this there is no respect of persons, because the ecclesiastical dignity is due to nobody. But there would evidently be gross respect of persons, if you should condemn one to punishment, without any motive save your own will, because punishment is due only to the commission of a crime ; and it would be the most odious respect of persons conceivable, if you should purposely make one commit a crime in order to have a pretext for punishing him. But this is the respect of persons Presbyterians ascribe to the Almighty.

The view we here take confirms the interpretation we have given to the passage quoted by the *Confession* from the Epistle to the Romans. "I have loved Jacob and hated Esau." There is no respect of persons here, because the honor of being chief of the people of God and father of the Messiah was due neither to Jacob nor to Esau. Again, "Whom he will he hardeneth." When one has once thrown himself into sin and voluntarily hardened his heart, the Almighty may justly and does justly leave him in his obduracy, even by withdrawing some of the graces previously granted. For it would be against all order of justice and providence to say, the more rebellious and sinful one becomes, the greater and more multiplied should be the graces bestowed.

The proofs against Calvinism which we have placed from our inspired volumes are sufficient ; but the doctrine of predestination is so repugnant to reason itself, especially when enlightened and directed by faith, that we cannot refrain from a few additional remarks. The wisdom of God allows no variance with predestination to sin and hell. God, the world, and man his noblest work, must have a motive, and a motive supremely reasonable and worthy of his name. He made man for an end, and what end we all know from the very elementary lessons of the Christian religion. The first questions put to the child in the Catechism is "What end did God create man ?" and the answer is "That he might love him, serve him in this life, and be with him in the next." This is the end for which man was created. It is a principle which has always been believed man was created. It is a principle the answer here assigned is the only one given. The Presbyterian child, to

the teachings of his sect, must answer to the question, Why did God make you ?—I don't know ; perhaps to offend and disobey him here, and be eternally miserable hereafter. But this answer, which follows rigorously from Presbyterian principles, is so revolting to reason, so absurd ; so contrary to the notions which all have of the will of God to save all men, and of their redemption through Christ, that Presbyterians themselves shrink from giving it. In their Larger Catechism, they ask, " What is the chief end of man ? " and answer, " Man's chief end is to glorify God and fully enjoy him for ever. " Truth is powerful and will out, in spite of all efforts to conceal it. After having told us in the Confession of Faith that by " God's decree, for the manifestation of his glory, some are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained unto everlasting death," they now tell us, in their Catechism, the end of man is " to glorify God and *enjoy* him for ever. " If the end of man be to glorify God, then God made him for that end ; then God made all that they might enjoy him ; and then he foreordained none to everlasting death, unless for their own demerits ; for otherwise the end for which he made them would not have been to *enjoy* him, but that they might be separated from him and burn eternally in hell.

Again, a God of infinite wisdom and mercy can hate no being without cause or motive, as is evident of itself. Hence, the royal prophet represents it as a horrid thing that his enemies " hated him without cause. " (Pss. xxxiv. 19, lxxviii. 5, cxviii. 61.) But if the Almighty from the beginning had foreordained some to everlasting death, he would have hated them without cause. The foreordination is the effect of hatred, of hatred as relentless, as intense, as eternity is long ; for God could not thus foredoom the objects of his love. The question does not turn on a greater or less degree of happiness and glory bestowed upon some and refused to others. For we grant that God might have made us solely for a temporal end, and he has created angels who are superior to men, and angels of different degrees of eminence. He may also have less love for one than for another at his pleasure ; but he cannot *hate* any one at his pleasure. Hatred requires essentially some demerit in the object hated, or else it is injustice and cruelty. Consequently, predestination to hell without motive of demerit in the predestinated, from the mere will of God, is unjust and cruel, which cannot be affirmed of God without absurdity and blasphemy.

Punishment, furthermore, is evidently unjust, unless for a crime committed. This is a most manifest and certain principle of both the natural and the eternal law. But eternal death is the most awful punishment, and therefore to inflict it where there is no crime committed is the most frightful injustice. But there is no difference between inflicting punishment where no crime is committed, and willing the punishment and then causing the crime to be committed that the punishment may be inflicted. Therefore, to suppose that God first wills or predestinates men to eternal death, and then makes them sin or fall into crime that he may inflict it, is charging him with the most frightful injustice. The conclusion is irresistible and undeniable.

Presbyterians tell us that by this predestination to hell God shows his infinite power and his sovereign justice. But who is not revolted at the bare thought of an intelligent being showing his power by punishing and torturing his creatures, not for their offences, but for the sake of showing his power? Cruelty to animals is considered unjustifiable even in men; how much more the infliction of eternal punishment on reasonable beings, for the sake of showing his power, by their Creator? When we read of the treatment the Helotes received from the Spartans, we shudder at the flagrant violation of the rights of humanity. They were excluded from the cities and subjected to severe labor; and, moreover, at a certain period in each year, were flogged, for no crime but simply that of being Helotes. They were made drunk in order to create in the Spartan youth a disgust for drunkenness; and when they were becoming too numerous, the young Spartans were sent to hunt them to death as wild beasts. What a horrible state of society does not this fact disclose! But to the everlasting shame of predestinarians, on their system, the good God, whom we are taught to call our Father, and who reveals himself as the Father of mercies, is made to act in regard to men and angels incomparably worse than this. For before they were created, before they had committed or could commit any evil action whatever, they were predestinated to everlasting death, and the sin they commit was intended, foreordained, as the means of fulfilling the decree which doomed them to the everlasting death! He creates men that he may show his power in damning them, and makes them sin that he may damn them *justly*, show his sovereign justice in their damnation! The bare statement is enough to curdle an ordinary man's blood; what, then, can Cal-

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vinists be who profess to believe it? and what must be their views of God, to suppose that such a manifestation of power and *justice* can redound to his glory? Why, even the Devil himself would almost scruple to accept of such glory, and spurn the sycophant who would award it to him.

The Scripture authorities we have adduced, and the reasonings we have offered, are undoubtedly amply sufficient for our purpose; but our conclusion will acquire a firmer hold on the mind, by being invested with the authority of the Church, the seal of truth and correct interpretation of Scripture.

As early as 475, we learn from ecclesiastical history, a priest of the Gallic Church, called Lucidus,* broached errors similar to those of our modern predestinarians. The bishops of Gaul were not slow to bring him to an abjuration of his errors, and in a letter which he wrote to a council of bishops convened at Arles, he expressly condemns his past errors, on account of which the council was assembled. He condemns the assertion, that "Christ had not died for all"; that "the prescience of God condemns some violently to death"; that "those who perish, perish through the will of God"; and that "some are doomed for death, and others predestinated for life." These errors do not seem to have spread far at that time; but we find, a few years later, another council, held at Orange, 529, asserting, "that some are predestinated unto evil by divine power, we not only do not admit, but, if there be any that would admit such great evil, we give them anathema with all detestation."

A monk called Goteschalchus, or Gottschalk, in the ninth century, broached anew the very errors we find in the Confession of Faith. This monk was then residing with Count Eberhard, to whom a learned bishop, Raban of Mayence, wrote:—

"I hear that you keep in your house a certain Gottschalk, who teaches that divine predestination imposes on men such a necessity, that, even if they exert themselves to the best of their abilities, with the help of divine grace, to work out their salvation, they will exert themselves in vain, if they are not predestinated for life; as if God by his predestination impelled men to sin! This doctrine has already thrown many persons into despair. It has made them say, 'What need is there of

* Labbe, Conc., Vol. IV., p. 1041.

my working out my salvation? For in vain shall I be good, if I am not predestinated; and if I commit sin, predestination will make me reach eternal life, notwithstanding.”

These sad results of predestinarianism Raban saw only on a small scale; it was reserved for succeeding centuries to see them exhibited on a large scale. It is needless to add, that Gottschalk was condemned in several councils.* In that of Mayence, 848, the error of this proud monk which was condemned was, that “God predestinates to evil as well as to good, and that there are men dragged to ruin by predestination, as if God had created them to damn them.” The Fathers of the Council of Quercy, 849, and of that of Valence, 855, say, “In the condemnation of the reprobate, their bad deeds precede the just judgment of God; God has foreseen but not fore-ordained their malice, because the malice comes from them, not from him.” “That some are predestinated by divine power to evil not only do we not believe, but if any one do maintain it, we give him anathema.” Two centuries later, Pope Leo IX., writing to the Bishop of Antioch, and summing up the principal articles of faith, says, — “I believe God has predestinated only good, and has foreseen good and evil.”†

The most holy Council of Trent repeats and confirms the preceding condemnation of the predestinarian heresy; for it maintains (Sess. VI., c. 2), that Christ died for all, — quoting the words of Scripture, that he gave himself a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world; and in canon 17 of the same session decrees, — “If any one shall say the grace of justification is given only to those who are predestinated unto life, and that all the rest who are called are called indeed, but receive no grace, because predestinated unto evil, let him be anathema.” The venom of the predestinarian heresy is also to be found in the fact, that it asserts the necessity of some to be good, and the impossibility of others to avoid evil, through the want of free will, a point which we shall hereafter consider, and which this holy council has also expressly condemned.

The Presbyterian doctors wind up their chapter on God’s eternal decree with the wise admonition, that “the doctrine of this high mystery is to be handled with especial prudence and care.” A timely suggestion. They may well make it; but in making it, they virtually say, “The doctrine is true, in-

* Labbe, Conc., Vol. VIII., p. 53, et seq. † Ib., Vol. IX., p. 977.

deed ; but take care that you do not preach it clearly and on all occasions. It is true ; but it is so harsh, that, if preached, it might bring Presbyterianism into disrepute ; it might make people crazy, and haunt them night and day by a more frightful terror than the sword of Damocles ; it might have an immoral tendency, loosen all moral restraints, and encourage sinners to run into every excess, by assuring them that it can make no difference, since, if they are predestinated unto life, they cannot be lost, and if they are predestinated unto evil, they cannot be saved ; nay, may lull parents, instructors, clergymen, into sloth and lukewarmness, and check all exertions for turning the wicked from the evil of their way, under pretence that the decree of God, in regard alike to those who are to be saved and those who are to be damned, will infallibly be accomplished without any human intermeddling." What do Presbyterians themselves, in this admonition, but condemn their own doctrine, confess its immoral tendency, its incompatibility with social peace, virtue, and order, and that it opens the door to all licentiousness and vice ? Their confession is warranted by their history, and even more disastrous consequences still would have followed, if they had not, in general, proved themselves, through God's restraining grace, better than their principles, and unable to act them out.

But every thing will fall into its place, and peace and confidence, without which success in any undertaking is impossible, will enter the breast, if, instead of this gloomy decree, we bear in mind, — 1. That God sincerely wills the salvation of all men, even since the fall of Adam ; and that even since that fall, as before, the true end of man is to know God, love and serve him, and be happy with him for ever. And Christ has truly died for all, to redeem all without any exception, agreeably to what the Church sings every Sunday at the *Credo*, "for us men, and for our salvation," — *propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem*. Hence, in one sense, it is true and undeniable, that all men — *ante prævisa merita* — are predestinated unto everlasting life, and there is, and there can be, nothing in the decrees of God to render this predestination null or fallacious. Hope is the undoubted privilege of every son of Adam ; for Christ has purchased it for all, even the most inveterate sinner, and truly, entirely, and sincerely ; for it would be the most horrid blasphemy to suppose there is or can be hypocrisy in God. 2. That God foreordained no one to damnation, but that it is man who predestinates himself to hell by his

own wicked works, which it was truly in his power to do or not to do, and which, therefore, he might avoid, and would avoid, if he did not through his own malice choose to do them. These two points are settled in the creed of Leo IX., — *Credo Deum prædestinasse bona tantum, prævidisse bona et mala*, — I believe God has *predestinated* good only, and that he has *foreseen* both good and evil. 3. That the just and the unjust must alike exert themselves unremittingly to obtain their salvation, — the just, because it is written, “Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown,” Apoc. iii. 11 ; and because it is also written, Phil. ii. 12, “Work out your salvation with fear and trembling,” yet should their heart be free from distrust, for God never abandons us, unless we first abandon him ; * — sinners, because it is written, “As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live. Turn ye from your evil ways, and why will you die, O house of Israel ?” Ezech. xxxiii. 11 ; and to all is addressed the admonition of St. Peter, “Wherefore, brethren, labor the more, that by good works you may make sure your vocation and election.” 2 St. Pet. i. 10. You are all elected and predestinated in the intention of God ; see that you render this predestination effectual by your good works.

These considerations sufficiently dispose of the first article of the Presbyterian doctrine on election and reprobation ; the second article, as given in our general statement, we will endeavour to discuss and dispose of in our next Review, having already detained our readers as long as it may be desirable to detain them for one quarter on so disagreeable, and we may say, so revolting, a subject. Nevertheless, our Presbyterian friends must not regard themselves as slighted. We shall, God permitting, pay them as much attention, for some time to come, as they can desire, or their own views of their importance can demand.

* Conc. Trid., Sess. VI., c. 11.

- ART. IV. 1. — *The Chapel of the Forest, and Christmas Eve.* From the German of CANON SCHMID. Baltimore : Murphy's Cabinet Library. No. VIII.
2. *Lorenzo ; or the Empire of Religion.* By a SCOTCH NON-CONFORMIST, a Convert to the Catholic Faith. From the French ; by a Lady of Philadelphia. Baltimore : Murphy. 1844.
3. *The Elder's House, or the Three Converts.* New York : Dunigan's Home Library. No. VIII.
4. *Pauline Seward ; a Tale of Real Life.* By JOHN D. BRYANT. Baltimore : Murphy. 1847. 2 vols. 12mo.

CANON SCHMID's tales are said to be for young persons, but they may be read with equal pleasure and profit by young and old, learned and unlearned. They are simple and unpretending, but exquisitely beautiful, and replete with the unction so peculiar to Catholicity, and which is attainable only by those who have long lived under Catholic influence, and been subdued by the holy discipline of the Church. They have almost a sacramental virtue, as have the writings of all saintly authors, and elevate their readers to those pure and serene regions where the soul enjoys a rich foretaste of heaven. Would that we had more of them.

. *Lorenzo* is evidently by a convert, but is, nevertheless, a very interesting and valuable little book, though far inferior to the inimitable tales of Canon Schmid. It wants the ease, simplicity, naturalness, and unction of the good Canon, and its author does not appear to be quite at home in the order of characters to which he wishes to introduce us. He tells us, indeed, of the power of religion to overcome the repugnances of nature, to enable one to sacrifice all that is dearest in life, and life itself, to save even an enemy, — to give calmness and joy in the midst of the severest trials and sorrows, the heaviest calamities and distresses ; and what he tells us is literally true ; but he does not write as one who has realized it in his own spiritual life, and he introduces too much physical weakness, too much nervous sensibility, and too much sighing and weeping, to permit us to believe him on his simple word. The Christian hero counts no sacrifice ; his loss is his gain ; and if he laments any thing, it is that he can make no sacrifice, for in every attempt to make one Almighty God prevents him, and overloads him with rich rewards. In general, however, saving

the marriage of cousins, and of the faithful with heretics, we can cheerfully recommend *Lorenzo* as interesting and edifying.

The Elder's House does not appear to be by a Catholic. It wants the Catholic accent, even where its doctrine is not objectionable. The author writes with ease, sprightliness, and occasionally with beauty and strength, and the argumentative part indicates learning and ability. Yet he does not appear to have learned that marriage is prohibited within the fourth degree, and that the Church abhors the marriage of the faithful with heretics. He shows too much favor to the demon revenge, and makes the good fathers of the Society of Jesus spend much more time in the families of rich heretics than is their custom. His Catholicity smacks more of Oxford than of Rome, and his book indicates quite too much hankering after the great, and fawning around the rich. It recommends, indeed, tenderness to the poor, but fails to make us feel that poverty in itself is no evil. Catholicity teaches us not merely to be tender to the poor, but to respect them, and to feel that they may have all that is truly respectable or desirable without ceasing to be poor. We regretted to find the author so familiar with Byron and Bulwer, and that he could represent a well-instructed Catholic as making love to an heretical young lady in the language and superstition of idolatrous Egypt and the East ; and we were even scandalized that he should make Florence Ruthven, intended to be a perfect model of a Catholic lady, fall in love with an heretical or infidel scamp, and break her heart and die because he married another. There may be such Catholics as the author introduces, but they should be held up to our pity, not to our approbation.

Pauline Seward is a work of some pretension, and not without solid merit. The author, we have seen it stated, is a convert, — a fact we should readily infer from the book itself. It is no easy thing for us, who have had the misery to be brought up out of the Church, to conceal the fact. Our speech betrays us, and we show in our accent that we are naturalized citizens, not native-born. Judging from internal evidence, we should presume the author to be not only a convert, but a recent convert, and that, in sketching the conversion of his heroine, he is portraying the principal features of his own. He is evidently a man of good natural gifts, a scholar of respectable attainments, a cultivated mind, and serious and noble aims. His novel possesses more than ordinary interest, and contains passages of rare beauty and power.

After taking it up, we found ourselves unwilling to lay it down, before reading to the end of the second volume. It is, upon the whole, the most interesting and the least objectionable of any of the popular religious novels, written on this side of the water, that have appeared since *Father Rouland*. Nevertheless, it is not without its faults. As a work of art it cannot assume a very high rank. The characters want individuality, and the dialogue is frequently stiff and awkward. There is too frequent a recurrence of the same epithets, and a little too much *dearing*, embracing, and kissing. An author may leave some things to be supplied by the knowledge or imagination of his readers. The incidents, some of which are very interesting in themselves, are often superinduced upon the main design, instead of being developed from it. The argument is sometimes needlessly minute, at other times quite too summary, and the whole work wants originality. The serious portion is avowedly copied from very common books of controversy, and the romance is hashed up from Bulwer, James, Dickens, and others. The author, moreover, looks with too much forbearance on the marriage of a Catholic with a Protestant, and, in one instance, at least, not necessary to specify, makes a concession to Protestants which is fatal to his whole argument, if strictly taken. But, notwithstanding these faults, the work, as the times go, is very creditable to the author, and leads us to hope for better things from him hereafter.

The last two works we have mentioned belong to that class of religious novels which we criticized with some severity in our last Review. This class of works, under the relation of art, are as offensive as a picture in which the painter joins the beautiful head of a maiden on to the body and tail of a fish. They are literary hybrids, formed by the union of the modern novel or novellette with the theological tract or pamphlet, and as such we have no toleration for them. What we think of them as romances we have heretofore told our readers. But it is not merely as romances, or works of art, that they are to be considered. They have another and a higher aim; and it is in relation to this other and higher aim that we wish now to examine their claims on the Catholic public. Waiving their character of romances, they pertain to the department of polemical theology, and are designed to set forth, recommend, and vindicate the Catholic faith. This is their principal aim. It is proper, therefore, to consider them in this latter character, and to examine with some care their

probable influence, supposing them to be extensively read, both on those who are without and on those who are within. If, under both or either of these relations, they are fitted, here and now, to exert a favorable influence, we must approve them, whatever may be our objections to them as mere romances or works of art.

I. In relation to those without, these works do not seem to us to be of the sort we want. The very fact that they mix up a love-story with the controversy is a drawback upon their good influence. They who are not sufficiently interested in the questions discussed, to read the arguments without the story, will hardly be sufficiently interested by it to read them with profit. They will read for the story, and, if they read the arguments, it will, in general, be as if they read them not. But those who are sufficiently interested to read the discussion with profit would read with more pleasure and profit the same matter without the story. The tone of these works is also against them. Protestants expect us to be less worldly-minded, and to possess more evangelical simplicity and humility, than they, and they are repelled from us just in the same proportion as they find us like themselves. The worldly and aristocratic tone which these works breathe, the hankering after wealth and fashion they exhibit, the care taken to introduce no Catholics upon the scene but such as are rich, learned, refined, or fashionable, in a country like this, where it is well known that the great majority of the faithful belong to the poorer and humbler classes of society, are more likely to disgust and repel intelligent Protestants, already prejudiced against our religion, than to charm and attract them to the Church. They show us too much like themselves for them to draw an inference favorable to Catholicity. These works would have a far better influence, if they laid their scene in some damp cellar, some miserable garret, or wretched shanty, and contrasted the poor Catholic, exiled from the land of his birth and all the cherished associations of his childhood and youth, in the midst of poverty, sickness, labor, destitution, and death, purified, sustained, consoled, made cheerful, joyous even, by his holy religion, with some rich and voluptuous heretic, surrounded by his troops of satellites, educated, learned, refined, with all that wealth and luxury can give, yet tortured by a gnawing within, weary of himself and the world, with no sweet recollection behind, no inspiring hope before, and

seeking to drown the present in gay dissipation or in vice and crime. He who has been an inmate in the houses of our rich and luxurious heretics, undazzled by the splendor of the outside, and able to look beneath the veil of elegant manners and refined hospitality, and who has also witnessed the simple faith and fervent piety of our poor Irish Catholics, sat down with them in their scantily furnished dwellings and shared their warm household affections, loses for ever all his hankering after high life, wealth, fashion, and feels his heart melt in unaffected pity for all whom the world envies.

It is also an objection to these works that they seek to present Catholicity in its resemblance to, rather than in its contrast with, Protestantism. The aim appears to be to make the faith as much like heresy as it can be, and still be called faith. This is very questionable policy, and betrays no profound knowledge of human nature in general, or of American Protestant nature in particular. In proportion as we diminish the differences between Catholicity and Protestantism, we should remember, we diminish, in a country like this, where all the worldly advantages are on the side of the latter, the motives there are for one to embrace the former. The Protestant does not become a Catholic in order to retain what he already has, but in order to get what he has not ; and to arrest his attention and induce him to investigate the claims of our religion, we must hold out to him, not what we have in common with him, but what we have which he has not, and cannot have, unless he becomes one of us. Assuredly, few men in this country will abjure Protestantism for the sake of receiving it back under the name of Catholicity.

On this point the works in question seem to us to commit a grave mistake. They adopt too low a tone, and seem to be afraid to present the Church in her imperial dignity and glory, as claiming always to be all or nothing. They appear to wish to conceal, rather than to display, her exclusiveness, — forgetful that it is her recommendation to those without as well as to those within. Men of the world, cold and indifferent as they are, will not listen to the Church, unless she speaks in a tone and language which none of the sects can or dare adopt. The sects are proud and arrogant, but they are also timid and cowardly. When it comes to the point, their courage oozes out, and their speech falters. Not one of them dare say that out of its bosom there is no salvation. They rely, and they know they rely, on man for their support, and they are al-

ways in trepidation lest they should say something which may be offensive to the human pride and prejudice on which they depend. The Church relies on God, and has no fear of men or devils. She speaks in the calm tones of authority whatever she has been commissioned to speak, and remains quiet as to the result. It is this which, more than any one thing else, penetrates the hearts of heretics, and makes them feel that she is not one of the sects, but something totally distinct and diverse from them all.

The great mass of Protestants, as we have known them, of all denominations, have a lurking suspicion that Protestantism is a nullity, — what Carlyle calls a *sham*, — and they cling to the *simulacrum*, only because they persuade themselves that there is nothing more real or less empty to be found. Their position is by no means what they wish it ; but they are unwilling to change it, because they have concluded that there can be no other position less unsatisfactory. They place Catholicity among the sects, and look upon all sects as substantially alike ; wherefore, then, should they change ? It is to this state of mind the Catholic controversialist must address himself, and his first and chief care must be to show that Catholicity cannot be included in the category of the sects, that her Christianity is *generically* distinguishable from that of each and all the sects, from Puseyism to Straussism, and that, under the relation of Christianity, she knows no one of the sects, or if so, only as St. Polycarp knew Marcion as “*primogenitum diaboli*.” She will be all, or she will be nothing ; and as such should always be presented to the public. When so presented, doubtless the Protestant’s first impulse will be to reply with a sneer, — Let her be nothing ; but his second impulse, as he reflects on the nullity of his own faith, what he knows of her past history and present condition, the wants of the soul, and the goodness of God, even as manifest by the light of nature, will be to inquire, if, perchance, she may not, in very deed, have the right to be all. It is always better to present the Church in her strength than in her weakness, — as she is and has the right to be, than as shorn of her glory, and compressed into the smallest possible dimensions, for the sake of eluding the attacks of her enemies. There is always less to be apprehended from offending Protestants than from failing to arrest their attention and engage them earnestly in the work of investigation.

These works, furthermore, assume too much as already ac-

cepted by Protestants. It is a mistake, rather than charity, to assume that Protestants in general are in good faith and really concerned about their salvation, and therefore are to be treated always as men who are willing to hear reason and yield to the force of argument. We make also an unwarrantable assumption, when we assume that they generally believe that our Lord has made a revelation, in the strict sense of the word, and instituted some sort of a Church for its dispensation. Individuals there are, among them, who, indeed, believe this much ; but, in general, if not always, these are to be regarded as persons who have received a special grace, and who are already on the high road to Rome, whither they are sure to arrive, if they persevere. The bulk of the Protestant world have no solid belief in the fact of revelation, and really admit nothing like a Church in any sense intelligible to a Catholic. There is a *differentia generis* between the views of even your High Churchmen and those of Catholics ; Dr. Pusey's notions approach no nearer to Catholicity than the vegetable oyster does to the animal ; and, for the most part, one must reason with a Tractarian as if he were a No-churchman.

It is never safe to assume, whatever a Protestant may profess to believe, that he believes any thing with sufficient firmness to warrant us in taking it as our point of departure in an argument against him. The majority of Protestants, it may be, still profess to believe the primary articles of the creed, and we do not question but they really believe that they believe them ; but, if we wish to deduce from these articles consequences in favor of the Church, or in favor of any conclusion they are not prepared to believe, we shall find they deceive themselves, and that we are to make no account of their profession. Their belief may be strong enough to bind them by consequences they wish to believe, but never strong enough to bind them by consequences, however legitimate and necessary, to which they are opposed. This cannot surprise us ; for we know, and it is one of our strong arguments against heretics, that they who reject the authority of the Church necessarily deprive themselves of all possible means of firm faith, even in those articles of the creed which they may flatter themselves they still retain. We ought, therefore, never to expect them to be bound by the consequences of their own avowed principles. If they cannot deny the necessity of the consequences, we may be sure they will escape conviction by casting doubts, in their own minds, on their premises.

To proceed prudently in our arguments against Protestants, we must reason against them as if we were reasoning *contra gentes*. We must first demolish their idols, show them the vanity of their superstition, and the absolute nullity of what they call their faith ; and then begin and build up an argument for the Church from the very foundation. We can presume nothing. It is labor lost to quote the Holy Scriptures against them. They are too far gone to be affected by prophet or Apostle. They will dispute the application of the prophecy, and gravely tell you, that, in their opinion, the Apostle, if he agrees not with them, was mistaken, or did not fully understand the doctrine he was inspired to teach !

Nor must our readers suppose that this is true only of those commonly called *Liberal Christians*. What we say does not apply only to Unitarians, Rationalists, and Transcendentalists in New England. These are as good Protestants as there are in the country, and though they may be a little bolder in their statements, or less disposed, or less able, to deceive themselves, they are far from differing generically from Protestants in general. We shall look in vain for an essential difference between Andover and Cambridge, Professor Stuart and Professor Norton, or between these and Dr. Strauss and his followers at home or abroad. Dr. Potts of St. Louis even quotes with approbation Michelet and Edgar Quinet, two notorious infidels. There is more unity in the Anticatholic world than we always suspect. Go where we will, whatever the form professed, at bottom we shall find the same want of that firm adhesion of the mind which Catholics understand by the term faith. It is true, converts from the ranks of Episcopalians and Presbyterians may be disposed, in some instances, to question this statement ; but the testimony of converts in favor of their former associates, as well as against them, is to be taken with some grains of allowance. They know what was true of themselves, and from that they are too apt to conclude what is true of those with whom they were associated, — forgetting that themselves received special grace, which gave them, if not faith, at least a certain preamble to faith, and that they have been brought into the Church, while the others have remained outside. We rest our conclusion not on the testimony of converts, nor on our own individual experience while a Protestant. When we find men avowing principles from which the Church is logically inferable, and yet refusing to admit it when it is clearly shown to them to be so inferable, we at-

tribute it, not to the inability to perceive the legitimacy and necessity of the inference, but to a secret distrust of the premises from which it is drawn.

In consequence of overlooking this fact, these works, as controversial works, have but little value. They do not go to the root of the matter, and reach the real difficulty under which the Protestant mind labors. Indeed, this may be said, to some extent, of all the works in our language on the points controverted between Catholics and Protestants. None of them are ultimate enough, and, unhappily, the greater part of them are directed specially against Anglicanism, which, if the most vulnerable, is by no means the dominant form of heresy among Protestants. They all, or nearly all, seem written for a by-gone age, and to proceed on the hypothesis, that the old Protestant formulas have in general some significance for their adherents. This is a serious defect; and if we are to have controversial works, their authors should study to give us works adapted to the present state of opinion and prejudice in the Protestant world, — at least, to what it is when they commence writing.

A still more serious objection to these works is, that they make no account of the necessity and agency of grace in the fact of conversion. To read them, one would think conversion is a purely rational or human process, and that nothing is more simple and easy than to convert a Protestant. The facility with which they effect conversions — on paper — is marvellous. Rich heiresses, crabbed old papas, and sour old uncles, and wild young men, and giddy young girls, are all subdued by a few commonplace arguments, and made devout and edifying Catholics. But conversion is no merely rational or human process. In vain we reason, in vain we prove every point, in vain we refute every objection, if grace be not present to open the understanding and incline the will. Till grace operates and dispels the mist which the Devil throws before the eyes of his children, they can see nothing opposed to his kingdom, though as plain as that two and two are four. They have eyes, but they see not, — ears, but they hear not, — hearts, but they understand not. Converts whom God has, in his great mercy, brought from darkness to light, from death to life, are prone to forget this. We fancy the path by which we came was plain and smooth, straight and continuous, and that nothing is easier than to point it out to our neighbours and persuade them to walk in it; but we overlook the fact, that it was grace which made it

so, and enabled us to walk in it without stumbling. Where grace is operative, all is indeed smooth and easy. It is marvellous how readily all difficulties give way, how obvious and beautiful the truth appears, how suddenly, and of themselves, all objections vanish. Strange we did not see this before ! How could we be so blind ? How could we regard that objection as pertinent, or that argument as solid ? It is grace, not human reason, that makes the crooked straight, and the rough even. How, then, without grace, shall the unbelieving or the misbelieving feel the force of our arguments ? Or why shall we be astonished that they see not as we see ? When we were in their shoes, we saw no more than they do ; and why should we ask them to see what, when we were as they, we saw not ?

But grace is always ready to assist all, if they wish it. Undoubtedly, and therefore all may see and believe if they will, and it is purely their own fault if they do not. But they cannot do it without grace, and whatever tends to make them rely on the rational process hinders, instead of furthering, their conversion. Their present difficulty is, that they rely on this process, and, not finding it leading them to the Church, conclude that the Church is against reason, and that they are justified in refusing her obedience. These books, by overlooking or making no account of the necessity of grace, have a natural tendency to confirm them in this conclusion, and therefore as fatal a tendency, so far as concerns those without, as they could possibly have.

There is no use in presenting arguments to one who is not predisposed to listen and to receive the truth. Prior to faith, there must be a preparation for faith ; and till there is this preparation, the arguments we present for faith itself will have no weight, for the mind is blinded to their conclusiveness. The first thing to attempt to produce, in the case of those not already prepared by their interior disposition to receive the truth when clearly presented, and with sufficient motives of credibility, is this interior disposition itself, which is the work of grace only. The motives to be presented in their case are not motives to believe, but motives to seek by prayer and humiliation the grace that disposes to believe. The necessity of this grace should always be insisted on, its readiness and willingness to aid all who do not resist it should be set forth, and the means of coöperating with it explained and pointed out, and their adoption seriously and solemnly urged. Conversion, if conversion, is no human work. "Convert us and we shall

be converted." We do not come, we are brought ; and in a way which is always a mystery unto ourselves. We cannot explain the process. All we can say is, Whereas we were blind, we now see. It is not our doing, but God's doing, and his alone be the praise and the glory. This fact needs to be known by those without, that they may be induced to look not to themselves, but to God, for illumination.

It is true, these works, in general, recognize the necessity of some preparation for receiving arguments for the faith ; but, unhappily, they seek the predisposing cause where it is not, and cannot be. They seek it in the human affections, in love, friendship, sympathy, social or domestic influence,—all of which are human, unable to generate grace, and, when sought without grace, are only an obstacle to its operation. It is impossible by these to prepare the mind and the will to receive the truth ; for their tendency is oftener to blind and pervert than to enlighten and correct. The motives to be urged are not to be found in the modern novel, but in ascetic theology. And here is the grand mistake of our authors. If they sought to combine the ascetic or the moral with the dogmatic, if they sought the interest of the story in moral or ascetic truth, instead of love and romance, their works would have, with the blessing of God, a tendency to predispose the will to coöperate with grace, and consequently a favorable influence in effecting conversions. But as they are, they seem to us better adapted to keep men out of the Church than to bring them into it.

II. Nor are these works better adapted to exert a wholesome influence on those within. Controversial reading is not, in general, that which is the most edifying to the faithful. The constant reading of controversial works tends to withdraw their attention from the practical part of theology, and to fix it on the speculative ; to cultivate acuteness and strength of intellect, rather than pious affection ; to make them able and skilful defenders, rather than devout followers of the faith,—hearers, rather than doers of the law ; and it requires more than ordinary grace to be able to withstand its dry and withering influence. Controversy is not the genius of Catholicity. It may sometimes be necessary, and when and where it is, she does not shrink from it ; but she refers it to those whose special vocation it is, and would, in the main, confine to them the task of defending the faith, and of guarding the flock over whom the Holy Ghost has placed them, against the subtlety and craft of their enemies.

She has no desire to see the great body of the faithful become able and expert disputants, for she knows that it is no gain to a man to be able to argue convincingly for the faith, and to silence the heaviest batteries of its enemies, so long as he does not practise it. It suffices for the faithful at large to know their faith and to obey it. Prayer, meditation, frequenting the sacraments, visits to our Blessed Redeemer who abides in our tabernacles to enlighten, console, and bless us, and works of charity, mercy, and mortification, are their best arguments for the truth, and their surest safeguards against error.

It is worth remarking, that they who fall away fall not from the faith till they have first fallen from its practice. Prayer is neglected or cut short, the confessional is forsaken, assistance at mass becomes irregular and infrequent; then doubts begin, bad books and evil companions are relished, faith is abandoned or stifled, and the apostate fancies that he is emancipated, and, because his vision is narrowed or blinded, that he is enlightened, that he is a philosopher, one of the free and choice spirits of the age. Now he talks largely of ignorance and craft, bigotry and superstition, looks with contempt on the simple faith and holy life of his fathers, sneers at Holy Church, and speaks big words in swelling tones to the priests of God's house, becomes deaf to the voice of conscience, and rushes on in mad license, through Protestantism or infidelity, to hell. Such is the process by which one loses his faith and his soul, — not because he did not know his faith, not because he was unable to answer the objections raised against it, but because he would not obey it; because he yielded to the temptations and seductions of the world, the flesh, and the devil. It is pious affection, not intellectual acuteness and strength, that is most needed; and this is seldom, if ever, promoted by controversial reading.

What we say of controversial reading in general, we may say *à fortiori* of the class of works, in particular, on which we are commenting. They are evidently written on the principle of the "sliding scale," and tend to turn the mind outward, to fix it on our religion as it is likely to be regarded by its enemies, and, in our age and country, to reduce it to its minimum. This is a grave objection. The disposition to ask, How little will answer? can be excused in those who are investigating the claims of the Church, but it is always inexcusable in the faithful themselves. There are, as every Catholic is presumed to know, some things which, though the Church does not positively command them, it is pious to believe and do, and

our good Mother is always pleased to see in us the disposition to believe and do them. The pious son or daughter is never willing to stop with what is positively commanded, but seeks always to be more perfect than the law, and to do not only all our dear Mother bids, but all she wishes. The disposition to be more perfect than the law is peculiarly Catholic, and every one who is livingly a Catholic manifests it always, and in all directions. Is there any thing more than is commanded which the Church would be pleased to have him do, he runs to do it ; any thing more than is strictly enjoined that it is permitted to believe, that it is pious to believe, that she wishes him to believe, his mind and his heart leaps to embrace it. His faith is broad and generous, and tends ever to a sublime excess. Those who are without regard him as of too easy a faith, and sneer at him as credulous ; but this does not affect him ; for he does not look to them for instructions, and they are the last people in the world he would resemble, or whose judgments he would respect. This disposition, the mark of a lively faith and an ardent charity, is most consoling to our dear Mother. It gladdens her maternal heart to see her children manifest it everywhere and on all occasions, as it does the hearts of our natural mothers to see us eager to do not only all they bid, but all they wish ; and she is grieved to see them manifest a contrary disposition, showing themselves close and stingy in their faith, love, and obedience, and careful always to inquire, How little will do ? How far can this article be pared down without incurring censure ? Such a disposition indicates that faith is weak, that charity is cold and languid, and excites the apprehension that both in the hour of trial may be found wanting. Our good Mother does not grieve that we do no more, but she grieves at our disposition to do no more, at our willingness to persuade ourselves that we have done all when we have done only the least that is required or that will be accepted.

This uncatholic disposition to ask, How little will do ? and to be satisfied with ourselves when we have done only the least, is, to some extent, characteristic of our times and country. It is one of the principal temptations to which we are exposed, one of the most formidable enemies we have now and here to combat. There are too many among us who seem to cultivate it on principle, and who approach as near the confines of heresy as they can without overleaping them. They appear to study to make Catholicity as near like Protestantism as they can

without destroying her indentity. They confine her long, flowing locks beneath a close Quaker cap, force her feet into a little pair of Chinese shoes, compress her waist in stout whalebone stays laced up by machinery, bid her put on a demure look, and mind and not speak above her breath, and, placing her a low stool in the obscurest corner of the drawing-room, turn to receive their gay, fashionable, and accomplished heretical friends. If one of these, in walking about, chances to espy her, they exclaim, "Don't be alarmed, dear friend. She is on her good behaviour. She can't bite or scratch. There can be no huge teeth in that pretty little mouth, so like the mouth of one of your own high-bred and gentle daughters; and her nails, you see, are pared down to the quick. Don't be alarmed."

These worthy people feel that it is necessary to keep their religion always in proper trim to be presented to their respectable heretical friends and visitors. They are people of the world, and they share in the passions and tendencies of their age and country. They are liable daily and hourly to hear their religion reviled, their children jeered because children of Catholic parents, and objections urged, many of which it is not pleasant to hear, nor always convenient to stop and answer. Why should they not, then, seek to make Catholicity present as few points objectionable to her enemies as possible? Some of them have a very dear friend, a father, a mother, a wife, or a husband, who is a heretic, yet perhaps, humanly speaking, warm-hearted, kindly disposed, whose feelings and prejudices must be respected, and with whom they would live in peace and love. How can they adopt, or be willing that others should adopt, a high, stern, and uncompromising Catholic tone? Perhaps the matters they hear most frequently objected to do not appear to them to be of vital importance. Why, then, insist on them? Why be always bringing out those very things which our "separated brethren" are the most prejudiced against? What need of being so bigoted and unyielding? These peculiarly offensive things may be well enough where there are none but Catholics, but here they only add to the unpleasantness of our position, and widen the breach between us and our "dissenting Christian friends," and can only do harm. You are imprudent, and drive them away from us by your ultra-catholic tone and sentiments. They are very respectable people, very sincere Christians in their way, and no doubt would be very good Catholics, if they only had the opportunity of learning the truth. We must be charitable and conciliatory.

Some of them even speak well of us. Only the other day, the distinguished Mr. Goldencalf was heard to say he "did not think Catholics were so bad as they had been represented," and Master Goldencalf said he "did not care a fig whether one was a Catholic or a Protestant," and Miss Goldencalf is actually receiving her education in one of our academies for young ladies. The country is becoming every day better disposed towards us. There is a more liberal tone. The age itself is growing more enlightened and tolerant; old animosities are passing away, a better feeling is springing up between Catholics and Protestants, and we trust that we shall prove, in this enlightened and happy country, that Christians, though they cannot all think alike, can agree to differ, and live in mutual peace, love, and esteem.

Now, in a country like this, there will always be large numbers of people who will think and speak in this manner, without once suspecting that they are only repeating the Socinian and Liberal cant of the day. Peace is beautiful, and we are always to follow after the things which make for it; but peace is founded in truth and justice, and there is and can be no peace out of Jesus Christ. It is the peace of the Lord which was left with the faithful, and which they are to study to merit and preserve. The Church, in this world, is the Church Militant, and does and must wage a deadly warfare with falsehood, error, heresy, sin, iniquity; and her children forget their love and fidelity to her, when they shrink from this warfare, seek to divert her from it, or show the least disposition to strike hands or sound a parley with her enemies. All the faithful are soldiers enlisted for the fight, during the war, and not one of them can retreat without dishonor, not one of them ever hope to be able to put off his harness and ground his arms, so long as life remains. The victor's crown is only for those who persevere unto the end.

Nevertheless, such people as we have described there are, and probably always will be, — for scandals will remain unto the end of the world; and these will always study to conceal their cowardice, their lukewarmness, or their indolence and love of ease, under the respectable names of prudence, liberality, and sometimes even that of holy charity. They will be an incubus on the breasts of their more zealous brethren, and justify themselves on the ground that they are conciliating and winning over those without, when in reality they are only ceasing to offer them any opposition. They will consider their faith, al-

most exclusively, as something to be presented to others, and made as unobjectionable as possible to the world in which they live. Naturally, then, and with perfect consistency, taking their point of view, must they always ask of each article of faith, of every statement of Catholic doctrine, How will this strike our separated brethren? What must they think of it? What can they say against it? What will they think of *us*, if told that *we* hold it? Anxious to avoid opposition, to have the task of defence as light and as easy as possible, they will necessarily study to explain and qualify away all the peculiarities of their faith, because it is precisely the peculiarities that are objected to; and thus be always laboring to reduce Catholicity, as we have said, to its minimum.

This tendency is already strong. Pour in upon us now a mass of books which spring from this tendency, which are written in perfect harmony with it, which never protest against it, never even intimate that it is dangerous, or not strictly and genuinely Catholic, and which keep our minds turned outward, not to oppose the enemies of God and his holy Spouse, but to conciliate them by showing them that we are not so far gone as they suppose us, and have more in common with them than they give us credit for, — presenting always the faith as something objected to, not as something which one already has, is to keep, be contented with, and to enjoy, — and it is easy to see what must be their influence, so far as they have any, and that they cannot fail to be deeply prejudicial to Catholic faith and piety. Such are, in general, the works we are considering; and hence the reason why, in our judgment, they are as little adapted to the edification of the faithful as to the conversion of the unbelieving and heretical world around us.

Nor is this all, — *Facilis descensus Averno*. The momentum we acquire in descending to the minimum may, if we are not on our guard, carry us below it. When we proceed on the principle, not of arraigning the enemies of our faith, attacking them in the very principle of their objections, and of compelling them to defend themselves against the charges of rebellion, malice, and falsehood, but of explaining and qualifying our doctrine so as to elude their objections to it, we are in great danger, unless we are learned and exact theologians, of going beyond the line. The declivity is so steep, and we descend with such fearful rapidity, that it is not always easy to arrest ourselves at the precise moment, and at the precise point. If we are not much mistaken, so far as concerns the general reader, and as

they are sure to be interpreted by the latitudinarian tendencies of the age and country, these works sometimes arrest their descent not until it is too late, and not till they have descended into the abyss below. In explaining and qualifying such articles as are peculiarly offensive to Protestants, they not unfrequently weaken, if not entirely destroy, their force and meaning, at least to the great majority of their readers.

We do not recollect one of these popular works which ever ventures to say, "Out of the Church there is no salvation," and there stop, as does the Church herself, as does our holy Father, Pius the Ninth, in his Encyclical Letter; but all of them, whenever they have occasion to introduce this dogma, are careful to accompany it with an explanation, which, in our age and country, eviscerates it of all its Catholic significance for the people at large, whether within or without. Thus, in the second work on our list, we read, — "We know that out of the Church there is no salvation; but many are they who, by want of opportunity of learning the truth, innocently adhere to error, and *thus are in spirit members of the Church.*" Here the qualification to the general reader negatives the dogma, and makes the assertion that out of the Church there is no salvation appear a mere rhetorical flourish. There are few people, not versed in the distinctions and subtleties of the schools, who in these latitudinarian times can read this qualification, expressed here in its least exceptionable form, and not gather from it a meaning wholly repugnant to faith. The conclusion the author draws, moreover, is not warranted by his premises. Undoubtedly men may innocently adhere to error, — but it does not *therefore* follow that they are in spirit members of the Church; for a man, though not in sin by reason of his error, may yet be in error by reason of his sin. It may be, that, if he had complied with the graces given him, and which are given to all men, he would have had the opportunity of being enlightened and brought to the knowledge of the truth. It is possible, then, that the reason why a man is not an actual member of the Church is his own fault, — not, indeed, the fault of not knowing what he had no opportunity of learning, but of not complying with the graces given him and with which he was bound to comply, — and we presume no one will pretend that he is *in spirit* a member of the Church, who through his own fault is not an *actual* member.

We are, indeed, authorized by our religion to judge no one individually, and we never have the right, without a special

revelation, to say of this or that man that he is eternally lost ; but faith declares that out of the Church there is no salvation. We are all commanded to hear the Church, and Almighty God gives to all the grace needed to obey his commands ; and the presumption is, therefore, always against all who live and die out of her visible communion. Certainly no one will ever be condemned for not doing what it was never in his power to do, or for not believing the truth he had never had an opportunity of learning ; but, since the providence of God in this matter must count for something, and we are never at liberty to take the simple human element alone, it is not easy to say precisely what is or is not the extent of the possibilities in the case. In no case is the opportunity of learning the truth ever furnished except by the providence of God, and it costs him nothing to furnish it whenever and wherever he sees that it will not be rejected. You must suppose the man prepared in his interior disposition to embrace the truth as soon as it is presented to him, or you cannot claim him as a virtual member of the Church ; but when you have supposed the disposition, are you sure that you have the right to suppose the non-possibility of the opportunity ? If the opportunity is withheld, can you say it is not withheld because there was no disposition to profit by it ? Can you adduce a case of a man having the disposition and dying without the opportunity ? Such a man, you say, had no opportunity of hearing of the Church, and yet he had the disposition. How know you that he had the disposition ? From his own statement, and the fact that the missionary found him with it. The missionary found him, then ? Then the opportunity was furnished, and your case is not in point. But if the man had died before the missionary came —. How know you, that, supposing his good disposition to remain, it was possible in the providence of God for him to die before the missionary came ? It may be that God would not let him die before, any more than he would holy Simeon before he had seen his salvation, and that he would not is presumable from the fact that he did not. You say there are large numbers in schismatical and heretical communions who are not guilty of the sin of schism or heresy. Be it so. But how know you that God will ever in his providence suffer any of these to die without an opportunity of being formally reconciled to the Church, — or that, if he suffers one to die in those communions, without such opportunity, it is not because he is in mortal sin ?

As Catholics, we know nothing of the fiction of an invisible Church, for which heretics in our day contend, and which is composed of the elect of all communions, — the subterfuge to which they were driven, when pressed to tell where their church was before Luther and Calvin. The Church which Catholics believe is a visible kingdom, as much so as the kingdom of France or Great Britain, and when faith assures us that out of the Church there is no salvation, the plain, obvious, natural sense of the dogma is, that those living and dying out of that visible kingdom cannot be saved. This is the article of faith itself, what we are bound to believe under pain of mortal sin ; it is what the fathers taught, — “ *Habere non potest Deum patrem*,” says St. Cyprian, “ *qui Ecclesiam non habet matrem*” ; — and where this is concealed or explained away, — as in the Grand Duchy of Baden, for instance, — faith becomes weak, charity languishing, and Catholicity hardly distinguishable from one of the sects. Theologians may restrict the language of the dogma, they may qualify its apparent sense, and their qualifications, as they themselves understand them, and as they stand in their scientific treatises for theological students, may be just and detract nothing from faith ; but any qualifications or explanations made in popular works, as the general reader will understand them, especially when the tendency is to latitudinarianism, will be virtually against faith ; because he does not and cannot take them in the sense of the theologians, and with the distinctions and restrictions with which they always accompany them in their own minds. We never yet heard a layman contend for what he supposed to be the theological qualification of this article of faith, without contending for what is, in fact, *contra fidem*. We can teach the whole faith, and must teach the whole faith ; but, do our best, we cannot teach the whole of theology to the common people. They may be firm and enlightened believers, and that is enough for them ; but they cannot become exact and accomplished theologians. There are a great many truths, and important truths to the scientific, which we can teach only to those who, by previous moral and mental discipline, are prepared to receive them. We may suppose we are teaching these truths to others, but we deceive ourselves ; for the truth in our mind becomes falsehood in theirs. This deserves more consideration from some from whom we look for better things, than they seem, if we may judge from their writings, to have given it.

We do not dispute the doctrine intended to be taught in the extract we have made from *Lorenzo*. We are not theologians by profession, and it is not our province to decide theological questions. Indeed, the gist of our complaint is, that popular writers do undertake to decide them, instead of confining themselves, as they should, to the simple dogma as the Church propounds it, concerning which there is, and can be, among Catholics, no dispute. The theological doctrine, as understood by those *theologians* who contend for it, we respect, as in duty bound. It is not to it as they understand it, that we are objecting, but to it as understood by the people at large, who learn it, not from theological works where it is treated at length, and the proper restrictions are made, but from brief, loose, and unqualified statements in popular novels, periodicals, newspapers, and *manuals*, — for, unhappily, many of these last are not always careful to distinguish between the dogma and the theological opinion. As hastily caught up from these, by careless, half-educated, and unreflecting readers, already deeply imbued with the prevailing latitudinarianism of the day, it becomes practically false and hurtful; for it is practically understood as if it meant that a man may be saved in any communion to which he is sincerely attached, and whose teachings he does not doubt.

Indeed, the plea of invincible ignorance is not unfrequently so extended as to cover the case of every one in any communion external to the Church, who could hope to be saved according to the teachings of that communion itself. *Thornberry Abbey*, in many respects an excellent little book, represents the good priest as sorely distressed, because he had, in a conversation not of his own seeking, pointed out to a Puseyite young lady the invalidity of Anglican orders. He was afraid that he had gone too far, and had endangered the poor girl's salvation by taking away the invincibility of her ignorance! The authoress of the *Catholic Story* makes no bones of sending to heaven as rabid an old heretic — to all appearance — as ever lived, — one who was filled with hatred of Catholicity, who withdrew his love from his wife, and refused to speak to, or even to see her, after her conversion, thus violating even the law of nature; and who, when his only daughter, to whom he had transferred his affections, was also converted, became perfectly frantic with wrath and hatred, made himself sick, and went off and died, without the least sign of repentance, regret, or forgiveness. And yet the

Catholic wife is made to say, and to defend it as Catholic doctrine, that she had no doubt that he had gone straight to heaven, for she was sure he would have embraced the truth, if he had only had an opportunity of learning it ! And this is to be said of a man of rank, of education, of extensive reading, living close by the Church, and having a wife and daughter converted and instructed in his own house ! Far be it from us to judge the old sinner, but if he was in invincible ignorance, we should like to know who, not brought up in the Church, may not be, if he chooses ; and if such a man, dying unchanged, goes straight to heaven, what is the use of hell, or even of purgatory ? The poor authoress had heard something about invincible ignorance, and persons who, though out of the visible communion of the Church, are yet in spirit members of the Church, and only half understanding what she heard, broaches a doctrine which makes the dogma, out of the Church there is no salvation, perfectly ridiculous. The article entitled *Reasons for adhering to the Roman Catholic Religion*, to be found in the *Garden of the Soul*, the *Ursuline Manual*, *Key of Paradise*, and we know not how many more of our popular manuals, goes almost as far. As understood by theologians, it contains nothing formally *contra fidem*, as is to be presumed from the fact that these manuals are published with episcopal approbation ; but we have had it frequently quoted against us by persons in and out of the Church, in support of a doctrine of which the best we could say was, that it was *not* Universalism, but which reminded us too forcibly of the latitudinarianism we preached when a Unitarian.

“ I believe I have been wrong,” said a Catholic lawyer and politician to us the other day ; “ we have, some of us, been laboring here, for some time, to liberalize the Church. It occurred to us, that the Church, having grown up in other countries and other times, might have incorporated into her constitution many things, which, since they are opposed to the genius of the age and country, and are those things most frequently thrown in our faces, she might consent to modify or reject altogether. We wished her, in a word, to conform to the enlightened and liberal spirit of modern society ; and we regretted to find the authorities opposed to us, and, while there was progress everywhere else, absolutely refusing to admit any progress into the bosom of the Church herself. We were honest and sincere ; we really believed that the policy we recommended would diminish the repugnance of the people

to becoming Catholics, enable us to take a more active part in the movements of the age, and accelerate the spread of Catholicity through the land ; but I begin to suspect that we were wrong, and that, since the Church is of God, the true policy is to labor to bring the people up to her, not her down to the people."

Our legal friend characterized precisely the spirit and tendency these popular works seem to us to encourage, and against which we seek to place our readers on their guard. The Church, however, we admit, adapts herself to time and place ; but in a contrary sense. Her spirit is always to insist with the greater firmness and energy on that particular truth which the genius of the age and country most opposes. She concedes that peculiar tendencies demand a peculiar application of truth ; and hence what she requires of us, here and now, is to bring out and state, in the greatest prominence possible, those very truths which stand opposed to our dominant errors and tendencies ; because it is only these truths which can resist them, and because these are precisely the truths which here and now we are the most liable to lose sight of. To throw these truths into the background, or to bring out in bold relief those views which offer no special resistance to the reigning errors and tendencies, however wise it may seem to men of the world, is a base desertion of the post of danger, and even a narrow and short-sighted policy ; for the public mind may change to-morrow, and a new set of errors and tendencies be uppermost. There may be times when it is not necessary to repeat the dogma, out of the Church there is no salvation, because there may be times when every body believes it, and there is no tendency to doubt it. In such times the theological explanation even may accompany it ; for then no one will misinterpret or misapply it. But when, as with us, the tendency is all in the direction against it, the dogma requires to be stated in the broadest and most unqualified terms the truth permits ; for it is only when so stated that it does not convey to minds in general less than the truth.

The temptation to conform to the spirit of the age, we know, is strong, but we must be firm against it. The age boasts of liberality, but under this liberality we see the curse of indifference. The real tendency is to the conclusion, that salvation — if salvation there be — is attainable in any form of religion or in none. The tendency we have pointed out among Catholics, and which seems to us to be encouraged by

the popular explanations and qualifications of the dogma of exclusive salvation, is in the same direction, and, at bottom, identical with it. It is, therefore, a tendency to be resisted, not fostered. Nothing can be more fatal, and it is not we alone who say so. God himself, speaking by his Vicegerent on earth, in the recent Encyclical Letter, addressed to all the patriarchs, primates, archbishops, and bishops of the world, and through them to all the faithful, has pointed this out as one of the special and formidable evils of our times, and commanded, nay, entreated, us to resist it with all our strength and energy. Now, all this ingenious speculation, all this refining on faith, and refusing to present the dogma which is opposed to this formidable evil without so explaining and qualifying it that it offers no longer any opposition to it, is not only not resisting it, but actually encouraging and augmenting it. We take up our popular publications, we look for some condemnation of the evil, for some bold proposition of the faith against it; but, alas! we look in vain. We find, perhaps, a glorification of the age, or a side blow at the earnest-minded Catholic who, in the simplicity of his faith, protests against it, — rarely any thing better. Our authors have nothing to say against the fatal latitudinarianism now so rife, but waste their time and strength in denouncing bigotry and intolerance. Yet bigotry and intolerance are not the besetting sins of the times, and what we say against them is much less likely to moderate them in our enemies than to produce laxity of doctrine in the faithful themselves. There is more hope of a bigot than of a latitudinarian. He who cares enough for his religion to oppose its enemies gives evidence that it is possible that he has some shreds of a conscience left. The Church has less formidable enemies to contend against when she is openly persecuted, than when there is a state of general religious indifference, or a general disposition to accommodate faith to the tastes and prejudices of her enemies. St. Hilary preferred Nero and Decius to Constantius, and the persecution of the former to the patronage of the latter.

For our part, we always prefer the man who is either cold or hot to the one that is lukewarm. We like the man of strong convictions, who has the courage to act up to his convictions. We cannot condemn a true principle because it is claimed and abused by those who have no right to it. In reading the *Elder's House*, we did not sympathize with the abuse heaped upon the heretical lady for refusing to marry

the man she loved because he was a Catholic. We honored her for her correct principle, and pitied her Catholic lover for his want of it. If there is any thing about which a man should be in earnest, it is his religion, and we respect the rigidity of our Puritan ancestors more than we do the laxity of their descendants. The man who is in earnest, and who really believes his religion to be the only true religion, must needs be regarded as bigoted and intolerant by all who differ from him. The Catholic is no bigot, is never uncharitable, but he is and must be, in all that concerns religion, exclusive. The Church is necessarily exclusive and intolerant, in the sense in which truth and duty are exclusive and intolerant, and they are wanting in their fidelity to her who maintain the contrary. There can be no giving and taking, no communion, no fellowship, no meeting half-way, between her and those without. As we have said, she will be all or nothing. If she is not what she professes to be, if she can have any fellowship with external communions, she deserves to be nothing, has no right to be at all ; but if, as every Catholic believes, she is what she professes to be, she has the right to be all, and whatever is opposed to her the faithful must hold to be of sin and iniquity, and to be resisted, if need be, even unto death.

But if you take that ground, you will be called a bigot, and accused of a want of charity and liberality. *Quid inde ?* Suppose it is so, is that a thing for which a man should break his neck ? In this country every man has the legal right to choose and observe his own religion, so long as he respects the equal right of others. This right we claim for ourselves, and, as far as in our power, vindicate for all ; but here we stop. We cannot consent to maintain, in deference to Voltaire and his followers, that a man has a divine and natural right to be of any religion he pleases. Before the divine and natural law no man has the right to be of a false religion ; and when the case is transferred from the exterior court to the interior, no man has the right to be of any religion but the Catholic, and no one can be acceptable to God or gain heaven, unless he is a true, firm, sincere, conscientious Roman Catholic. You say this is narrow-minded bigotry ; we say it is truth and consistency, and what every Catholic must say, and he who is afraid to say it has no business to call himself a Catholic. But you who are outside may call it what you please. We have no wish to be gratuitously offensive to you, but we do not look to you for instructions. You

are not our masters, nor are we troubled by what you say of us,—unless you speak in our praise. Then, indeed, we might ask with the Psalmist, “O Lord, what sin hath thy servant committed, that the wicked praise him?” We Catholics look to our Holy Mother for approbation, and if we secure her maternal smile and blessing, we care not, for our sakes, however much we may for yours, what you may think of us. It would be much more to the purpose for you to ask what you ought to think of yourselves.

Every Catholic, from the fact that he is a Catholic, has the world and the devil for his enemies. This is one of the necessities of his profession of faith. He cannot escape it, without deserting his post, and proving a traitor to his Master. If he be not a base coward, he will gird on his armour, and go forth to the battle in the Lord. The enemy is always at hand, and must be ferreted out and withstood, let him come in what lurking disguise he may. He comes to-day as a pretended friend, bearing the honorable name of Liberality, and dressed in the shining robes of Charity; but he is none the less, but all the more, dangerous for that. The pretended friendship is a snare; the boasted liberality is a lure. Be on your guard. If you listen to the voice of the siren, and drink of the proffered chalice, like the companions of Ulysses, you will be transformed into swine, and wallow in the mire. We cannot shake hands with the spirit of the age without contracting a mortal disease. We must resist it, or die. In vain would we sound a parley with the devil, and seek to coax or bribe him to leave us to serve in peace Him whom he hates. Resist the devil, and he will flee from you. There is no other way of safety; and the sooner we understand this, accept it, and beg of God to give us grace to conform to it, the better will it be for us and also for the enemies of the Church.

It is always the sign of an unhealthy state of things, when the faithful contemplate their faith as something to which those without are to be conciliated, rather than as the principle of a holy life in themselves. The conciliation and conversion of heretics is, no doubt, a great and important work; but there is a work greater and more important still,—namely, the edification of the faithful, and the salvation of our own souls. We are, indeed, to do good to all men as we have opportunity, but especially to the household of faith. Charity begins at home; and he who provides not for his own household has denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. Our faith and

religion need to be studied and presented mainly for the edification and perfection of the faithful themselves ; and when we seek so to study and present them, we shall not ask, how little will answer. We shall inquire, not for the minimum, but for the maximum. We want for ourselves our religion in all its fulness, in all its life and vigor, with all its outspreading branches and thick foliage, in all the rich, luxuriant growth of nature, — not trimmed and pruned to suit the taste of a cold, rationalistic, half-skeptical, timid, and fastidious taste. We want it as unlike heresy as it can be. What sectarians most hate we most love ; what they find most offensive we find most edifying ; the more they hate, the more we love ; and even things indifferent in themselves become dear to us as life, the moment they oppose them. It is in this spirit books should be written, and would be, if written by Catholics for Catholics. The books we are censuring are not written in this spirit, and therefore are not books adapted to our edification.

The conversion of heretics is desirable, we grant ; but for their sakes, not for ours. We seek their conversion from charity, not interest. We receive nothing from them, but they receive an infinite benefit. The gain is all on their side. They have nothing to give us. We covet not their silver or their gold, their fashion or their respectability. The Church looks not to the rank or standing of her members. She can borrow no respectability from the highest rank, but the highest can receive new dignity and lustre from her. We admit that the great majority of the faithful, with us, belong to the poorer and humbler classes, and we thank God that it is so. The poor have souls as precious as the souls of the rich. They, in all ages, have been the jewels of the Church, and the sounder part of the faithful. They build our churches, support our clergy, and endow our orphan asylums and charitable institutions. It is the widow's mite that makes the treasury of the Church overflow. Sad indeed would have been the condition of the Catholic Church in this country, if she had been compelled to depend, for her temporal goods, on the contributions of rich and fashionable Catholics. The poor are God's chosen people, and above all, with us, the poor Irish. We honor the German emigrant ; he has done well, for he came richer in faith than in gold ; but the poor Irish laborers and servant-girls have been, with us, the most liberal benefactors of the Church. They came, and on landing looked round and asked, Where is the

Church ? Honest souls ! in their simple faith and tender piety, they could not understand how there could be any living without the Church. They could work hard, shelter themselves in a poor shanty, lodge on the bare ground, and want food for the body ; but they could not live without the Church. They must have the Bread of Life, and some one to break it for them ; and where they went, churches arose, surmounted by the emblem of man's salvation, the sacred priest followed, the Holy Sacrifice was offered, God was praised, and the poor exiles found a home. Would we exchange these for rich and fashionable heretics ? Or shall we think it is to be regretted that God sent us these to be our laity, instead of the rich and noble, the learned and the distinguished ? O, no ! Our good Father chose well for us ; and who knows how much we, who have the happiness of being converted, owe to the prayers of the poor servant-girls we have had in our employment ? Nothing is more silly or disgusting than this fawning around the rich and fashionable, than this hankering after wealth and patronage, which our Catholic novels exhibit. Such things make one ashamed and blush for the folly and forgetfulness of some of his brethren.

We presume, in these remarks, we shall be found treading on some worthy people's corns or gouty toes, and that we shall be thought by many bigoted and severe, as well as unfair and unjust to our incipient literature. All we can say is, that we stand here on our own natal soil, a free man, by divine grace a Catholic, and we do not know how to speak in a servile or an apologetic tone. Before authority we count it an honor to be permitted to bend the knee and the will ; but before heresy, error, evil tendencies, by whomsoever abetted, we stand erect, and, with God's blessing, will stand erect, as becomes one who has been made a free citizen of the commonwealth of God. If we speak at all, we must, as a Catholic, speak as we have been taught. If we err, let authority rebuke us, and we are submissive, silent ; but we shall not rebuke ourselves for aiming to show the necessity there is that all Catholic writers should adopt a free, pure, bold, lofty, and uncompromising Catholic tone, and speak out from good, warm, honest, *Catholic* hearts, without the least conceivable fear of heretics, or of their father, the devil, to make them falter and stammer in the utterance of God's truth.

As a critic, we aim to be fair, candid, and just, but are by

no means infallible, and appeal lies from us to the public. The aggrieved party can appeal, and in most cases, we doubt not, the appeal will be sustained ; for we are far from pretending to be guided by popular taste or public opinion in forming and expressing our judgments. The authors of the publications in question are, for the most part, entirely unknown to us, and we have and can have no personal motive for treating them unfairly or unkindly. We take a deep interest in our literature, and wish to see it flourish, but they must pardon us if we tell them that we prefer Catholicity to its literature. Faith and sanctity are necessities of life, but literature is not. A bad literature is worse than none ; and any literature which is not adapted to our wants, which turns our minds away from what should fix attention, and aids and encourages tendencies already too strong, in our judgment, is bad. If in this we err, or if we have misconceived the spirit of our present popular literature, it has been from ignorance or weakness, not from malice.

We have spoken plainly and strongly, for it is always better to crush an evil in the bud than when it is full blown, and because we regard our popular writers as possessing learning, talents, genius enough to give us far better works than they do, and they deserve something of a castigation for not doing so. They give us works which spring from the exceptionable tendencies we have pointed out, and which, instead of checking, can hardly fail to exaggerate them. We tell them this, not to discourage them, but to do what in us lies to direct their attention to the dangers to which the faithful are exposed, and to urge them, by the most powerful motives of our religion, to adapt their works to our actual and most pressing wants. We respect their motives and applaud their zeal, but we pray them to look deeper, to take a wider survey of our actual condition, and consider more attentively the peculiar temptations and seductions we are called upon to resist ; and to write books which will tend to edify us, to turn our attention, not outward, where all is hostile, but inward, where all should be, and may be, unremitted effort after Christian perfection. If they would do this, and give us works modelled, to some extent, after the charming tales of Canon Schmid, — works which unfold the internal richness and beauty of religion, which show how it blends in with all our daily duties and household affections, sweetening our cares, sustaining us in our trials, consoling us in our sorrows, imparting depth and tenderness to chaste love, new charms to the innocence and sprightliness of childhood,

strength and dignity to the prime of life, peace and gravity to old age, they would furnish a far more attractive series of publications, secure to themselves a far wider circle of readers, and exert an infinitely more healthful influence, both on Catholics themselves, and on those who unhappily are aliens from the kingdom of God.

Unquestionably, such works would require labor and study, prayer and mortification, abstraction from worldly thoughts and cares, subdued passions, and complete self-annihilation. But we will not suppose that this would be an objection. It should rather be an argument in their favor, and serve to stimulate ambition. The ambition to do what is beautiful, great, noble, and difficult, for the love of God and our neighbour, is praiseworthy, and the only ambition that is not mean and belittling. A blessing would attend the preparation of such works. The author would live in a pure and serene atmosphere, and commune with the sweet and gentle, the strong and the heroic. He would dwell in the presence of God, and sustain and nourish his life with Him who gave his own life to be ours. He would become a better man ; his vision would be purged, his heart expanded, and his soul filled with holy unction ; and from his pen would flow words of sweetness and power ; he would make to himself a throne in the hearts of the young and the old, the joyful and the sorrowful ; the poor and the bereaved would bless him, the saints would claim him as their brother, and God would embrace him as his son. His work would be holy ; his reward a crown of life. O, who would not, if duty permitted, leave the arid and barren field of mere dialectics, the tumultuous sea of controversy, and seek out some quiet retreat, where bloom the perennial flowers of piety and love, and where, if he spoke at all, he would speak from the heart to the heart of the rich graces and consolations our good Father, through our sweet Mother, never tires in bestowing on those who love him, and seek no love but his ?

When we look upon the multitude of our youth, growing up in a land so hostile to their faith, amidst temptations and seductions so numerous and so powerful, and reflect how hard it is, even for those who are far advanced in Christian perfection, to maintain their ground, we feel that every generous heart should beat for them, and every lover of God and of his neighbour should rush to their aid and rescue. It is frightful to think how many of those around us, who have never known the true Church, precious souls, for whom God has died, must

finally be lost ; but it is far more frightful, that not these only, but thousands of our own dear children, regenerated in Holy Baptism, anointed with the Holy Chrism, soldiers enlisted in the army of King Jesus, are to fall away, become deserters, traitors, and, from heirs of heaven, heirs of eternal fire. These claim our thoughts, our prayers, and our labors. For the love of Jesus, dear friends, turn your minds and affections towards these exposed youth, and speak, if you can, a word that shall touch their susceptible hearts, that shall quicken their love for religion, and make them feel how noble, how honorable, it is to be a Catholic, especially in a land where the Cross is derided, where holy things are hourly profaned, and men glory in denying the Lord that bought them. Open to them the grandeur and sublimity of our holy religion, and make their cheeks redden that they ever were so cowardly as to be ashamed of it. Make them feel, by your own quiet, assured manner, by your own inward fulness and joy, that you have in it all you ask for, and that you do not need to coax all the world to go with you, in order to save you from regretting the choice you have made. Show that you love your brethren, that you honor your Catholic friends, even the humblest, and see, in the poorest and most illiterate servant-girl, a nobility that infinitely surpasses that of the proudest of earth's kings or potentates ; for the humblest Catholic has that which makes him the son of the King of kings, and heir of an immortal crown.

Our youth find their religion rejected and derided by those they see, when they look forth into the world, honored, courted, and flattered, even by Catholics themselves. Wealth, fashion, honors, distinction, place, power, are in the hands of the enemies of the Church, and they feel that their religion is an obstacle to their rising in the world, a bar to their worldly ambition, and they are tempted to wear it loosely, or to throw it off altogether, — unless, perchance, to call it in, if they have an opportunity, to bury them. They are ashamed of it, because they imagine it detracts from their respectability ; and it is not uncommon to hear even those who are not, as yet, quite lost, apologizing for it, and alleging as their excuse, that their parents were Catholics, and brought them up to go to Mass. This, in a country like ours, where there are no fixed ranks, where nobody is contented to serve God and save his soul in the state of life in which he was born, and where there is a universal strife of every body to rise to the top of the social

ladder, makes the condition of our Catholic youth one full of peril.

It is of no use to undertake to show them, in books, that we have Catholics able to grace any walk in life, or to add lustre to the most brilliant and fashionable assemblies, and that we are daily making converts from the very *élite* of Protestant society. This is only to approve their false ambition, and to inflame it yet more. Moreover, these marvellous Catholics, and still more marvellous converts, — so common in books, — are somewhat rare in every-day society ; they bear but a small proportion to the whole number of the faithful ; the worldly advantages remain as ever on the side of the enemies of the Church, and those Catholics who flatter themselves that they are somebody are very apt to show that they prefer a rich and distinguished heretic, as a friend and companion, to the poor but devout Catholic. Our authors should study to correct this, and seek to avert the evil by drying up its source. They must repudiate the silly and absurd notion, that the heretical world around us is the fountain of honor, that it is an honor to a Catholic for rich and influential heretics to take notice of him, or that it is better to frequent the gay saloons and fashionable assemblies of those who are the enemies of God, the deriders of his Immaculate Spouse, than it is to live in the modest and humble society of the faithful. What is the proudest heretic in the land, in comparison with the poorest and most illiterate Irish laborer or servant-girl ? Who would not rather be poor and outcast, despised and trampled on, with the hope of heaven before him, than to have all this world's goods, and hell in the world to come ? And who that has a Catholic heart does not find more that is congenial to his taste and feelings, more of all those qualities which adorn human nature, and which make one a desirable friend and companion, in the humblest but sincere Catholic, than in your most elevated, high-bred, accomplished, and fascinating heretic ? Believers are the true nobility, whatever their social position or worldly possessions. They are God's nobility, and will surround his throne, and live in his immediate presence ; while others, whom a vain and foolish world runs after, admires, adulates, all but adores, will be cast down to hell, to writhe in eternal agony with devils, and all that is foul, and filthy, and hateful, and disgusting, — gnashing their teeth, and blaspheming, as they behold from afar the glory and beatitude of those they had despised when living. This thought should stamp itself on the pages of our literature.

Our writers should aim to show not tenderness only to the poor, but true Christian HONOR, as our religion commands ; they must acknowledge no high life, where God is not loved and served ; rise above the vain follies and frivolities of the world ; and, avoiding the levelling absurdities of the day, all of which spring from a worldly pride, recognize the dignity and worth of every soul, the true equality of all souls before God, and then they will breathe a Catholic spirit, and, to the extent of their influence, create a Catholic atmosphere around our youth, — a Catholic public sentiment to which they may defer without meanness or danger of corruption.

Our authors would do us a service, if they would stamp with disgrace that silly notion which some, who regard themselves as the better sort among Catholics, are not ashamed to express, — that our condition would be much pleasanter, and the cause of Catholicity more flourishing in this country, if we had a larger number of wealthy and distinguished Catholics. We have heard this said, and coupled even with a regret that so large a portion of the Catholic population is made up of poor foreigners. Converts from the old Puritan stock, like ourselves, are very apt, when first coming into the Church, to take up without reflection a notion of this sort. God forgive them ! Whom did our Lord choose for his intimate friends and for his apostles ? Were they not poor fishermen and contemned publicans ? Who composed the first Christian congregations in the cities of the Gentiles ? Were they not poor dispersed Hellenistic Jews, the poor Irish of their day, — almost an abomination to their proud and idolatrous heathen neighbours, — and after those, chiefly the slaves and the lowest class of the people ? Did the Apostles complain of this ? Nay, they gloried in it. Do our honorable bishops and priests complain of the rank and standing of their flocks ? By no means, for they know that God seeth not as man seeth. What matters it where a man was born ? Let us who are native-born remember that so large a portion of our brethren were born elsewhere only to remember the faith and virtues they brought with them, and to engage in a holy strife with them which shall outdo the other in humility, and works of charity and mercy. The Church is the Catholic's country, and his home is where God is offered for the living and the dead, and abides with his people.

Finally, we beg our authors to study to strengthen the sentiment and draw closer the bonds of brotherhood among our widely scattered population, and to induce us to feel and speak

of ourselves as a **CATHOLIC COMMUNITY**. We are such, if we would but own it. We are in the world, but not of it ; and, saving that charity which knows no geographical boundaries, or distinctions of race or creed, we should seek, as far as possible, to concentrate our interests and affections, our hopes and aspirations, our joys and our sorrows, within our own cherished Catholic community. Taking care, in relation to those without, to discharge all our duties as good citizens, kind neighbours, and faithful servants, we should regard ourselves as forming a commonwealth of our own, in which we live according to our own laws and usages. We are such a commonwealth, and the closer we draw its bonds, the better for us, the better for all. This accepted, we should have a public and a public opinion of our own, and our children would find a home at home, and soon come to restrict their aspirations to such rewards and honors as are in the gift of their own, their *Catholic* countrymen.

The world around us, no doubt, at first will rage or sneer at this ; but no matter. Take care to give them no just cause of complaint, and then heed them not. We are and must be, in some sort, a people apart, with our own aims, hopes, duties, and affections. Let us be so ; let us love and honor the meanest of our brethren beyond the most distinguished among the heretics ; cherish each other, aid and assist, protect and defend, each other as our religion commands ; and soon the world without will look on in admiration. Seeing how closely we are knit together in the bonds of unity, and how we love one another, they will knock at our door for admission, and, with tears and entreaties, beg to be naturalized in our republic, to live under our laws, and to share the freedom, peace, and prosperity of our institutions.

Let all who undertake to write for us look to this desirable result, and write with a deep and tender love, not only for Catholicity, but for Catholics, and because they are Catholics ; and their works will have a salutary influence in checking the evils to which we are exposed. They will then write as Catholics for Catholics ; and our youth, if they read, will see and feel that not the clergy only, but all good Catholics, take an interest in them, and are willing to cast their lot in with theirs. The attention of the faithful will be turned more and more in upon themselves, and the work of our own conversion and progress will be accelerated ; and just in proportion as we ourselves are what we should be, the work of conversion will

go on without. Let the faithful only be good Catholics, obedient to their dear Mother, and attentive to their duties, and they will merit blessings not only for themselves, but for others. God will then hear and answer their prayers for the conversion of their Protestant friends ; and before they are aware of it, they will find the whole country is Catholic, that throughout its whole extent the Cross is planted, the choral chant is heard, the "clean sacrifice" daily offered, and the whole population, as it were, drawing near in faith and humility to receive the Bread of Life.

This glorious consummation, under God and the intercession of his Holy Mother, is undoubtedly to be brought about chiefly by the ministry of those whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us to govern and to feed us ; but we who are laymen, and write for the public, may, working in submission to them, with warm hearts, and fervent zeal, and strong faith, and ardent charity, in our humble degree contribute something towards it, — at least, we can pray for it, strive for it, and avoid doing any thing to retard it. But we almost feel that in what we have said we have exceeded the province of the layman, especially one who but yesterday was himself in the ranks of the enemies of the Church, and who is not worthy of the least consideration among the faithful ; but if so, may God and our brethren forgive us.

ART. V. — *Sanctissimi Domini nostri Pii Divina Providentia Papæ IX. Epistola Encyclica ad omnes Patriarchas, Primates, Archiepiscopos, et Episcopos.* Romæ. Typis Rev. Cam. Apost. apud Salvivecios. 1846.

WE copy below the *Encyclical Letter* of our Holy Father, Pope Pius IX. We have no room for comments, and should not offer any if we had. In it God speaks to us by his Vicegerent on earth, and it is ours to listen, believe, and obey. We cannot, however, forbear remarking, that whoever would wish to understand what are the precise evils of the day, against which the Church and all the faithful are to struggle, will find them all here clearly enumerated and distinctly characterized. It leaves us at no loss as to what are the dangerous tendencies we are to struggle against, or under what forms and disguises the Enemy of souls now makes his appearance to seduce us from our love and fidelity to the Immaculate Spouse of

God. Truly does St. Peter continue to watch over the flock, and to feed the sheep and the lambs of his Master.

PIVS PP. IX.

Venerabiles Fratres, Salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem.

Qui pluribus jamabhinc annis una Vobiscum, Venerabiles Fratres, episcopale munus plenum laboris, plenum sollicitudinis pro viribus obire, ac Dominici gregis partem curæ Nostræ commissam pascere nitebamur in montibus Israel, in rivis et pascuis uberrimis, ecce ob mortem clarissimi Prædecessoris Nostri Gregorii XVI., cujus certe memoriam, atque illustria et gloriosa facta aureis notis inscripta in Ecclesiæ fastis semper admirabitur posteritas, præter omnem opinionem cogitationemque Nostram, arcano divinæ Providentiæ consilio, ad Summum Pontificatum, non sine maxima animi Nostri perturbatione ac trepidatione, evecti fuimus. Etenim si semper grave admodum et periculosum Apostolici ministerii onus merito est habitum atque habendum, hisce quidem difficillimis christianæ reipublicæ temporibus vel maxime formidandum. Itaque infirmitatis Nostræ probe conscii, et gravissima supremi Apostolatus officia, in tanta præsertim rerum vicissitudine, considerantes, tristitiæ et lacrimis Nos plane tradidissemus, nisi omnem spem poneremus in Deo salutari Nostro, qui numquam derelinquit sperantes in Eo, quique, ut potentiæ suæ virtutem ostendat, ad suam regendam Ecclesiam infirmiora identidem adhibet, quo magis magisque omnes cognoscant Deum ipsum esse, qui Ecclesiam admirabili sua providentia gubernat atque tuetur. Illa etiam consolatio Nos vehementer sustentat, quod in animarum salute procuranda Vos socios et adjutores habeamus, Venerabiles Fratres, qui in sollicitudinis Nostræ partem vocati, omni cura et studio ministerium vestrum implere, ac bonum certamen certare contenditis. Hinc ubi primum in sublimi hac Principis Apostolorum Cathedra, licet immerentes, collocati in persona Beati Petri gravissimum munus ab ipso æterno Pastorum Principe divinitus tributum accepimus pascendi ac regendi non solum agnos, universum scilicet Christianum populum, verum etiam oves, hoc est Antistites, nihil certe Nobis potius, nihil optabilius fuit, quam ut intimo caritatis affectu Vos omnes alloqueremur. Quamobrem vix dum ex more institutoque Decessorum Nostrorum in Nostra Lateranensi Basilica Summi Pontificatus possessionem suscepimus, nulla interposita mora has ad Vos Litteras damus, ut exiniam vestram excitemus pietatem, quo majore usque alacritate, vigilantia, contentione custo-

dientes vigilias noctis super gregem curæ vestræ commissum, atque episcopali robore et constantia adversus teterrimum humani generis hostem dimicantes, veluti boni milites Christi Jesu, strenue opponatis murum pro Domo Israel.

Neminem vestrum latet, Venerabiles Fratres, hac nostra deplorenda ætate acerrimum ac formidolosissimum contra catholicam rem universam bellum ab iis hominibus confliari, qui nefaria inter se societate conjuncti, sanam non sustinentes doctrinam, atque a veritate auditum avertentes, omnigena opinionum portenta tenebris eruere, ea que totis viribus exaggerare, atque in vulgus prodere et disseminare contendunt. Horrescimus quidem animo et acerbissimo dolore conficimur, cum omnia errorum monstra, et varias multiplicesque nocendi artes, insidias, machinationes mente recogitamus, quibus hi veritatis et lucis osores, et peritissimi fraudis artifices omne pietatis, justitiæ, honestatis studium in omnium animis restringere, mores corrumpere, jura quæque divina et humana perturbare, catholicam religionem, civilemque societatem convellere, labefactare, immo, si fieri umquam posset, funditus evertere commoliuntur. Noscitis enim, Venerabiles Fratres, hos infensissimos christiani nominis hostes, cæco quodam insanientis impietatis impetu misere raptos, eo opinandi temeritate progredi, ut inaudita prorsus audacia *aperientes os suum in blasphemias ad Deum** palam publiceque edocere non erubescant, commentitia esse, et hominum inventa sacrosancta nostræ religionis mysteria, catholicæ Ecclesiæ doctrinam humanæ societatis bono et commodis adversari, ac vel ipsum Christum et Deum ejurare non extimescant. Et quo facilius populis illudant, atque incautos præsertim et imperitos decipiant, et in errores secum abripiant, sibi unis prosperitatis vias notas esse comminiscuntur, sibi que philosophorum nomen arrogare non dubitant, perinde quasi philosophia, quæ tota in naturæ veritate investiganda versatur, ea respuere debeat, quæ supremus et clementissimus ipse totius naturæ auctor Deus singulari beneficio et misericordia hominibus manifestare est dignatus, ut veram ipsi felicitatem et salutem assequantur. Hinc præpostero sane et fallacissimo argumentandi genere numquam desinunt humanæ rationis vim, et excellentiam appellare, extollere contra sanctissimam Christi fidem, atque audacissime blaterant, eam humanæ refragari rationi. Quo certe nihil dementius, nihil magis impium, nihil contra ipsam rationem magis repugnans fingi, vel excogitari potest. Et si

* Apocalyp. xiii. 6.

enim fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen vera dissensio, nullumque dissidium inter ipsas inveniri umquam potest, cum ambæ ab uno eodemque immutabilis æternæque veritatis fonte Deo Optimo Maximo oriantur, atque ita sibi mutuam opem ferant, ut recta ratio fidei veritatem demonstret, tueatur, defendat; fides vero rationem ab omnibus erroribus liberet, eamque divinarum rerum cognitione mirifice illustret, confirmet atque perficiat. Neque minori certe fallacia, Venerabiles Fratres, isti divinæ revelationis inimici humanum progressum summis laudibus efferentes, in catholicam religionem temerario plane, ac sacrilego ausu illum inducere vellent, perinde ac si ipsa religio non Dei, sed hominum opus esset, aut philosophicum aliquod inventum, quod humanis modis perfici queat. In istos tam misere delirantes percommode quidem cadit, quod Tertullianus sui temporis philosophis merito exprobrabat: *Qui Stoicum, et Platonicum, et Dialecticum Christianismum protulerunt.** Et sane cum sanctissima nostra religio non ab humana ratione fuerit inventa, sed à Deo hominibus clementissime patefacta, tum quisque vel facile intelligit, religionem ipsam ex ejusdem Dei loquentis auctoritate omnem suam vim acquirere, neque ab humana ratione deduci aut perfici umquam posse. Humana quidem ratio, ne in tanti momenti negotio decipiatur et erret, divinæ revelationis factum diligenter inquirat oportet, ut certo sibi constet Deum esse loquutum, ac Eidem, quemadmodum sapientissime docet Apostolus, rationabile obsequium exhibeat.† Quis enim ignorat, vel ignorare potest omnem Deo loquenti fidem esse habendam, nihilque rationi ipsi magis consentaneum esse, quam iis acquiescere firmiterque adhærere, quæ à Deo qui nec falli nec fallere potest, revelata esse constiterit?

Sed quam multa, quam mira, quam splendida præsto sunt argumenta, quibus humana ratio luculentissime evinci omnino debet, divinam esse Christi religionem, et *omne dogmatum nostrorum principium radicem desuper ex calorum Domino accepisse*,‡ ac propterea nihil fide nostra certius, nihil securius, nihil sanctius extare, et quod firmioribus innitatur principiis. Hæc silicet fides, vitæ magistra, salutis index, vitiorum omnium expultrix, ac virtutum secunda parens et alitrix, divini sui auctoris et consummatoris Christi Jesu nativitate, vita, morte, resurrectione, sapientia, prodigiis, vaticinationibus confirmata,

* Tertull. de Præscript., cap. VIII.

† Ad Rom. xiii. 1.

‡ S. Joan. Chrysost. Homil. I. in Isai.

supernæ doctrinæ luce undique refulgens, ac cælestium divitiarum dilata thesauris, tot Prophetarum prædictionibus, tot miraculorum splendore, tot Martyrum constantia, tot Sanctorum gloria, vel maxime clara et insignis, salutare proferens Christi leges, ac majores in dies ex crudelissimis ipsis persecutionibus vires acquirens, universum orbem terra marique, a solis ortu usque ad occasum, uno Crucis vexillo pervasit, atque idolorum profligata fallacia, errorum depulsa caligine, triumphatisque cujusque generis hostibus, omnes populos, gentes, nationes utcumque immanitate barbaras, ac indole, moribus, legibus, institutis diversas divinæ cognitionis lumine illustravit, atque suavissimo ipsius Christi jugo subjecit, annuntians omnibus pacem, annuntians bona. Quæ certe omnia tanto divinæ sapientiæ ac potentæ fulgore undique collucet, ut cujusque mens et cogitatio vel facile intelligat Christianam fidem Dei opus esse. Itaque humana ratio ex splendidissimis hisce, æque ac firmissimis argumentis clare aperteque cognoscens Deum ejusdem fidei auctorem existere, ulterius progredi nequit, sed quavis difficultate ac dubitatione penitus abjecta atque remota, omne eidem fidei obsequium præbeat oportet, cum pro certo habeat a Deo traditum esse quidquid fides ipsa hominibus credendum et agendum proponit.

Atque hinc plane apparet in quanto errore illi etiam versentur, qui ratione abutentes, ac Dei eloquia tamquam humanum opus existimantes, proprio arbitrio illa explicare, interpretari temere audent, cum Deus ipse vivam constituerit auctoritatem, quæ verum legitimumque cælestis suæ revelationis sensum doceret, constabiliret, omnesque controversias in rebus fidei et morum *infallibili* judicio dirimeret, ne fideles circumferantur omni vento doctrinæ in nequitia hominum ad circumventionem erroris. Quæ quidem viva et *infallibilis* auctoritas in ea tantum viget Ecclesia, quæ a Christo Domino supra Petrum totius Ecclesiæ Caput, Principem et Pastorem, cujus fidem numquam defecturam promisit, ædificata, suos legitimos semper habet Pontifices sine intermissione ab ipso Petro ducentes originem, in ejus Cathedra collocatos, et ejusdem etiam doctrinæ, dignitatis, honoris ac potestatis hæredes et vindices. Et quoniam ubi Petrus ibi Ecclesia,* ac Petrus per Romanum Pontificem loquitur,† et semper in suis successoribus vivit, et judicium exercet,‡ ac præstat quærentibus fidei veritatem,§ iccirco di-

* S. Ambros. in Psal. 40.

† Concil. Chalced. Act. 2.

‡ Synod. Ephes. Act. 3.

§ S. Petr. Chrysol. Epist., ad Eutich.

vina eloquia eo plane sensu sunt accipienda, quem tenuit ac tenet hæc Romana Beatissimi Petri Cathedra, quæ omnium Ecclesiarum mater et magistra * fidem a Christo Domino traditam integram inviolatamque semper servavit, eamque fideles edocuit, omnibus ostendens salutis semitam, et incorruptæ veritatis doctrinam. Hæc siquidem principalis Ecclesia, unde unitas Sacerdotalis exorta, † hæc pietatis metropolis, in qua est integra christianæ religionis ac perfecta soliditas, ‡ in qua semper Apostolicæ Cathedræ vigit Principatus, § ad quam propter potiore principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire Ecclesiam, hoc est qui sunt undique fideles, || cum qua quicumque non colligit, spargit.¶ Nos igitur, qui inscrutabili Dei iudicio in hac veritatis Cathedra collocati sumus, egregiam vestram pietatem vehementer in Domino excitamus, Venerabiles Fratres, ut omni sollicitudine et studio fideles curæ vestræ concreditis assidue monere, exhortari connitamini, ut hisce principiis firmiter adhærentes, numquam se ab iis decipi, et in errorem induci patiantur, qui abominabiles facti in studiis suis humani progressus obtentu fidem destruere, eamque rationi impie subijcere ac Dei eloquia invertere contendunt, summamque Deo ipsi injuriam inferre non reformidant, qui cælesti sua religione hominum bono atque saluti clementissime consulere est dignatus.

Jam vero probe noscitis, Venerabiles Fratres, alia errorum monstra et fraudes, quibus hujus sæculi filii catholicam religionem, et divinam Ecclesiæ auctoritatem, ejusque leges acerrime oppugnare, et tum sacræ tum civilis potestatis jura conculcare conantur. Huc spectant nefariæ molitiones contra hanc Romanam Beatissimi Petri Cathedram, in qua Christus posuit inexpugnabile Ecclesiæ suæ fundamentum. Huc clandestinæ illæ sectæ e tenebris ad rei tum sacræ tum publicæ exitium et vastitatem emergere, atque a Romanis Pontificibus Decessoribus Nostris iterato anathemate damnatæ suis Apostolicis Literis,** quas nos Apostolicæ Nostræ potestatis plenitudine confirma-

* Concil. Trid., Sess. VII. de Baptis.

† S. Cyprian. Epist. 55, ad Cornel. Pontif.

‡ Litter. Synod. Joann. Constantinop. ad Hormisd. Pontif. et Sozom. Histor. Lib. 3, cap. 8.

§ S. August. Epist. 162.

|| S. Irenæus, Lib. 3, Contra Hæreses. cap. 3.

¶ S. Hieronym. Epist. ad Damas. Pontif.

** Clemens, XII. Const. *In eminenti*, Bened. XIV. Constit. *Providas*, Pius VII., *Ecclesiam a Jesu Christo*, Leo XII. Const. *Quo graviora*.

mus, et diligentissime servari mandamus. Hoc volunt vafferimæ Biblicæ societates, quæ veterem hæreticorum artem renovantes, divinarum Scripturarum libros contra sanctissimas Ecclesiæ regulas vulgaribus quibusque linguis translatos, ac perversis sæpe explicationibus interpretatos, maximo exemplarium numero, ingentique expensa omnibus cujusque generis hominibus etiam rudioribus gratuito impertiri, obtrudere non cessant, ut divina traditione, Patrum doctrina, et catholicæ Ecclesiæ auctoritate rejecta, omnes eloquia Domini privato suo judicio interpretentur, eorumque sensum pervertant, atque ita in maximos elabantur errores. Quas societates suorum Decessorum exempla æmulans recol. mem. Gregorius XVI., in cujus locum meritis licet imparibus suffecti sumus, suis Apostolicis Litteris reprobavit,* et Nos pariter damnatas esse volumus. Huc spectat horrendum, ac vel ipsi naturali rationis lumini maxime repugnans de cujuslibet religionis indifferentia systema, quo isti veteratores, omni virtutis et vitii, veritatis et erroris, honestatis et turpitudinis sublato discrimine, homines in cujusvis religionis cultu æternam salutem assequi posse comminiscuntur, perinde ac si ulla umquam esse posset participatio justitiæ cum iniquitate, aut societas luci ad tenebras, et conventio Christi ad Belial. Huc spectat fœdissima contra sacrum clericorum cælibatum conspiratio, quæ a nonnullis etiam, proh dolor! ecclesiasticis viris sovetur, qui propriæ dignitatis misere obliti, se voluptatum blanditiis et illecebris vinci et deliniri patiuntur; huc perversa in philosophicis præsertim disciplinis docendi ratio, quæ improvidam juventutem miserandum in modum decipit, corrumpit, eique fel draconis in calice Babylonis propinat; huc infanda, ac vel ipsi naturali juri maxime adversa de *Communismo*, uti vocant, doctrina, qua semel admissa, omnium jura, res, proprietates, ac vel ipsa humana societas funditus everterentur; huc tenebrosissimæ eorum insidiæ, qui in vestitu ovium, cum intus sint lupi rapaces, mentita ac fraudulenta purioris pietatis, et severioris virtutis, ac disciplinæ specie humiliter irrepunt, blande capiunt, molliter ligant, latenter occidunt, hominesque ab omni religionis cultu absterrent, et Dominicas oves mactant atque discerpunt. Huc denique, ut cetera, quæ Vobis apprimè nota ac perspecta sunt, omittamus, teterrima tot undique volantium, et peccare docentium voluminum ac libellorum contagio, qui apte compositi, ac fallaciæ et artificii pleni, im-

* Gregor. XVI. In Litteris Encyclicis ad omnes Episcopos, quarum initium *Inter præcipuas machinationes.*

manibusque sumptibus per omnia loca in christianæ plebis interitum dissipati, pestíferas doctrinas ubique disseminant, incautorum potissimum mentes animosque depravant, et maxima religioni inferunt detrimenta. Ex hac undique serpentium errorum colluvie, atque effrenata cogitandi, loquendi, scribendique licentia mores in deterius prolapsi, sanctissima Christi sprete religio, divini cultus improbata majestas, hujus Apostolicæ Sedis divexata potestas, Ecclesiæ oppugnata atque in turpem servitutem redacta auctoritas, Episcoporum jura conculcata, matrimonii sanctitas violata, cujusque potestatis regimen labefactatum, ac tot alia tum christianæ, tum civilis reipublicæ damna, quæ communibus lacrimis una Vobiscum flere cogimur, Venerabiles Fratres.

In tanta igitur religionis, rerum ac temporum vicissitudine de Universi Dominici gregis salute Nobis divinitus commissæ vehementer solliciti, pro Apostolici Nostri ministerii officio nihil certe inausum, nihilque intentatum relinquemus, quo cunctæ Christianæ familiæ bono totis viribus consulamus. Verum præclaram quoque vestram pietatem, virtutem, prudentiam summo opere in Domino excitamus, Venerabiles Fratres, ut cælesti ope freti una Nobiscum Dei, ejusque Sanctæ Ecclesiæ causam, pro loco quem tenetis, pro dignitate qua insigniti estis, impavide defendatis. Vobis acriter pugnandum esse intelligitis, cum minime ignoretis, quibus quantisque intemerata Christi Jesu Sponsa vulneribus afficiatur, quantoque acerrimorum hostium impetu divexetur. Atque in primis optime noscitis, vestri muneris esse catholicam fidem episcopali robore tueri, defendere, ac summa cura vigilare, ut grex Vobis commissus in ea stabilis et immotus persistat, *quam nisi quisque integram, inviolatamque servaverit absque dubio in æternum peribit.** In hanc igitur fidem tuendam atque servandam pro pastoralis vestra sollicitudine diligenter incumbite, neque umquam desinite omnes in ea instruere, confirmare nutantes, contradicentes arguere, infirmos in fide corroborare, nihil umquam omnino dissimulantes ac ferentes, quod ejusdem fidei puritatem vel minimum violare posse videatur. Neque minori animi firmitate in omnibus fovete unionem cum Catholica Ecclesia, extra quam nulla est salus, et obedientiam erga hanc Petri Cathedram, cui tamquam firmissimo fundamento tota sanctissimæ nostræ religionis moles innitur. Pari vero constantia sanctissimas Ecclesiæ leges custodiendas curate, quibus profecto virtus, re-

* Ex Symbolo *Quicumque*.

ligio, pietas summopere vigent et florent. Cum autem *magna sit pietas prodere latebras impiorum et ipsum in eis, cui serviunt, diabolum debellare,** illud obsecrantes monemus, ut omni ope et opera multiformes inimicorum hominum insidias, fallacias, errores, fraudes, machinationes fidei populo detegere, eumque a pestiferis libris diligenter avertere atque assidue exhortari velitis, ut impiorum sectas et societates fugiens, tamquam a facie colubri, ea omnia studiosissime devitet, quæ fidei, religionis, morumque integritati adversantur. Qua de re numquam omnino sit, ut, cessetis prædicare Evangelium, quo christiana plebs magis in dies sanctissimis christianæ legis præceptionibus erudita crescat in scientia Dei, declinet a malo et faciat bonum, atque ambulet in viis Domini. Et quoniam nostis Vos pro Christo legatione fungi, qui se mitem et humilem corde est professus, quique non venit vocare justos, sed peccatores, relinquens nobis exemplum ut sequamur vestigia ejus; quos in mandatis Domini delinquentes, atque a veritatis et justitiæ semita aberrantes inveneritis, haud omittite eos in spiritu lenitatis et mansuetudinis paternis monitis et consiliis corripere atque arguere, obsecrare, increpare in omni bonitate, patientia et doctrina, cum *sæpe plus erga corrigendos agat benevolentia, quam austeritas, plus exhortatio, quam comminatio, plus caritas, quam potestas.†* Illud etiam totis viribus præstare contendite, Venerabiles Fratres, ut fideles caritatem sectentur, pacem inquirant, et quæ caritatis et pacis sunt sedulo exequantur, quocunctis dissentionibus, inimiciis, æmulationibus, simulatibus penitus extinctis, omnes se mutua caritate diligant, atque in eodem sensu, in eadem sententia perfecti sint, et idem unanimis sentiant, idem dicant, idem sapiant in Christo Jesu Domino Nostro. Debitam erga Principes et potestates obedientiam ac subjectionem christiano populo inculcare satagite, edocentes juxta Apostoli monitum‡ non esse potestatem nisi a Deo, eosque Dei ordinationi resistere, adeoque sibi damnationem acquirere, qui potestati resistunt, atque iccirco præceptum potestati ipsi obediendi a nemine umquam citra piaculum posse violari, nisi forte aliquid imperetur, quod Dei et Ecclesiæ legibus adversetur.

Verum cum *nilhil sit, quod alios magis ad pietatem, et Dei cultum assidue instruat, quam eorum vita et exemplum, qui se*

* S. Leo, Serm. VIII., cap. 4.

† Concil. Trident., Sess. XIII., cap. 1, de Reformat.

‡ Ad Roman. xiii. 1, 2.

divino ministerio dedicarunt, et cujusmodi sunt Sacerdotes, ejusmodi plerumque esse soleat et populus, pro vestra singulari sapientia perspicitis, Venerabiles Fratres, summa cura et studio Vobis esse elaborandum, ut in Clero morum gravitas, vitæ integritas, sanctitas, atque doctrina eluceat, et ecclesiastica disciplina ex Sacrorum Canonum præscripto diligentissime servetur, et ubi collapsa fuerit, in pristinum splendorem restituatur. Quapropter, veluti præclare scitis Vobis summo opere cavendum, ne cuiuspiam, juxta Apostoli præceptum, cito manus imponatis, sed eos tantum sacris initeitis ordinibus, ac sanctis tractandis admoveatis mysteriis, qui accurate exquisiteque explorati, ac virtutum omnium ornatu et sapientiæ laude spectati, vestris diocæsisbus usui et ornamento esse possint, atque ab iis omnibus declinantes, quæ Clericis vetita, et attendentes lectioni, exhortationi, doctrinæ exemplum sint fidelium in verbo, in conversatione, in caritate, in fide, in castitate,† cunctisque afferant venerationem, et populum ad christianæ religionis institutionem fingant, excitent, atque inflamment. Melius enim profecto est, ut sapientissime monet immortalis memoriæ Benedictus XIV., Decessor Noster, pauciores habere ministros, sed probos, sed idoneos atque utiles, quam plures, qui in edificationem Corporis Christi, quod est Ecclesia, nequidquam sint valituri.‡ Neque vero ignoratis, majori diligentia Vobis in illorum præcipue mores, et scientiam esse inquirendum, quibus animarum cura et regimen committitur, ut ipsi tamquam fideles multiformis gratiæ Dei dispensatores plebem sibi concreditam sacramentorum administratione, divini verbi prædicatione ac bonorum operum exemplo continenter pascere, juvare, eamque ad omnia religionis instituta ac documenta informare, atque ad salutis semitam perducere studeant. Intelligitis nimirum Parochis officii sui ignaris, vel negligentibus, continuo et populorum mores prolabi, et christianam laxari disciplinam, et religionis cultum exsolvi atque convelli, ac vitia omnia et corruptelas in Ecclesiam facile invehiri. Ne autem Dei sermo, qui vivus, et efficax, et penetrabilior omni gladio ancipiti § ad animarum salutem est institutus, ministrorum vitio infructuosus evadat, ejusdem divini verbi præconibus inculcare, præcipere numquam desinite, Venerabiles Fratres, ut gravissimum sui mu-*

* Concil. Trid., Sess. XXII., cap. 1, de Reform.

† Ad Timoth. iv. 12.

‡ Bened. XIV. in Epist. Encycl. ad omnes Episcopos, cujus initium, *Ubi primum.*

§ Ad Hebr. iv. 12.

neris officium animo reputantes, evangelicum ministerium non in persuasibilibus humanæ sapientiæ verbis, non in profano inanibus et ambitiosis eloquentiæ apparatu et lenocinio, sed in ostentatione spiritus et virtutis religiosissime exerceant, ut recte tractantes verbum veritatis, et non semetipsos, sed Christum Crucifixum prædicantes, sanctissimæ nostræ religionis dogmata, præcepta juxta catholicæ Ecclesiæ et Patrum doctrinam gravi ac splendido orationis genere populis clare aperteque annuncient, peculiaria singulorum officia accurate explicant, omnesque a flagitiis deterreant, ad pietatem inflamment, quo fideles Dei verbo salubriter imbuti atque refecti vitia omnia declinent, virtutes sectentur, atque ita æternas poenas evadere, et cælestem gloriam consequi valeant. Universos ecclesiasticos viros pro pastoralis vestra sollicitudine et prudentia assidue monete, excitare, ut serio cogitantes ministerium, quod acceperunt in Domino, omnes proprii muneris partes diligentissime impleant, domus Dei decorem summopere diligant, atque intimo pietatis sensu sine intermissione instant obsecrationibus et precibus, et Canonicas horas et Ecclesiæ precepto persolvant, quo et divina sibi auxilia ad gravissima officii sui munera obeunda impetrare, et Deum christiano populo placatum ac propitium reddere possint.

Cum autem, Venerabiles Fratres, vestram sapientiam minime fugiat, idoneos Ecclesiæ ministros nonnisi ex optime institutis clericis fieri posse, magnamque vim in recta horum institutione ad reliquum vitæ cursum inesse, pergite omnes episcopalis vestri zeli nervos in id potissimum intendere, ut adolescentes clerici vel a teneris annis tum ad pietatem solidamque virtutem, tum ad litteras severioresque disciplinas, præsertim sacras, rite informentur. Quare vobis nihil antiquius, nihil potius esse debet, quam omni opera, sollertia, industria clericorum Seminariorum ex Tridentinorum Patrum præscripto* instituere, si nondum existunt, atque instituta, si opus fuerit, amplificare, eaque optimis moderatoribus et magistris instruere, ac intentissimo studio continenter advigilare, ut inibi juniores clerici in timore Domini, et ecclesiastica disciplina sancte religioseque educantur, et sacris potissimum scientiis juxta catholicam doctrinam ab omni prorsus cujusque erroris periculo alienis, et Ecclesiæ traditionibus, et sanctorum Patrum scriptis, sacrisque cæremoniis, ritibus sedulo ac penitus excolantur, quo habere possitis navos atque industrios operarios, qui ec-

* Concil. Trid., Sess. XXIII, cap. 18, de Reform.

clesiastico spiritu præditi, ac studiis recte instituti valeant in tempore dominicum agrum diligenter excolere, ac strenue præliari prælia Domini. Porro cum Vobis compertum sit ad ecclesiastici ordinis dignitatem, et sanctimoniam retinendam et conservandam pium spiritualium exercitiorum institutum vel maxime conducere, pro episcopali vestro zelo tam salutare opus urgere, omnesque in sortem Domini vocatos monere, hortari ne intermittatis, ut sæpe in opportunum aliquem locum iisdem peragendis exercitiis secedant, quo, exterioribus curis sepositis, ac vehementiori studio æternarum divinarumque rerum meditationi vacantes, et contractas de mundano pulvere sordes detergere, et ecclesiasticum spiritum renovare possint, atque expoliantes veterem hominem cum actibus suis, novum induant, qui creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate. Neque Vos pigeat si in Cleri institutione et disciplina paulo diutius immorati sumus. Etenim minime ignoratis multos existere, qui errorum varietatem, inconstantiam, mutabilitatemque pertæsi, ac sanctissimam nostram religionem profitendi necessitatem sentientes, ad ipsius religionis doctrinam, præcepta instituta eo facilius, Deo bene juvante, amplectenda colenda adducentur, quo majori Clerum pietatis, integritatis, sapientiæ laude, ac virtutum omnium exemplo et splendore ceteris antecellere conspexerint.

Ceterum, Fratres Carissimi, non dubitamus, quin Vos omnes ardenti erga Deum et homines caritate incensi, summo in Ecclesiam amore inflammati, angelicis pene virtutibus instructi, episcopali fortitudine, prudentia muniti, uno eodemque sanctæ voluntatis desiderio animati, Apostolorum vestigia sectantes, et Christum Jesum Pastorum omnium exemplar, pro quo legatione fungimini, imitantes, quemadmodum decet Episcopos, concordissimis studiis facti forma gregis ex animo, sanctitatis vestræ splendore Clerum populumque fidelem illuminantes, atque induti viscera misericordiæ et condolentes iis qui ignorant at errant, devias ac pereuntes oves evangelici Pastoris exemplo amanter quærere, persequi ac paterno affectu vestris humeris imponere, ad ovile reducere, ac nullis neque curis, neque consiliis, neque laboribus parcere umquam velitis, quo omnia pastoralis muneris officia religiosissime obire, ac omnes dilectas Nobis oves pretiosissimo Christi sanguine redemptas, et curæ vestræ commissas a rapacium luporum rabie, impetu, insidiis defendere, easque ab venenatis pascuis arcere, ad salutaria propellere, et qua opere, qua verbo, qua exemplo ad æternæ salutis portum deducere valeatis. In majori igitur Dei et Ecclesiæ gloria

procuranda viriliter agite, Venerabiles Fratres, et omni alacritate, sollicitudine, vigilantia in hoc simul elaborate, ut omnibus erroribus penitus depulsis, vitiisque radicitus evulsis, fides, religio, pietas, virtus majora in dies ubique incrementa suscipiant, cunctique fideles abjicientes opera tenebrarum, sicut filii lucis ambulent digne Deo per omnia placentes, et in omni opere bono fructificantes. Atque inter maximas angustias, difficultates, pericula, quæ a gravissimo episcopali vestro ministerio hisce præsertim temporibus abesse non possunt, nolite umquam terri, sed confortamini in Domino, et in potentia virtutis Ejus, *qui nos in congressione nominis sui constitutos desper spectans, volentes comprobat, adjuvat dimicantes, vincentes coronat.** Cum autem Nobis nihil gratius, nihil jucundius, nihil optabilius quam Vos omnes, quos diligimus in visceribus Christi Jesu, omni affectu, consilio, opera juvare, atque una Vobiscum in Dei gloriam et catholicam fidem tuendam, propagandam toto pectore incumbere, et animas salvas facere, pro quibus vitam ipsam, si opus fuerit, profundere parati sumus, venite, Fratres, obtestamur et obsecramus, venite magno animo, magnaque fiducia ad hanc Beatissimi Apostolorum Principis Sedem, Catholicæ unitatis centrum, atque Episcopatus apicem, unde ipse Episcopatus, ac tota ejusdem nominis auctoritas emersit, venite ad Nos quotiescumque Nostræ, et ejusdem Sedis auctoritatis ope, auxilio, præsidio Vos indigere noveritis.

In eam porro spem erigimur fore, ut Carissimi in Christo Filii Nostri Viri Principes pro eorum pietate et religione in memoriam revocantes *regiam potestatem sibi non solum ad mundi regimen, sed maxime ad Ecclesiæ præsidium esse collatam,†* et Nos cum *Ecclesiæ causam tum eorum regni agere, et salutis, ut provinciarum suarum quieto jure potiantur,‡* communibus nostris votis, consiliis, studiis sua ope et auctoritate faveant, atque ipsius Ecclesiæ libertatem incolumitatemque defendant, ut *et Christi dextera eorum defendatur imperium.§*

Quæ omnia ut prospere, feliciterque ex sententia succedant, adæamus cum fiducia, Venerabiles Fratres, ad thronum gratiæ, atque unanimes in humilitate cordis nostri Patrem misericordiarum, et Deum totius consolationis enixis precibus sine intermissione obsecremus, ut per merita Unigeniti Filii sui infirmi-

* S. Cyprian. Epist. 77, ad Nemenianum et ceteros martyres.

† S. Leo, Epist. 156, al. 125, ad Leonem Augustum.

‡ Idem, Epist. 43, al. 36, ad Theodosium Augustum.

§ Idem, ibid.

tatem nostram omnium cælestium charismatum copia cumulare dignetur, atque omnipotenti sua virtute expugnet impugnantes nos, et ubique augeat fidem, pietatem, devotionem, pacem, quo Ecclesia sua sancta, omnibus adversitatibus et erroribus penitus sublatis, optatissima tranquillitate fruatur, ac fiat unum ovile, et unus pastor. Ut autem clementissimus Dominus facilius inclinet aurem suam in preces nostras, et nostris annuat votis, deprecatricem apud Ipsum semper adhibeamus sanctissimam Dei Genitricem Immaculatam Virginem Mariam, quæ nostrum omnium dulcissima mater mediatrix, advocata, et spes fidissima ac maxima fiducia est, cujus patrocinio nihil apud Deum validius, nihil præsentius. Invocemus quoque Apostolorum Principem, cui Christus ipse tradidit claves regni cælorum, quemque Ecclesiæ suæ petram constituit, adversus quam portæ inferi prævalere numquam poterunt, et Coapostolum ejus Paulum, atque omnes Sanctos cælestes, qui jam coronati possident palmam, ut desideratam divinæ propitiationis abundantiam universo christiano populo impetrent.

Denique cælestium omnium munerum auspicem, et potissimæ Nostræ in Vos caritatis testem, accipite Apostolicam Benedictionem, quam ex intimo corde depromptam Vobis ipsis, Venerabiles Fratres, et omnibus Clericis, Laicisque Fidelibus curæ vestræ concreditis amantissime impertimur.

Datum Romæ apud Sanctam Mariam Majorem, die ix. Novembris, Anno MDCCCXLVI., Pontificatus Nostri Anno Primo.

ART. VI.—*Poems.* By R. W. EMERSON. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1847. 16mo. pp. 251.

IF we could forget that Almighty God has made us a revelation, and by faith solved for us the problem of man and the universe; and if we could persuade ourselves that we are here with darkness behind us, darkness before us, and darkness all around us, relieved only by the fitful gleam from the reversed torch of reason, at best serving only to confront us, turn we which way we will, with the dread unknown, we should greet these poems with a warm and cordial welcome, and saving the mere mechanism of verse-making, in which they are sometimes defective, assign them the highest rank among our American attempts at poetry. The author is no every-day

man ; indeed, he is one of the most gifted of our countrymen, and is largely endowed with the true poetic temperament and genius. He has a rich and fervid imagination, a refined taste, exquisite sensibility, a strong and acute intellect, and a warm and loving heart. He is earnest and solemn, and, taking his own point of view, a man of high and noble aims. If truth were no essential ingredient of poetry, if the earthly were the celestial, and man were God, and if the highest excellence of song consisted in its being a low and melodious wail, we know not where to look for any thing superior to some of the wonderful productions collected in the volume before us.

But the palm of excellence, even under the relation of art, belongs not to poetry which chants falsehood and evil. The poet is an artist, and the aim of the artist is to realize or embody the beautiful ; but the beautiful is never separable from the true and the good. Truth, goodness, beauty, are only three phases of one and the same thing. God is the True, the Good, the Fair. As the object of the intellect, he is the True ; as the object of the will, the Good ; as the object of the imagination, the passions, and emotions, the Beautiful ; but under whichever phase or aspect we may contemplate him, he is always one and the same infinite, eternal God, indivisible and indistinguishable. In his works it is always the same. In them, no more than in him, is the beautiful detached or separable from the true and the good ; it is never any thing but one phase of what under another aspect is good, and under still another true. The artist must imitate nature, and he fails just in proportion as he fails to realize the true and the good in his productions. His productions must be fitted to satisfy man in his integrity. We have reason and will, as well as imagination ; and when we contemplate a work of art, we do it as reasonable and moral as well as imaginative beings, and we are dissatisfied with it, if it fail to satisfy us under the relation of reason or will, as much as if it fail to satisfy us under that of the imagination.

Moreover, the beauty which the artist seeks to embody is objective, not subjective, — an emanation from God, not something in or projected from the human soul. Mr. Emerson and the Transcendentalists contend that beauty is something real, but they make it purely ideal. With them, it is not something which exists out of man and independent of him, and therefore something which he objectively beholds and contemplates, but something in man himself, dependent solely on his own in-

ternal state, and his manner of seeing himself and the world around him. But the ideal and the real are not identical ; and if the beautiful were the projection or creation of the human soul, and dependent on our internal state and manner of seeing, it would be variable, one thing with one man and another thing with another, one thing this moment, another the next. We should have no criterion of taste, no standard of criticism ; art would cease to have its laws ; and the boasted science of æsthetics, so highly prized by Transcendentalists, and on which they pride themselves, would be only a dream. Beauty is no more individual, subjective, than is truth or goodness. It neither proceeds from nor is addressed to what is individual, idiosyncratic ; but it proceeds from the universal and permanent, and appeals to what, in a degree, is common to all men, and inseparable and indistinguishable from the essential nature of man.

Mr. Emerson's poems, therefore, fail in all the higher requisites of art. They embody a doctrine essentially false, a morality essentially unsound, and at best a beauty which is partial, individual. To be able to regard them as embodying the beautiful, in any worthy sense of the term, one must cease to be what he is, must divest himself of his own individuality, and that not to fall back on our common humanity, but to become Mr. Emerson, and to see only after his peculiar manner of seeing. They are addressed, not to all men, but to a school, a peculiar school, a very small school, composed of individuals who, by nature or education, have similar notions, tastes, and idiosyncrasies. As artistic productions, then, notwithstanding they indicate, on the part of their author, poetical genius of the highest order, they can claim no elevated rank. The author's genius is cramped, confined, and perverted by his false philosophy and morality, and the best thing we can say of his poems is, that they indicate the longing of his spirit for a truth, a morality, a freedom, a peace, a repose, which he feels and laments he has not.

We know Mr. Emerson ; we have shared his generous hospitality, and enjoyed the charms of his conversation ; as a friend and neighbour, in all the ordinary relations of social and domestic life, he is one it is not easy to help loving and admiring ; and we confess we are loath to say aught severe against him or his works ; but his volume of poems is the saddest book we ever read. The author tries to cheer up, tries to smile, but the smile is cold and transitory ; it plays an in-

stant round the mouth, but does not come from the heart, or lighten the eyes. He talks of music and flowers, and would fain persuade us that he is weaving garlands of joy ; but beneath them is always to be seen the ghastly and grinning skeleton of death. There is an appearance of calm, of quiet, of repose, and at first sight one may half fancy his soul is as placid, as peaceful, as the unruffled lake sleeping sweetly beneath the summer moonbeams ; but it is the calm, the quiet, the repose of despair. Down below are the troubled waters. The world is no joyous world for him. It is void and without form, and darkness broods over it. True, he bears up against it ; but because he is too proud to complain, and because he believes his lot is that of all men and inevitable. Why break thy head against the massive walls of necessity ? Call your darkness light, and it will be as light — to you. Look the fiend in the face, and he is your friend, — at least, as much of a friend as you can have. Why complain ? Poor brother, thou art nothing, or thou art all. Crouch and whine, and thou art nothing ; stand up erect on thy own two feet, and scorn to ask for aught beyond thyself, and thou art all. Yet this stoical pride and resolve require a violent effort, and bring no peace, no consolation, to the soul. In an evil hour, the author overheard what the serpent said to Eve, and believed it ; and from that time, it would seem, he became unable to believe aught else. He loves and woos nature, for he fancies her beauty and loveliness emanate from the divinity of his own being ; and he affects to walk the fields and the woods, as a god surveying his own handiwork. It is he that gives the rose its fragrance, the rainbow its tints, the golden sunset its gorgeous hues. But the illusion does not last. He feels, after all, that he is a man, only a man ; and the enigma of his own being,

“ The fate of the man-child,
The meaning of man,”

torments him, and from his inmost soul cries out, and in no lullaby tones, for a solution. But, alas ! no solution comes ; or, if one, it is a solution which solves nothing, which brings no light, no repose, to the spirit wearied with its questionings. As a proof of this, take the poem with which the volume opens, entitled *The Sphinx*. In this the author proposes and attempts to solve the problem of man. He begins by chanting the peace, harmony, and loveliness of external nature, and proceeds : —

“ ‘ But man crouches and blushes,
Absconds and conceals ;
He creepeth and peepeth,
He palter and steals ;
Infirm, melancholy,
Jealous glancing around,
An oaf, an accomplice,
He poisons the ground.

“ ‘ Outspoke the great mother,
Beholding his fear ; —
At the sound of her accents
Cold shuddered the sphere : —
“ Who has drugged my boy’s cup ?
Who has mixed my boy’s bread ?
Who, with sadness and madness,
Has turned the man-child’s head ? ” ’

“ I heard a poet answer,
Aloud and cheerfully,
‘ Say on, sweet Sphinx ! thy dirges
Are pleasant songs to me.
Deep love lieth under
These pictures of time ;
They fade in the light of
Their meaning sublime.

“ ‘ The fiend that man harries
Is love of the Best ;
Yawns the pit of the Dragon,
Lit by rays from the Blest.
The Lethe of nature
Can’t trance him again,
Whose soul sees the Perfect,
Which his eyes seek in vain.

“ ‘ Profounder, profounder,
Man’s spirit must dive ;
To his aye-rolling orbit
No goal will arrive ;
The heavens that now draw him
With sweetness untold,
Once found, — for new heavens
He spurneth the old.

“ ‘ Pride ruined the angels,
Their shame them restores ;

And the joy that is sweetest
 Lurks in stings of remorse.
 Have I a lover
 Who is noble and free ? —
 I would he were nobler
 Than to love me.

“ ‘ Eterne alternation,
 Now follows, now flies ;
 And under pain, pleasure, —
 Under pleasure, pain lies.
 Love works at the centre,
 Heart-heaving alway ;
 Forth speed the strong pulses
 To the borders of day.

“ ‘ Dull Sphinx, Jove keep thy five wits !
 Thy sight is growing blear ;
 Rue, myrrh, and cummin for the Sphinx, —
 Her muddy eyes to clear ! ’ —
 The old Sphinx bit her thick lip, —
 Said, ‘ Who taught thee me to name ?
 I am thy spirit, yoke-fellow,
 Of thine eye I am eyebeam.

“ ‘ Thou art the unanswered question ;
 Couldst see thy proper eye,
 Alway it asketh, asketh ;
 And each answer is a lie.
 So take thy quest through nature,
 It through thousand natures ply ;
 Ask on, thou clothed eternity ;
 Time is the false reply.’ ” — pp. 9 – 13.

The contrast between moral and physical is founded in fancy. The disorders of the external world are not less striking than those of man, and the strife of elements is as terrible as that of the passions. There are blight and mildew, earthquakes and volcanoes, floods and droughts, in nature, as well as wars and revolutions in states and empires. But let this pass. Whence comes the evil in man ? “ The fiend that man harries is love of the Best.” That is, man is never satisfied with what he has ; but imagines that he sees always something better just beyond and above him. Advance or ascend as he may, the Ideal floats ever before him, urging him on, and bidding him climb higher up, ever higher up yet.

There is no rest for him. What is good and what is evil in his condition spring alike from this aspiring disposition. In this originate his virtues, and in this his vices, — what is noblest in his being and character, and what is lowest and meanest ; and his sorrow is at the distance there is ever between his aspirations and his realizations. But in this the author confounds the love of the Best, or aspiration to the Perfect, with pride. He teaches, and consciously, that Satan in aspiring to be God was actuated by love of the Best, and therefore holds, — what his disciples do not hesitate to preach, — that Satan has been greatly wronged, and that the sin for which he was cast out of heaven and down to hell, and bound in chains of darkness for ever, was only the pure aspiration of a noble nature after a higher perfection ! “Pride ruined the angels, their shame them restores.” Indeed, their ruin was no ruin, but a stage in their progress, — “And the joy that is sweetest lurks in the stings of remorse.”

But pride and the love of the Best are not identical. Pride is the perversion of the love of the Best, and consists in believing one's self already perfect, not in seeking after a perfection not yet possessed. Lucifer did not rebel because he would be more perfect than he was, but because such was his lofty estimate of himself that he would acknowledge no being as his superior. This is the essential nature of pride. It believes itself to be the highest, and places all else below itself. The basis of love of the Best is humility, and humility springs from a consciousness of our own defects, and the reverent contemplation of the superior merits of others, — a deep and living conviction that there is a Being above us whom we are to love and obey, honor and exalt. Pride would usurp the perfect, — humility would love, reverence, and glorify it ; pride would possess it to exalt and glorify itself, — humility for the sake of glorifying Him who is perfect. Humility loves perfection itself with a pure, disinterested love ; while pride loves it only for the sake of self, and therefore loves only self, and not perfection at all. The sorrow of pride flows from the mortification of being compelled to admit that there are others which occupy positions above it ; the sorrow of humility is that it can never worthily love and reverence, honor and exalt, the good and perfect God as it feels he deserves ; but, unlike that of pride, it is a sorrow which has its own consolations, and which is compatible with inexpressible internal peace and joy. The love of the Best, a love which is not the love of

self, but really love of the Best, is no "fiend that man harries"; it breeds no disorder, occasions no fall, no vice, no strife, but bears man onward and upward to God, his true beginning and end.

But, mistaking pride for love of the Best, Mr. Emerson makes it the glory of our nature; and as pride knows no peace so long as it sees aught above it, he teaches that we must always be harried, that we must run ever, but never attain our goal. The Best dances ever before us, and above our reach. It is always farther on, and higher up, and as man ascends, he sees new

"Hills peep o'er hills, and Alps on Alps arise."

The West recedes the farther from the weary emigrant the farther he travels.

"To his aye-rolling orbit no goal will arrive,
The heavens that now draw him with sweetness untold,
Once found,—for new heavens he spurneth the old."

Each height is scorned as soon as gained, and man must be ever the child who, as soon as you give him one bawble, throws it away and cries for another.

"Couldst see thy proper eye,
Alway it asketh, asketh;
And each answer is a lie.
So take thy quest through nature,
It through thousand natures ply;
Ask on, thou clothed eternity;
Time is the false reply."

There is no remedy, no hope. Each new solution, as soon as obtained, ceases to be true. The answer to the question from one height discloses a height which is higher yet, from which it becomes a lie. There is no truth for us. The truth in the valley is falsehood on the mountain; the truth to-day is falsehood to-morrow. Thus are we, thus must we be, "ever learning, never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." Ever does the secret intense longing for an unseen something spur us onward, upward from height to height, and ever must continue the same evils, the same vices, the same crimes, the same misery and wretchedness,—endless motion, and yet no advance.

"Eterne alternation, now follows, now flies,
And under pain, pleasure,—under pleasure pain lies."

What more sad and gloomy ? In our very virtues lie and germinate the seeds of our vices ; and what is lowest, meanest in us springs from what is purest, noblest, best. And this is man's normal order, the glory of his being, the source of joy and gladness ! No change, no deliverance, no day of pleasure without pain, of joy without sorrow, of virtue without vice, of love without hatred, of light without darkness, life without death, is ever to come, to be hoped for, or even desired ! And this is the gospel of the nineteenth century, preached in this good city of Boston, by one of the most gifted and loving of our countrymen, who has himself once worn the garb of a professed minister of Him who died that man might live ! O my brother, how low hast thou fallen ! The old heathens themselves might shame thee. Their Islands of the Blest, nay, their dark Tartarean gulf, were a relief to thy cold and desolating philosophy. Warble no more such music in our ears. We would rather hear the ravings of the wildest fanaticism, or the mutterings of the foulest superstition.

We have never read any thing more heart-rending than the poem entitled *Threnody*. It is, indeed, a lamentation, and the saddest part is the consolation it offers. It is no imaginary lament. The author speaks in his own character, his own grief over the early death of his own son, — a son of rare sweetness and promise. It was a lovely boy, one a father might well love, and be pardoned for weeping. The grief is natural. The stern pride of the father gives way to it, and the stoic becomes wild, all but frantic, and blasphemous nature, his only god after himself.

“ Step the meek birds where erst they ranged ;
 The wintry garden lies unchanged ;
 The brook into the stream runs on ;
 But the deep-eyed boy is gone.
 On that shaded day,
 Dark with more clouds than tempests are,
 When thou didst yield thy innocent breath
 In birdlike heavings unto death,
 Night came, and Nature had not thee ;
 I said, ‘ We are mates in misery.’
 The morrow dawned with needless glow ;
 Each snowbird chirped, each fowl must crow ;
 Each trampler started ; but the feet
 Of the most beautiful and sweet
 Of human youth had left the hill
 And garden, — they were bound and still.

There 's not a sparrow or a wren,
There 's not a blade of autumn grain,
Which the four seasons do not tend,
And tides of life and increase lend;
And every chick of every bird,
And weed and rock-moss is preferred.
O ostrich-like forgetfulness!
O loss of larger in the less!
*Was there no star that could be sent,
No watcher in the firmament,
No angel from the countless host
That loiters round the crystal coast,
Could stoop to heal that only child,*
Nature's sweet marvel undefiled,
And keep the blossom of the earth,
Which all her harvests were not worth?
Not mine, — I never called thee mine,
But Nature's heir, — if I repine,
And seeing rashly torn and moved
Not what I made, but what I loved,
Grow early old with grief that thou
Must to the wastes of Nature go, —
'T is because a general hope
Was quenched, and all must doubt and grope.
For flattering planets seemed to say
This child should ill of ages stay,
By wondrous tongue, and guided pen,
Bring the flown Muses back to men.
Perchance not he, but Nature, ailed, —
The world, and not the infant, failed.
It was not ripe yet to sustain
A genius of so fine a strain,
Who gazed upon the sun and moon
As if he came unto his own,
And, pregnant with his grander thought,
Brought the old order into doubt.
His beauty once their beauty tried;
They could not feed him, and he died,
And wandered backward as in scorn,
To wait an æon to be born.
Ill day which made this beauty waste,
Plight broken, this high face defaced!
Some went and came about the dead;
And some in books of solace read;
Some to their friends the tidings say;
Some went to write, some went to pray;

One tarried here, there hurried one ;
 But their heart abode with none.
 Covetous death bereaved us all,
 To aggrandize one funeral.
 The eager fate which carried thee
 Took the largest part of me :
 For this losing is true dying ;
 This is lordly man's down-lying,
 This his slow but sure reclining,
 Star by star his world resigning.

" O child of paradise,
 Boy who made dear his father's home,
 In whose deep eyes
 Men read the welfare of the times to come,
 I am too much bereft.
 The world dishonored thou hast left.
 O truth's and nature's costly lie !
 O trusted broken prophecy !
 O richest fortune sourly crossed !
 Born for the future, to the future lost ! "

— pp. 240 – 244.

How different is this from the temper which the Christian father would have exhibited at the grave of his son cut down in early morning ! He too might have wept, but he would not have been desolate ; and a joy would have mingled with his grief, and turned it to gladness. He would not have felt that his child was lost to him or to nature ; that a bright existence had been blotted out, a sun extinguished and gone to the wastes of nature ; but he would have looked upon his boy's death-day as his birthday, and rejoiced that he was so soon removed from the evil, so soon permitted to return from his exile, to be received to his home, and permitted to behold the face of his Heavenly Father, and there in fulness of love and joy, by his prayers and intercessions, obtain new graces for the dear earthly parents whose term of exile had not yet expired. For nature, for the " flown Muses," for the mysteries to be unlocked for the race, for the glorious future the boy-sage was to usher in, he would have felt no uneasiness ; because he would have known that the boy in heaven could effect more than the boy on earth ; because there has been given to the world the Babe of Bethlehem ; and because, as the German proverb says, " The old God still lives," and can take care of nature and of man.

But the author checks the wildness of his grief, and in his excessive charity directs us to the sources of his consolation. But here he is sadder to us than in his grief. Here all becomes sombre and dark, vague and misty, and — what is rarely the case with Mr. Emerson — words, words with no distinct meaning, with scarcely any meaning at all. The verse flows on, but the sense stands still. The father's heart recoils from the pit of annihilation; the proud, unbelieving philosopher scorns to yield to the sweet hope of immortality. The father shrinks with horror from the thought that his bright-eyed boy is lost for ever; the Transcendentalist disdains to believe in an uprising of the dead. What, then, shall he say? What hope can he indulge, what solace dare trust? The bright-eyed boy is not all extinguished. What was elemental in him could not die, and he lives absorbed in the Infinite, as the drop in the ocean!

“ Wilt thou not ope thy heart to know
 What rainbows teach, and sunsets show?
 Verdict which accumulates
 From lengthening scroll of human fates,
 Voice of earth to earth returned,
 Prayers of saints that inly burned, —
 Saying, *What is excellent,*
As God lives, is permanent;
Hearts are dust, hearts' loves remain;
Heart's love will meet thee again.
 Revere the Maker; fetch thine eye
 Up to his style, and manners of the sky.
 Not of adamant and gold
 Built he heaven stark and cold;
 No, but a nest of bending reeds,
 Flowering grass, and scented weeds;
 Or like a traveller's fleeing tent,
 Or bow above the tempest bent;
 Built of tears and sacred flames,
 And virtue reaching to its aims;
 Built of furtherance and pursuing,
 Not of spent deeds, but of doing.
 Silent rushes the swift Lord
 Through ruined systems still restored,
 Broad-sowing, bleak and void to bless,
 Plants with worlds the wilderness;
 Waters with tears of ancient sorrow
 Apples of Eden ripe to-morrow.

*House and tenant go to ground,
Lost in God, in Godhead found.*" — pp. 248, 249.

"Heart's love will meet thee again." Yes, love without the loving heart, love without a lover ! O my brother, is this all thy consolation ? Is this

"What rainbows teach, and sunsets show ?"

Nay, most desolate father, not rainbows or sunsets taught thee this ; it was the moon, the moon, fickle goddess of the night ; for no man not moonstruck would talk of hearts' loves remaining when hearts are no more. Thou consolest thyself with a vain shadow, nay, not so much as a shadow, but a very absurdity, a sheer impossibility ; for whoever heard of heart's love without the loving heart, any more than of thought without a thinker, or act without an actor ? Thou boastest thyself wise, thou makest the "great Heart" say to thee,

"But thou, my votary, weepest thou ?
I gave thee sight, — where is it now ?
*I taught thy heart beyond the reach
Of ritual, bible, or of speech ;
Wrote in thy mind's transparent table,
As far as the incommunicable ;
Taught thee each private sign to raise,
Lit by the supersolar blaze.*
Past utterance, and past belief,
And past the blasphemy of grief,
The mysteries of Nature's heart ;
And though no Muse can these impart,
Throb thine with Nature's throbbing breast,
And all is clear from east to west." — pp. 245, 246.

And yet thou here revivest the old Hindu dream, stripped of its self-coherence, reduced to an absurdity so palpable that the veriest child can detect it ; and this thou claspest as a spiritual balsam to thy torn and bleeding heart, and wouldst gravely persuade us that it is a sovereign remedy, that it heals thy wound and makes thee whole, a man, a hale and joyous man again. "Hearts are dust, hearts' loves remain," — remain when hearts are no more ! O my brother, how true it is, that when we turn our back on God and his word, esteem ourselves wise, and boast that we have been taught

"Beyond the reach
Of ritual, Bible, or of speech,"

we become — fools ! Thou art a man of rare gifts, and thou

hast studied long and much, thou hast questioned the past and the present, the living and the dead, the stars and the flowers, the fields and the groves, the winds and the waves, the day and the night, and thou hast a keen, penetrating glance, and thou hast a warm, sympathetic soul, and yet thou art solitary in thick darkness ; thou seest not the plainest things under thy very nose, thou seest not clearly even thy hand before thee. There is a bright and glorious universe around thee, full of light, love, and gladness, of which thou dreamest not ; angels hover round thee and fan thee with their soft breath, and thou feelest them not ; angel voices call to thee, in sweet music that trances the soul, but thou hearest them not ; and because thou art blind, and deaf, and insensible, in thy foolish pride thou deniest what to every faith-illuminated eye is as clear as the sun in the heavens, and to every faith-opened heart as distinct and dear as voice of lover or of friend.

Alas ! we are not ignorant of the blindness and deafness of those who are without faith, or of the strange illusion which makes us obstinately persist that we both see and hear. There is something weird and mysterious in the thoughts and feelings which come to us, unbidden, when we leave faith behind, and fix our gaze intently upon ourselves as upon some magic mirror. The circle of our vision seems to be enlarged ; darkness is transformed to light ; worlds open upon worlds ; we send keen, penetrating glances into the infinite abyss of being ; the elements grow obedient to us, work with us and for us, and we seem to be strong with their strength, terrible with their might, and to approach and to become identical with the Source of all things. God becomes comprehensible and communicable, and we live an elemental life, and burn with elemental fire. The universe flows into us and from us. We control the winds, the waves, the rivers and the tides, the stars and the seasons. We teach the plant when to germinate, to blossom, or ripen, the reed when to bend before the blast, and the lightning when to rive the hoary oak. Alas ! we think not then that this is all delusion, and that we are under the influence of the Fallen Angel, who would persuade us that darkness is light, that weakness is strength, that hell is heaven, and himself God. Under a similar influence and delusion labors the author of these poems. There are passages in them which recall all too vividly what we, in our blindness and unbelief, have dreamed, but rarely ventured to utter. We know

these poems ; we understand them. They are not [~]sacred chants ; they are hymns to the devil. Not God, but Satan, do they praise, and they can be relished only by devil-worshippers.

Yet we do not despair of our poet. He has a large share of *religiosity*, and his soul needs to prostrate itself before God and adore. There is a low, sad music in these poems, deep and melodious, which escapes the author unbidden, and which discloses a spirit ill at ease, a heart bewailing its bondage, and a secret, intense longing to burst its chains, and to soar aloft to the heaven of divine love and freedom. This music is the echo of the angel voices still pleading with him, and entreating him to return from his wanderings, to open his eyes to the heaven which lies around him, his ears to the sweet voices which everywhere are chanting the praises of God. We must hope that ere long he will, through grace, burst the Satanic cords which now bind him, open his eyes to the sweet vision of beauty that awaits him, and his ears to the harmony which floats on every breeze. Bear with me ; nature never intended thee for an Indian Gymnosophist or a heartless Stoic. Thou art a man, with a warm, gushing human heart, and thou wast made to love and adore. Say, Get behind me, Satan ! to the vain philosophizing you have indulged ; have the courage to say you have been wrong, open your heart to the light of heaven as the sunflower opens her bosom to the genial rays of the sun, and thy spirit will be free, thy genius will no longer be imprisoned, and thy heart will find what it sighs after, and wail no more. One who was as proud as thyself, and who had wandered long in the paths thou art beating, and whose eye was hardly less keen than thy own, and who knew by heart all thy mystic lore, and had as well as thou pored over the past and the present, as well as thou had asked

“ The fate of the man-child,
The meaning of man,” —

and had asked the heavens and the earth, the living and the dead, and, in his madness, hell itself, to answer him, and whose soul was not less susceptible to sweet harmonies than thy own, though his tones were harsh and his speech rude, — nay, one who knows all thy delusions and illusions, assures thee that thou shalt not in this be deceived, and thy confidence will not be misplaced or betrayed.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1847.

ART. I. — *The Two Brothers ; or, Why are you a Protestant ?* — Continued.

VII. ONLY a few days elapsed before John, finding his brother apparently at leisure, pressed him to redeem his promise.

“ You are prepared, brother, by this time, I presume, to undertake your vindication of the Reformers, and to prove that they were sound lawyers and rigid reasoners.”

“ The Church has so spread out her claims over every thing, that it is hard to construct an argument against her, which does not apparently take for granted some point which she contends is the point to be proved ; but the devil, though cunning, can be outwitted.”

“ What ! by heretics ? ”

“ Protestants are not heretics.”

“ The Church is in possession ; and since Protestants break away from her and contend for what she declares to be contrary to the faith, they are at least presumptively heretics, and are to be treated as such, unless they prove the contrary.”

“ The Church is in possession *de facto*, not *de jure*. She is a usurper.”

“ Possession *de facto*, we have agreed, is *primâ facie* evidence of title. The Reformers were, therefore, as we have seen, bound either to admit it, or show good and valid reasons for questioning it.”

“ True ; but they showed such reasons.”

“ So you have said, but you have not told me the reasons themselves.”

"I gave you as one of those reasons, the fact that our Lord founded no such church as the Romish."

"But that was a reason you could not assign, because the simple fact of the existence of the Church in possession was *primá facie* evidence to the contrary."

"I offered to prove my position from the word of God."

"But could not, because the Church was in possession as the keeper and interpreter of the word, and you could not adduce it in a sense contrary to hers without begging the question."

"I have the word as well as she, and it interprets itself."

"That you have the word, or that it interprets itself, you were not able to prove. Moreover, the argument may be retorted. The Church has the word as well as you, and the word interprets itself. She alleges that the word is against you, and her allegation, at the very lowest, is as good against your position as yours is against hers."

"I deny her infallibility."

"Do you claim infallibility for yourself?"

"I claim infallibility for the word of God."

"That is what logicians call *ignorantia elenchi*. But do you claim infallibility for your own private understanding of the word?"

"No."

"Then you are fallible, and may fall into error?"

"I do not deny it."

"The Church, at the very worst, is only fallible, and therefore, at the very worst, is as good as you at the very best, for at the very best you are not infallible. Consequently, your allegations of what is the word of God can never be a sufficient motive for setting aside hers. Nothing, then, which you can adduce from the Scriptures, even conceding you all the right to appeal to them you claim, can be sufficient to invalidate her title. As she, at worst, stands on as high ground as you can even at best, her simple declaration that the word of God is in her favor is as good as any declarations you can make to the contrary. The proof, then, which you offered to introduce, would have availed you nothing, even if you had been permitted to introduce it."

"I do not admit that. I offered to prove, and I am able to prove, from the Holy Scriptures, that our Lord founded no such church as the Romish."

"It is certain that you can introduce no passage of Scrip-

ture which expressly, in so many words, declares that our Lord founded no such church. If, then, you can prove it from the Scriptures at all, you can prove it only by means of the interpretations you put upon the sacred text. But, at any rate, and on any conceivable hypothesis, the Church has as much right to interpret the sacred text as you have, and her interpretations have, to say the least, as high authority as, granting you all you ask, yours can have. But she interprets the word in her favor, and, according to her interpretations of the word, it is clear and undeniable that it is in her favor, and that our Lord did found such a church as she claims to be. Since, then, your interpretations can never be a sufficient motive for setting aside hers, for they at best can be no better than hers at worst, it follows necessarily that you can never, under any supposable hypothesis, prove from the Scriptures against her, that our Lord did *not* found such a church as she assumes to be. All this I could say, even waiving the argument from prescription. But I do not waive that argument. You have conceded that the Church was in possession. She is, then, presumptively what she claims to be. Then her interpretations are presumptively the true interpretations, and yours against her presumptively false. For you to say, then, that no such church was ever instituted, is a plain begging of the question, and so is every argument you can construct against her, drawn from the Holy Scriptures."

"But I may disprove the claims of the Romish Church by proving positively that some other church is the one actually founded by our Lord."

"Unquestionably ; but you cannot plead at one and the same time an adverse title, and that no such title was ever issued. If you plead that there was no such church ever instituted, you are debarred from pleading an adverse title ; for you plead that the Church has no title, because none was ever issued. If none was ever issued, there can be none in an adverse claimant. On the other hand, if you plead an adverse title, you concede, what you have denied, that our Lord did institute such a church as the Catholic Church claims to be ; that the title she possesses has been issued and vests somewhere. This changes the whole question. There is no longer any controversy between us as to the fact whether our Lord did or did not found a church in the sense alleged, but simply a question whether it be the Roman Catholic Church or some other."

"Grant that our Lord did found such a church as is pretended, — and I believe in the Holy Catholic Church as well as you, — still I deny that it is the Romish Church."

"You join a new issue, then, and plead now, not no title, but an *adverse* title?"

"Be it so, for the present."

"And what is the adverse claimant you set up against Rome?"

"The Church of which, by God's grace, I am an unworthy minister."

"That is to say, the Presbyterian?"

"Yes. The Presbyterian Church is the visible Catholic Church, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation."

"So says the Westminster Confession of Faith. But which Presbyterian church do you mean?"

"I do not understand you."

"There are, you know, brother, quite a number of Presbyterian churches; for instance, in Scotland, the Kirk by law established, the Free Kirk, and the Seceders; in this country, the Old School, the New School, and the Cumberland Presbyterians; in England, the Presbyterian Dissenters, for the most part Unitarian; and on the Continent, the Dutch Reformed, the Reformed German, the Genevan, and the French Huguenots, all virtually Presbyterian churches, and very generally fallen into Socinianism, Rationalism, Deism, or Transcendentalism. Which of these, not to mention several others, is the one you mean?"

"It is not necessary to particularize; I mean the Presbyterian Church in general."

"Do you include even those who have become Socinian, Rationalistic, Deistical, Transcendental?"

"It is to be regretted that in many of the old Presbyterian churches grievous, and, as I hold, damnable, errors have crept in."

"But are those which have lapsed into these damnable errors still integral portions of the Presbyterian Church? Do you claim the English Presbyterians, the Genevan, and French?"

"The Church is never free from error, taken as a whole, but there are always in the Church a remnant who are faithful, and somewhere in it there is always the pure preaching of the word, as well as the maintenance of the true ordinances of God's house."

“ You forget that you have just conceded that our Lord did found such a church as the Roman Catholic claims to be ; but the Roman Catholic Church claims to have authority from God to teach, and to teach everywhere, and at all times, one and the same doctrine, free from all admixture of error.”

“ I do not forget what I have conceded. I say, in the language of the Westminster Confession of Faith, that ‘ the purest churches under heaven are subject both to mixture and error ; and some have so degenerated as to become no churches of Christ, but synagogues of Satan. Nevertheless, there shall be always a church on earth to worship God according to his will.’ ”

“ But this does not relieve you, for it says positively the purest churches under heaven are subject to mixture and error. Then there is no church not liable to error and corruption. Then, whatever your Presbyterian Church may claim, it does not claim, even as the Church, to be able to teach infallibly ; therefore does not even claim to be such a church as the Roman Catholic claims to be. Consequently she cannot be set up as an adverse claimant. The title she claims is not the title the Catholic Church claims, and therefore, if established, does not necessarily negative hers. If, then, you concede that our Lord did found such a church as the Roman Catholic Church claims to be, you must concede that it is not the Presbyterian.”

“ Not at all ; for does not the Confession say, ‘ Nevertheless, there shall be always a church on earth which shall worship God according to his will ’ ? ”

“ True ; but this either amounts to nothing, or it contradicts what you have just alleged. If it means that there shall always be on earth a church which teaches God’s word infallibly, then it is false to say that the purest churches under heaven are subject to mixture and error ; but if it means that the church which worships God according to his will is not free from mixture and error, it amounts to nothing, for it proposes no church claiming to be what the Catholic Church claims to be, since it is undeniable that she claims to teach without the least mixture or error.”

“ But one may be subject to error, and yet not err in fact. The Church is not exempt from the liability to err, but there is always a portion of it which, as a matter of fact, does not err.”

“ What prevents it ? ”

“ The grace of God ; for God will not suffer the gates of hell wholly to prevail against his Church.”

“ Very well ; but is the Church, what your Confession calls the ‘ visible Catholic Church,’ herself always preserved by this grace from error ? and if so, can she be said to be subject to error ? ”

“ The visible Catholic Church consists of all those persons throughout the world who profess the true religion, together with their children. There is always a portion of these who are, through grace, preserved from error ; and therefore there is always a church or body of worshippers who worship God according to his will. In some periods the number of these is very small, in others it is large.”

“ But you do not answer my question. Individuals may err, particular branches of the Church may fail ; but does the Church, the teaching and judging authority of the Church, in matters of faith and morals, ever err ? ”

“ Individual members and particular churches may err, but God always preserves some individuals who do not err, who are witnesses for him in the darkest and worst of times. Consequently, the whole Church never falls into error.”

“ But your Confession declares the visible Catholic Church to be a *kingdom*. Jesus Christ, it says, ‘ hath erected in this world a *kingdom*, which is his Church.’ Now to a kingdom it is essential that there be a supreme authority. There may be provincial and communal governments with local authority, customs, and usages, but they must all be subordinated to one supreme central authority, or else you have not one kingdom, but as many separate kingdoms as you have separate local governments. The kingdom erected by our Lord is one, not many, and therefore must have somewhere, somehow constituted, a supreme central authority, from which all the subordinate authorities derive their authority, and to which they are responsible. This supreme central authority is, in the case of the Church, the Church teaching and governing, and is what is specially meant by *the Church*, when speaking of its fallibility or infallibility. Now my question is, whether the Church herself, that is, the supreme central authority from which all the particular and local authorities are derived, is subject to error, or by grace rendered infallible.”

“ I know no such authority as you speak of but that of Jesus Christ himself, who is the head and husband of the faithful, and he of course cannot err.”

“ You admit that the Church is a *kingdom* ? ”

“ Yes.”

“ And a kingdom erected in *this world* ? ”

“ I do.”

“ And that where there is no supreme central authority there is no kingdom ? ”

“ There must be such authority, but it may be in Jesus Christ, who is the invisible head of the Church.”

“ It is the authority that constitutes the kingdom, not the kingdom the authority ; for prior to the authority, the kingdom is not. The authority and kingdom must be in the same order. If, then, the kingdom is in the visible order, the authority which makes it a visible kingdom must be in the visible order, and therefore itself be visible. You could not call Great Britain or France a visible kingdom, if one or the other had no visible supreme authority. The most you could say would be, that there is an invisible kingdom in Great Britain or France, not that either is itself a visible kingdom. So of the Church. If it is a visible kingdom, it must have a supreme visible authority ; if not, it is not a visible, but an invisible kingdom. The individuals might be visible as individuals, but not as members of the Church, or subjects of the invisible authority. In such case, the distinction your Confession makes, and which you contend for, between the visible Church and the invisible, would be a distinction without a difference. When, therefore, you tell me, as you do in your Confession, that the visible Church is a *kingdom in this world*, you necessarily tell me that it has in this world a supreme visible central authority. And in point of fact, Presbyterians themselves do recognize such authority ; for they regard their Church as a polity, and it has its constitution, its officers, its supreme legislature, and supreme judicatory. If not, what means the General Assembly, which ‘represents in one body’ all the particular churches of the Presbyterian denomination, and to which belongs ‘the power of deciding in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline ; of reproof, warning, of bearing testimony against error in doctrine, or immorality in practice, in any church, presbytery, or synod ; of erecting new synods when it shall be judged necessary ; of superintending the concerns of the whole Church ; of suppressing schismatical contentions and disputations,’ &c., and to which every candidate for ordination must promise obedience and subjection ? ”

“ There is a supreme visible government of the Church, *under God*, I admit.”

"Under God ; and who ever dreamed of a supreme government of the Church over God ?"

"The Papists."

"Nonsense ! Do you not know that Catholics hold Jesus Christ to be the supreme invisible Head of the Church, and that they call the Pope his vicar ? If the Pope is the *vicar* of Jesus Christ, how can he be above him ? God is supreme, the sovereign of sovereigns, and there is no power not from him and subject to him. So no more of this nonsense. But you hold the Church to be a kingdom or polity, do you not ?"

"I do."

"And as such it has its government, its supreme authority ; for if not, it is no kingdom or polity."

"Be it so."

"Now, what I ask is, Does this supreme authority, such as it is in the Presbyterian Church, claim to be infallible in all that concerns faith and morals ?"

"It does not."

"Then your plea of an adverse title amounts to nothing ; the title you allege is not the negative of that claimed by the Church. The title she claims is that of an infallible teacher of God's word ; the title you set up is that of a fallible teacher, which you may well be without prejudice to her claim ; for you can claim to teach *fallibly* without denying her claim to teach *infallibly*."

"But were I to grant this, it would not follow that the claim of Rome must be conceded."

"Not from this fact alone ; but as you have conceded that the title was issued, and must vest somewhere, in some one, it follows necessarily that it vests in the Roman Catholic Church, if it vests in no one else. And as she is in possession, you must concede it to her, unless you can produce and establish an adverse title."

"The Greek Church has as good a title as the Romish."

"That is not to the purpose. The Greek Church has either a valid title, or none at all. It is not enough to say that she has as good a title as the Roman Church ; you must say she has a perfect title, or say nothing."

"I say, then, she has a perfect title."

"Then she is the Church of God. Why, then, are you not of her communion ?"

"That is neither here nor there. You have no right to conclude any thing to her prejudice from my practice. I may be inconsistent. What then ?"

"But she condemns you, and has solemnly anathematized every one of your doctrines, with a single exception, in which you depart from the teachings of the Roman Church."

"Be it so ; what then ? That may prove that we Protestants are wrong, but not that she is wrong, or you right."

"Moreover, she does not even claim to be the One Holy Catholic Church, and to have the supreme central authority over the whole body of the faithful throughout the world. She does not pretend to unchurch the Church of Rome, or even that the Roman Church does or ever did owe subjection to her. She admits, even to this day, the Roman Catholic Church to be truly the Church of Christ in what was originally the patriarchate of the West, that the Pope is the legitimate patriarch of the West, and rightfully exercises patriarchal authority over that patriarchate. She does not claim and never has claimed for herself the title she denies to Rome. She denies the supreme authority over the whole Church claimed and exercised by the Pope, not because she claims the supremacy for herself, but because she denies that any such supremacy was conferred on any one in the original constitution of the Church. She is, then, no adverse claimant, and in all essential respects, except this one, she concedes virtually, if not expressly, the title claimed by Rome, at least so far as it is now in question. So you cannot get an adverse claimant in the Greek Church. Indeed, when you have once conceded that our Lord founded such a church as the Roman claims to be, you must concede that the Roman is that church, for there is no other that even claims to be it."

"That is hardly true. The Anglican Church claims to be it."

"The Anglican Church, as well as your own, puts on lofty airs, and she now and then tells us gravely that she is Catholic, — not *Roman*, but *Catholic*, — and lets off her double battery of popguns on the one hand against Rome, and on the other against Presbyterians, Baptists, Congregationalists, Methodists, &c. ; but she has not courage enough to claim to be the Catholic Church in its unity and integrity. She claims, at most, to be only a branch of it, which implies that the root and trunk are elsewhere ; and she does not even pretend that the supreme visible central authority she obeys or exercises is the supreme visible central authority of the whole Church of Christ. Moreover, she confesses that she is fallible, that she has heretofore erred grievously in doctrine and manners, and

may err again. Her claim, therefore, is not the same as that of the Roman Church, and her title is not, strictly speaking, an adverse title. So you can succeed no better with her than with the Greek Church, or than with your own."

VIII. "But you told me the other day," replied James, after a short pause, "that the essential character of the Romish Church is, that she claims to have received a divine commission or authority to teach, or to keep and declare the word of God."

"To keep and expound or teach the word of God, I grant; but I conceded this only so far as concerned the special controversy in which we were engaged, as I then told you. Nevertheless, I admit now that the essential claim of the Church is, that she has been divinely commissioned or authorized to teach the word of God."

"Then you must concede that any other church claiming to be divinely commissioned is an adverse claimant."

"Divinely commissioned *to teach*, granted."

"Then it is not true that there is no adverse claimant against Rome, as you so confidently assert; for, in point of fact, the Greek Church, the Presbyterian, and the Anglican each claims for itself to be divinely commissioned."

"The Greek Church claims the commission for herself in no sense in which she does not concede it to Rome, and therefore is not an *adverse* claimant. The Presbyterian and Anglican Churches do not in reality claim it at all; for both deny the fact of a divine commission in denying the infallibility of the Church."

"But to deny the infallibility is not necessarily to deny the divine commission of the teacher; and, therefore, not to claim the infallibility is not to fail to claim the commission."

"The commission in question is the commission to teach, and must be the warrant of infallibility in the teacher, unless God can authorize the teaching of error."

"That proves too much. All the teachers of your Church, you hold, are divinely commissioned; but you cannot hold that each is infallible; for, if you should, you would be obliged to hold that Luther himself did not err, since, as is well known, he was at first a Romish doctor."

"The teachers of the Church are all divinely commissioned to teach in communion with and in subordination to the Sovereign Pontiff, the successor of St. Peter, I admit, and so long

as they so teach, they teach infallibly ; but when they break away from that communion, and assume to be independent teachers, they are fallible ; for then they have no divine commission."

"Is there any of these teachers, taken individually, who may not break from that communion, and assume to be an independent teacher ?"

"No one except the Pope himself."

"What, then, is your warrant that your particular teacher does not err ?"

"The fact that he teaches in communion with and in subordination to the Sovereign Pontiff."

"So the Pope is his voucher ?"

"Communion with the Pope."

"Who vouches for the Pope ?"

"The divine commission, which gives him, as the successor of St. Peter, plenary authority to teach and declare the word of God."

"If the Pope should fail, your whole Church might fall to the ground."

"Not necessarily ; but the Pope cannot fail, because he is divinely commissioned. As the successor of St. Peter, he inherits the authority of St. Peter, and the promise made to him, — 'Upon this rock will I build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.' The Pope, therefore, since he has the promise of God, cannot fail, unless God himself can fail, which is not supposable."

"But your argument, nevertheless, proves too much ; for all legitimate civil governments are divinely commissioned, and yet no man can pretend that they are infallible."

"Commissioned to govern, but not to teach or declare the word of God. There is a difference between the commission to govern and the commission to teach. Teaching has reference to the conscience, to the internal act of the man ; government only to external acts. The teacher is commissioned to teach the truth ; government is commissioned simply to control and direct the external acts for the general good, according to the rules of prudence ; and to attain its end, it is not essential that it should be able to propose measures which are absolutely in all and every respect the wisest and the best ; nor is it necessary, in order to believe it for the general good, and to obey all its commands, that the subject should believe it infallible, or that it can never err in any one of its measures. He

can obey an unwise order, and it may be for the general good that sometimes he should do so. But the end of teaching is the proposition and belief of the truth. All teaching is in order to truth. If the teacher be fallible, the end of teaching is not secured ; for he may propose, and I may believe, on his proposition, what is not true. The commission is authority from God to teach, and a command to those the teacher is commissioned to teach to believe as the truth, and nothing but the truth, what he teaches. If fallible, then, he may propose and I believe, on *divine authority*, what is false ; and then God may authorize the teaching and the believing of falsehood, — which cannot be ; for he is infinitely true, and can neither be deceived nor deceive, which would not be the fact, if he could authorize the teaching or the believing of falsehood. Therefore, the divine commission to teach — and it is only of the commission to teach that I speak — must necessarily be the warrant of infallibility in the teacher.”

“ Though the divinely commissioned teacher be assumed to be infallible, the commission is not itself necessarily and essentially a warrant of his infallibility.”

“ To the full extent of the matter covered by the commission it is, you yourself do and must admit.”

“ I do not admit it. A commission, by the simple fact that it is a commission, does no such thing ; for a government may commission an ambassador, and yet that ambassador may misrepresent its will and intention.”

“ Commissions in general may not, but the divine commission to teach does. Human governments have no power to secure the infallibility of their ministers ; but you cannot say this of God. He can make his ministers infallible.”

“ He can ; but it does not therefore follow that he does.”

“ I have shown that he must, because he cannot authorize either the teaching or the believing of error, without contradicting his own nature, which is infinitely and essentially true ; and that he does, to the full extent of their commission to teach, you yourself do and must hold, or give up all belief in external revelation.”

“ Not at all.

“ Why do you believe our Lord was the Son of God ? ”

“ Because he himself so declared.”

“ Why do you believe his declarations ? ”

“ Because he was the Son of God, and could not lie.”

“ A good reason, after it is proved that he was the Son of God ; none at all before.”

"I believe him because the miracles he performed proved that he was from God ; for no man could do the miracles he did, unless God were with him."

"Was *from God*, that is, sent or commissioned by God as a teacher, but not that he was God."

"The miracles proved him to be God. He raised the dead, and none but God can raise the dead."

"None but God can raise the dead as *efficient* cause ; but men as *instrumental* cause may raise them, as is shown by the fact that the apostles and many of the saints have raised the dead. How, then, from the miracle alone conclude that our Lord raised the dead, not as instrumental cause, but as *efficient* cause ?"

"The efficient cause was the divine power."

"Granted. But the divine power inherent in Jesus, as his own proper power, or the divine power merely displayed on the occasion of his saying to the dead, Arise ? Moses smote the rock, and the water gushed out. Was it Moses, or God who stood behind Moses, that caused the water to flow from the rock ?"

"God who stood behind him."

"So, for aught the miracle itself says, it may have been, not Jesus himself, but God who stood behind him, that caused the dead to live. The miracle does not prove the proper Divinity of our Lord. It only proves that he was sent from God, and that God was with him, and displayed his almighty power at his word."

"Very well."

"The miracles having proved that our Lord was from God, that God sent him and was with him, you *therefore* believe what he said. He said he was the Son of God, and therefore you believe he was the Son of God, and therefore God himself."

"Be it so."

"The miracles, then, simply proved his divine commission, that is, accredited him as a teacher sent from God. But how from the fact of his commission conclude the truth of what he said, if the divine commission be not the warrant of infallibility ? If one who is divinely commissioned to teach, notwithstanding his commission, may err, how can you say that our Lord himself did not err, and that you do not err in believing him to be the Son of God ? Indeed, it is only on the ground that the divine commission is the warrant of infallibility, that

your profession of faith in the Bible as the infallible word of God is not ridiculous and absurd."

"The sacred writers were inspired, but the divinely commissioned teachers you speak of are not. Being inspired, they could know the truth of what they affirmed 'and being honest and godly men, they would not affirm what they did not know.'"

"That is nothing to your purpose. The inspiration was nothing more nor less than God simply telling or communicating to them what they were to teach, and they have in this respect no advantage over the Church, in case she be fully instructed as to what she is to propose as the word of God. If instructed, it matters not, as to her ability to teach, whether instructed by immediate inspiration to herself, or only mediately through that of the prophets and apostles. She claims to have been fully instructed, for the commission under which she professes to act was, 'Going, teach all nations; teaching them to observe *all things whatsoever I have commanded you.*' — St. Matt. xxviii. 19. The alleged defect of immediate inspiration in her case, or its presence in the case of the sacred writers, can, therefore, of itself, be no reason for believing one in preference to the other. The real reason for believing the sacred writers is, that God authorized them to teach; and you have the same reason for believing the Church, if you have equal reasons for believing her authorized by God to teach his word. The commission is a warrant of infallibility in her case, as much as it was in theirs."

"But you forget that I gave as my reason for believing the sacred writers, that they were honest and godly men, and would not affirm what they did not know."

"You, then, consider the personal character of the teacher better authority than the divine commission? This is a common Protestant blunder, and hence the worthlessness of the greater part of your treatises on the evidences of Christianity. God's authority for believing is not sufficient till man indorses it! The best men are fallible, and may be deceived. If we had nothing but the personal characters of the sacred writers on which to rely, honest and godly as they certainly were, we should have no sufficient reason for believing what they wrote to be the Word of God. Their personal character may be important when the question turns on their credibility as witnesses to the facts they record, but does not enter into the account when the question is on their authority as teachers of revealed truth.

No man's personal character is a sufficient warrant for believing that any thing he asserts to be a doctrine of revelation is really and truly a doctrine of revelation. If it were, we should be obliged to believe whatever any man, whose character, so far as we know, is honest and irreproachable, chooses to teach as the word of God. How, then, can you maintain that the personal character of the teacher is a surer warrant of infallibility than the divine commission ? ”

“ The simple fact that the sacred writers were honest and godly men may not be alone a sufficient reason for believing them, yet, if they had been bad men, that would alone have been a sufficient reason for *not* believing them. For God does not and will not speak by bad men.”

“ That is not so certain. Balaam, the son of Peor, was a bad man ; yet God spoke by him, and caused him to utter a glorious prophecy. Do you believe his prophecy on his personal character, or because divinely commissioned teachers have told you that it was not he who spoke from himself, but the Lord who spoke by him ? ”

“ I believe the sacred writers because God authorized them to teach his word, and the Holy Ghost was with them to enable them to teach it, and to preserve them from error in teaching it.”

“ Is not the assistance of the Holy Ghost, so far as needed, necessarily implied in the commission or authority to teach ? ”

“ If the commission were the warrant of infallibility, it would be so implied ; but that is precisely what I deny.”

“ No man can teach infallibly without it ? ”

“ No.”

“ But with it any man can teach infallibly ? ”

“ Perhaps so.”

“ No *perhaps* about it. It must be so positively, or you cannot assert the infallibility of the sacred penmen.”

“ God leaves the will free ; any one who has the assistance may teach infallibly, if he chooses ; but it does not therefore follow that he must and will so teach.”

“ In what concerns personal morality, natural or Christian, the will is free ; but in teaching at the command of God, it is not. The individual speaks not as moved by his own will, but as moved by the Holy Ghost. Thus, Balaam was forced against his will to bless Israel, and to utter a prophecy he did not intend, and which he was unwilling to utter ; for it was against his interest, and he loved the wages of iniquity. Thus,

too, the prophet Jonas sought to run away from the Lord, and not to preach as commanded to the Ninevites, but the Lord brought him back by a miracle, and forced him to utter his word. Moreover, if the matter depended on the human will, the teachings of no human teacher, however authorized and assisted by the Holy Ghost, could ever be regarded as infallible ; because no one could ever know whether the teacher spoke as moved by the Holy Ghost, or merely from his own proper motion. In vain, then, would you claim to have in the Bible the *infallible* word of God. Nay, you have yourself just said, the Holy Ghost enables the teachers to teach the word, and *preserves* them from error in teaching it."

"In the case of the sacred writers, not of all men."

"For all men have not the assistance of the Holy Ghost to teach the word of God, nor are all commissioned to teach it ; but if it be what you define it, any one who has it must be able to teach, and be preserved from error in teaching, and therefore must teach the word infallibly."

"Be it so."

"But the divine commission does not necessarily imply this assistance ?"

"No, it does not ; therefore, I admit the infallibility of the sacred writers specially, and not of divinely commissioned teachers in general."

"What is the significance of the divine commission to teach the word of God ?"

"It authorizes the one who receives it to be a teacher of God's word, but does not necessarily enable him to teach it infallibly."

"So one may have authority from God to teach his word, and yet not have the ability to teach it in the only sense in which God can authorize it to be taught ! What, then, means the authority ?"

"Why, it is authority to teach."

"Unquestionably, but what is that ?"

"He who has it is authorized to speak or teach in the name of God."

"That is, to propound the word of God, not in his own name and on his own authority, but in the name and on the authority of God ?"

"Yes, it means that he is empowered to teach with divine authority."

"Can any thing but truth be taught with divine authority ?"

"No."

“ God cannot authorize the teaching of error ? ”

“ No ; for that would be the same as to teach it.”

“ Then no one not able to teach the truth, and not preserved from error in teaching it, can be said to teach by divine authority ? ”

“ So it would seem.”

“ You say that for God to authorize the teaching of error would be the same as for him to teach it ? ”

“ I do.”

“ And on the principle that what is done by another’s authority, it is virtually that other that does it ? Thus, what the agent does by the authority of the principal is held to be done by the principal himself, who is responsible for it. What an ambassador does by the authority of his government is done by his government. Consequently, what one does by the authority of God is done by God himself, and the responsibility rests on him, and not on his agent. So what one teaches by divine authority is taught by God himself, and God is responsible for it. No one can, then, be divinely commissioned to teach what God may not himself teach immediately, and for which he will not hold himself responsible.”

“ I do not deny it.”

“ Can God teach or be responsible for error, or for any thing but truth ? ”

“ He cannot.”

“ Then he can authorize no one to teach any thing but truth ? ”

“ He cannot.”

“ Then he who is divinely commissioned can teach nothing but truth ? ”

“ Apparently so.”

“ He who can teach nothing but truth is infallible, is he not ? ”

“ So it would seem.”

“ Then the divine commission is, as I have said, the warrant of infallibility, and as one cannot be infallible without the assistance of the Holy Ghost, it necessarily implies that assistance. Consequently, the claim to the divine commission to teach the word of God is necessarily and essentially the claim to infallibility in teaching, and therefore to the assistance of the Holy Ghost, so far as needed to enable the teacher to teach the word, and to preserve him from error in teaching it. Is it not so ? ”

“ I have been accustomed to think differently, but let it pass.”

“ Then my position, that the essential claim of the Church

is that she teaches the word infallibly, is not different from the one I assumed the other day, when I declared it to be the claim to the commission to teach, or that she had the word of God and was its legal keeper and expounder ? ”

“ Be it so.”

“ Then you produce no adverse claimant, since you produce none that even pretends to be able to teach the word infallibly.”

“ Very well.”

“ But in pleading an adverse title, you conceded that the title was issued, and vests somewhere ; or, in other words, that there is and must be somewhere such a church as the Roman claims to be. Now, as you do not and cannot produce an adverse claimant, you must concede that she is what she claims to be ; therefore the Church of God ; and therefore that you and all who make war upon her are rebels and traitors to God. Is it in this way you propose to vindicate the Reformers ? ”

Poor James was misled by his Protestant theology, which makes every thing pertaining to religion a sham. Thus, justification is with it, not making one just, but *reputing* him just, — a forensic, not an inward, intrinsic justification. It is no real justification at all, but a mere make-believe justification, — to say nothing of the blasphemy of representing God as accounting or reputing a man just who is intrinsically unjust, — for it leaves the man as foul a sinner as he was before he was justified. So in the matter of the divine commission to teach, this same theology teaches that one may have the commission, be authorized by God to teach, and yet not teach infallibly, as if God could authorize the teaching of a lie ! A queer thing is this Protestant theology ! Well may its authors and adherents boast themselves the lights of the age !

This notion, that the authority does not necessarily imply the ability to teach, is the source of much of that prejudice which exists in the Protestant community against all claims to authority from God to teach his word. There is a general feeling among the great majority of intelligent Protestants, that there can be no divine authority to teach where there is not the ability to teach ; and seeing nowhere among themselves any teacher who has the ability, they very naturally conclude that no one has the authority. It is absurd, say they, to suppose that God authorizes a man like ourselves to teach, a man who knows no more than we do, and is no better able to teach than the rest of us. When the Catholic speaks to them of

the commission of his Church to teach, and that God gives her authority to teach all nations, they turn up their noses, and ask us, if we suppose they are such fools as to believe that God, the common Father of us all, has given to mortals like ourselves authority to teach us, and commanded us to yield up our own reason and judgment to our fellow-men !

Now, probe the matter to the bottom, and you will find that these people object by no means to the idea that God may authorize men to teach his word, but simply to the notion that the authority can exist where the requisite qualifications to teach are wanting. Their real objection is to the doctrine which Mr. James Milwood attempts to maintain, that teachers confessedly fallible as teachers may nevertheless be divinely commissioned to teach. They object, not to the Catholic doctrine of authority, but to the Protestant. To really God-commissioned teachers, that is, teachers who, in their judgment, have the intrinsic ability to teach truly and infallibly the word of God, they do not object, as is evident from their tendency to Hero-worship, and their common remark that he who is able is divinely commissioned. Read Carlyle, Emerson, the Transcendentalists generally, and you will find that it is always to the notion of authority without the intrinsic ability that they object, and that wherever they fancy the ability they are ready to concede the commission. They err in making the ability the warrant of the authority, instead of making the commission the warrant of the ability ; yet they are right against Protestantism, and perceive a great and essential truth which old-fashioned Protestantism denies, namely, that the authority and the intrinsic ability to teach are inseparable, and that any authority separate from the ability cannot be conferred by God, and is therefore a usurpation. To one who is familiar with the Protestant community, and who comprehends its more recent developments of thought, it is evident that Protestants are very generally growing tired and sick of sham and shamming. They are rapidly becoming unable to satisfy themselves with a religion which is no real religion, but a mere make-believe religion. They cry out from the depths of their hearts for something real, for something which *is*, not merely *seems*. They see that the Reformers built on mere *seeming*, and taught and acted a lie, — gave them hollow appearances, and no solid realities, — at best, the mere hull without the kernel, — a symbol symbolizing nothing, — a mere pretence ; and they grow indignant, turn away in disgust, and say, “ Give us

something real, something that is, if it be but the devil ; for any thing that *is* is better than nothing seeming to be something. If your religion is a mere sham, call it a sham and away with it ; for the oldest gospel is, that a lie is a lie, and no truth. Stop lying, stop seeming, and begin to be." So deep is this feeling of the hollowness of all Protestant pretensions, and so strong is the craving for something real, that it has almost become one of the cants of the day.

It is true, that, knowing no religion but the Protestant, they to whom we refer conclude rashly that Catholicity is also a sham, also a mere hollow pretence, and that no religion is real but that of nature. But in this they draw a conclusion quite too broad for their premises. The Church detests Protestantism as heartily as they do, and, in most cases, for like reasons. She detests it because it is outward, lifeless, empty, and no living reality ; because it contains nothing solid, substantial, has no bottom, but is bottomless, like the pit from which it is an exhalation, and into which, as the religious atmosphere clears up, it subsides. She condemns with all her energy whatever is mere pretence or make-believe. She tolerates no empty forms, no insignificant rites, no vain ceremonies. She will and can approve nothing which is not real, solid, substantial. She teaches the doctrine of the **REAL PRESENCE**, and always presents the very reality she symbolizes. She can call no man justified who is not intrinsically just, and recognize no teacher as teaching by divine authority who does not teach God's word infallibly. If these people would turn their attention to her, they would soon find the truth and reality for which their hearts cry out ; for, to say the least, grace is not less true and real than nature.

IX. "Unquestionably," at length James replied, "there is no other church which makes the same specific claim as the Romish, and if my plea of an adverse title is to be taken as a concession that God has founded such a church, I of course must concede that she is it, and that the Reformers cannot be justified."

"I have not confined you to her *specific* character ; I have only restricted you to her *generic* character, to what she must absolutely be, if a church at all, with divine authority to teach."

"Well, let that pass. I made the concession, not absolutely, but provisionally ; since, as you well know, I do not and

cannot, as a Presbyterian, admit that our Lord ever founded, specifically or generically, such a church as the Romish claims to be, and which is no church of Christ, but a synagogue of Satan."

"Then you retract your plea of an adverse title, and revoke your concession?"

"I do."

"Very well; as I have no wish to take advantage of your mistakes, you may do so. What do you plead now?"

"The Romish Church is corrupt, and by her corruptions has forfeited her title to be the Church of God."

"That is your original plea, which you withdrew for the sake of pleading that no title was ever issued, or, in other words, that our Lord had founded no such church as she claims to be. You will remember that you cannot plead at one and the same time the forfeiture of title, and that no title ever existed. A title which never existed cannot have been forfeited. The allegation, that the Church has forfeited her title, concedes, then, that the title originally existed, and was hers. Am I to understand you as meaning to concede that our Lord did originally found such a church as the Roman claims to be, and that she was originally that church?"

"Not at all. I do not admit that such a title as she claims ever existed."

"You deny, then, that our Lord ever founded such a church as she claims to be, that is, a church with authority from him to teach."

"I do."

"But she is in possession as such a church, and possession is *primâ facie* evidence of title. If, then, you allege that no such title ever existed, the burden of proof is on you. But you cannot prove that no such title ever existed, as you learned in our conversation the other day. Moreover, you have just alleged forfeiture of title, which concedes that the title originally existed and was vested in the Church of Rome. You cannot now deny that it ever existed."

"I admit a title once existed, and was vested in her, though not such a title as she claims; and when I say that she has forfeited her title, I mean not that she has forfeited such a title as she now claims, but such a title as she originally had."

"That is nothing to the purpose. But what was that title?"

"I have told you already, in declaring that she has forfeited her title to be the CHURCH OF GOD. I do not deny that the

Church of Rome was once a pure church, but I contend that she is now corrupt, and no longer God's Church, or any portion of it."

"But the pure Church, the Church of God, is either such a church as the Roman claims to be, or a different church."

"It is widely different."

"Is the Church of God one, or many?"

"Properly speaking, there is but one church, although the one church may be composed of many particular churches."

"But such must be the character of the particular churches as not to detract from the real unity of the whole?"

"Granted."

"And this one church composed of many particular churches is *the* church and the *only* church our Lord founded?"

"It is."

"And it is widely different from such a church as the Roman claims to be?"

"Certainly it is."

"Then you simply deny that our Lord ever founded such a church as the Roman claims to be, and merely reiterate the plea you have withdrawn."

"I do not care for that; I am not to be tied down by your arbitrary rules of special pleading. The Church of Rome was once pure. She then belonged to the Church of God; she is now corrupt, and has forfeited her title. I do not say her title to be such a church as she pretends to be, but to be an integral part of the Church of God."

"She has degenerated from her original purity, and is now a corrupt church?"

"That is what I allege."

"But she is in possession as the pure and authoritative Church of God, and the burden of proof that she is corrupt is on you."

"I accept it, and am ready to prove her corruption."

"Corruption implies a change from a former or primitive state. You must know that state, or you cannot know that she is corrupt."

"She has corrupted the word of God; she teaches the commandments of men for the pure word; and has so disfigured the original gospel of our Lord, that it can be no longer recognized in her teachings."

"That is for you to prove."

"I am ready to prove it. Indeed, it needs no proof. It

is notorious. The world admits it. She has become a sink of corruption ; is full of all manner of uncleanness and filth."

" Words, brother ; mere words. Pause a moment and take breath, and then proceed to the proof. When you tell me the Catholic Church is corrupt, has degenerated, you assume a primitive state from which she has fallen ; and it is only by comparing her present state with that primitive state, that you can determine that she has fallen from it. What, then, was that primitive state ? "

" I can show what it was from the Scriptures."

" They are not in your possession. You are not their legal keeper, and have no authority to expound their sense. You can therefore make no appeal to them against the Church who is in possession, and has, presumptively, the sole right to interpret them. She interprets them in her favor, and you are bound to presume her interpretations to be correct, till you can prove by a competent authority to the contrary. This competent authority you are not ; for, on any conceivable hypothesis, at the very worst her authority is as good as yours can be at the very best. You must get a commission, or at least a *presumptive* commission, from Almighty God, as the legal keeper and expounder of the Sacred Scriptures, before you can prove any thing from them but your own arrogance and impudence."

" I can prove from the early Fathers that the primitive Church was essentially different from the present Romish Church."

" That is, you can prove it from early tradition ? "

" Yes."

" But the Church is in possession as the keeper and expounder of primitive tradition, as well as of the Sacred Scriptures. She interprets it in her own favor, and from it proves that she conforms perfectly to the primitive model."

" But she misinterprets the Fathers."

" As a matter of fact, it is undeniable that the Fathers may without violence be interpreted as she interprets them, and that she rightly interprets them is to be presumed, till the contrary is shown. Moreover, as her authority as the interpreter of primitive tradition, or of the Fathers, is at the worst equal to yours at the best, you have and can have no sufficient authority for setting her interpretation aside. So the appeal to primitive tradition will avail you no more than the appeal to the Scriptures ; and the fact that you have no authority to declare the sense of either debars you from all right to appeal to either against what she declares to be their sense."

“ But she has corrupted the primitive faith.”

“ You cannot say that, unless you are authorized to say what the primitive faith was. She has presumptively the right to declare that faith, and she declares that it was what she now teaches, and therefore she declares that she has not corrupted it. You are bound to presume that she has not, and must prove that she has, before you can use an argument which *assumes* that she has. But what was the original faith which she has corrupted ? ”

“ There is a great number of doctrines which she has corrupted. It is not necessary to mention all. Take, for instance, the doctrine of justification. The primitive doctrine was, that man is justified by faith alone ; the Romish doctrine is, that man is justified by works.”

“ The Catholic doctrine is, that man is justified by faith and works, meaning thereby works done through grace purchased for us by the merits of our Lord ; but on what authority do you assert that the primitive doctrine was, that man is justified by faith alone ? ”

“ The Holy Scriptures.”

“ On what authority do you assert that the Holy Scriptures teach it ? ”

“ Why, they teach it.”

“ You either have authority for saying so, or you have not. But you have not, as is certain from the fact that you have no authority to keep and expound the Scriptures. Then you say it without authority. An assertion made without any authority is worthless, and not to be entertained. Here is the answer to every instance of corruption of doctrine you do or can allege. In confessing the fallibility of your sect, you have confessed that you have no authority from God to teach his word. Then you have no authority for declaring what was the primitive faith, and then none for saying that the Church has corrupted it.”

“ But the Romish Church has forfeited her title to be considered the Church of God by authorizing superstition and idolatry, for evidently no church that authorizes these can be the Church of God.”

“ That is something to your purpose, and you will be entitled to a judgment, if the evidence sustains you. You take now the only ground from which you can legitimately frame an argument against the Church. Every previous ground you have taken has been untenable, because it required the authority to maintain it which you were contesting, and which you

had not, and were obliged to presume to be in the Church herself. You undertook to prosecute her under the law of grace, and failed for the want of a court of competent jurisdiction. As she is presumptively the supreme court, under the law of grace, you could under that law institute no process against her ; for to every allegation you could make she had only to plead want of jurisdiction. The only possible way of prosecuting her is under the law of nature, and it is only by proving her to have violated some precept of that law, that you can obtain judgment against her. The law of nature falls, to some extent, under the jurisdiction of reason, and reason, to that extent, is its legal keeper and judge, and has the right to sit in judgment on its infractions. As the law of nature and that of grace both have the same origin, are enacted by the same sovereign Lawgiver, and as the latter confessedly presupposes the former and confirms it, it can never authorize what the former prohibits, any more than the former can authorize what the latter prohibits, unless we may suppose, what is not supposable, that God may be in contradiction with himself. The law of grace transcends the law of nature, but does not and cannot enjoin what it forbids. As superstition and idolatry are undeniably forbidden by the law of nature, if you prove that they are authorized, or in any sense sanctioned, by the Church, you prove that she is not and cannot be the Church of God. But she does not authorize or sanction them ; she strictly forbids them. Thus, in her catechism for children she teaches the child to ask and answer : —

“ *What is forbidden by this [the first] commandment ?*

“ To worship false gods or idols ; or to give any thing else whatsoever the honor which belongs to God.

“ *What else is forbidden by this commandment ?*

“ All false religions ; all dealings with the devil ; and inquiring after things to come, or secret things, by fortune-tellers or superstitious practices.

“ *What else ?*

“ All charms, spells, and heathenish observation of omens, dreams, and such like fooleries.

“ *Does this commandment forbid the making of images ?*

“ It forbids making them so as to adore them ; that is, it forbids making them our gods.

“ *Does this commandment forbid all honor and veneration of saints and angels ?*

“ No, we are to honor them as God’s special friends and servants ; but not with the honor which belongs to God.

“*And is it allowable to honor relics, crucifixes, and holy pictures?*”

“Yes; with an inferior and relative honor, as they relate to Christ and his saints, and are memorials of them.

“*May we, then, pray to relics and images?*”

“No, by no means; for they have no life or sense to hear or help us.”

Here is evidence enough that the Church denies your charge. The burden of proof is on you, and you must prove her guilt of superstition and idolatry.”

“And I am ready to prove it. The Reformers charged her with idolatry, and we have never ceased from their day to reiterate the charge.”

“But a lie, though a million of times repeated, is none the less a lie. Nobody disputes that Protestants have accused the Church of idolatry, but that is not to the purpose. You must prove your allegation.”

“Why, you might as well ask me to prove that there is a sun in the heavens. All the world knows that the Church of Rome is sunk in the grossest idolatry and the foulest superstition.”

“Words, words, brother; give me the proofs.”

“Proofs! you need no proofs. The fact is undeniable, and nothing but the grossest impudence on the part of the Romish Church could ever dream of denying it.”

“No advance in the argument, brother. Have you yet to learn that the unsupported assertions of a man who admits that he speaks without authority are not proofs? Here is the Church, on the one hand, teaching her children, in the very first lessons she teaches them, to abhor idols and all superstitious practices; and here are you, on the other, accusing her of superstition, and that worst and most abominable species of superstition, idolatry, — she in possession and to be presumed to be the Church of God, and you presumptively a rebel against God, and a calumniator, till you make good your charge. Prove, then, the charge, or withdraw it.”

“The Reformers proved it, the greatest and best of our writers have asserted it; it is a question settled, *res adjudicata*. Has it not entered into history? Do you not read it in the very elementary books for children? Look at the great and enlightened State of Massachusetts! she prohibits by law all sectarianism in her admirable system of schools, and the introduction into them of any books which show any preference for

one religious denomination over another ; and yet she does not hesitate to permit the introduction of books which teach that Papists are idolaters and image-worshippers. Have we not, in every land where we have had the power, prohibited the Romish worship ? Why have we, the only friends of religious liberty, why have we who have poured out our treasure and our blood to redeem the world from Papal tyranny and superstition, why have ~~we~~ done this, but for the reason that we have not dared tolerate superstition and idolatry ? ”

“ Why did the Jews, God’s chosen people, through whom the Messiah was to come, and who were hourly expecting him and praying for his coming, crucify him between two thieves when he did come, but on the pretext that he had a devil and was a blasphemer ? Did the fact that they falsely accused him, and then crucified him on that false accusation, supported by false witnesses, render them the less guilty ? ”

“ Do you mean to say that so many great and good men, so many pure and holy men, the glory of their age, their country, and their religion, have all conspired to bear false witness against the Romish Church ? The thing is incredible. ”

“ More so than that the Jewish nation conspired to crucify their God ? I know nothing about your great and good men, your pure and holy men ; but I know that whoever accuses the Church of idolatry, or any species of superstition, utters as foul a lie as did the wicked Jews who told our Lord he had a devil, and that he blasphemed. No doubt, it is an easy matter to prove the Church guilty, if all you have to do is to bring a false accusation, assume your own sanctity, and then conclude it must be well founded or you could not have made it. But your logic would be more respectable, if from the falsity of your accusation you concluded your want of sanctity. If the character of Protestants is a presumption against their conspiracy to bring a false accusation, the character of Catholics is a still stronger presumption against their having conspired to uphold and practise idolatry ; for the great and pure and holy men who have lived and died in the Catholic faith, granting you all you can pretend to, are as a thousand to one to those of Protestant communions. But you forget that I was brought up a Protestant, and that to talk to me of Protestant sanctity is ridiculous. I am acquainted with Protestants, and with what they facetiously call their religion. Our dear mother, too, was brought up a Protestant, a Presbyterian, and yet what did she tell me on her death-bed ? ”

"What did she?"

"No matter now; but she did not die a Presbyterian."

"Did not? What mean you?"

"Some day, I may tell you, but you are not now worthy to hear."

"Did my father know?"

"As much as you, and no more."

"Did any body know, but yourself?"

"Yes."

"Do you mean to insinuate that a Popish priest was smuggled into our house?"

"O my wise brother, you do not know all things. Angels of mercy, messengers of grace, are sometimes sent even where the ministers of Satan fancy they do and can find no admission. All things are possible with God, and nothing is too good for him to do for those who are obedient to his grace."

"Am I to understand that my mother on her death-bed renounced Presbyterianism, and became a Papist?"

"She did not die a Presbyterian. You may recollect, that during the last week of her life she refused to see Mr. Grim-face, her old Presbyterian pastor."

"True, and my father and I thought it strange; but as we had no doubt of her being one of the elect, it gave us no great uneasiness. But there was no Romish priest within two hundred miles of us."

"I have no doubt that my mother died in a state of grace; but more I will not tell you, till you prove or withdraw your charge against the Church."

"But why did not our mother tell us all, as well as you, of her apostasy?"

"She knew both your father and you, and that, if she had told you, she would have been denied the last consolations of religion; and after she had received them, there was no opportunity, till she became unable to do so. But your charge, — prove or withdraw it."

"I will prove it, but you must excuse me now. Our conversation has been long, and I am fatigued. But to-morrow, God willing, I will prove that the Romish Church is an idolatrous church."

"Be it so. But remember and prove it, or I shall require you to own that Protestantism —"

"Is of the devil. I accept the alternative. If I fail to establish the charge of idolatry and superstition against the

Romish Church, I will consent that the Reformers be branded as calumniators, and that Protestants are and have been from the first acting under the delusion of Satan."

"See that you keep your word."

The brothers separated for the remainder of the day, and James, though pleading fatigue, betook himself to his library to look up his proofs and prepare for the morrow. He felt that all depended on the issue he had joined, and that, if he failed to justify his charge, he could no longer pretend to uphold the Reformers. Hitherto his brother had kept him discussing the law of the case; but now he thought he saw a chance of entering upon its merits, and of introducing his witnesses. How he succeeded will be related in the next chapter.

ART. II. — 1. *The Jesuits*. From the French of MM. Michelet and Quinet, Professors in the College of France. Edited by C. Edwards Lester. New York: Gates & Stedman. 1845. 12mo. pp. 225.

2. *Des Jesuites par un Jesuite. Première Partie. EXAMEN DES TEXTES*. 2^e Edition, augmentée. Paris. 1844. 18mo. pp. 192.

3. *Des Jesuites par un Jesuite. Seconde Partie. EXAMEN DES FAITS HISTORIQUES*. Paris. 1844. 18mo. pp. 381.

THE first of these works is an English, or American, translation of the infamous lectures of Messrs. Michelet and Quinet, of the College of France, against the Jesuits, delivered in the summer of 1843; the other two works are a formal reply to them by a Jesuit, Father Cahour, written with great mildness, but with much keenness of wit and force of logic. They leave little to be desired by way of refutation of the Lectures, and ought to have accompanied the American edition of them; and would, if the American editor, whose name we are loath to write, had had the least conceivable sense of justice.

The Lectures, owing to the position and reputation of the Professors, and to the state of the public mind, especially in Paris, at the time they were delivered, were not altogether

without effect, and they are even now sometimes referred to by anti-Catholic writers with a certain degree of approbation. A Presbyterian minister of St. Louis, Missouri, who possesses all the zeal, and more than the average sourness of his sect, lately quoted them, in replying to an article of ours against him, as a work of authority ; and such is the deplorable ignorance of Protestants in general concerning Catholicity, especially concerning the religious orders it opposes, that many, we doubt not, may really suppose the work is in fact something better than a mere tissue of sophistry and misrepresentation. It may, therefore, not be amiss to subject these Lectures to a rigid examination, and lay open to the public their false assumptions, misstatements, and calumnies. We intended to do this some time since, and had, over a year ago, collected the necessary materials ; but we have hitherto been prevented from executing our intention by a press of other matters which we were unwilling to postpone. No great harm, however, can have resulted from the delay. The controversy is an old one, and changes not its character by lapse of time. The Society of Jesus remains, and will remain, as it was, and its enemies have long since ceased to be able to assume a new position or to invent a new falsehood against it.

Our readers are already familiar with the character of the Professors from the account we have given of them, when reviewing some of their other works. They are distinguished chiefs of what, in a general way, is called the modern *Movement* party, — a party with which we ourselves were associated in the days of our blindness, and from which we hoped the redemption of man and society, till the grace of God disabused us. This party is variously denominated, and is not easily defined or described. Perhaps its most appropriate name is the *Shadowistic* or *Symbolistic* party ; very nearly what is commonly meant in this country by the Transcendental party. It is not Catholic ; it is not Protestant, in the sense old-fashioned Protestants wish us to understand Protestantism ; nor is it precisely infidel, after the fashion of the last century, or, if so at bottom, it seeks to disguise the fact by dressing up its infidelity in the costume of religion. Its members claim to be religious, even Christian ; but Christian only in their own peculiar sense, because they profess to embrace and seek to realize what they allege was the *idea* entertained by our Lord. All religion, according to them, is a shadow or symbol, never the reality or the substance itself. The idea entertained by our Lord, or

the religion he contemplated, was, they tell us, a religion which completely and exactly symbolizes the whole of human nature, and shadows forth all its permanent and indestructible facts or laws. All religions are to be accepted, for each symbolizes a portion of these ; but no one can be accepted as perfect religion, for no one completely and exactly symbolizes them all. All, so far as they are positive, are true and divine ; and each, so far as exclusive, is false and mischievous. This is the great truth our Lord taught, and in obedience to this truth he sought to select out the positive portions of all religions and mould them into a perfect and self-consistent whole, which should be the adequate expression of all the essential facts of human nature. To this end he labored, suffered, and died. They only are truly his followers, or have the right to call themselves Christian, who, in this respect, imitate his example. To labor for such a religion is *Christian*, because it is to labor for the Christian *idea*, and to be a fellow-laborer with Christ himself is to be Christ — we shudder to write it — in the sense he was Christ ! and is *Catholic*, because it is to accept all religions, and to construct out of the materials they furnish a universal religion.

Moreover, human nature is progressive, continuously progressive, and progressive without term. It is never the same in any two epochs or countries, hardly in any two individuals, or in the same individual at two different periods of his life. The religion which perfectly symbolizes it in one age or nation will not in another. The garments fitted to the child will not fit the full-grown man, and to demand that they be retained and worn without alteration or enlargement is, in effect, to demand that the man remain for ever a child. As man himself advances, as human nature grows, and is continually unfolding more and more of what was concealed in the original germ, so the religious symbol must itself advance, have a power of development or expansion, which enables us to keep it always in harmony with our actual state ; for, if it do not advance with us, we outgrow it, leave it behind us, and are compelled to go on in our eternal career of progress without it.

But the growth, progress, development, or expansion of the symbol is not the work of God as the author of grace, — who may, indeed, *gratiâ inspirationis*, develop his revelations as seemeth to him good, — but the work of man himself. Man himself is intrusted with the work of casting his own shadow, of adapting his symbol to his nature. But to be able to do

this, he must be free to develop his own activity without restraint, and the religious symbol must be subjected to the free action of his own intellect and will, — and, we may add, to passion and caprice. Hence the *conditio sine qua non* of the progressiveness of religion is unrestrained freedom for man to alter, reform, amend, modify it at will, so as to adapt it to his moral and intellectual state ; or, in other words, unrestrained freedom to make his religion at all times and in all places after his own image. Hence, whatever tends to restrict man's control over his religious institutions, to render his religion inflexible, immovable, and immutable, the same always, everywhere, and for all, is hostile to religion itself, antichristian, mischievous to man, and hateful to God.

Such, in brief, is the general theory or doctrine of the *Shadowists*, or, as they are also sometimes called, the *Progressists*, as we can testify of our own knowledge, and as it is easy to collect from these Lectures themselves. It is clear from this statement, that the leading idea of these philosophers, doctors, or poets is the destruction of all antagonism between man and his religion. They find that there is a powerful antagonism between themselves and religion, as presented by its authorized teachers ; this antagonism they, very properly, look upon as wrong, and to be destroyed. But their peculiarity consists in proposing to destroy it by conforming, not man to religion, but religion to man. Hitherto it has been thought, that, whenever there is discrepancy between man and religion, he, not religion, should give way ; but this the theory corrects, and assumes that man is right, and that religion is in fault and in need of reform, — a notable discovery, no doubt.

It is also clear from our statement that the Shadowists do not hold religion to be imposed on man by his Maker as the law he is to learn, believe, and obey ; but they hold it to be something developed from man, spun, spider-like, from his own bowels, subjected to his free control, which he is to provide for and keep in constant repair, alter, contract, enlarge, amend, as occasion may require, so as to prevent it from ever offering any opposition to the age, country, or individual. The religious life, accordingly, consists, not in believing the revelation and keeping the commandments of God, but in adapting one's religion to the times. Under the religious point of view, man is a religion-developer, mender, or stretcher, whose chief duty is to make his religion always an exact shadow of himself. The service he may thus render religion is perhaps intelligible ; but

the advantage to be derived from his religion is not very obvious. Somebody has remarked, that the difference between a good physician and a poor one is very great, but between a good one and none at all it is not great. Perhaps our Professors think that by rendering religion flexible, a sort of India-rubber religion, capable of contracting and expanding at will, they make it a good religion, and therefore nearly, if not quite, as good as none.

If we analyze this marvellous theory, we shall find that it proceeds on the assumption, that the falsehood and mischief of a religion are in the restraint it imposes on human activity, and that it is true and wholesome so far as it leaves us free and unimpeded, and permits us to follow the bent of our nature, and live as we list. It assumes the end of man to be, not, as the Catechism teaches, "to know God, to love and serve him in this world, and to be happy with him for ever in the next," but to develop freely and in all directions his inherent activity, or, in other words, to develop and perfect his nature. Our nature, as God left it, is merely inchoate, and we must take it up and complete it ; that is, do what the Creator has left undone. If left free, man will always keep his religion in harmony with the times, and prevent it from interposing any obstacle to his self-development and growth. It will cease to be a let or hindrance to his progress, and he may then go on in his career, and attain — Here the oracle is silent, and no further response can be obtained.

Knowing now the theory and character of the Professors, we can easily understand the ground of their opposition to the Jesuits. They oppose the Jesuits, substantially, because the Jesuits oppose their theory of man and religion, because they deny that religion should be flexible, movable, mutable, and alterable at the will and caprice of each age, country, and individual ; because they are exclusive, and will not admit that man can attain to salvation in one religion as well as in another ; because they are hostile to the free development of human activity, and seek to subject it to a positive law imposed by authority on man, and not merely developed from him. Here is the ground of their opposition to the Jesuits, and their principal charges against them.

But in these charges they in fact allege no offence. There is no offence where there is no infraction of law ; and where no law is alleged as violated, no offence is alleged. The Professors allege no law as violated by what they charge against

the Jesuits. They declare on no law ; but simply on their own theory. That theory is not law ; it is a mere private speculation or opinion, and therefore its infraction is no offence.

Before the Professors can allege the infraction of their theory as an offence, they must assume it to be law. But they cannot assume it to be law without contradicting themselves. The essence of their theory, as is evident to all who comprehend it, or have studied their Lectures, is that there is no law, and that man is perfectly free to exert his own activity as seemeth to himself good. To assume the theory to be law is to deny this, and to assert that man is subject to law, and free to exert his activity only according to law. On no hypothesis, then, can the Professors allege the infraction of their theory as an offence. That theory is either true or it is false. If true, there is no law ; then no offence, for its infraction violates no law ; if false, its infraction can be no offence ; for it can be no offence to violate a false theory. This is a bad beginning for our distinguished Professors, our learned and philosophic Universitarians, who would have us regard them as standing at the apex of modern civilization, and is not likely to exalt our opinion of their legal attainments and logical ability.

But the case for our Professors is worse yet. They not only cannot allege the infraction of their theory as an offence, but, on the assumption of that theory, they can allege no act of the Jesuits or of any body else, whatever it may be, as an offence. According to their theory, human activity is left perfectly free and unrestrained, and subject to no law but its own inherent law, by virtue of which it is human activity ; which inherent law, it is evident of itself, can never be violated, unless it be by not acting. There is no law, then, which restrains or forbids any act whatever. There then can be no offence ; for the offence is necessarily in doing what the law forbids. If there can be no offence, none can be charged against any one, let him do what he will. This is an awkward position for our Professors to assume. They wish to commence and sustain an action against the Jesuits, and as the condition of doing it, begin by denying all law, and therefore the possibility of any actionable matter ! But no man can be arraigned without law, or but by law. Whoever, then, wishes to arraign and condemn a party must in the outset concede the existence of law, and show that the law, on which he declares, forbids the particular acts he sets forth in his declaration. Are the

learned Professors of the College of France, the celebrated Universitarians, under the necessity of being taught this ?

But, unhappily for our Professors, if they should undertake to assert law, and to relieve themselves by an appeal to it, they would be obliged to abandon their theory. If they appeal to law, they recognize a legal order. But the moment they recognize a legal order, they recognize an authority to make and declare the law, and that the right or the wrong of human actions is determinable only by the law. This is as true in moral matters as in civil. Man is a moral being only by being placed under law; and he is moral or immoral in his character, simply as his acts conform or do not conform to the law to which he is subjected. Deny law, and you deny morals. Admit law, and you must admit a sovereign lawgiver, whose will is law. But the will of the lawgiver cannot bind till promulgated, and it cannot be promulgated without authority. Where there is no authority to promulgate and declare the will of the sovereign, there is no law. Law necessarily supposes such authority, and the supposition of such authority necessarily supposes the law to be what, and only what, the authority declares it to be. But if the Professors admit this, as they must, if they appeal to law, they admit the very principle for which they arraign the Jesuits; for the gist of their allegation against the Jesuits is that they assert that man is subject to law, and that the law is determinable only by the authority which promulgates and declares it. They would, then, not only bring no charge against the Jesuits, but they would even condemn themselves. Not the Jesuits, then, would be wrong in opposing, but they in defending, their theory. So much in general; a more particular examination will disclose everywhere this same original vice of the pleadings of the Professors against the Jesuits. They assert universal liberty, and allege against the Jesuits that they deny and oppose it. Be it so. But if all actions are free, it is no more an offence against liberty to deny it than it is to assert it. The Jesuits in denying it only exercise that liberty which you assert, and therefore do only what you assert they are free to do.

Do you reply, that it is self-contradictory to assert universal liberty, and at the same time the universal liberty to violate liberty? If so, that is your affair, not ours. To assert universal liberty is, no doubt, to assert a universal absurdity; but the responsibility is yours, not ours. If you assert it, you can assume no act to be a violation of it; for whatever the

act may be, it is a free act, which no law forbids. But liberty, you say, necessarily excludes all acts which are repugnant to liberty. But no act is repugnant to liberty, if liberty be universal. Let this pass. Liberty can exclude no act repugnant to liberty, unless liberty be erected into law. The law must ordain it, define it, and forbid its violation. But a law ordaining and defining liberty is already a limitation of liberty, and there is only so much liberty as the law ordains, concedes, or forbids to be attacked. But the Professors by their theory deny all law.

There is a great deal of loose declamation in our days about liberty and natural rights; but liberty is really unintelligible without law. Liberty is my right, or it is not liberty. If it is my right, you have no right to encroach on it, and if you attempt it, I have the right to repel you; for a right which there is no right to defend as a right is no right at all. But I can have no right to repel your attack, unless there is some law which forbids it. Hence law always lies necessarily at the foundation of liberty, — the law of God, of nature, of the state, or of nations. The question of liberty, therefore, always involves the question of law, and can never be determined but by determining what the law permits, commands, or forbids. Deny this, you assert, in the name of universal liberty, universal liberty to violate liberty, which is absurd. The assertion of law is essential to the assertion of liberty, and the denial of law is a virtual denial of liberty; for it denies liberty as a right. We wish our modern advocates of liberty, who seek to advance liberty by the destruction of law, would bear this in mind, and remember that liberty without the guaranty of law is even less than an empty name.

This reasoning is as applicable in one sphere of human activity as in another, in the sphere of thought as in that of outward action. The Professors seek to arraign and condemn the Jesuits in the name of liberty of thought; but the liberty of thought cannot be asserted without asserting law, which grants and guarantees it, and therefore only so much liberty of thought can be asserted as the law grants and guarantees. To determine how much this is, the appeal is not to liberty itself, but to the law; and therefore to the authority competent to declare the law. But our Professors deny all such authority, for the gist of their charge against the Jesuits, as we have seen, is that they assert it. They then deprive themselves of the means of determining whether they are entitled to the liberty

they claim, therefore whether they have a law against the Jesuits to which appeal may be made. In order, then, to make the denial of that liberty an offence, they are obliged to assert universal liberty of thought, and then the denial ceases to be an offence ; for it is only an exercise on the part of the Jesuits of the liberty asserted. If all thought be free, I am as free to think against that freedom itself as you are to think in its favor.

But if the Professors find themselves estopped from proceeding in the name of liberty against the Jesuits, and appeal to law, they abandon the liberty for which they contend, and, for aught they allege, the Jesuits are right, and they wrong. They concede, then, that thought itself is subject to law, and is free only where the law leaves it free. The assertion, then, that the law restrains thought, is true and just, and the only ground of controversy is whether the law does or does not forbid the degree of restraint the Jesuits are said to uphold, — clearly a question for the court to decide. As the only recognized court of competent jurisdiction has already decided this question, and decided it in favor of the Jesuits, it is *res adjudicata*, and no longer an open question, unless the Professors can impeach the court itself. The only court of competent jurisdiction recognized by any body is the Catholic Church, and that has decided in favor of the Jesuits. You deny the jurisdiction of that court, or you appeal from its decision. Very well. To what do you appeal? To the judgment of mankind? We deny the right of such appeal; but let it pass. To the judgment of mankind declared by authority or without authority? If you say by authority, you abandon your cause, for you assert authority. If without authority, then the judgment is of no authority, and cannot overrule that of the Church. To private reason or judgment? But that appeal is fatal to you; for, on the ground of private reason or judgment, the Jesuits have the same right to oppose your views that you have theirs. Consequently, neither in the name of liberty, nor in the name of authority or law, can the Professors assert that the Jesuits, in what is alleged against them, violate the freedom of thought.

The Professors present themselves as the champions of freedom of opinion, and arraign the Jesuits as its enemies. On what ground? On the ground of their denying and opposing the Professors' theory; certainly on no other. But in doing this they assume to themselves the right to define that freedom, and to declare that to oppose their definition is to oppose the freedom itself. But their definition is only their opinion,

and by what right do they impose their opinion as law, and assume to arraign me for rejecting it? In this very fact, they violate the freedom for which they contend. They assume the principle, that they have the right to impose their opinions on me, and hold me up to public derision and abhorrence, if I have the audacity to disregard them. In this they assert the most perfect dominion over me, and claim me as their slave in both soul and body. He who has the right to impose his opinions on me as law, to compel me to think as he thinks, has the dominion of my soul, and he who has dominion of my soul has of course dominion of my body; for the dominion of the body is in the soul. In the very name of freedom of opinion, these Professors would subject us to our fellow-men, and establish a tyranny which M. Michelet himself admits to be tenfold worse than the worst political tyranny conceivable.

Liberty, rightly defined, is a sacred name, and he is worthy of condemnation who violates it; but who gave Messrs. Michelet and Quinet the right to define it, and impose their definition as the law? We know well enough what they understand by liberty, but we deny that to violate it in that sense is a crime. As that sense is not the sense in possession, they must establish it by competent authority as the legitimate sense, before the declaration that the Jesuits violate it alleges an offence. It is easy to declaim, nay, to grow lyrical, and utter dithyrambs on liberty, and to denounce all who do not chance to understand it as we do; but that does not prove that we are right, or that they are wrong,—that we are its friends, or that they are its enemies. It is not without reason that a Madame Roland, who had herself sacrificed law to liberty, or, more properly speaking, to license, exclaims, when led to the scaffold by partisans still more violent than herself,—“O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!” It is not seldom that they who scream loudest for liberty are its greatest enemies. Who more clamorous for liberty than Marat, Danton, Robespierre? Who more determined against forcing conscience than the boastful children of the Reformation, who have never yet gained or retained the predominance in a single country without the aid of the civil arm, and by pains and penalties enacted and enforced against all who dared oppose their opinions, as England, Scotland, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and our own country can bear witness? Indeed, it may almost be laid down as a rule, that the man who clamors loudly for liberty, and claims to be its especial friend, is

sure to be a tyrant at heart, and means by liberty only liberty to make others succumb to him.

The Professors accuse the Jesuits of being "the counter Revolution"; that is, of opposing the French Revolution, of seeking to repair its disasters, and to prevent the recurrence of a similar catastrophe. Concede it, what then? When did the French Revolution become a law? When did it become a crime before God, or against the human race, to deny the justice and utility of that Revolution? Has not France had enough of revolution? Bewitched by her sophists and demagogues, she madly exclaimed, — "Go to, let us make a revolution. Let us do away with this old political order, under which for these twelve hundred years we have lived, grown great, renowned, and led the civilization of the world. To the guillotine with the last of our glorious dynasty of kings, and let the PEOPLE REIGN!" She gave the word, and down went altar and throne, temple and palace, church and state, faith and manners, and up went the red cap and the tree of liberty. What gained she? Ask her exiled chivalry, her royal and noble blood flowing in torrents on the Place de Grève; ask the burning sands of Egypt and Syria, the snows of Russia, the field of Waterloo, the Isle of St. Helena, — all France bristling with foreign bayonets, her beautiful capital held by foreign mercenaries, and herself owing her not being blotted out from the roll of nations to the mercy or the policy of her conquerors. Alas! France at a frightful sacrifice has taught us the worth of revolutions and the revolutionary spirit. She, rising from her prostrate condition, and assuming her rank among the nations of the earth, only in proportion as she re-establishes the order she had in her frenzy cast off, proclaims to all the world, that it is no crime to condemn her Revolution, and to arm her children by the precepts of religion against the madness of attempting to continue or to reproduce it. If this is the offence of the Jesuits, it is their glory. In the name of France, of humanity, of all that is sacred, if this is their crime, we say, All hail to the Jesuits! They are the true followers of Jesus; and however much shallow sophists and conceited demagogues may revile and persecute them, great is their reward in heaven.

The Professors say the Jesuits are Ultramontanists; Ultramontanism is opposed to the revolutionary order in France, and therefore they are monsters and to be condemned and expelled.

"The worst thing for it would be to show that its profession of faith is not only different from, but inimical to, the profession of faith of the State. In her institutions founded upon the equality of existing worships, France professes and teaches the unity of Christianity, under the diversity of particular churches. This is her confession, such as it is, written in the sovereign law; all Frenchmen belong legally to the same church under different names: there are, henceforth, here no schismatics or heretics, but those who, denying every church but their own, every authority but their own, wish to impose it upon all others, to reject all others without discussion, and who dare to say, — 'Out of my church there is no salvation,' when the State says precisely the reverse. It has not been from pure caprice, if the law has broken the religion of the State. France could not adopt as her representative the *Ultramontanism which, from its principle of exclusiveness, is diametrically opposed to the social dogma and the religious community, inscribed upon the constitution as the result, not only of the Revolution, but of all modern history.* Whence it follows, that, for things to be otherwise than they are, one of two things must take place: either France must abjure her social and political communion, or Catholicism must become truly universal, by comprehending at last what it is now content to curse." — pp. 88, 89.

Suppose the antecedent, we deny the consequence. Grant there is an antagonism between Ultramontanism, that is, Catholicity, and the order to which the Revolution has given birth in France, it no more follows from this fact that Ultramontanism is wrong than it does that the Revolutionism is wrong. By what authority is that order which has resulted from the Revolution assumed to be the law, which to oppose is necessarily a crime? You must establish the legitimacy of that order, the legality of what you call the sovereign law, before you can assume it to be a crime to disregard or transgress it.

The Revolution, we are told, has established in France, as the sovereign law of the state, a law which Ultramontanism necessarily contravenes. That is, there is a necessary antagonism between the political order and the religious order. Be it so. But if the Church opposes the State, the State opposes the Church. Whence, then, follows it that the Church is wrong? Why is not the fact, that the political order opposes the religious, as good proof, to say the least, that the political order is wrong, as that the religious order is? Which is the more sacred, religion or politics? Where there is antagonism between religion and politics, which must give way? Religion? Since when has the political order been made su-

preme? Since when has the State had rightfully the supreme control in matters of religion? Since when has it received from Almighty God authority to teach his word, and to assume the direction of consciences? The Christian religion was condemned, prohibited by the State, under the pagan emperors of Rome; — was it therefore wrong for the subjects of the emperor to embrace it, and to do all in their power to propagate it? If you assert the supremacy of the State in spirituals, be so obliging as to show us the patent of the Almighty constituting the State the *Ecclesia docens*, and the temporal prince the *pontifex maximus*.

The Professors tell us that the Jesuits are Ultramontanists; Ultramontanism is the supremacy of the Church, and the assertion of the supremacy of the Church is inimical to religious liberty. Hence the Jesuits are opposed to religious liberty, and, for that reason alone, should be suppressed. But why is it more inimical to religious liberty to assert the supremacy of the Church than it is to assert the supremacy of the State? Is religious liberty less interested in the liberty of the Church than in the liberty of the State? If you declare the State supreme, you subject the Church to the State. Is religion free, when it is subjected to the State? Is it to defend religious liberty to assert the right of the State over it, and to oppose it to assert the freedom of the Church? Am I free in my religion, when I am bound to take my religion from the temporal power, and prohibited from embracing a religion the State does not see fit to authorize? Am I the enemy of religious liberty, because I resist the attempt to make the State the director of consciences, and to give the prince absolute authority over the souls, as well as the bodies, of his subjects? Strange advocates of religious liberty are these celebrated Universitarians! Religious liberty with them means freedom from the authority of religion, and absolute subjection, body and soul, to the civil power; that is, the most absolute religious despotism conceivable, — a despotism which was realized in part by Henry the Eighth of England, when he caused himself to be declared supreme head of the Church, — which is still more fully realized by the Autocrat of the Russias, — and which is perfectly realized by the Emperor of China, the mighty brother of the moon! Strange that these men of lofty words do not see that the principle on which they condemn the Jesuits condemns themselves, and that they cannot assert religious liberty for themselves without asserting it also for Ultra-

montanists ! The State destroys religious liberty by prohibiting religion, as much as it does by ordaining a particular religion and forbidding the exercise of any other.

Again ; these Professors, by the principle they contend for, condemn themselves as politicians. They assert the authority of the State against the Jesuits, and hold, that, inasmuch as they are condemned by that authority, they are justly condemned. This asserts the sacredness of the authority of the State, and denies the right of any one to go against it. They then deny the right of revolution, for revolution is the subversion of the authority of the State. They then condemn themselves ; for they assert the legitimacy of revolution. Nay, they are, in principle, themselves the counter revolution, and obnoxious to the very charges they bring against the Jesuits. If they insist on asserting the sacredness of the State, the absolute authority of the State in matters of conscience, they should descend from their stand as accusers, and take their place in the prisoner's box to receive the sentence of the court. How hard it is for iniquity to avoid condemning herself ! how hard it is to forge a weapon against truth and justice which shall not pierce our own hands and heart ! Yet these Professors are great men, lights of their age, and stand, as we have said, at the very apex of modern civilization !

But this is not the worst of it. The facts assumed are not true. There is no such sovereign law in France as is alleged in the passage quoted. What is given as the sovereign law of France is nothing more than the opinion of Messrs. Michelet and Quinet, and their party, and they must remember that their opinion does not happen to be law. The French charter of 1830 declares, that "each one professes his religion with equal liberty, and obtains for his worship the same protection." This is the sovereign law of France. M. Quinet tells us that this article ordains that every one may be saved in his own religion, and asserts the unity of Christianity under the diversity of particular churches. With his leave, it does no such thing. It simply guaranties the freedom of worships, without deciding any thing at all in favor of one or another. It is a simple declaration that the State professes no religion, or that she tolerates and protects the religion of her subjects, be it what it may. To say that this is a profession of faith is nonsense. The State declares in her fundamental law that she makes no profession of faith ; therefore she makes a profession of faith ; and, therefore, whoever makes any profes-

sion of faith contravenes the sovereign law of the State ! The government of this country protects all religions, but professes none. Therefore, it professes a religion. What religion ? No religion. Therefore, to profess a religion is to contravene the profession of the State. This is the way these master-spirits of the nineteenth century, these champions of art, science, intelligence, reason, argue ! The State says it affords equal protection to all worships adopted by its subjects ; therefore it decrees that every one may be saved in his own religion ; and therefore the Catholic, who holds and teaches that out of the Church there is no salvation, contravenes the law, and is placed out of its protection ! Cannot these marvellous philosophers understand that there is a difference between affording equal civil protection to diverse religions, and decreeing that all are equally available for salvation ? In protecting all religions, the State throws the responsibility of his religion on the subject, and assumes that she has nothing to do with his spiritual welfare or future salvation. Moreover, if all religions are equally protected, the Catholic must be protected as well as any other. Then the Catholic has the legal right to believe and to teach that out of the Catholic Church there is no salvation. Then the Jesuits, in so teaching, do not contravene the sovereign law of France ; for that which is legal cannot be against law. Consequently, even if the abominable heresy of the supremacy of the temporal authority in matters of religion were to be asserted, it would still follow that the Professors fail to allege even an offence against the Jesuits.

France, we are told, recognizes "the unity of Christianity under the diversity of particular churches." This is not true ; but suppose it true, what then ? What is it to me what France does or does not recognize ? Is France the Church ? It is amusing to observe the *ado* Frenchmen, even some Frenchmen who are Catholics, make about France. To our Professors France is very nearly what the Church is to the faithful, and it suffices for them to ask, What does France — that is, those who assume to speak in the name of France — teach or tolerate ? and they seem to take it for granted that France is infallible, and that whatever she condemns must needs be damnable. All this may be very patriotic, but we cannot accept it. France is no doubt a very considerable kingdom, Paris a very clever city ; but Paris is not the Holy See, nor France the Church of God. We can pardon much to patriotism, and we expect a French philosopher to hold that France is all the

world, Paris all France, and himself all Paris ; but because he does, it does not follow that we must, or that the Jesuit who does not is therefore guilty of a crime. Religion, truth, justice, virtue, do not depend on national distinctions, are not bounded by geographical lines, and change not in form or substance as we pass from one country to another. They are universally and eternally the same, — the same for Socrates and Theodore Parker, for Confucius and Michelet, the Hottentot and the Frenchman, the Asiatic and the American. What in the world has nationality to do with faith, religion, morality, philosophy ? Talk not to us, then, of what France recognizes, or does not recognize. She might cease to be, and the Church remain, religion remain, and wisdom and virtue remain. Before you bring in France as umpire in religious matters, recollect and produce her credentials, and authenticate to us her divine commission.

But even here, again, the Professors are out as to their facts. France officially recognizes no such doctrine as is pretended. What are the facts ? Simply that she recognizes diverse worships, and supports their ministers from her treasury ; but not that she recognizes them as *Christian*, or as substantially one and the same religion. One of those religions is the Hebrew religion. Does she recognize Judaism as identical with Christianity ? She, for reasons or no reasons satisfactory to herself, pays the expenses of different religions ; but she nowhere professes to believe these religions are all alike true, and available for salvation. That is a question she leaves to her subjects to decide for themselves. For aught she says, she may believe them all false and anti-Christian. As a government, speaking officially, she professes no religion, though in point of fact the Catholic religion is declared by the charter of 1830 to be the religion of the French, and therefore Protestantism and Judaism are merely tolerated.

The Professors gravely tell us that France is more catholic than the Church, because the Church excludes from salvation all not of her communion, and France does not. This might make even a tyro in metaphysics laugh. In the first place, France teaches nothing on the subject ; and if she did, it would amount to nothing. In the second place, catholicity is predicable only of that which is one and identical. To claim to be catholic because you hold that salvation is attainable in diverse communions is absurd. A church embracing diverse communions is syncretic, or eclectic, not catholic. A church is not

catholic because it denies the possibility of salvation out of its bosom, but it cannot be catholic unless it does so. Exclusiveness is essential to catholicity, as every one who knows any thing of metaphysics knows full well. It is not to the credit of the Universitarian philosophers that they do not know this, and that they fall into the absurdity of confounding catholicity with eclecticism or syncretism.

The catholic teacher must teach all truth to be taught pertaining to the order in which he teaches. If there be no one communion or church that does this, there is no catholic teacher. It is not catholic to teach that truth is distributed through all communions, and that, if the separate portions of each were collected together into one whole, you would have all truth. Undoubtedly there is truth in all religions and in all sects ; and no sect could live a single day, were it not for the truth it has. But is there or is there not a communion that has all truth, and therefore truth in its unity and plenitude, all that is distributed through the various sects ? Is there a sect which has a single truth not possessed by that one communion ? If so, there is no catholic church. France, we say, not in order to be more catholic than Rome, but in order to be catholic at all, then, must possess the whole truth, and be able to teach it in its unity and plenitude. Do the Professors claim this for her ? They do not. They simply contend that she professes that there are elements of truth in some communions wanting in others, and that no one has them all. Then it is absurd to talk of her catholicity, for her catholicity consists simply in the denial of catholicity. What admirable metaphysicians and logicians are these renowned Universitarians !

Our Professors allege, also, that the Jesuits are opposed to the glory of France, and *therefore* should be condemned and expelled from her dominions, especially from Paris. But to oppose the glory of France is no offence, unless that glory be the law, or, what is the same thing, unless there be some law which forbids opposing it. In this charge the Professors, then, assume a law, and therefore abandon their theory, which denies all law. But let this pass ; by what right do they declare the glory of France the law, and make an appeal to national vanity and prejudice against the Jesuits ? The Jesuits are a religious order approved by the Church ; they are laboring to spread Catholicity ; and they would, if they could, make all France thoroughly Catholic. This is the worst that can be said of them. The assumption, then, is, that there is antagonism be-

tween Catholicity and the glory of France, that France cannot be Catholic without sacrificing her national glory. Suppose it; what then? Is national glory in general, or the national glory of France in particular, to be placed above religion? Suppose the antagonism; whence follows it that the fault is on the side of religion? We had supposed that religion is before politics, that where there is opposition, politics, not religion, must give way, and that no national glory may be consulted at the expense of justice, sanctity, truth.

Religion can never be legitimately opposed on the authority of politics or of national glory. Religion is that which is highest; what it ordains is ordained by God himself, who is the sovereign Lord and Proprietor, and who has in all things and in all cases the sovereign right to command. It is the *lex suprema*, and overrides all the ordinances of men, all national institutions, and civil enactments; for these must be tried by it, not it by them. If it sanction them, they are legitimate, and may stand; if it condemn them, they are by that fact alone illegitimate, and without right or business to be at all. It extends even to the thoughts and intents of the heart, and is the supreme law in both courts, the exterior and the interior. As individuals or nations we are placed under it, bound to conform to it, to obey it in every particular, and are guilty of rebellion against God, our rightful Sovereign, if we do not. If, then, Catholicity be the true religion, you must submit to all her demands, however opposed she may be to your individual or your national pride and vanity. What she opposes God opposes; what opposes her opposes God, and you must abandon it, or stand condemned as guilty of treason against your rightful Sovereign. If you would oppose Catholicity, you must, then, do it on some other ground than that of national glory or national vanity. You must unchurch her, show that she has not the commission she claims, and then you have a good reason for rejecting her, whether she do or do not oppose national glory. But till then, the fact that this or that is opposed by her is only a proof that this or that is itself to be opposed.

Moreover, the charge is absurd. It does not allege that Catholicity is false, and therefore repugnant to the national glory. But conceding, by implication, its truth, it alleges that the Jesuits are censurable for laboring to spread it, because it is hostile to the glory of France. But there is and can be no national glory in opposition to true religion. The glory of the nation, as of the individual, is in loving and obeying the Lord,

in making his law supreme, and in refraining from every act, however advantageous it may appear to our short-sighted wisdom, which it forbids. Concede the truth of Catholicity, and national glory is in strict fidelity to it; and it is national sin and shame to go against it. What more absurd, then, than to allege that Catholicity, conceded to be true, is repugnant to national glory?

But we deny the fact alleged; put it on any ground you will, we deny that the Jesuits, in laboring to make France Catholic, are warring against the glory of France. In so laboring they are true Frenchmen, and show that they, not the Universitarians, have the true French spirit, and are filled with the true national life of France. The glory of France is identified with the Catholic religion. Her power, greatness, renown, art, civilization, chivalry, glorious deeds, recollections, — all that is a spell upon the heart of the Frenchman, and makes him proud to belong to France, to call himself her son, — is redolent of Catholicity, inseparable from Catholic faith and piety. Divest France of what she owes to Catholicity, and she is a byword and a mockery. Her shame, her disgrace, the foul deeds for which she blushes and all her friends blush, she owes to her forgetfulness of the true source of her glory, to her neglect of Catholic faith and piety, to her Huguenots, Jansenists, and infidel philosophers, and infidel rabble. These have torn her bosom, stripped her of her fair ornaments, cast her out in nakedness and shame, wounded, bleeding, and half dead. The Catholic Church made her a kingdom, gave her her rank among the nations, her noble sentiments, her lofty and refined civilization; inspired her chivalry and heroism; covered her soil with the monuments of art and charity; sent forth her armies of missionaries and martyrs, more glorious in their conquests than those led on by her unrivalled military heroes. O, base and degenerate is the Frenchman who would rob her of this her true glory, who would sever her from the Church, bid her spurn the Catholic religion and seek to be glorious by denying her whole past, and becoming a feeble infant of yesterday, without recollections, without ancestors, without parents, — a mere foundling, to be nursed by the tender charities of an infidel and blaspheming world! O gentlemen, are you mad? In the name of patriotism, as well as of religion, if you love your beautiful country, if you would not sink her so low that there shall be none so poor as to do her reverence, labor day

and night with all your zeal and power to bind her, soul and body, to Rome. Link her fortunes to the Eternal City, her glory to the Holy See, and long as the world stands shall she flourish, be loved, be honored, and revered. Separate her, and she is gone; France of the past, France of the Middle Ages, France of Chivalry, France the leader of modern civilization, France the great, the renowned, to whom even the foreigner is compelled to do homage, is no more, and her place in history is henceforth a blank for ever.

Yet we deny not that there is adroitness in this appeal. It is the common resort of all who would oppose the Church of God, from the loud-bellowing Luther down to the low-piping Ronge. All seek their *point d'appui* in the national spirit, and trust for success to the appeal to national prejudice. Thus, Luther appealed to the old Germanic spirit against the Church, and evoked the shade of the defunct Herman, the old pagan, to renew the fight against Rome. Rome is a foreign power, anti-national, the hereditary enemy of the Germanic people. Shall we, whose fathers so often met her legions in battle, who never succumbed to her power, who defeated her armies, invaded her territories, and blotted her old empire out from the list of nations, — shall we tamely yield to the mandates of a shaven priest, who impudently pretends to the throne of the Cæsars? Shall our serene and high-mighty princes submit to be ruled by his creatures, to hold his stirrup, to kiss his toe, and do his bidding? Where is the old Germanic spirit? Rouse ye, brothers, rouse ye from your baseness; wake the old Teutonic thunder; shake the seven-hilled city beneath him, and let him know that Germans are men, free men, and never were and never will be in subjection to a foreign power!

Thus, too, in England appealed the enemies of the Church to the national spirit, and alleged that it was a disgrace, that it derogated from the national dignity and independence, that his Majesty Henry the Eighth should not be supreme in his own realms over all things spiritual and temporal, and that when he wanted to put away one wife and take another he must send to Rome for permission, and — be denied. Should not a king be supreme? Should he not, when his wife no longer suffices for his lust, have the right to behead her and take another? Fine time of day, when his sacred Majesty cannot do his will without humbly craving leave of an Italian despot! It is an outrage upon the nation. Shall free-born Englishmen submit to it? Submit to it! No.

Are you Englishmen? Speak out, then, and let that Italian usurper know that you despise him, and that not a minion of his shall set his foot on English soil, without meeting a dungeon, a scaffold, or a gibbet.

Thus too is it with anti-Catholic writers and lecturers in our own country, our Beechers, Bushnells, and Kirks, with their foreign associates, Sperry, Leahy, and Hogan. They appeal to the national spirit, to *American* vanity and prejudice, to check the growth of the Church amongst us. They are, all at once, marvellously patriotic. What! free Americans, will you suffer a foreign power to steal into your free territories and establish his dominion over you? Can ye surrender the independence so gloriously won by your patriot sires? Have ye so soon forgotten Bunker's Hill, Saratoga, Yorktown, Washington, Adams, Franklin, Jefferson, and Henry? Where is your national spirit? Are ye already prepared to bow your necks tamely to the yoke of the foreigner? Know you not that the Pope is the head of the Church, that all Catholics are his subjects, his slaves, sworn to do his bidding, that he is a foreigner, an Italian despot, and that, if you become Catholics, you must become the subjects of a foreign master, must lose your national independence, lose your rights as freemen, your inalienable rights as men, and sink into mere slaves? Ay, free Americans! become Catholics, and you lose all your rights; you cease to be men; you become slaves, soul and body, to the will of an old man seated on the seven hills of Rome. Are you prepared for this? Has national independence no longer a charm for you? Is freedom not worth possessing? Are your free institutions not worth struggling for, dying for? Rouse ye, then, before it is too late. Insidiously the enemy is stealing upon you. He is establishing his posts and fortifying himself throughout the whole length and breadth of your land, consecrated to freedom by the labors, privations, prayers, tears, and blood of your fathers, and ere you dream of it, you will find yourselves in his power and obliged to surrender at discretion. Then farewell to the hopes of freemen, of sages, of philanthropists, the mighty dead and the mighty living, that at length there might be one country in which man should be free to live under laws of his own making and a religion of his own choosing. Americans! free Americans! by all your national spirit, by all your recollections, and by all your anticipations, be warned in season; awake from your fatal security, and make one bold,

manly effort, before it is for ever too late, for your country, your political institutions, your homes and firesides. — Such is their appeal.

Yet, ingenious and successful as is this appeal, may be it is nothing but a gross absurdity. What is it in principle, but setting up nationality as the law of religion, as if religion were not free, sovereign, and catholic, but dependent on national distinctions and geographical lines? Prove the Catholic religion false, prove that the Church is not the Church of God, if you can, and oppose her on the ground that she has no authority from God to promulgate and declare his law; but do not so stultify yourselves as to oppose her on the ground that she is anti-national; for, if religion as religion is admitted at all, she must be admitted as superior to the nation itself. None but such as deny all religion, regular atheists, can, if they know what they do, condemn any religion for reasons drawn from any national spirit or political order. Religion is higher than politics, and gives the law to the nation, instead of taking the law from it. You must conform your nationality to your religion, not your religion to your nationality, and subordinate your politics to its precepts, unless you would maintain the infamous maxim that “all is fair in politics,” — a maxim first openly proclaimed, we believe, by a modern Jew in New York, — a fit representative of those who crucified their God between two thieves.

It is lawful to object to the authority of the Pope, if a good and solid reason can be found for doing so; but to object to it *because* the Pope is an Italian, not an American, an Englishman, an Irishman, a Frenchman, a German, or a Dutchman, is as absurd as to refuse to acknowledge the authority of our Lord, because, according to the flesh, he was a Jew. The Pope, if he has any authority at all, has it, not by virtue of the fact that he is a foreigner, an Italian, or an Italian prince, but by virtue of the fact that he is the successor of St. Peter, the Visible Head of the Church, which is catholic, of no nation, but over all nations and in all. If he have the authority he claims, it is no national authority, but the authority delegated to him by Him who has all power in heaven and in earth, and to resist it is to rebel against God. And is there any who dares maintain that it is lawful to rebel against God?

“But we deny the authority of the Pope; we do not admit that the authority Catholics claim for him was ever delegated to him.” Then say so; prove what you assert, and oppose

him for that reason ; but not because he is, perchance, an Italian, and resides at Rome, instead of Geneva, London, Paris, or Washington. Do not oppose him on the ground of his nationality, when he claims and exercises no authority on that ground. If he has no authority, that fact alone is reason enough for not submitting to him ; if he has the authority he claims, there is no good reason conceivable for not obeying him. If he is not God's Vicegerent, nobody asks you to obey him ; if he is, nobody can deny that he ought to be obeyed by all, of whatever nation they may be. This is all we will deign to reply to the objections drawn from nationality and politics. We could easily refute them by denying the supposition on which they rest, and showing that there is nothing in the constitution of the ecclesiastical or Papal power that contravenes any national independence, national spirit, or political order, not morally wrong in itself ; but we will not do religion the foul dishonor of compelling or suffering her to plead at the tribunal of politics or nationality. We agree with our Puritan fathers, that the Church is free and sovereign, and can never be compelled to answer at the bar of the State. She is supreme. In relation to each other, all states and nations are by right free and independent ; before God, or before his Church, if it be his Church, no one is free or independent, save in obedience ; for in respect of nations as of individuals, it is the law that God is to be obeyed rather than men.

This is the Christian doctrine ; it is the doctrine of common sense ; it is, moreover, the American doctrine. It was the denial of the supremacy of the State over religion, and the assertion of the supremacy of the Church over the State, — the freedom and sovereignty of religion, and the subjection of the State to the law of God, promulgated and declared by *his* ministers, — that induced our fathers to leave their homes, that sustained them amid the privations of the wilderness, and enabled them to found the American state. America was rescued from its savage state and made the abode of civilization in obedience to the great principle of the freedom and sovereignty of the Church of God. Especially was this true of Puritan New England. Our fathers had their faults and their errors ; but while their blood courses in our veins, we will not rob or consent to see them robbed of their only glory, their only solid claim on the gratitude of their posterity. They only are true to their memory, and really entitled to call themselves in any deep and significant sense Americans, who are true to this

great and everlasting principle, the denial of which is the assertion of the subjection of religion to the State, and God to man. If our Puritan fathers had been the Church of God, as they falsely assumed they were, they would have been right, and no descendant of theirs would have had cause to blush for their principles or general conduct. Their major was sound ; only their minor was false. Even as American citizens, as descendants of the Puritans, we are bound to assert the principle of the supremacy of the Church, and to refuse to make religion justify herself before the temporal authority. But be this as it may, religion is, as we have said, the *lex suprema*, the law of laws, and the right of the Church to teach and to govern all nations is established the moment she is established to be God's Church. Deny that she is his Church, give a respectable reason for your denial, and we will meet you and discuss her claims ; but never will we discuss with you, whether she is favorable to one political order or another, the national spirit and the national majesty, or against them.

These very scientific and logical Professors, these attorney-generals of the human race, the rejuvenescence of the famous Baron Anacharsis Clootz of the French Convention, also cry out against the Jesuits and demand their condemnation in the name of humanity. But here again they forget their theory, and assert law, which their theory repudiates, — refute themselves by assuming authority which has the right to control human activity, — the very thing they charge against the Jesuits. But waive this. Consistency is rarely a striking quality in the enemies of truth. They speak in the name of humanity, — a respectable name, we do not deny ; but there is a higher name, a name which is above every name, which every tongue must confess, and at which every knee must bend, whether in heaven, on the earth, or in hell. The Jesuits profess to speak in this higher name, and to promulgate the law humanity is bound to obey, not to take their law from humanity. Humanity is no lawgiver. It is the creature ; is itself under law ; and all its glory is in obedience to the law imposed upon it by its sovereign, and by which it is to be judged. To undertake to impeach the Jesuits in the name of humanity, prior to impeaching them in the name of God, is to make man the law, the sovereign, to substitute him for God, and to fall into idolatry, forbidden even by the law of nature. You stand, then, in your own wrong, and cannot be entitled to judgment against the Jesuits.

The Professors contend that the Jesuits are opposed to human progress, and are therefore the enemies of God ; but it is only progress in their sense that they allege the Jesuits oppose. But they are not entitled to assume their sense as the true sense, and to oppose the Jesuits because they do not accept it. The progress of mankind in the knowledge and love of God, in faith, and hope, and charity, in all, they being judges, which constitutes the true good and real glory of man, nobody can allege the Jesuits oppose ; for this is an end which they avow, and for which they labor with a zeal and a perseverance which even their enemies applaud. The question between them and the Professors, then, is, whether the one or the other takes the right view of progress, — evidently a question for the court to decide.

But the view of progress taken by the Professors is only a recent and a crude speculation, is entertained only by the Professors and their party, and in their works is assumed without proof, or any attempt at proof. It is, then, without authority ; and to seek to condemn the Jesuits because they disregard it is to seek to condemn them without any authority for condemning them, — rank injustice, tyranny, oppression. In the very name of humanity, then, in which they affect to speak, they are themselves condemned ; for there is nothing more repugnant to humanity than oppression, tyranny, injustice. Humanity demands justice ; justice is inconceivable without law, and law, without the Sovereign Lawgiver. Justice, by the force of the word itself, means conformable to law. Deny law, the *jus*, and there is no *justice*. Hence, the Professors, in denying law, in denying all authority to declare the law, and in arraigning the Jesuits for adhering to law, and maintaining that it is what the sovereign ordains, are themselves guilty of that enmity to man which they charge upon the Jesuits ; for in this they deny justice, and leave man no appeal from the tyranny and oppression of his brother.

So it always is. They who break from the Church, who seek some other rule of life, whether they do it in the name of liberty, or progress, or philanthropy, are always sure to defeat the end they profess to have in view. In every country, the ruin of the constitution, and the loss of the liberty of the subject, and finally of the state, have invariably been due to measures introduced by the partisans of liberty. If any one doubts it, let him read the histories of Greece and Rome. The liberal party always are the party that overthrow liberty.

It has been so in France ; it has been so in England ; it is rapidly becoming so in this country. Every step the party whose battle-cry is liberty takes in advance, here and everywhere, is the loss of some guaranty of freedom. Their shout of victory is always over some edifice thrown down ; never over some one erected. It is when demolishing palace and cottage, and making the abodes of peace, elegance, and safety a heap of ruins, that the frantic shouts of the mob make the welkin ring, and honest people feel that hell is broken loose.

It has been the same in regard to religion. The Reformers would have religious freedom, and they have gained by their sacrilegious attacks on the Church, in most countries where they have succeeded, the complete subjection of religion to the State, and in others, religious anarchy, even worse than religious despotism. For the last hundred years the world has scouted the holy name of charity, and taken up the sentimental name of philanthropy. The great men would not hear of God ; they were all for man, for fraternity, peace on earth, and good-will ; and hardly since the world began have vice and crime more prevailed, the poor been more neglected, the lower orders more trampled on, or doomed to suffer greater privation and distress ; tyranny and arbitrary power made more rapid strides, or established themselves more securely in their thrones of oppression. Truth, justice, mercy, all that man needs, all that is honorable to human nature, is sacrificed to "the almighty dollar." The money-god is worshipped everywhere, and daily are whole hecatombs of human hearts sacrificed at each of his ten thousand shrines. Yet all is done in the name of liberty, brotherhood, universal love, and good-will ! O, the terrible madness which seizes men, the moment they leave God to follow the devices of their own hearts ! The devil then has full power over them, and whirls and tosses them hither and thither, and sports with them at his leisure ; and they, poor souls, fancy it is all freedom, and joy, and peace, and love, and quiet and easy journeying to heaven. But there is no way but God's way, and the only way of securing a hundred-fold in this life is to give up all for the life to come. Man never suffices for himself, and whenever he attempts, in his own way, by his own wisdom and strength, to effect even a good end, and labors for it with all zeal and diligence, with constancy and perseverance, shrinking from no difficulty and danger, and pressing on even to the sacrifice of life, he only

finds himself the farther from its accomplishment, and that he has only aggravated the disease he sought to cure.

Let who will examine the actual results of all the extra-Catholic movements in modern times for the melioration of man's moral, religious, or social condition, and he will be struck with the truth of what we assert. Let one go farther, and examine with some care, with some philosophical insight and logical acumen, the theoretic plans according to which these movements take place, and he will see, with equal clearness, that these results ought in all cases to be precisely what they have been. We are not disposed to deny, even to our French Professors, a certain kind of humanity, and though, like all reformers and philanthropists out of the Church, they act on the principle that the end sanctifies the means, we have no doubt but they wish a better order of things than they seem to themselves to see, and really persuade themselves, that, if they could once realize their theory in actual life, the condition of the individual and of society would be greatly ameliorated; yet there is not a single good their theory proposes which is not, on that theory, impracticable. Their theory is hostile to the end they wish. The good they crave for society, may be, is possible; but whoever knows the nature of man knows that it does not consist in the elements they suppose, and whoever knows the ordinary laws of cause and effect knows equally well that it is not attainable by the means they would have us adopt. Let actual living men, men not in the closet, but out in the world, with all their natural dispositions and passions, sympathies and antipathies, hurtling one against another, adopt that theory and attempt to act upon it, and its authors would themselves be among the first to condemn the result.* Nothing of that which they promise them-

* In confirmation of what is asserted in the text, we may remark that the original movers of all great social or religious revolutions are always found, as the revolution proceeds, seeking to arrest its progress, and to prevent it from going too far. Luther soon found himself obliged to struggle against the legitimate development of the movement he commenced, and we see him during the last years of his life battling with a broken heart against the practical workings of his own theories. The men who made the French Revolution in 1789 nearly all turned their arms against it, sought to arrest its progress, and most of them perished in the attempt. What a sad spectacle does Lafayette present, seeking to persuade his army to leave the frontier, and march upon Paris to suppress the Convention which he himself had helped create! In no instance we have ever read or heard of have the men who have sought to remodel the Church

selves would be realized, and all of that which even they most dread would be multiplied a thousand fold. Men are not mere machines, and their conduct is governed by moral and not mechanical laws. They are living, and it is the property of life to suspend the action of many of the natural laws. We know the action of chemical laws upon the dead body, but these laws are held in abeyance during life. Another and a subtler agent is at work, on the laws or modes of whose activity chemistry can throw no light. These are taught us only by another science, and one of which they who sneer at the *scientia divina* and study only the *scientia humana* are and must be ignorant. Hence they miscalculate their forces, mistake their operation, and construct in their theories only monuments to their own rashness and folly. The explanation of man is not in man himself, but in his Maker alone. Man attains to a knowledge of himself only in proportion as he attains to knowledge of God. Ever are we riddles to ourselves, till we find in God the solution. We must be adequate to the design of a work of art, before we can comprehend the whole design of the artist from the contemplation of the work itself. Man must be equal to the creation of man, before from man himself he can comprehend the full meaning of man. But only he who comprehends the full meaning of man can determine his end, or disclose the means of attaining it. Hence all those human theories fail of their purpose, and must fail; and for both the knowledge of our end and the means of gaining it, as well as for the ability to will it, and to use the means, we must depend on the bounty of Him who has made us, and alone knows what we are, what is our true good, and how it is to be attained. If he has not furnished us with the means of instruction and of grace, it is idle to seek for the melioration of society; and if he has, it is worse than idle to seek the end by any other means than those which he furnishes.

But enough of moralizing for the present. In what we have thus far said, we have aimed merely to show the folly and ab-

or the State after their own theories been satisfied with the result of their efforts. They almost always abandon their work in disgust, and, if carried on at all, it is by another generation, who succeed them, and who in their turn are disappointed and disgusted and give or are compelled to give way to another and a madder generation. Calvinism sinks to Socinianism, Socinianism to Transcendentalism; constitutional monarchy descends to democracy, democracy to ochlocracy, and ochlocracy yields only to military despotism.

surdity of the Professors Michelet and Quinet in attempting to sustain an action against the Jesuits on their theory, and the grave errors in which the attempt involves them. They assume scarcely a position, let the conduct of the Jesuits be what it may, that is tenable. They have nothing solid of their own, no law or authority to urge against any body or any thing. They have theory, speculation, dithyrambics, hate, and prejudice ; but these are of no weight, and will never authorize an accusation. Before we can successfully condemn others, we must have something certain of our own. This is a fact the enemies of the Church forget. They forget that they can no more condemn without law, than we can demand their submission without law ; and that they cannot deny without reason, at random, any more than we can affirm without reason ; because every denial is itself an affirmation. We have, therefore, wished to show that the Professors have no ground on which to attack the Jesuits ; for they have no ground on which to stand themselves. This we think we have done.

But in doing this we have not done all. We have thus far, if we may so speak, considered only the account which the Professors have given of themselves. There remains to be considered the account they give of the Jesuits. Thus far we have simply demurred to their declaration, and labored to show that they allege no offence, since they allege no law. But in condescension to what we presume to be their wish, we will waive the demurrer, and join issue with them on the facts in the case. We will endeavour to show that the Jesuits of their Lectures, so far as there can be pretended to be any thing exceptionable in their conduct, are mere *entia rationis*, or creatures of the imagination, and especially will we show that the charges against the Jesuits' system of education are either unfounded, or commendations. But we have no space to do this in our present paper, and must reserve it to a future occasion. The furious attacks made upon the Jesuits, the fear and consternation with which their very name strikes the enemies of God, and the distinguished services they have rendered the cause of truth, piety, science, art, and literature, render the subject interesting and important, and warrant us in devoting very considerable space to the discussion of the questions raised by Messrs. Michelet and Quinet. We are not afraid of drawing too largely upon the attention or patience of our readers ; and it is well to let our unbelieving countrymen know something of the value of the oft-repeated accusations

against an order which has done so much for Catholicity, and which has received so many and so signal tokens of the divine approbation and protection. We hope to be able to resume the subject in our next Review.

ART. III. — *Speech of the Hon. R. B. RHETT, of South Carolina, on the Oregon Territory Bill, excluding Slavery from that Territory, — the Missouri Compromise being proposed and rejected.* Delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, January 14, 1847. 8vo. pp. 14.

WE always read Mr. Rhett's speeches with interest, and rarely without instruction. He ranks high among the most eminent of South Carolina's gifted sons, is high-minded and honorable, one of the few — alas ! very few — of our public men who act always from principle. He may sometimes be unsound in his views, but he always aims at truth and justice, and acknowledges that in politics, as in every thing else, a man should always act under a deep and abiding sense of moral obligation.

The speech before us is earnest, able, and eloquent, — the production of the statesman and the constitutional lawyer. It is on a subject of great and almost fearful interest, which is every day forcing itself more and more directly upon the attention of the American people. It is confined, indeed, principally to the inquiry, Where vests the political sovereignty, under our system of government ? but it raises this inquiry only in its bearing on the great and absorbing question of Slavery. The question of slavery is becoming for us, through the influence of causes no longer controllable, the question of questions, which can henceforth be blinked with safety by no section of the Union, but which must be met and in some way disposed of, or it will dispose of the Union itself. How it is to be met and disposed of it is not easy to say, and not for us to attempt to say.

As conductor, some years since, of the *Boston Quarterly Review*, we took frequent occasion to express our views of the Abolitionists ; and though many, many changes have come over us, and we can hardly be recognized by our readers as

the same man that we were then, our estimation of them remains unaltered, except that, if possible, we now hold them in still greater detestation. They are the worst enemies of their country, and the worst enemies, too, of the slave. They are a band of mad fanatics, and we have no language strong enough to express our abhorrence of their principles and proceedings. But we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that they have the sympathy of a large portion of the people of the Free States, and that in several of the Northern States they are already powerful enough to make it an object for demagogues to bid for their suffrages. Both political parties pander to them. Even the administration seems to court them ; for it has appointed from this Commonwealth scarcely an individual to a prominent office in its gift, not selected from the Abolition section of its friends, — certainly, no one distinguished for his bold and resolute opposition to Abolition movements. In the Whig party the tendency to Abolitionism, or to court the Abolitionists, is, perhaps, still more decided than in the Democratic party. In Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, the party, at least just before elections, is almost avowedly Abolitionist, and would be in this State, were it not for a few distinguished leaders, whose influence we are sorry to see daily declining. Young Whigdom in all the Free States, composed of young men and boys, not to say young misses, who are soon to be the Whig party itself, is virtually an Abolition party, and its leaders are nearly as far gone as Garrison, Phillips, Leavitt, and Abby Foster.

All the sects, if we except, perhaps, High Church Episcopalians, are either already carried away by the Abolition fanaticism, or rapidly yielding to it. The great body of Unitarian ministers in New England, once a respectable and conservative body of men, exerting, indeed, a bad influence on religion, yet highly commendable for political and social virtues, are almost to a man now mad and fanatical Socialists and Abolitionists. If some few yet hold out, they are timid, and without influence on the general action of the body of which they are members. Nearly all the young men from Protestant theological seminaries come out infected, and, wherever settled as ministers, seek to enlist their congregations in the movement. Only the Church, which can be surprised by no new moral or social question, which has nothing to learn from experience, and whose doctrines on all subjects are long ago determined and fixed, remains unaffected by the fanaticism around her, and pays no attention to the decisions of modern casuists.

Add to this the new aspect the question assumes through the anticipated extension of American territory by conquests from Mexico, and the bravest must admit that there is serious cause for alarm. The Slaveholding States contend that the territories of the United States not yet erected into States belong to all the States in common, and must be as open to their citizens to settle and occupy with their property, as to the citizens of the Free States ; and there is a very general determination on the part even of the most moderate of the citizens of the Free States to resist the further extension of the slave system. The majority of them will not seek to disturb it where it now legally exists, but they feel, that, for the sake of humanity and the honor of the American States, they ought resolutely to oppose all efforts to open new territory to it. If any new territory shall be acquired by the Union, a conflict is likely to come, whose shock may shiver the Union, and reduce it to its primitive elements.

For ourselves, we adopt no extreme views on the question of slavery. We have no sympathy with the Abolitionists ; we entertain not for a moment even one of their fundamental principles. Man, we are ready to maintain, may have property in man, a valid right to the services of his slave,— though no dominion over his soul ; slavery is not *malum in se*, and in no case justifiable ; there is nothing in slavery that necessarily prevents the slaveholder from being a true and pious Christian ; and where the master is a true Christian, and takes care that his people are instructed and brought up in the true Christian faith and worship, slavery is tolerable, and for negroes, perhaps, even more than tolerable. Many of the laws of the Slaveholding States on slavery are unnecessary, unjust, cruel, and disgraceful ; a large body of the slaveholders are deeply censurable for neglecting to recognize and respect marriage among their people, and for bringing them up in heathenism or heresy ; but we have no sympathy with those who denounce them *because* they are slaveholders, and we have no reason to suppose that they cannot, in the moral, social, and religious virtues, compare favorably with their brethren of the North ; and, whatever repugnance we may feel, personally, to the slave system, we are fully convinced that the greatest disservice they could do to their slaves would be to grant them immediate emancipation ; which would be as cruel as for a father to turn his children out upon the world, at a tender age, to take care of themselves.

But the great body of the people of the Free States are in principle opposed to the whole system of involuntary servitude. All their feelings and convictions are against it. They may not, the majority of them, as we have said, seek to disturb it where it now has a legal existence ; but they shrink from its further extension within the bounds of the Union. They regard it as inconsistent with their professions of liberty and equality, and they feel acutely the hypocritical taunts of foreigners. They cannot endure the thought of consenting to pour out their blood and treasure to extend its area, and sooner than do so they are not unlikely to join in the enterprise to overthrow it where it is now established. If we have not mistaken the feeling in the Free States, the determination is fixed, even in the minds of the warmest and least hesitating friends of the South, that there shall be no further extension of the slave territory of the Union, and no more Slave States admitted into the Union. Whatever we may think of such a determination itself, we regard it as madness to deny its existence, and idle to attempt to withstand it.

But here arises a serious difficulty. The territories of the United States not yet erected into States belong to all the States in common, and must, in justice, be open alike to the citizens of each, who may wish to occupy them. Congress can make no discrimination between the States, in prescribing the conditions on which the territories may be settled and occupied. If the citizens of Non-slaveholding States are left free to settle and occupy them with their property, the citizens of the Slaveholding States must also be left free to settle and occupy them with theirs. The fact, that the latter recognize property in slaves, while the former do not, cannot be taken into the account. Congress has no authority to define property, to say what shall or shall not be property, but is bound to respect as property, for the citizens of each State, what their State defines to be property. One State cannot define it for another ; for, in relation to the others, each State is an independent sovereign, and its definition of property within its own limits must be respected by all the others, as well as by the Union. Hence, in the territories which belong to no State in particular, but of which all are tenants in common, no State can have any right to make its system of property prevail over that of any of the others ; and Congress, being bound to respect the system of each for the citizens of each, cannot prefer the system of one to the exclusion of the system of another. Then Congress

can make no law which would prohibit the citizens of Slaveholding States from emigrating to the territories and occupying them with their property in slaves, any more than it can prohibit the citizens of the Non-slaveholding States from occupying them with their property in horses and mules, sheep and cattle. The famous Wilmot Proviso was, therefore, unconstitutional, and could not have been passed without a usurpation of power.

But it is contended, on the other hand, that the general government is the sovereign of the territories belonging to the United States, and therefore may prohibit slavery in them, if it chooses. This position would seem to be supported by the Ordinance erecting the old Northwest Territory, by the Missouri Compromise, as it is called, and the exercise by the general government of sovereign powers in the erection of territorial governments. But the erection of territorial governments does not imply plenary sovereignty, and may be defended on the ground of a sovereignty within the limits of the constitution; and the precedents established by the *Ordinance* and the *Compromise*, if unconstitutional, cannot be pleaded.

Mr. Rhett, in the speech before us, denies that the general government holds the sovereignty of the territories in question, and he does it on the ground, that the general sovereignty exercised by the Union vests, not in the Union itself, but in the States severally which have created the Union. But this, though conceded, would not of itself be decisive of the case. It matters not, so far as the exercise of sovereignty by the Union is concerned, whether that sovereignty vests originally in it, or be only delegated to it. If the States have delegated to it the sovereignty in full of the territories, it can exercise all the sovereignty over them it could, if it were sovereign in its own right. But there is, as we shall by and by show, no express delegation of such sovereignty, and the sovereignty in its full sense over them must vest where, and only where, under our system, the plenary sovereignty in general is vested. If it is in the Union, then the Union is sovereign over the territories by its own right, and can exercise plenary sovereignty over them, unless the constitution ordains to the contrary, without any express grant of power. But if it vests in the States severally, then the Union has no sovereignty but what is expressly delegated to it, and its power over the territories is limited to the express grant, and what is necessarily incident to it. Since, then, there is no express grant of plenary sovereignty over the territories in the constitution, it becomes

necessary, in order to ascertain whether the general government possesses it or not, to ascertain whether, under our system, the general sovereignty vests originally in the Union, or elsewhere.

For ourselves, we agree perfectly with Mr Rhett in his position, that the political sovereignty with us vests originally, not in the Union, but in the States severally which have made the Union, and from which the Union derives its existence and all its powers. Nevertheless, he must pardon us, if we say we cannot, in all cases, accept the reasoning by which he sustains this position, and are unable to adopt his view of the State governments. He maintains that the general government is not sovereign, not only on the ground that it is the creature of the States, but also on the broader ground, that under the American system no government is sovereign, not even the State governments themselves. If government in general, if the State government itself, is a mere agency, deriving all its powers from an authority antecedent to government, then, *a fortiori*, the Federal government in particular. He says,—

“Sir, it is a truth, vital to all free popular governments, that sovereignty can never be in government. The fundamental doctrine, on which all our free institutions rest, is that government is nothing of itself, but is simply the agent of the people. Make government sovereign, and the people are subject. They are ruled, and do not rule themselves. To attempt to alter, change, or abolish the forms of government over them will, then, not be a right in the people, but treason to the existing government, for which they may rightfully be gibbeted or put to the sword. I repeat the position, that sovereignty, in free, popular governments, can never be in government. It is, under our system of government, neither in the general nor in the State governments. Both are but agencies.”—p. 5.

Understand by *people*, the *States*, and restrict the doctrine asserted to the Federal government, this may pass ; but understand by *people*, not the state, but population, and extend the doctrine to the State governments, it is inadmissible. The Federal government, it is historically certain, is the creature of the States, and, saving the faith they have pledged to each other, the States have the same right to alter, change, or abolish it, that the principal has to alter, change, or revoke the powers he has given to his agent. But we cannot say as much of the State governments. They are governments, not agencies ; for there is and can be in the States no authority antecedent to them to create them. The people as population have never made them, and therefore cannot unmake them.

The people as the state, the legally constituted people, are inconceivable without the government, are the government itself in fact, as well as in principle, and for them to abolish it would be to commit political suicide.

But "make the government sovereign, and the people are subject." Unquestionably. Sovereign and subject are correlatives, and one necessarily implies the other. Where there is no subject, there is no sovereign; for nothing can be *over*, where there is nothing *under*. If you assert sovereignty, you must concede subjection. Then the people "are ruled, and do not rule themselves." Granted. But what is government for, if not to rule the people? and is that government which neither rules them, nor has the right to rule them? Does government operate on *things* only, subject things only, never persons? Are not the people, every man, woman, and child of them, subject to the laws? And is it not the boast of our institutions, that no one is above the laws? How can you say that the people are subject to the laws, and yet not subject to the government? and if governed by the laws, that they are not ruled? You must either deny all government of *persons*, and exempt from the dominion of the law all except *things*, or else you must concede that the people are subject to government and ruled by it.

But, if they are ruled, they do not rule; and the fundamental principle of our institutions is that people rule. Rule as the government, conceded; as population taken distributively, denied. The confusion arises from the ambiguity of the word *people*, which, in this country, is taken in two senses, very distinguishable one from the other. The term *people* means, 1. Population, the whole number of persons inhabiting the territory or country; 2. The state, commonwealth, or political sovereignty. In the latter sense, as the state, the people are sovereign, and rule; in the former sense, they are not sovereign, but subject, and are ruled. Numerically considered, the people in the one sense may or may not be commensurate with the people in the other sense; but in no actual case are they so. The people, as population, are the whole population, men, women, and children, freemen and slaves; as the state, they may include only a small number, in some countries more, in others fewer. They are some two hundred thousand out of thirty-five millions in France, and with us they never exceed, in fact never equal, the whole number of free male citizens twenty-one years of age and over; and in most

cases never include more than the free *white* male citizens of the same age and over ; and these in South Carolina, for instance, do not exceed one in ten, and in no State one in five, of the whole population.

But these free male citizens, the electors, are themselves, save in the simple act of voting, subject to the laws, and ruled in the same manner as the rest of the inhabitants. Moreover, the elective franchise, which they possess and exercise, they possess only by virtue of law, and can exercise only according to the law. They may alter, change, or abolish the existing *form* of government, it is true ; but by virtue of law, and only in the way, and by the means, the existing form authorizes ; and the attempt to do it in any other way, or by any other means, would be treason, and punishable as such, by the laws of every State in the Union. To abolish the government is, under our system, no more the right of the people, than it is under any other system, as Mr. Dorr and his partisans in Rhode Island discovered to their cost.

The insane doctrine of but too many of our politicians on this subject arises from the ambiguity we have pointed out in the word *people*. From the fact that the political sovereignty with us is unquestionably vested in the people *as the state*, they sophistically conclude that it vests in the people *as population* ; that is, in the people out of, or antecedent to, the state. But where there is no state, no *πολις*, no political entity, there is and can be no political sovereignty. Out of the state and antecedent to it, if you may make the supposition, the people are not a state, have no political existence, and therefore are not sovereign, and have no sovereignty. It is absurd to assume that the sovereignty vests in them ; and if it does not in this sense vest in them, they of course cannot delegate it to the state, nor can the state derive it from them. The States could delegate sovereignty to the Union, for they were antecedent to it, and were, prior to it, sovereign states, and possessed the powers they delegated. But the people could delegate no sovereignty to the State or State government ; for, antecedently to the State government, they were no political entity, and therefore had no sovereignty to delegate.

Here is the refutation of the prevalent fallacy of the popular *origin* of government. The administration of government may be popular, and is so with us ; but its origin is never popular. The people cannot make the constitution ; for to make the constitution is itself an act, and the most sovereign act, of

the political sovereign ; and antecedently to the constitution the people are not sovereign, since antecedently to it, as we have seen, they have no political existence. What is not cannot act. Where there is no sovereign, there can be no act of sovereignty. To assume that the people make the constitution is, then, to assume them capable of performing an act of sovereignty before they exist as a sovereignty, which is absurd. It would be to assume that sovereignty is self-created, — an impossible supposition. Nothing can be self-created, for the very solid reason, that nothing can act before it is. The constitution must always be *octroyée*, — granted or imposed by authority, — or it has and can have no legal force or vitality. But if we suppose as already existing an authority competent to grant or impose a constitution, we suppose the state to be already constituted, and the sovereign authority to exist. When the state already exists, with its sovereign authority, the people owe it allegiance, are subject to it, and have neither the right nor the occasion to make the constitution.

In denying the popular origin of government, we neither deny the legitimacy nor mistake the character of our American system of government. The doctrine of the popular origin of government — that is, that government is instituted by, and derives its powers from, the people, antecedently, logically or chronologically considered, to the state — is no American doctrine, and implied in no American institution. It is an exotic, brought hither from the gardens of foreign theorists, and should be rooted up and rejected by every American who loves his country, and would be able to distinguish between the state and the mob.

Not one of our State governments has had a strictly popular origin ; for there has never been with us a moment when the people were unconstituted or without government, and free, without regard to existing authority, to institute government for themselves. We are not so rash as to pretend that the people here have never been guilty of any irregularity, or that all their proceedings are defensible in strict law ; but we do say, and are ready to maintain against all challengers, that what with us is called *making the constitution*, with one or two apparent, but not real, exceptions, has been nothing but a modification of a previous constitution, and a modification effected, not by the people as population antecedent to the state, but, if by the people at all, the people as the state, by virtue of pre-

viously existing political authority. The conventions which have modified the old constitutions and formed our present constitutions have all been called, or held to be called, by an already constituted public authority, by virtue of public law, and according to law. Their whole authority as conventions has been derived from the government which authorized them, and there has never been a moment when to call conventions without the authorization of the existing government, and to attempt to enforce their acts against it, was not treason, and as such punishable by existing law.

The colonists on arriving here were, as before leaving home, subject to the laws of the mother country; and the colonial governments were constituted governments by the authority of that mother country, and derived from it all their powers. Our present governments are only the mediate or immediate continuations of the colonial governments, by whose authority they have from colonial become State governments. In no instance has the change been effected but by their authority. Mr. Dorr and his friends attempted, in the case of Rhode Island, to effect a change by popular, instead of legal authority, and failed. This is strictly true of all the old thirteen Colonies, as nobody can pretend to deny. With regard to the other States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Federal constitution, nearly all have formed their constitutions by authorization of the general government through their territorial governments. Vermont and Michigan, perhaps Kentucky and Tennessee, though of these we cannot speak positively, formed their constitutions in the first instance in conventions called without legal authority; but the defect of legality was subsequently supplied by the acknowledgment of the governments in contravention of whose authority they formed them. Maine became a State by the consent of Massachusetts, on whom she depended, and the authority of Congress. Texas was erected into a State by the act of Mexico, originally illegitimate, but made legal by the subsequent acknowledgment of Mexican independence by Spain, the mother country, and she became an independent State by the revolution which subverted the Mexican union or federal government. All our governments may, then, plead a legal, in distinction from a popular origin.

Against us, some may allege the American Revolution, the Declaration of Independence, and the prevalent theories and speculations of American statesmen and politicians. The

theories and speculations of many of our statesmen and politicians assert the popular origin of government, we grant ; but these theories and speculations are precisely what we are controverting, and their authors cannot assert them as American, on the authority of our institutions, unless necessary to explain and justify their existence. The existence of these institutions does not require them for their explanation or justification, as we have shown, in showing that they are explicable and justifiable on legal principles.

The Declaration of Independence, in the preamble, asserts the popular origin of government, it is true ; but that document is of no legal force or value, forms no part of the public law of either the States or the Union. The act of the Congress which drew it up, declaring the Colonies absolved from their allegiance to the crown of Great Britain, has entered into the modifications our institutions have received ; but the principles of government they asserted, and the reasonings by which they justified it, enter for nothing. Moreover, the Congress which drew up the document had received from the States whose agent they were no authority to promulgate a theory of government, or a political code, and in doing so exceeded their powers. Consequently the political doctrines they published are to be treated simply as the private opinion or speculation of the individual delegates. Furthermore, the assertion of the popular origin of government was a mere *obiter dictum*. The essential issue between the Colonies and Great Britain was, not whether the people have or have not the right to institute government for themselves, but whether the crown of Great Britain had or had not committed illegal and unconstitutional acts, and if it had, whether it had forfeited its rights over the Colonies. The Colonies decided that it had, that the king had proved himself a tyrant, and having so proved himself, they were absolved — by his act, not by theirs — from their allegiance. The real assumption of the Colonies was, not the right of the people to originate government, but that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject. If it had been otherwise, there would have been no necessity for attempting, as they do in the document in question, by a recital of his acts, to prove that George the Third was a tyrant.

What is called the American Revolution, properly speaking, was no revolution at all, and no man, in order to maintain the legitimacy of our institutions, is obliged to assert the right of revolution, and therefore the popular origin of government ;

because it was not the act of the people as population, out of or antecedent to the State, but of the people acting in subjection to the colonial governments, — the constituted authorities ; because all our institutions originally or by legal derivation date from beyond it, and not one of them can be said to have originated in it ; because the authority of the mother country was not resisted, till it had forfeited its rights, and ceased to be a legal authority ; and because, whatever illegality there may have been in the Declaration and War of Independence, the stain was wiped off, and the whole legitimated, by the subsequent acknowledgment of the independence of the United States by Great Britain. A just appreciation of what we improperly call the American Revolution would show that in it the American people were far from intending to declare themselves revolutionists on principle. The whole controversy which preceded the struggle for independence proves that they held themselves bound to obey legitimate authority, and that they did not resist the British government till they had convinced themselves — rightly or wrongly is nothing to our present purpose — that it had ceased to be legitimate, and by its own acts absolved them from their allegiance. But in resisting the crown of Great Britain, they did not resist their own governments ; at least, never asserted their right to subvert them, which they must have done in order to have asserted the sacred right of insurrection as it is called, and the strictly popular origin of government.

That there is much confused thinking on this subject among our countrymen at present, and that men with fanciful theories and lawless passions, for which they wished to obtain free scope, have seized upon the American Revolution, and tortured it entirely out of its original shape, we do not deny. That there were at the time individuals — perhaps prominent individuals — affected by the mischievous theories of their times, and carried away by the Utopian dreams of liberty, equality, the perfectibility of human nature, and the realization of a paradise on earth, then so common, and the bitter fruits of which France and all Europe were soon to reap, and that they sought, in season and out of season, to introduce their insane imaginings, and to make it appear to all the world that they had the sanction of the American people, and that individuals of this description, of whom the author of *Common Sense*, subsequently, of the *Age of Reason*, was an associate and a sample, were able to direct and color too many of the proceedings of the

time, is but too true ; but instead of regarding what they said and did as the rule, we should, as true Americans, regard it as exceptional, to be forgotten, not continued, and exaggerated. The less we have of Jean Jacques Rousseau and his school, Thomas Paine and his protectors and followers, and the more we have of the strong old Anglo-Saxon sense, and old Anglo-Saxon loyalty, the better. Massachusetts was foremost in the struggle for independence, and it, perhaps, is some proof that the patriots did not intend to be revolutionists, that she has always been foremost among the States in contending for the supremacy of the law,—though she may not have always maintained it, or been as faithful as we could wish to her principles.

Our readers, of course, will understand that in denying the popular *origin* of the American governments, we do not deny, or wish to deny, their popular administration. We merely assert the legal order against the revolutionary order, and maintain, that, notwithstanding the popular forms of our government, the broad popular basis of their administration, the state is as sovereign with us as it is elsewhere, and that loyalty to the state is as much a virtue here, and made as obligatory upon the people by our institutions, as it is under any other form of government. We recognize all the freedom in the people, as the state acting according to law, that the most zealous radical amongst us contends for ; but in the people, regarded as population, in their capacity, not of sovereign, but of subjects, no other freedom than the law grants and guaranties to them. In the ordinary routine of government, in all its ordinary functions, there is no perceptible difference in the practical working or results of our governments, whether we suppose their origin to be legal or to be popular. But there is an immense practical difference, when it comes to the interpretation of their powers, and the allegiance of the subject. If the theory of their popular origin is adopted, they can be assumed to have no powers not granted in the constitution, and the obedience of the subject can never be lawfully enforced. Nay, they have no right of self-preservation ; and the people, without reference to law, may abolish them at will, and set up any government or no government in their place, as they please.

Mr. Dorr's movement in Rhode Island, sincere and philanthropic on his part, and undertaken, we have reason to believe, in a pure, disinterested spirit, shows clearly the danger of the theory we denounce. He adopted the theory of the popular origin of government, and held that an instrument drawn

up and proposed by a body of men assembled without authority of law, if sanctioned by the votes of a majority of the people, would be the fundamental law of the state, and might be lawfully enforced as such by sword and bayonet against the regularly constituted authorities. He reasoned, it is true, fallaciously ; for he was obliged to assume the legality of the existing government in order to determine who were the people of Rhode Island, which was necessary to enable him to determine how many votes he must have in order to have a majority ; and when he had assumed the legality of that government, he had conceded his obligation to obey it, and therefore denied to himself all right to resist it, at least so long as it continued in the legal discharge of its legal functions ; that is, unless it ceased, by its own act, to be legitimate. But, waiving this consideration, his conclusion was logical, if the popular origin of government was conceded, as it was, for the most part, by his opponents. He certainly had the advantage in the argument of the chief justice of Rhode Island, and of the learned president of Brown University. Yet there was no sober, thinking man, who reflected on his movement, that did not see that it was wholly subversive of all legitimate rule, of the essential principle of government itself. It is unquestionably true, that the legal people, legally convened, have the right to alter or amend the constitution, and equally true, that the new or amended constitution, in most cases, though not in all, will not go lawfully into operation unless sanctioned by a majority of the voters voting on it ; but not because the constitution derives its authority from the people antecedent to government, but because the *law* so ordains. The law could, if the sovereign so willed, dispense with the popular vote, and also with the convention ; nay, deny the right altogether, under any circumstances, by any methods whatever, to alter the fundamental law ; and experience will yet prove that the facilities provided by law for altering or amending the constitution are incompatible with the safety and stability of our political institutions, if indeed it has not done so already.

We have dwelt at length on the legal origin of our State governments, in opposition to the popular fallacy that they derive from the people as population, because we wish to present our institutions in their true character, and guard, as far as possible, against the false and dangerous theories afloat concerning them. The danger with us is not likely to come from the side of law ; but it will come through the corrupting the-

ories of the enemies of all legal order. We have an abundance of politicians, — demagogues, more properly, — but, unhappily, a great dearth of statesmen, and no good school of politics. The ambition of our politicians is, not to serve the country, consolidate and perpetuate our institutions, and secure the practical enjoyment of the blessings they promise, but to rise to place and power; and only that which best enables them easily and speedily to rise are they very likely to study. As to rise, one must secure the votes of the electors, as these are with us a numerous body, the easiest and speediest way is to make constant appeals to the popular element, to flatter the people, to exalt their majesty, and exaggerate their sovereignty, their wisdom, intelligence, and virtue. Hence the tendency is to undervalue and neglect law, and to prize and consult only *popularity*. We have seen, during the last twenty years, this tendency growing stronger and stronger, till the bulk of our fledgling politicians have become hardly able to recognize any real distinction between the convention and the caucus, the state and the mob, republicanism and ochlocracy. The man who contends for law and order, by a singular misnomer, is termed an *Algerine*, and he who declaims lustily for the people, sneers at all legal distinctions and legal forms as dry and barren technicalities, unworthy a freeman, is regarded as inagnanimous and noble, eloquent and profound, wise and sagacious, the true friend of his country, the man of his times, worthy of universal honor, and the highest offices in the gift of a free people. What will be the end it is not difficult to experienced wisdom to foresee.

It has been from no love of theorizing that we have gone thus largely into the principles of our State governments. The question we have raised is no merely speculative question, but a question of vital practical importance. If our State governments are mere agencies, not governments in the proper sense of the term, we have no governments at all, no legal order, and there is and can be no disloyalty, no treason, and therefore no right to coerce obedience. The government so called is at the mercy of the mob, and Judge Lynch has as valid a commission, and his court as legal an existence, as any judge or court in the land. Moreover, the rule of interpretation is altogether different, on the view we present, from what it is on the one we oppose. If our State governments are governments, they are the STATE, and have all powers, under God, not denied them by the constitution; if they are mere

agencies, they have no powers but such as are specially granted in the constitution. In the former case, the constitution is nothing but a limitation of powers ; in the latter, it is a grant of powers. In the one case, the practical statesman has only to ask what is forbidden ; but in the other, he must ask what is granted. The difference is obvious and important. If the latter view prevail, there will be a constant usurpation of power ; for no grant of specific powers which human wisdom can devise will ever be adequate to all the exigencies of the state ; and then, either the public weal must be sacrificed through the inefficiency of the government, or the constitution be nullified, and all legal order overthrown, by the exercise of unconstitutional powers.

While, then, we cheerfully concede to Mr. Rhett, Mr. Calhoun, and the South Carolina school of politicians generally, that the Federal government is a simple agency created by the States, we cannot concede it on the ground, that, under our system, even the State governments themselves are only agencies. The general government and the State governments are in no sense analogous ; they rest on totally distinct foundations, and can never be rightfully interpreted on the same general principles. The people do not make the State government in the sense in which the States make the general government, and the relation between the people and the State government bears no analogy to the relation between the States and the general government. The relation in the latter case is that of principal and agent ; in the former, it is that of sovereign and subject. The Federal constitution is a grant of powers, the State constitution a limitation of powers ; the Union has no powers not specified in the grant, the State all powers not specifically denied in the constitution. The Union must prove its power before it can act ; the State can act unless its power is disproved. The presumption is in favor of the State, but it is against the Union. It is necessary to bear this difference in mind, lest, applying to the Union the principles proper to the State governments, we run into consolidationism, — or to the State governments the principles proper to the Federal government, we run into no-governmentism, and confound the state with the mob.

Some of our statesmen, and statesmen, too, whose views are entitled to the respect always due to superior talents, distinguished rank, and eminent service, reject the doctrine of State sovereignty which, after Mr. Calhoun, we have set forth,

and contend that the sovereignty vests, not in the States, but in the Union ; that is, that the American people are one sovereign people or state, and that the Federal government has all the sovereign powers, substantive or incidental, of government in general, not denied it in the constitution. Foremost among these is Mr. John Quincy Adams, ex-President of the United States, really one of our most scientific, though at times one of our most erratic, statesmen. He, if we understand him, asserts the sovereignty of the Union on the ground that we were one people from the beginning, and that the division into colonies was only for the purposes of administration. He alleges in proof of this, that the Colonists had a common origin, a common language, common habits and sentiments ; and that the Colonies had the Common Law, derived all their authority from the same imperial government, and were subject to one and the same prince. For the purposes of administration they were distinct departments, each with its own local authority, but they retained their unity by being all subordinated to the same supreme government from which emanated all their legal authority. Consequently, we remain one people, notwithstanding the government of the Union was formed by the States acting in their capacity as distinct states ; for it was the only way, prior to the establishment of the Union, in which the sovereign people could legally express its will.

This theory is plausible, but not sound. The common origin, language, sentiments, habits, &c., prove nothing to the purpose, because they exist still between us and Great Britain, in all their essentials, as much as they did between the Colonies themselves prior to the Revolution, and yet we and Great Britain are not one legal people. The possession of the Common Law, for the same reason, proves nothing. We have it still in common with England. The greater part of the Continental states of Europe possess the Civil Law, which binds in their courts, and yet they are none the less independent states. Subjection to one and the same prince proves just as little. England, Scotland, and Ireland continued — if they do not still continue — to be separate kingdoms long after their union under the same prince, and the acts of the British Parliament would not operate in either of the latter unless specially named. Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Lombardy, &c., are all subject to the same prince, the Emperor of Austria, and yet in relation to each other are independent states. The great vassals of the crown of France, in feudal times, were none

the less sovereign in relation to each other, because they held from the same suzerain or lord paramount. The Colonies derived all their legal authority from the same source, it is true ; but to have been one colonial people for that reason, they must have been subordinated, not to the authority of the mother country only, but to one paramount colonial authority. But there was no paramount colonial authority between them and the mother country. They each held immediately from the crown, and each, under the crown, contained in itself all the legal authority it recognized, or to which it was subjected. Consequently, they were not so many departments or divisions of one colonial people, but so many distinct, and, in relation to each other, independent colonies. Consequently, again, when the authority of the mother country to which they were subordinated, and which was their only bond of legal unity, was thrown off, they necessarily became independent sovereign states, not one sovereign state or people. The proofs, then, on which Mr. Adams relies do not sustain him, and his theory, however consistent it may be with itself, cannot be asserted, because it is contradicted by the historical and legal facts of the case.

Mr. Webster, regarded by a large portion of his countrymen as the ablest expounder of the constitution we have had, and sustained in his views, we are inclined to believe, by the convictions and intentions of many of the men who aided in framing the constitution, concedes that prior to the adoption of the Federal constitution the States were independent sovereignties, but contends that by its adoption their sovereignty was merged in that of the Union, and that therefore the Union is now sovereign. But this is inadmissible, for the reasons we have assigned when denying the popular origin of government. The constitution is the act of the sovereign authority, and therefore does not and cannot create that authority. There can be in the constitution no sovereignty but that which makes, imposes, or grants it. The sovereignty which made or granted it vested, it is conceded, in the States severally. Therefore the sovereignty in the constitution vests in the States severally, — not in the Union, which is their creature. Moreover, the whole vitality and force of the constitution are in the sovereignty which makes it, and are lost the moment that sovereignty ceases to exist. To suppose, then, that the State sovereignty, which made or granted the constitution, ceased to exist the moment the constitution was adopted, is to suppose that

the constitution the moment it was adopted became a nullity, and had no legal force or vitality. If the States were sovereign before its adoption, they must be after its adoption ; since it can be a constitution only by virtue of their sovereignty. Their sovereignty must survive its adoption, then, as much as the authority of the principal survives the instructions by which he constitutes his agent. Then the sovereignty vests, not in the Union, but in the States severally ; and then the Union has no powers but those the States have severally delegated to it.

Mr. Jefferson and his peculiar school do not adopt precisely either Mr. Webster's theory, or the one we have set forth ; but appear to adopt one somewhere about midway between the two ; that is, that we are one sovereign people in all our foreign relations, and several independent, sovereign states in all our internal relations. This, if intended merely to state the practical fact, that under the constitution the foreign relations of the country are subjected to the Union, and the internal, with some rather important exceptions, to the State governments, is true enough, and nobody disputes it ; but if intended to point out the seat of sovereignty under our system, is open to all the objections we have urged against the theory of Mr. Adams and that of Mr. Webster, and to all those which the consolidationists allege against State sovereignty, besides being an absurdity in itself. Sovereignty is necessarily one and indivisible. A divided sovereignty is inconceivable. The sovereignty must be in the States, and the exercise of it, within certain limits, delegated to the Union ; or it must be in the Union, and the exercise, within certain limits, delegated to the States. If you say the former, you have the doctrine we contend for ; if the latter, you have the theory either of Mr. Adams or of Mr. Webster. Moreover, if we were not one people in what regards our foreign relations before the adoption of the constitution, as, in refuting Mr. Adams, we have shown we were not, we could not be made one people in reference to those relations any more than in reference to our internal relations, for the reasons we have assigned against Mr. Webster. Both Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Webster appear to us to have been misled by their assumption, that the government derives its authority from the people, not as the state, but as antecedent to the state, — the doctrine of the atheistical Hobbes, and the sentimental and licentious Jean Jacques Rousseau, — and by their overlooking the fact, that it is the political sovereign that makes or grants the constitution, not the constitution or fundamental law that

creates the sovereign ; and this has happened to them, we presume, in consequence of their having been more concerned with the practical mode to be adopted for administering government, than with inquiries into the origin and nature of government itself. Most of us, however logical we may be in our capacities and tendencies, are apt to take for our premises the assumptions of our particular school, or of the community in which we are brought up, and rarely, if ever, question them till we find them leading us into consequences from which our good sense or right feeling recoils. The error of these great men is easily accounted for, without detracting from their eminent talents, or the solid worth of their characters.

The four views we have considered are all that have been or can be suggested on the constitution of the United States. No other than one of these is possible, and the last three we have seen, though supported by high authority, are inadmissible. Nothing remains, then, but the first, Mr. Calhoun's view, — namely, the sovereignty, under our system, still vests in the States, and the Union has only a delegated sovereignty, and can rightfully exercise only such powers as are specially delegated to it.*

Practically, there is no difference in the mode of operation or in the legality of the acts of the Union, whether we assume the Union to be sovereign in its own right or only by the dele-

* Our readers must not understand us, in adopting Mr. Calhoun's theory of State sovereignty, to adopt also his doctrine of nullification. We heretofore gave in our adhesion to it, but a more thorough investigation of the subject than we had formerly made of it has led us to doubt both its theoretical soundness and its practical efficacy. If the sovereignty still vests in the States severally, a State must have, saving her faith, the right to absolve her subjects, if she chooses, from their obligation to obey the Union, since she alone has created that obligation. But she can nullify no act of the Union in the passage of which she has participated, either for or against, without breaking her faith ; and as she is, by her own agreement in consenting to the Union, rightfully held to participate in every act of the Union while she remains in it, whether she actively participates or not, she cannot nullify an act of the Union without seceding from it. She must secede, as the condition of nullifying without breach of faith. The abstract right of a State to secede we are not disposed to question ; but as no State has or can have the right to break its faith, we confess we can hardly conceive a case in which the State can practically exercise this abstract right, for it is hard to conceive a case in which the engagements the State has already entered into do not bind her to remain in the Union. But, as the subject has no necessary connection with our present discussion, we reserve its full consideration to some future occasion, should such occasion occur.

gation of the States, so long as it keeps within its clear and unquestionable powers. The difference arises only the moment when it concerns doubtful powers. If the power is doubtful, the Union cannot exercise it ; for the doubt must always be interpreted in favor of the States, against the Union. The Union can claim none of the incidental powers of sovereignty, unless they are expressly granted, and the only incidental powers it has are such as are incidental or necessary to the exercise of its express substantive powers.

There are, then, only two grounds on which plenary sovereignty over the territories of the United States can be claimed for the Union ; that is, it must be itself expressly granted, or it must be necessary to the exercise of some substantive power expressly granted. It evidently is not expressly granted. The only express grant of power over the territories is, that "the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all *needful* rules and regulations respecting the territories and other property belonging to the United States." This is no grant of plenary sovereignty ; and nobody pretends or can pretend that the exercise of plenary sovereignty over the territories is necessary to the exercise of any other power granted in the constitution. Congress has simply power to *dispose of* and to make all *needful* rules and regulations respecting the territories belonging to the United States. Beyond this it cannot go without a usurpation of power. But *needful* to what ? Evidently to the end of preserving to the States the property and sovereignty of the territories, and to provide, perhaps, for their settlement, erection into States, and final admission into the Union. The most liberal construction can force nothing more than this from the language of the constitution. Then the power of Congress over the territories is restricted to this end, and it is only on the ground that it is necessary to this end that Congress has the power even to erect provisional territorial governments.

The question whether Congress has authority to exclude slavery from the territories is now easily disposed of. If the exclusion of slavery is needful or necessary to the exercise of the power granted, or to secure the end for which it was granted, Congress unquestionably has the power ; but if it is not, it has not the power. Since the power is not expressly granted, and can be exercised, if at all, only as an incident of some power expressly granted, it can be claimed as the incident of no power expressly granted but the one in question. But the

exclusion of slavery is not needful to the exercise of this, as is evident from past experience, and indeed of itself ; it follows, therefore, necessarily, that Congress has no constitutional power to exclude slavery from the territories of the United States.

But it is contended that Congress may exclude it indirectly, by refusing to admit into the Union any new State whose constitution permits slavery. The constitution says new States *may* be admitted, but does not say they *shall* be. It leaves the admission or non-admission to the discretion of Congress, and prescribes no conditions for admission or refusal. If Congress has discretionary power to admit or not to admit, it may refuse to admit a Slave State, if it chooses. This seems plausible enough.

But the Congress is the agent of the States ; the agent is bound to exercise his discretionary powers according to the general scope and design of his instructions, and can never so construe his discretion as to make it override a specific instruction, or to make it the grant of full powers over matters on which he has received specific instructions, and in them only limited powers. To do so, if not absolutely a usurpation of power, would be an abuse of power, which the law would not tolerate. Congress, by the fact that it is the agent and not the principal, is bound to subordinate its discretionary powers to the ends contemplated in the powers expressly granted in its instructions. As the power to exclude slavery from the territories is denied it by not being granted in the specific instructions which it has received respecting them, it cannot acquire it by any construction of its discretionary powers. Hence, Congress cannot exclude slavery from the territories by refusing to admit into the Union a State which authorizes it, nor can it refuse to admit the new State itself, on the ground that its constitution does not prohibit it, — certainly not without a dangerous abuse, if not absolutely a usurpation, of power. The Union is bound, by its general character of agent of the States, and its instructions as such, to treat the territories as nearly like the States as their exceptional character will allow. Consequently, as it is acknowledged on all hands to have no power over slavery in the States, it can have none over it in the territories, unless necessary to the exercise of its legitimate power over them. It is not necessary to this, and therefore it has and can have no power over it in the territories ; and then none to exclude a State from the Union for the sake of excluding slavery from the territory.

Moreover, the refusal of Congress to admit a new Slaveholding State into the Union would have little practical effect. New States, when once admitted, stand, and must stand, on an equal footing with the old States, and Congress can bind the new State after its admission no further than it can one of the old States. Every State now in the Union has the right, so far as the Union is concerned, to hold slaves. Massachusetts may reëstablish slavery to-morrow in her dominions, if she chooses, and the Union has nothing to say to her. The new State, after her admission, would have the same right. All a State wishing to hold slaves has to do, then, is simply to prohibit slavery in her constitution for the sake of admission, and as soon as admitted call a convention, and strike out the prohibition. She will then have the right to hold slaves in defiance of Congress ; and if bent upon holding slaves, this would be her course, if she could gain admission on no other conditions.

It is clear, from what we have now established, that there is no constitutional means of preventing the extension of the area of slavery, if there should be an extension of the territory of the Union. What, then, are they who are resolved to confine it within its present limits to do ?

There are boys and girls and some men amongst us who will answer, Humanity is prior and paramount to constitutions, and has the right to prevail over all human conventions and legal enactments. This is very easy to say, and sounds very fine ; but it is true only on condition that it is humanity truly interpreted, instead of humanity as each fanatic may choose to interpret it for himself. The maintenance of legal order is the primary interest of mankind, because there is no interest of mankind that can be protected or promoted without it. They war upon humanity herself, who war, though professedly in her name, upon legal order, and trample on the constitutions of states. Humanity always requires us to show our philanthropy in subordination to the legal order of our country, and forbids us ever to do it in defiance of that order. Of two evils, we are allowed, nay, commanded, in morals, to choose that which is least ; and there is no prudent man who can for a single moment doubt that the continuance and even extension of negro slavery is a less evil than the destruction of the whole legal order of the country. Such destruction would bring no liberty to the slave ; for it would be the destruction of all the conditions and guaranties of liberty, and the reduction of the whole population of the country to anarchy, which is worse than slavery.

There is no greater evil possible to humanity than is threatened by these Abolition and other associations which swarm over the land, and seek to expound to us the laws of God and of humanity; and it is the duty of every one, who loves his God, his race, or his country, to oppose to them the firmest and the most persevering resistance. They are self-created, irresponsible, and without any authority to decide on any moral or political question, except what they arrogate to themselves. Whatever their avowed objects, they are engines destructives of all true liberty. They are formed for and against every thing, and usurp control over both the private and the public conscience. Already have they become in the so-called Free States nearly intolerable. They are everywhere; they annoy us in our down-sitting and uprising, in our eating and drinking, in our sleeping and waking. They overawe juries, they make the judge hesitate in his charge, and render the impartial administration of justice nearly impracticable. The magistrate fears to encounter them, and must obtain their permission, before venturing to discharge his duties. If we yield to them on one point, we must on another, — take the law from their dictation on one occasion, we must on all occasions, and hold our property, our liberty, and our consciences only at their mercy. Let us break up to-day the legal order of the country in reference to slavery at their bidding, and to-morrow we must do it in reference to some other question, next day to still another. All security then is gone. We are at the mercy of a wild, insatuated, and fickle multitude. The evils of negro slavery are but the dust in the balance with the evils we should then experience. No, never trample on law and constitutions in obedience to the mandates of self-constituted and irresponsible associations, which no well-ordered state can safely tolerate. A thousand times better is it to be the slave of the most brutal master, than to come under their lawless and fanatical sway.

Others, hardly less mad, seek to obviate the difficulty by dissolving the Union. But the dissolution of the Union would be the dissolution of American society itself. Remove the pressure of the Union, and the States would fall to pieces. Their strength, as well-ordered states, is in the Union. Let them resume the exercise of all their powers as independent sovereignties, and war, revolution, and anarchy would almost instantly follow. They would soon become hostile to each other, and bitter and savage in their hostility in proportion to the intimacy of their former mutual relations. The larger

States would soon reduce the smaller to the condition of conquered provinces, and oppression and misrule would become universal.

The external evils would be incalculable ; but the internal evils, those which would spring up in the bosom of the state itself, would almost infinitely exceed them. Not a single one of our State constitutions, especially in the Northern, Middle, and Western States, would stand. The insubordination, the love of change, the passion for experimenting of our people are so great, that nothing would remain permanent and fixed, but change itself. The tendency to ochlocracy is already fearfully strong. The reverence for law has nearly disappeared ; loyalty is a word of bad meaning ; fixed and permanent institutions are held to be derogatory to the majesty and sovereignty of the people, and there is a wide and active determination to sweep away every thing which may impose even a momentary check upon popular passion and popular caprice. The magistrate trembles before the multitude of the irresponsible and fanatical associations to which we have alluded, and the government in the Free States is already passing into their hands. And what are these associations themselves but mobs, — their influence but the influence of the mob, and their rule but the rule of the mob, — unknown as they are to the state, and to all laws, human and divine ? Antirentism, agrarianism, forming the principle of one of two leading parties in the great State of New York, the independence of the judiciary already gone, and the judges converted into demagogues by being made elective by the people, for a short term of years, and re-eligible, — a senseless Socialism spreading like wildfire from one end of the Union to the other, inflaming all ardent temperaments, maddening the young and inexperienced with delusive dreams and fallacious hopes, and undermining the very foundations of society itself, — tell but too plainly the dangerous elements at work in the heart of the American population, and the terrible evils which would fall upon us, if the Union were dissolved, and all the restlessness, ambition, intrigue, cunning, energy in each State, now absorbed by the general government, were turned loose to prey at will upon the bosom of the State itself. Society would be broken up, anarchy in its most hideous forms would reign, and we should be sunk so low as to hail as a liberator the military despot who should succeed in restoring something like order by subjecting us to absolute dependence on his arbitrary will and iron rule. No ; talk not of

the dissolution of the Union. Palsied be the tongue that would propose it ; palsied the arm that would attempt it. Let the day be cursed in which the wretch was born who dare wish it ; let him be driven out from the habitations of men, and his memory perish for ever.

What, we ask again, is, then, to be done ? The question, as we intimated in the beginning, is practically important only on the supposition of the extension of the territory of the Union by new acquisitions from Mexico. So far as concerns our present territory, the question is merely speculative. Oregon is not likely to become a Slave State, and if slavery should be introduced there, it would soon die out, for the same reason that it has died out in the Northern and Central States of the Union, — because it would be found to be bad economy. The whole importance of the question, as a practical question, is occasioned by the present war with Mexico, and the probability of our insisting on a cession to us of a portion of her territory, adapted to a slave population. This gives a fearful interest to that war, and imposes a terrible responsibility on the government which has involved us in it, if it could with honor have avoided it.

We have heretofore observed silence on the Mexican war, for we do not like the idea of declaiming against a war in which our country is actually engaged, especially if we have only our private judgment on which to question its justice or necessity. We hold loyalty to be a virtue indispensable in the citizen, and that, even in a free country, no man has the right to offer a factious opposition to the administration, and no opposition at all beyond what is demanded by the clear and unquestionable calls of duty, either to his religion or to his country. Especially do we hold this to be the case when our country is engaged in war, and needs the cordial union and support of all her citizens. This consideration has prevented us heretofore from expressing our own views of the real character of the Mexican war, and would keep us silent even now, if there were a single solid reason for prosecuting that war any farther. But no such reason can be pretended. The success of our arms has secured to us already all the legitimate objects which the war could have had, and which could justify its further continuance. We are, therefore, no longer bound to silence ; but we and all good citizens are now at liberty to speak out freely, according to our mature and honest convictions, without subjecting ourselves to a charge of want of patriotism, or of offering a factious opposition.

For ourselves, we have regarded the Mexican war from the first as uncalled for, impolitic, and unjust. We have examined the documents published by order of the government; we have read the official defence of the war in the last annual Message of the President to Congress, and with every disposition to find our own government in the right; but we are bound to say, that our original impressions have been strengthened rather than weakened. The President, undoubtedly, makes it clear that we had many just causes of complaint against Mexico, which at the time of their occurrence might have justified reprisals, perhaps even war, — but he cannot plead these in justification of the present war; for they were not the ground on which we professed to engage in it. The official announcement of the President to Congress was that war already existed between the two republics, *by the act of Mexico herself*; and whatever use we may make of old grievances in adjusting the terms of peace, we can make no use of them in defending the war. We can plead in its defence only the fact on which we grounded it, namely, war exists by the act of Mexico herself. But unhappily, at the time of the official announcement, war *did not exist* between the two republics at all, for neither republic had declared war against the other. There had been a collision of their forces, but this was not war, as the President would probably have conceded, had he known or recollected the distinction between war and hostilities. By placing the war on the ground that it existed by the act of Mexico, and that ground being false, he has left it wholly indefensible, whatever the old grievances we may have to allege against Mexico.

The act of Mexico in crossing the Rio Grande, and engaging our troops on territory which she had possessed and still claimed as hers, but which we asserted had, by a recent act against which she had protested, become ours, — the act which the President chose to inform Congress and the world was war, — may or may not have been a just cause for declaring war against her, but it assuredly was not war itself. We have no intention to justify Mexico. She may have been decidedly in the wrong; she may have had no valid title to the territory of which the President had just taken military occupation; that territory may have been rightfully ours, and it may even have been the duty of the President to occupy and defend it; — but it cannot be denied that she had once possessed it; that it was still a part of one of her states or provinces; that she

still claimed it, and had continued to exercise jurisdiction over it, till driven from it by our army of occupation ; that she invaded it with an armed force, if invasion it can be called, not as territory belonging to us, but as territory belonging to her ; and that she attacked our troops, not for the reason that they were ours, but for the reason, as she held, — and she had as good a right to be judge in her own case as we had in ours, — that they were intruders, trespassers on her soil. The motive of her act was not war against the United States, but the expulsion of intruders from her own territory. No sophistry can make her act war, — certainly not without conceding that our act in taking military possession of that territory was also war ; and if that was war, then the war, if it existed at all, existed by our act and not by hers, for her act was consequent upon ours. The most that the President was at liberty to say, without condemning his own government, was, that there had been a collision of the forces of the two republics on a territory claimed by each ; but this collision he had no right to term war, for every body knows that it takes something more than a collision of their respective forces on a disputed territory to constitute war between two civilized nations. In no possible point of view was the announcement of the President that war existed between the two republics, and existed by the act of Mexico, correct. It did not exist at all ; or if it did, it existed not by act of Mexico, but by our act. In either case, the official announcement was false, and cannot be defended.

The President may have been governed by patriotic motives ; he may have felt that prompt and energetic action was required ; he may have believed that in great emergencies the chief magistrate of a powerful republic, having to deal with a weak and distracted state, should rise superior to mere technical forms, and the niceties of truth and honor ; but it strikes us that he would have done better, proved himself even more patriotic, and sufficiently prompt and energetic, if he had confined himself to the ordinary rules of morality, and the well-defined principles of international law. By aspiring to rise above these, and to appear original, he has placed his country in a false position, and debarred himself, whatever the just causes of war Mexico may have given us, from pleading one of them in justification of the actual war. We must be permitted to regret that he did not reflect beforehand, that, if he placed the defence of the war on the ground that it already existed, and existed by the act of Mexico herself, and on that ground de-

manded of Congress the means of prosecuting it, he would, in case that ground proved to be untenable, as he must have known it would, have nothing whatever to allege in its or his own justification. He should have been lawyer enough to have known that he could not plead anew, after having failed on his first issue. It is often hazardous in our pleadings to plead what is not true, and in doing so in the present case, the President has not only offended morality, which he may regard as a small matter, but has even committed a blunder.

The course the President should have pursued is plain and obvious. On learning the state of things on the frontier, the critical condition of our army of occupation, he should have demanded of Congress the reinforcements and supplies necessary to relieve it and secure the purpose for which it was avowedly sent to the Rio Grande ; and, if he believed it proper or necessary, to have in addition laid before Congress a full and truthful statement of our relations with Mexico, including all the unadjusted complaints, past and present, we had against her, accompanied by the recommendation of a declaration of war. He would then have kept within the limits of his duty, proved himself a plain constitutional President, and left the responsibility of war or no war to Congress, the only war-making power known to our laws. Congress, after mature deliberation, might, or might not, have declared war, — most likely would not ; but whether so or not, the responsibility would have rested with it, and no blame would have attached to the President.

Unhappily, this course did not occur to the President, or was too plain and simple to meet his approbation. As if fearful, if Congress deliberated, it might refuse to declare war, and as if determined to have war at any rate, he presented to Congress, not the true issue, whether war should or should not be declared, — but the false issue, whether Congress would grant him the means of prosecuting a war, waged against us by a foreign power. In the true issue, Congress might have hesitated ; in the one actually presented, there was no room to hesitate, if the official announcement of the President was to be credited, and hesitation would have been criminal. By declaring that the war already existed, and by the act of Mexico herself, the President relieved Congress of the responsibility of the war, by throwing it all on Mexico. But since he cannot fasten it on Mexico, — for war did not already exist, or if so, by our act, and not hers. — it necessarily recoils upon himself,

and he must bear the responsibility of doing what the constitution forbids him to do, — of making war without the intervention of Congress. In effect, therefore, he has trampled the constitution under his feet, set a dangerous precedent, and, by the official publication of a palpable falsehood, sullied the national honor. It is with no pleasure that we speak thus of the chief magistrate of the Union, for whose elevation to his high and responsible office we ourselves voted. But whatever may be our attachment to party, or the respect we hold to be due from all good citizens to the civil magistrate, we cannot see the constitution violated, and the national honor sacrificed, whether by friend or foe, from good motives or bad, without entering, feeble though it be, our stern and indignant protest. The humiliation is deep and painful, and would be insupportable, were it not for the earnest patriotism of the people which the war has called forth, and the brilliant achievements of our brave troops in Mexico. These relieve the gloom, and make us still proud to call ourselves an American citizen.*

* We are far from regarding Congress, in echoing the false statement of the President, as free from blame. It ought to have seen and corrected the executive — mistake. Yet it is not surprising that it took the President at his word. The late Congress had some able members, and it adopted some judicious measures; but we express only the common sentiment of all parties, when we say it was far from covering itself with glory, and that it is to be hoped another Congress like it will not meet again very soon. Various motives, no doubt, governed the members. Many, no doubt, ignorant of the distinction between war and hostilities, really believed the President, and therefore regarded the suggestion that war did not exist, and exist by the act of Mexico, as proceeding either from a want of patriotism, or from a factious opposition to the administration. Some, perhaps, felt that they were bound by their party obligations to support executive measures, whether right or wrong; others felt that the declaration of the President, whether true or false, would shield them; others still, perhaps, acquiesced, lest their patriotism should be questioned, and their opposition be set down to faction; and, finally, a number, very likely, believing war to be inevitable, and not undesirable, held that it mattered little on what pretence it was made, providing it was made and prosecuted with vigor. These could see no good likely to result from the deliberations of Congress. The issue presented, the actual state of the army, were adapted to mislead many, and left no time to deliberate, to take a calm survey of the momentous question, and correct first impressions. All was hurry and confusion. The danger was imminent, and permitted no delay. The administration and its confidential friends would suffer no division of the question, and through the influence of committees forced members either to vote the war or bear the odium of refusing to vote the reinforcements and supplies necessary to the safety of the army. Those who had scruples could obtain no division and no delay, and the greater part of the members of both Houses yielded to the executive. It

But passing over this, we have yet to be convinced, whatever were the just causes of complaint we had against Mexico, that the war was called for. We are willing to admit that we had suffered grievous wrongs from Mexico, and that we had shown exemplary forbearance, and treated her with great generosity; but she had shown a willingness to treat with us, and the greater part, if not all, of the old offences we had had to complain of she had acknowledged, and they had been settled in a convention of the two republics. True, she had not, in all cases, fulfilled her engagements; but she had manifested no unwillingness to fulfil them, and no one doubts that she would have fulfilled them, had it not been for her unsettled and distracted internal state. The more recent difficulties growing out of the affair of Texas demanded great delicacy and forbearance on our part. She felt herself wronged and humbled by the annexation of Texas to the Union, and, however blameworthy we may choose to regard her conduct, we are sure, if the cases had been reversed, we should have behaved at least no better than she did. She protested, as was her undoubted right, against the annexation of Texas; but she committed no act of violence against us, so long as we confined our army of occupation to territory over which Texas had actually exercised jurisdiction. We might well have forborne to press our claims further, and it would have been no derogation of our national dignity to have refrained from pushing our claims at once to their farthest limits against a weak, humbled, and distracted, albeit gasconading, neighbour. It would have been wise and just to give her time to cool, — time for her wounds to begin to heal, and to reconcile herself to her humiliating loss. — especially since she had been stripped of the province of Texas through her misfortune, not her fault.

The necessity of sending our troops from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande, to occupy a position within territory claimed indeed by Texas, but which it is well known continued to be subject to Mexican laws, and to form a portion of one of the undoubted states or provinces of the Mexican republic, was not at all urgent. That the position taken up by General Taylor, under orders of the President, was in terri-

is to be regretted they did; but, however censurable they were, their wrong does not relieve the President, nor can their votes under protest be pleaded by his friends in mitigation of his conduct; because it was by his act that they were led, almost compelled, to do what they did.

tory which had never been in the actual possession of Texas, and which had continued since as before Texan independence subject to Mexican authority, it is worse than idle to question. Whether we had a right to claim under Texas beyond what Texas held in actual subjection to her laws may be disputed ; but even admitting that we had a valid title to all of Mexico to which Texas saw proper to set up a claim, there can be no doubt that a little patience would have enabled us to adjust peaceably the question of boundary between the two republics. But if worst had come to worst, we might at any time have fixed upon the boundary we intended to maintain, and confined ourselves simply to its defence. The real cause of the war, disguise it as we may, was the act of the President in ordering the troops under General Taylor to the Rio Grande, an act done on his sole responsibility, while Congress was in session, and without necessity or reason of state ; for, so long as we were the stronger party, there was no danger of our losing our title by delaying to vindicate it, and there was no other conceivable reason for urging its immediate vindication. The vindication could have been safely, prudently delayed. The act, therefore, which brought on the war was an unnecessary act, and therefore the war itself was uncalled for.*

* It is contended, in opposition to us, that the removal of our troops to the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was not the immediate cause of the war, — 1. Because Mexico has never made that act a special ground of complaint ; and, 2. Because that territory was as much a part of the State of Texas as that to the east of the Nueces. These replies are both disingenuous. That the actual jurisdiction in some instances and to some extent crossed the Nueces, we believe to be true ; for Corpus Christi itself, on the map we have consulted, is to the west of that river ; but that it extended to the Rio Grande, or even far to the west of the Nueces, is not true. Texas may have declared that the whole of the territory between the two rivers was included within one of her Congressional districts, for that was easy enough to do ; but there is no one bold enough to say that she opened her polls and received votes for her Congressmen from the citizens of Tamaulipas, in the vicinity of what is now Fort Brown, or even in the vicinity of Point Isabel. The laws of Texas were never acknowledged or regularly enforced in that section. That Texas set up a claim to the Rio Grande, we concede ; but that she actually exercised jurisdiction to the Rio Grande, or far to the west of the Nueces, is what we deny, and the government, so far as we have seen, has offered no evidence to the contrary.

The second reply is more disingenuous still. Mexico sets up a claim to the whole of Texas to the Sabine, and that claim she refuses to relinquish. While she continues her claim to the whole, she can make no distinction as to a part. She could not plead our occupation of the territory in ques-

The war, furthermore, was impolitic. If unsuccessful, it could not fail to disgrace us ; if successful, it could hardly fail to weaken Mexico, already too weak for our interest. The true policy of this country is, not to destroy, absorb, or weaken Mexico, but to preserve her nationality and independence, and to strengthen her. It is a great evil to a nation to have only weak neighbours, and worse than madness for us to seek to be the only power on the North American continent. Solitude is no more the normal state for a nation than for an individual, and in the case of either, without special grace, is hurtful. If the nation has only weak neighbours, it will be constantly tempted to the practice of injustice ; and if no neighbours, it will be torn by intestine divisions, and sink into anarchy or despotism.

But especially was this war impolitic in consequence of the slave question, already threatening the Union, and with difficulty restrained within constitutional limits. The war, if successful, can hardly fail in extorting from Mexico a portion of her territory, and that territory to some extent not unsuitable to a slave population. Its annexation to the Union must bring on, in all its fierceness, the contest between the Free States and the Slave States, — a contest in which both have much to lose, and neither any thing to gain. The Free States are resolved not to pour out their blood and treasure to extend what they regard as a detestable system, and, if new territory is acquired, they cannot, as we have seen, avoid doing so, without trampling on the constitution, which we are afraid, if forced to the alternative, they will not hesitate to do. The administration should have foreseen this, and avoided the war, if possible, for

tion as a special grievance, without making a distinction between it and that east of it, and, in fact, not without abandoning her claim to all the rest of Texas. This reply by some of the defenders of the President may answer to throw dust in the eyes of the people, but it is really unworthy of an American citizen. Nothing would have pleased our government more than to have found Mexico complaining of that invasion as a special grievance. No doubt, it was the very blunder they hoped to provoke her to commit ; and if she had committed it, we can believe our troops would have been speedily ordered back to the Nueces ; for it would have virtually yielded to us all the territory Texas actually possessed, and with that the President would probably have been satisfied. It is idle, then, to draw any inference from the silence of Mexico as to the act which we say was the immediate cause of the war. That it was the immediate cause of the war we may infer from the fact, that, till it was done, Mexico made no effort to disturb our possession of Texas ; and there can be little doubt, that, but for it, she would silently have abandoned her claim to all of Texas east of the Nueces.

this reason, if for no other ; for, if the Antislavery party find itself strong enough to prevent the extension of slavery in defiance of the constitution, it will not stop there. It will no longer respect constitutional barriers ; but will take up the question of slavery in the States, and immediate emancipation or civil war will be the alternative, — both bad, and one hardly more to be deprecated than the other. If no foreign element be introduced to give additional force to the excitement already so fearful, the friends of the constitution may be able, at least for a time, to keep it from any direct interference with slavery where it is ; but introduce such an element, let there be a colorable pretext for asserting that the Free States are called upon, not merely to let slavery alone, but to aid in extending it, and there is no longer among us any power to control the consequences. The present administration should have considered this, and have studiously avoided every occasion of fanning the excitement. It has, we are sorry to say, not done so. It has gained no friends by its policy at the North, and it has done its best to ruin the South.

In the present posture of affairs, and in view of the probable results of the war, there is only one constitutional course to be pursued, and that is for both the friends and the enemies of the slave system to unite in resisting the further extension of the territory of the Union. This is politic and constitutional. Mexico must not be dismembered, nor a foot of her territory permanently annexed to the Union. Let this be the settled policy of both parties. Let not the South think of converting the North to her views of slavery, nor the North attempt to check the progress of slavery by trampling on the constitution. It is too late in the day to attempt the former, and it is always out of season to dream of the latter. But both may unite in resisting any extension of the present territory of the Union, and, in doing so, remove all additional pretext for excitement. The territory of the Union is large enough, and he is as poor a patriot as he is a statesman who would seek to extend its bounds. The insane rage of a portion of our people for annexation, and the influence demagogues acquire for nefarious purposes by appealing to it, must be checked, or our national honor is gone, our national sense of justice obliterated, and our free institutions become our reproach. A firm and successful resistance of the attempt likely to be made to extend the territory of the Union, by cessions extorted from Mexico, will have this salutary effect, and we trust it will be made.

ART. IV. — *L' America un tempo Spagnuola riguardata sotto l' Aspetto religioso dall' Epoca del suo Discuoprimento sino al 1843, di MONSIGNORE GAETANO BALUFFI. Ancona. 1844, 1845.*

THE author of this interesting work is at present the successor of our popular Pontiff in the see of Imola, and a member of the College of Cardinals. For several years he fulfilled, with great advantage to religion, the high functions of representative of the Holy See in the republic of Granada, where he procured the recall of the Jesuits to resume their labors in that region, formerly cultivated with great success by the fathers of this illustrious society. Availing himself of such opportunities of research as were afforded him by his position, he indulged his literary taste by reviewing the history of the discovery and settlement of the Spanish possessions, and considering the influence of religion in inspiring the enterprise and remedying the evils caused by the passions of the adventurers. Since his return to the Pontifical court, he has given to the world the fruits of his studies and meditations in the two admirable volumes which, in successive years, have issued from the press of Ancona, and which are creditable to Italy, as well on account of the mechanical execution, as for the spirit and elegance of the composition. In several places he makes favorable mention of our social institutions and ecclesiastical councils, and eulogizes several of the members of our hierarchy, whose acquaintance he formed during a short visit to the States on his way to Europe.

The acts of some Popes, who stripped monarchs of their diadems, have been plausibly interpreted as declarations of a forfeiture incurred by the violation of the social compact; but those which, in high-sounding phraseology, gave to the sovereigns of Portugal and Spain power and dominion over the regions previously unknown, which had been discovered by the adventurous genius of their subjects, or which might afterwards be discovered, have been long regarded as direct and positive assumptions of temporal dominion. Such a conclusion, however, is not necessary to be drawn. A different and perhaps a juster view of them was presented by the celebrated Count Le Maistre, who considered them as no more than authoritative declarations of right, and solemn sanctions interposed at the solicitation of the party interested, with a view to preserve

peace between Christian princes, and to prevent conflicting enterprises. Cardinal Baluffi adopts this view, and tacitly vindicates them, whilst he states the end to which the Papal acts were directed. "The Roman Pontiffs, as universal fathers, not because they imagined themselves lords of the material world, but in order to prevent the effusion of Christian blood, found themselves, at the epoch of the discovery of America, in circumstances which rendered it desirable that they should divide the countries, and mark mutual limits to the conquests of the nations that took arms against unknown nations. By their command, ministers of peace were despatched at the same time, not only to proclaim the faith, but to aid and direct the people in the path of duty, so as to establish order and promote the public welfare, the great objects which the Popes always had in view."

Alexander the Sixth, whose personal character was not likely to add weight to his official acts, was not the first Pontiff who exercised his authority in determining the rights of sovereigns grounded on discovery, and fixing limits to their ambition. About the year 1438, Eugene the Fourth granted to the Portuguese an exclusive right to all the countries which they might discover from Cape Non to the continent of India; and the validity of the grant was universally recognized, so that, as Robertson testifies, "all Christian princes were deterred from intruding into those countries which the Portuguese had discovered, or from interrupting the progress of their navigation and conquest."* Edward the Sixth of England, on the remonstrance of John the Second of Portugal, prohibited English merchants from opening a trade with the coast of Guinea, because it would be against the terms of the Papal concession. Whatever may now be thought of such acts, it is clear that they were supported by what was then the public law of Christian nations, and had, at least, all the force that can be derived from general consent. Wheaton, our own distinguished writer on international law, observes, — "As between the Christians themselves, the sovereign Pontiff was the supreme arbiter of conflicting claims. Hence the famous bull issued by Pope Alexander the Sixth in 1493."† Even Prescott remarks: — "This bold stretch of Papal authority, so often ridiculed as chimerical and absurd, was in a measure justified by the

* *History of America*, Book I.

† *Elements of International Law*, Part II. c. IV. p. 210.

event, since it did, in fact, determine the principles on which the vast extent of unappropriated empire in the Eastern and Western hemispheres was ultimately divided between two petty states of Europe.”* Mr. Adams himself, in a very singular speech which he delivered in Congress on the Oregon question, admitted the validity of the Papal grant, as supported by general consent and law at that period ; but we must regret that the ex-President did not treat the subject with the gravity that became his age and character. In judging of such documents, we must not consider, in the abstract, what powers were divinely communicated to the fisherman of Galilee ; but we should attend to the social position of his successors, which brought with it an immense accession of temporal influence. An exercise of authority which was sought for by princes, and submitted to by their rivals, must have been widely different from usurpation. Its foundation must have been in right and justice ; and we can see no incongruity in the choice made of the Pontiff as the interpreter of right and umpire in controversy.

The lawfulness of the enterprise of Christian adventurers, who sought to discover unknown countries and subject them to the sovereigns under whose sanction their enterprise was undertaken, may be doubted of ; but where the nations discovered are in a barbarous or savage state, it is, we believe, generally conceded by writers on the laws of nations that it is lawful to reduce them, even by force of arms, with a view to put an end to unnatural atrocities, and to introduce civilization. The Gospel is not to be promoted by the aid of the sword, teaching and preaching being the means pointed out by Christ for spreading it throughout the world ; yet, if the enterprise of the Spaniards was justifiable in the common interests of humanity, it did not cease to be so from the circumstance that ministers of religion accompanied the adventurers with a view to communicate its saving truths to the conquered nations, and lay the foundations of true civilization, by inculcating its pure and chastening principles. There is, then, nothing in the celebrated bull of Alexander the Sixth which may not be justified by the jurisprudence of his age, and, in the main, by principles still acknowledged. It was designed to convey, in language the most expressive, the fullest title which could be granted, and it was substantially a solemn declaration of rights

* *Ferdinand and Isabella*, Vol. II. Chap. XVIII.

founded on actual discovery, and an authoritative sanction to future enterprise, given with a view to the peace of Christian nations.

We should, however, mistake the spirit of the fifteenth century, were we to suppose that abstract reasoning on principles of jurisprudence, or ambition of discovery, or desire of empire, gave the primary impulse to the great adventure of Columbus. Whatever may have been the weaknesses and vices of men at that time, zeal — sometimes, it may be, not sufficiently temperate — was generally felt for the advancement of religion, and genius and power were enlisted in her service. The idea of discovering unknown regions and nations enkindled the ambition of Columbus, principally because he hoped to introduce to them the preachers of the Gospel, and thus shed the light of Christianity on those who sat in darkness and in the shades of death. The captivating idea of extending the dominion of Christ beyond the waste of waters, to nations who previously had not heard the sweet sound of his saving name, interested many in the project who would otherwise have smiled at it as the dream of fancy. Father Diego Deza, of the order of Friars Preachers, Father John Perez de Marchena, Guardian of the Franciscan Convent of La Rabida in Andalusia, Father Thomas de Torquemada, Inquisitor-General and confessor of Ferdinand, lent their powerful influence to its support, — not from a full conviction of the likelihood of success, but from a feeling that it was worth a trial, where the result might be to communicate to millions the blessings of religion. “With Isabella,” as Robertson acknowledges, “zeal for propagating the Christian faith, together with the desire of communicating the knowledge of truth and the consolations of religion to people destitute of spiritual light, were more than ostensible motives for encouraging Columbus to attempt his discoveries.”* The religious spirit of the chief adventurer was manifested in the name of the vessel in which he sailed, in placing himself under the protection of the Virgin-Mother, in the erection of the cross on the ground on which he first landed, and in the name *San Salvador*, given to the island. He may be said to have taken possession of the newly discovered regions in the name of the King of kings, ere he thought of performing those formal acts which, according to the usage of nations, were necessary to establish the rights of the Spanish

* *History of America*, Book VIII.

sovereign. The hymn of praise which was entoned on this occasion was beautifully expressive of the sovereign dominion of the Deity, as proclaimed by the Church throughout the entire world : — “ Te æternum Patrem omnis terra veneratur. . . . Te per orbem terrarum sancta confitetur ecclesia.”

On the return of Columbus from his first voyage, writing to Raphael Sanzio, the royal treasurer, he gave to God all praise for his success, and dwelt with delight on the glory that would redound to Christ from the union in his worship of so many nations hitherto unknown. Isabella likewise “endeavoured to fulfil her pious purpose, and manifested the most tender concern to secure not only religious instruction, but mild treatment, to that inoffensive race of men.”* At the foot of a crucifix she hung the first gold presented to her from the New World, making it a votive offering to Him who gave himself a victim of propitiation for the whole world. Ferdinand gave the edifying example of standing sponsor for some of the Indians whom Columbus presented at the sacred font, and the nobles imitated the condescension of their sovereign. From all these facts, it is manifest that the discovery of the New World, although justly regarded as one of the most splendid fruits of the inspirations of genius, was still more eminently the result of religious zeal.

The condition of nearly all the Indian tribes discovered by Columbus and subsequent adventurers was most degraded ; and even those that exhibited some appearance of civilization, such as the Mexicans and Peruvians, offered human sacrifices, and practised cannibalism. The flesh of a slave, immolated for the occasion, was dressed up for their religious banquets ; and to feast on the mangled remains of an enemy was necessary for the consummation of the victory gained in the bloody strife. Modesty was necessarily unknown among the naked wanderers, and if the amorous passion did not appear active, it arose from insensibility of character, rather than from any sense of moral propriety. Where marriage was recognized, polygamy prevailed, especially with the chiefs, whose prowess was rewarded by the number of their concubines. So destitute did they appear of moral sense and of spiritual ideas, that Robertson affirms that many of them had no idea of a Supreme Being, although he admits that they all believed in the immortality of the soul. Baluffi shows the mistake of the his-

* Robertson, *ubi supra*.

torian in ascribing his singular opinion to a Jesuit father, and in affirming that the Peruvians had not even a term to express creator ; and points to the name of their favorite deity, *Pachacamac*, as identical with Creator of the world. In some places usages and traditions prevailed that have given rise to the conjecture that Christianity was not unknown to the remote ancestors of the tribes. The memory of a deluge which generally prevailed had, among the Aztecs, a striking affinity to the Scriptural narrative. We cannot fail to recognize our mother Eve in Cioacoatl, a Mexican goddess, near whom a serpent was depicted, and through whom sin is said to have come into the world. The story of David and Uriah is easily discovered under other names in their annals. Even vestiges of some distinctive Christian usages may be perceived among them. The Aztecs touched with water the head and lips of the infant, named it on that occasion, and invoked their favorite goddess to cleanse it and give it a new birth. The cross was venerated in the temples of Anahuac. The conquerors "met with it in various places, and the image of a cross may be seen at this day sculptured in bas-relief on the walls of one of the buildings of Palenque."* These facts, we admit, are insufficient to warrant any certain inference ; but they are sufficiently remarkable to be noticed. They did not, however, in any way facilitate the conversion of the aborigines to Christianity, who were somewhat disposed to receive its teachers by a tradition preserved among them, and said to be derived from their great father, who, on leaving them, foretold that a superior race would come from the east.

The transition of millions of Indians to Christianity within a few years is a fact attested by the most prejudiced historians, who represent it as a mere external change, the result of terror or of caprice, without the corresponding change of sentiment, and without moral improvement. Baluffi admits that the incongruous union of Spanish dominion and Christian faith; in the invitation made by the adventurers to the various tribes, was calculated to injure Christianity by identifying it with the interests of the Spanish monarchy, and presenting it in alliance with the crown, combined, as it were, to strip the nations of their independence. "The military and political powers, acting in a manner diametrically opposed to the maxims of the Gospel, made war, in effect, on the word of salvation and

peace which was preached, and, by presenting a sanguinary religion, sought to make God himself an accomplice in their crimes." "Never before was the law of Christ promulgated in such a way. In all parts of the world where this divine Gospel was preached, men were not called by the sound of the drum to enter into the Christian brotherhood; the independence of empires was not attacked; the people were not slaughtered; families were not plundered; treasures were not seized; individual liberty was not taken away. Unfortunately, in America an utter disregard was manifested for the rights of nature and of nations, whilst the ecclesiastics, as meek lambs, taught the pure faith of Jesus. Vulgar prejudice, — an indiscreet zeal, not conformable to the spirit of the Church, — at that time esteemed it a great and heroic undertaking to make war on infidels, and plunder them, however inoffensive. The Spaniards seemed to fancy themselves, like the Hebrews of old, divinely commissioned to combat the Amorrheans, Jebuseans, and other nations accursed of God, and to exterminate them from the land of promise." This very severe censure may admit of mitigation, if it be considered that the violence offered by the Spaniards was not generally, at least, directed to enforce the doctrines of Christianity, but rather to abolish the unnatural and horrible custom of sacrificing human victims. When Cortés urged the Cacique of Cempoalla (or Zempoalla) and his subjects to embrace the faith, the chief indignantly rejected the proposition, and threatened the vengeance of the gods on the Christians, should they interfere with their worship. "The zeal of the Christians," observes Prescott, "had mounted too high to be cooled by remonstrance or menace. During their residence in the land, they had witnessed more than once the barbarous rites of the natives, their cruel sacrifices of human victims, and their disgusting cannibal repasts. Their souls sickened at these abominations, and they agreed with one voice to stand by their general, when he told them that Heaven would never smile on their enterprise if they countenanced such atrocities, and that, for his own part, he was resolved the Indian idols should be demolished that very hour, if it cost him his life. . . . Fifty soldiers, at a signal from their general, sprang up the great stairway of the temple, entered the building on the summit, the walls of which were black with human gore, tore the huge wooden idols from their foundations, and dragged them to the edge of the terrace. . . . With great alacrity they rolled the colossal monsters

down the steps of the pyramid, amidst the triumphant shouts of their own companions, and the groans and lamentations of the natives. They then consummated the whole by burning them in the presence of the assembled multitude."* The consequent conversion of the natives cannot be regarded as the effect of fear, but rather as resulting from the evidence presented to them that their idols were powerless. "The same effect," says the historian, "followed as in Cozumel. The Totonacs, finding their deities incapable of preventing or even punishing this profanation of their shrines, conceived a mean opinion of their power." He goes on to relate, that some of the Totonac priests joined in the procession which was formed, when, after some days, the temple became a Christian sanctuary, and that, according to the Spanish chronicle, Indians as well as Spaniards were melted into tears and audible sobs by the impressive ceremonies of the Catholic worship, and the touching eloquence of the pious Father Olmedo. In accounting for this extraordinary demonstration, he compares the different modes adopted by Catholic and Protestant missionaries, and pays an involuntary homage to the power of the Catholic ritual over the feelings. The Protestant, he says, presents the pale light of reason to his hearers; "the bolder Catholic, kindling the spirit by the splendor of the spectacle, and by the glowing portrait of an agonized Redeemer, sweeps along his hearers in a tempest of passion."† The historian would have spoken more correctly, had he observed that the Catholic studies to convince the understanding, but does not neglect to interest the feelings and imagination by the imposing influences of a sublime ceremonial.

From the high character given of Father Olmedo by Prescott, Robertson, and all historians, we may be assured that he, at least, did not suffer any to be coerced into a profession of Christianity. Many centuries before, a council of Toledo, whose decrees could not have been unknown to him, forbade violence to be used to induce the reception of baptism, or profession of the faith, since the grace of God is to be given to those only who are willing to receive it. Robertson has paid due homage to his sacerdotal courage and prudent toleration, when describing his opposition to the coercive measures which Cortés proposed to adopt at Tlascala: — "Cortés, astonished and enraged at their obstinacy, proposed to execute by force

* *Conquest of Mexico*, Book II., Chap. VIII.† *Ibid*

what he could not accomplish by persuasion, and was going to overturn their altars and cast down their idols with the same violent hand as at Zempoalla, if Father Bartholomew de Olmedo, chaplain to the expedition, had not checked his inconsiderate impetuosity. He represented the imprudence of such an attempt in a large city newly reconciled, and filled with people no less superstitious than warlike ; he declared that the proceeding at Zempoalla had always appeared to him precipitate and unjust ; that religion was not to be propagated by the sword, or infidels to be converted by violence ; that other weapons were to be employed in this ministry ; patient instruction must enlighten the understanding, and pious example captivate the heart, before men could be induced to abandon error and embrace the truth." The historian cannot suppress his surprise at hearing such language from a Catholic priest at that period ; yet it was by no means peculiar to Olmedo. " One is astonished to find a Spanish monk of the sixteenth century among the first advocates against persecution, and in behalf of religious liberty. The remonstrances of an ecclesiastic no less respectable for wisdom than virtue had their proper weight with Cortés. He left the Tlascalans in the undisturbed exercise of their own rites, requiring only that they should desist from their horrid practice of offering human sacrifices." *

It is clear that even Cortés, although eager to see the Indians converted to Christianity, limited his coercive measures to the destruction of the idols ; and, by the persuasion of Olmedo, was content with putting an end to the unnatural practices which made of the temple a human slaughter-house. From Montezuma he obtained the conversion of a *teocalli*, or temple, into a Christian sanctuary, and, having displaced the stone of sacrifice, so often stained with human blood, to make room for the representation of the Victim of Calvary, and placed on high the image of the Virgin " mild and chaste," he had the consolation of seeing assembled around him many of the idolaters, who were struck with admiration at the mysterious simplicity of the Christian worship. " As the beautiful *Te Deum* rose towards heaven, Cortés and his soldiers, kneeling on the ground, with tears streaming from their eyes, poured forth their gratitude to the Almighty for this glorious triumph of the cross. It was a striking spectacle, — that of these rude warriors lifting up their orisons on the summit of this mountain temple, in the very

* *History of America*, Book V.

capital of heathendom, on the spot especially dedicated to its unhallowed mysteries. Side by side, the Spaniard and the Aztec knelt down in prayer, and the Christian hymn mingled its sweet tones of love and mercy with the wild chant raised by the Indian priest." *

An affecting tribute was paid by the converted Indians to the humanity and paternal affection of Olmedo at his death, when they refused all food or drink, even water, until his remains were interred. Such was their deep affliction for his loss ! That he did not stand alone in the practice of the sublime virtues of his ministry, Prescott is forced to acknowledge. "Olmedo belonged to that class of missionaries — of whom the Roman Catholic Church, to its credit, has furnished many examples — who rely on spiritual weapons for the great work, inculcating those doctrines of love and mercy which can best touch the sensibilities and win the affections of their rude audience. These, indeed, are the true weapons of the Church, the weapons employed in the primitive ages, by which it has spread its peaceful banners over the farthest region of the globe." † To Toribio, a Franciscan friar, the historian bears a like honorable testimony. "Toribio employed himself zealously with his brethren in the great object of their mission. He travelled on foot over various parts of Mexico, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Wherever he went, he spared no pains to wean the natives from their dark idolatry, and to pour into their minds the light of revelation. He showed even a tender regard for their temporal as well as spiritual wants, and Bernal Diaz testifies that he has known him to give away his own robe to clothe a destitute and suffering Indian." ‡ Twelve other Franciscans, sent as missionaries to New Spain, in 1524, have merited a no less favorable eulogium. "They were men of unblemished purity of life, nourished with the learning of the cloister, and, like many others whom the Romish [!] Church has sent forth on such apostolic missions, counted all personal sacrifices as little in the sacred cause to which they were devoted." § The historian cannot dissemble that the virtues of the early missionaries — especially their tender charity — exercised a most powerful influence over the Indians, and won to the faith

* *Conquest of Mexico*, Book IV., Ch. V.

† *Ibid.*, Book III., Ch. I.

‡ *Ibid.*, Book III., Ch. IX., *note*.

§ *Ibid.*, Book VII., Ch. II.

many who had resisted the arms of the adventurers. The celebrated Bartholomew de Las Casas "preached the gospel among the natives of Nicaragua and Guatemala ; and succeeded in converting and reducing to obedience some wild tribes in the latter province who had defied the arms of his countrymen." *

With this evidence before us of the character of the missionaries, we cannot assent to the assertion of Robertson, that the converts were admitted without due instruction in the Christian doctrines, or a cordial abandonment of their superstitious practices. Regard was doubtless had to the weakness of their intellect, and their very limited capacity ; but sincere conviction of the truth and divine origin of Christianity was exacted, and they were specially instructed in its great mysteries. The chief ground for regarding their transition to the Christian worship as merely nominal is the rapidity of the conversions ; which, with more apparent reason, might be objected to the three thousand and five thousand converts that marked the first promulgation of the Gospel. Should not the believers in revealed truth feel happy in seeing parallel cases to those just mentioned, in the numbers of Indians who embraced the faith on the preaching of the missionaries of the sixteenth century ? " A single clergyman," says Robertson, " baptized in one day above five thousand Mexicans, and did not desist until he was so exhausted by fatigue, that he was unable to lift his hands. In the course of a few years after the reduction of the Mexican empire, the sacrament of baptism was administered to more than four millions." To deny that conversions so numerous could be solid and sincere is not the best means of rendering credible the facts recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. What Robertson asserts may be true of some of the new Christians, that they occasionally relapsed into superstitious practices ; but the perseverance of the immense multitude is beyond question. Prescott attests that the labors of the missionaries rendered finally effectual even the indiscreet efforts of the conquerors to bring the Indians to the profession of Christianity. " The seeds thus recklessly scattered must have perished but for the missionaries of their own nation, who, in later times, worked over the same ground, living among the Indians as brethren, and by long and patient culture enabling the germs of truth to take root and fructify in their hearts." †

* *Ibid.*, Book II., Ch. VIII., *note*.

† *Ibid.*, Book III., Ch. I.

Who has not heard of the atrocities of the Spanish adventurers, — the cruelty with which they sometimes set bloodhounds to tear in pieces the naked Indians, — the perfidy with which they invited them to friendly interviews, and then massacred them? God forbid that we should say a word to mitigate the horror which such crimes excite! Baluffi is unsparing in denouncing them, and we join from our hearts in the strong language which he employs. Yet truth and justice require us to observe, that cruelty and perfidy did not ordinarily mark the career of Spanish discovery. If it be lawful to use force to put a stop to unnatural enormities, — such as human sacrifices and cannibalism, — most of the horrific scenes exhibited in the discovery of America must be classed among the incidents of just warfare. Robertson and Prescott agree that Cortés had certain information of a plot formed by the inhabitants of Cholula for the destruction of the Spaniards, before he resolved on anticipating the attack by their massacre. Rumors of a plot formed by the Aztec nobles led Alvarado to fall upon them when assembled for a religious festival. Of the conquerors of Mexico Prescott testifies, — “ Their swords were rarely stained with blood, unless it was indispensable to the success of their enterprise.” If this did not wholly justify it, it affords some extenuation, since the desperate condition of men engaged in a perilous undertaking for a just end may prompt them to measures from which they would otherwise shrink with horror.

Unhappily, the annals of our country present instances of cruelty and perfidy towards the aborigines, which should make us speak less severely of the Spanish adventurers. Robertson states that the Indians made an attempt to massacre all the English settlers in Virginia, and actually murdered a considerable number, which naturally provoked retaliation, but marked with ferocity and perfidy the most execrable. “ They hunted the Indians like wild beasts, rather than enemies; and as the pursuit of them to their places of retreat in the woods, which covered their country, was both difficult and dangerous, they endeavoured to allure them from their inaccessible fastnesses by offers of peace and promises of oblivion, made with such an artful appearance of sincerity as deceived their crafty leader, and induced them to return to their former settlements, and resume their usual peaceful occupations. . . . The English, with perfidious craft, were preparing to imitate savages in their revenge and cruelty. On the approach of harvest, when they knew an hostile attack would be most formidable and fatal, they

fell suddenly upon all the Indian plantations, murdered every person on whom they could lay hold, and drove the rest to the woods, where so many perished with hunger, that some of the tribes nearest to the English were totally extirpated." *

The religious settlers of the more northern provinces, who would not proceed to battle until they had cast out from among them the unclean, "who were under a covenant of works," are not free from the like reproach. As they advanced against the Indians on one occasion, "setting fire to the huts which were covered with reeds, many of the women and children perished in the flames; and the warriors, in endeavouring to escape, were either slain by the English, or, falling into the hands of their Indian allies, were reserved for a more cruel fate." All this may be put to the account of lawful warfare; but the historian proceeds to inform us, that, "after the junction of the troops from Massachusetts, the English resolved to pursue their victory; and hunting the Indians from one place of retreat to another, some subsequent encounters were hardly less fatal to them than the action on the Mistick. In less than three months the tribe of Pequods was extirpated. Instead of treating the Pequods as an independent people, who made a gallant effort to defend the property, the rights, and the freedom of their nation, they retaliated upon them all the barbarities of American war. Some they massacred in cold blood; others they gave up to be tortured by their Indian allies; a considerable number they sold as slaves in Bermudas; the rest were reduced to servitude among themselves." † Under one pretext or another, the Indians residing near the English settlements were extirpated; or if spared, they had to part with the hunting-grounds of their fathers for a nominal consideration. The almost total extinction of the Northern tribes has been the result of the English policy; whilst, notwithstanding the many that fell in the struggle against the Spanish invaders, and the greater number that were worked to death in the mines, the Indian tribes of the Southern portion of our continent have been preserved, and have been allowed to commingle with their conquerors, and to rise in some places to an equality of power. The proud Spaniard did not disdain connubial alliance with the daughter of the red man, which the haughty Briton spurned as calculated to deteriorate the Anglo-Saxon race. Travellers

* *History of America*, Book IX.

† *Ibid.*, Book X.

who see the great varieties of men in Southern countries, the result of the mixture of the races, may superciliously despise the motley populations ; but they should reflect that the liberty of marriage left to all by the Spanish crown was more consonant with the dictates of reason and rights of humanity, than the exclusive principle which elsewhere has preserved the purity of European blood. The *mestizo* fruit of these mixed nuptials may be fairly regarded as elevated above the mere Indian as far at least as he is below the Spaniard.

The kind partiality with which the aborigines were viewed by the Spanish ecclesiastics is testified by Prescott and Robertson. The latter expressly refutes those "who have accused them of animating their countrymen to the slaughter of that innocent people, as idolaters," and attests that "they uniformly exerted their influence to protect the Indians, and to moderate the ferocity of their countrymen."* A solitary exception to this general eulogium is pointed out by him in the person of Father Vincent de Valverde, who is represented as urging the Spaniards to fall on the Peruvians, and make havoc of them, because they would not at once yield to his invitation to submit to the Pope and to the king of Spain, the Inca having, as is alleged, answered the summons by casting indignantly to the ground the breviary of the friar. This highly improbable story did not receive full credit from the historian, who utterly denies that Valverde continued to encourage the soldiers as they proceeded in the work of blood. It originated with the friends of Pizarro, who sought to veil the perfidy by which an unsuspecting chief and his people were assailed and massacred at the conference to which they had been invited. Garcilasso de la Vega, a descendant by his mother from the Inca, and who derived his information from Spaniards present on the occasion, expressly contradicts the charge, and lays the blame where it should lie. The court of Spain, which was probably deceived for a time, afterwards did justice to the pious missionary, who was promoted to the bishopric of Cuzco, a post for which a sanguinary fanatic was not likely to be selected. Baluffi triumphantly vindicates him.

There were among the adventurers some who deemed the Indians incapable of mental culture, and unfit to enjoy personal liberty or Christian privileges ; whilst others, and especially

* Book VI., Note XV.

"all the ecclesiastics," as Robertson admits, maintained, that, "though rude and ignorant, they were gentle, affectionate, docile, and, by proper instructions and regulations, might be formed gradually into good Christians and useful citizens." Some, indeed, were slow to admit them to the Eucharistic banquet, from which even an ecclesiastical assembly (not a council), held in Lima in 1552, directed them to be withheld, unless they should manifest a clear perception of its mysterious character ; but their admissibility was fully recognized in a solemn council held in the same city in 1567. Pope Paul the Third had already, thirty years before, declared them entitled to all the privileges of Christians. The Cardinal, by reference to these facts, reduces the statement of the historian within its just limits.

The servitude to which the Indians were reduced, and the labor to which they were consequently subjected, involve the adventurers in severe censure, but serve only to present in increased lustre the claims of the missionaries to our admiration. We shall leave the Scottish historian to speak their praise. "The missionaries, in conformity to the mild spirit of that religion which they were employed to publish, early remonstrated against the maxims of the planters with respect to the Americans, and condemned the *repartimientos*, or distributions by which they were given up as slaves to their conquerors, as no less contrary to natural justice and the precepts of Christianity than to sound policy. The Dominicans, to whom the instruction of the Americans was originally committed, were most vehement in testifying against the *repartimientos*. In the year 1511, Montesinos, one of their most eminent preachers, inveighed against this practice, in the great church at St. Domingo, with all the impetuosity of popular eloquence. Don Diego Columbus, the principal officers of the colony, and all the laymen who had been his hearers, complained of the monk to his superiors ; but they, instead of condemning, applauded his doctrine, as equally pious and seasonable. The Dominicans, regardless of political and interested considerations, would not relax in any degree the rigor of their sentiments, and even refused to absolve or admit to the Sacrament such of their countrymen as continued to hold the natives in servitude."*

We have already had occasion to name Bartholomew de las Casas as a successful missionary ; we must now present him as the uncompromising and persevering advocate of the Indians.

* Book III.

He first gave the example of humanity and justice by setting free the Indian slaves whom he had inherited from his father, and then raised his voice in behalf of the oppressed, for whom he crossed the ocean several times, to plead their cause before the throne. The great Ximenes was moved by his eloquence to appoint Hieronymite monks as commissioners to repair to the spot, investigate the facts, and grant relief; and Charles the Fifth yielded much to his appeals. The lustre of his renown has been somewhat dimmed by his proposal to substitute African labor for that of the Indians, which, in the judgment of the acute regent of Spain, involved inconsistency. It was, at least, humane to subject to labor those whose constitution qualified them to bear it, rather than the weak aborigines, who were sure to sink beneath a burden beyond their natural strength. He is falsely said to have been the first to introduce African slaves into America, since from the beginning of the century they had been imported. If he appear inconsistent, let it be remembered that he was led to make the suggestion, in order to take from rapacity its plea, by showing the adventurers that they could be humane towards the Indian, without foregoing the prospects of gain from their new possessions. Besides, he had the manliness to avow and deplore the counsel.*

Baluffi draws a parallel between the Indians' advocate and Ireland's liberator. "In this bishop, the true friend of man, the energy, dissimulation, avarice, and ferocity of the oppressors found an effectual check, whilst afflicted India venerated him as her most energetic advocate, her first writer, and her liberator. If in some points the genius of Bartholomew and O'Connell appear similar, the ancient advocate of humanity has the advantage over the modern. In intellect, eloquence, disposition, resolution, perseverance, enthusiastic devotion to the relief of the oppressed, they are equal; but the tribune of the Irish people is favored and borne forward by the spirit of the age, whilst the advocate of America had to struggle against the ferocity of the age in which he lived. The former demands freedom for a neighbouring and powerful people, whose very silence is alarming to their oppressors; the latter sought it for degraded, inert, and distant nations, whose complaints or efforts could create no apprehension in the breast of the sovereign of Castile. The philanthropy of the one is great; the

* *Conquest of Mexico*, Book II., Ch. VIII., Note.

most pure charity of the Gospel, in an heroic degree, was possessed by the other. Both are indefatigable and undaunted in dangers; the labors and disasters of the Spaniard are incomparably greater. Both won the gratitude of the oppressed; but the ecclesiastic has no other reward than affection."

His Eminence may indulge our partiality with leave to observe, that Ireland's advocate is not a mere philanthropist, but one who feeds his lamp with the oil of the sanctuary; and if he accept tokens of the gratitude of his country, it is because he has sacrificed great pecuniary interests to her cause, and could not, unaided, devote himself wholly to her advocacy. We have no wish, however, to raise a controversy on the comparative merits of two men so illustrious, and we heartily applaud the apostleship of Las Casas, whilst we pay the meed of praise to the labors of O'Connell.

Lest we should weary our readers, we hasten to close, for the present, our observations on this interesting work, which shows how much the newly discovered continent and its inhabitants owed to religion and her peaceful ministers. The Scottish historian had preceded his Eminence in testifying to these benefits. "From the accounts," says Robertson, "which I have given of the humane and persevering zeal of the Spanish missionaries in protecting the helpless flock committed to their charge, they appear in a light which reflects lustre upon their function. They were ministers of peace; who endeavoured to wrest the rod from the hands of oppressors."

We may hereafter call attention to some other points in which the eminent author, whose work we have perused with so much pleasure, is borne out by the acknowledgments of Protestant historians.

ART. V. — *The Literary World. A Gazette for Authors, Readers, and Publishers.* CHARLES F. HOFFMAN, Editor. New York: Osgood & Co. 1847. Weekly. Nos. 1–15.

THIS is the title of a literary journal and advertiser recently commenced under the auspices of two or three very respectable publishing houses in New York, and which has thus far been conducted with a spirit, talent, and good-sense worthy of very

general commendation. We do not always accept its literary or other doctrines, but we have found in it a much higher order of criticism, more just literary appreciation, and more freedom and independence in the expression of its judgments, than we have been accustomed to look for in journals of its class. There may possibly be some danger of its yielding too much to the tastes or interests of the houses which established it ; but if it preserve the independence with regard to their publications which it has thus far shown in its reviews of those of other establishments, and if sustained in doing so, it will go far towards supplying a want many have felt, and prove itself not unserviceable to the cause of American letters.

We perceive, by the announcement in the fifteenth number, that the journal has passed into the hands of a new editor, Mr. Charles F. Hoffman, of New York. We know little ourselves of Mr. Hoffman, having never to our knowledge read any of his writings, his works not coming particularly within our department ; but he holds a very respectable rank among our popular authors, and we hear him spoken of as a man of ability, learning, and fine literary taste. We have no reason to suppose the journal will not gain rather than lose in spirit, interest, and usefulness by its change of editors, although Mr. Hoffman's predecessor was an editor whose place is not easily made good.

The distinctive character of the *Literary World* is real or affected Americanism. It devotes its chief attention to American literature, and its aim seems to be to induce the public to give a decided preference to American authors, and to encourage especially the production and growth of a sound and healthy American literature. It therefore naturally suggests for our consideration the somewhat hackneyed subject of American literature, — a subject on which our readers must permit us to offer a few comments of our own.

Much is said and written about American literature. Some make extravagant boasts of the excellence to which it has already attained ; others make loud and long laments that it does not as yet even exist ; others again are busy in devising ways and means of creating it, forcing its growth, or bringing it to maturity ; and a very voluminous, if not a very respectable, national literature is growing up among us, about the literature we are assumed to have or not to have, and the means of obtaining or perfecting national literature. All this is very well ; the American people are a very enlightened people, and their

authors far in advance of those of any other nation, as it is patriotic to believe ; but it seems to us, that on this subject of national literature, as on literature in general, there is much loose thinking, if thinking it can be called, and no little want of clear and well-defined views. It is hard to say what is the precise meaning our countrymen attach to the word *literature*, in what they suppose its desirableness to consist, what ends it serves or ought to serve, or wherein it contributes to the glory of nations or of the race. These are important points, and on these, we are sorry to say, our authors leave us in the dark. We have consulted the best literary authorities of the country, but no light dawns to relieve our darkness, no clear, distinct, definite answers are obtained. This is bad, and makes us suspect that with us very few who talk of literature have any real meaning. It is easy to indulge in vague and general declamation ; it is easy to seize upon a few loose and indefinite terms, and to have the appearance of talking largely, eloquently, wisely, profoundly, when in fact we are saying nothing at all. Before any thing more is said, it would be a real service to many persons, and to ourselves in particular, if our authors would define their terms, tell us precisely what they understand by literature, and for what it is necessary, useful, or desirable.

For ourselves, there are a few things we understand. We understand that human existence has a purpose, a high and solemn purpose ; that man is placed here by his Maker to gain an end, and is morally bound to seek that end at every moment, in all things, and in every act of his life, however great, however little. We understand, also, that it is necessary that we know this end, that we be placed on our guard against every thing that would divert us from it, and exhorted, stimulated, aided to gain it ; and, furthermore, that whatever serves this purpose, whether oral teachings and admonitions, or books, essays, scientific treatises, poetic chants, scenic representations, music, architecture, pictures, statues, are for that reason valuable, desirable. But beyond this we see nothing useful, nothing not undesirable, vain, or hurtful, the offspring of the world, the flesh, or the devil.

Now, we apprehend that letters, only in so far as they serve, and for the simple reason that they serve, this purpose, are not what our people generally mean, or fancy they mean, by literature. Letters in this sense are moral, religious, social, political, refer to man's duties in some one or all of the relations in which he is placed by his Maker, and tend by all their in-

fluence to render all particular duties subordinate, and their discharge subservient to the one great and all-absorbing duty of loving God above all things, with the whole heart and soul, and our neighbours as ourselves, in him and for him. But, if we are not much mistaken, what the world means, or fancies it means, by literature is something which is independent of all moral, religious, or social doctrines, and may be read with equal pleasure and profit by all men, whatever their religion, their ethical code, or their political system. It is something which inculcates no doctrine, instructs man in no particular truth, and urges to the performance of no particular duty. Back and independent of all that relates to man's belief and duties as a moral, religious, and social being, it is assumed that there is a broad and rich field for the man of letters, and the culture of that broad and rich field yields literature proper. But our difficulty in understanding what is meant by this arises from the fact that this supposed field is purely imaginary, an "airy nothing," to which even the poet, with "his eye in a fine frenzy rolling," cannot give "a local habitation and a name." A general literature, which teaches nothing special, is as unreal as man without men, the race without individuals. The *genus*, for us human beings at least, is real only in the *species*; what has no specific meaning has for us no meaning at all, and is as if it were not.

Books which mean nothing are nothing, and are to be treated as nothing. But books which do mean something necessarily mean something specifically related to man as a moral, religious, or social being; and to mean any thing valuable, their meaning must either throw some light on man's duties under some one or all of these relations, or exhort, stimulate, or aid him to perform them. Turn the matter over, disguise it, as you will, use all the big words in the language, be as profound, as eloquent, as poetical as you can, and this is the simple, sober truth. Man is a being whose existence has a purpose, whose life has duties, and his whole business is to learn the former and fulfil the latter. He has no time, no strength, no right to consult any thing else, and whatever is not related to the one or the other has and can have no significance for him.

Grant this,—and we envy no man who will deny it,—and literature can be looked upon only as a subordinate affair. It is not a question of primary importance, and there may be circumstances in which it is of no importance at all. In itself considered, literature is not necessarily a good or an evil; but

is the one or the other only according to its quality, and the purpose it is made to serve. For its own sake, it is no more commendable or desirable than any other worldly possession. The common notions on this head, which revived with the Revival of Letters, as it is called, in the fifteenth century, are pure heathenism ; and these notions, we are sorry to say, are not confined to the Protestant world, which may claim them by right of inheritance. Even some Catholics, without reflection, give in to them, and we have been not a little scandalized by M. Audin's *History of Luther*, and especially by some extracts we have seen from his *Life of Leo the Tenth*. No Protestant could surpass him in his depreciation of the Middle Ages, or in his ecstasies over the *Renaissance*. We doubt not the purity of his motives, or the sincerity of his zeal ; but to undertake to gain a momentary triumph to Catholicity by a principle of defence which was disapproved yesterday, and must be abandoned to-morrow, is as unwise as it is sad. The Church speaks through all ages in the same severe and inflexible language, and never turns aside from her direct course, either at the opposition of enemies or the solicitations of friends. The "classical" infatuation of even Churchmen in the fifteenth century, and the first half of the sixteenth, is excusable, for they had in spite of it splendid attainments, noble qualities, and solid virtues ; but to make that infatuation itself a virtue, and to set it forth as one of the glories of the Church as the Spouse of God and Mother of the faithful, is to suffer one's self to be overpowered by the spirit of our times, and to forget for a moment that faith and piety are not to be measured by their relation to literature and art.

To the old heathen philosophers, — men who had cast off their national superstitions, but who had only a feeble belief even in the existence of God, and no abiding hope of an hereafter, weary of the world, disgusted with its vanities, and too wise to be seduced by its honors and distinctions, — literature, what they termed philosophy, was, no doubt, useful as a relief from the burdens of existence, as a retreat and a solace. One easily feels, while reading, Cicero's eloquent discoursing in praise of philosophy. The great object with these old philosophers, whatever the school to which they belonged, was to devise the means of making life as tolerable as it could be. Life was empty. It came, no one could say whence or wherefore, and its issue was into night and eternal silence. It was the part of wisdom to seize the present moment, and to

make the most of it. Of all the sources of consolation open to them, especially in old age, the most respectable and efficacious was the tranquil pursuit of letters. This removed them from the cares and vexations of the world, the turmoils of the camp, and the intrigues and rivalries of the court, soothed their passions, protected them from perturbation, and secured them a measure of repose, of serenity, and peace. To men in our day whose want of faith and hope is the same as theirs, letters are, no doubt, the readiest and safest resort. We can easily understand that men who have no faith in God as the author of grace, who have lost all hope of a future life, in the Christian sense, who have come to regard heaven and hell as mere fables which served to amuse the infancy of the race, and to whom life appears once more what it did to the old pagan philosopher, should feel existence a burden, and the need of something to fill up the vacancy in their hearts, to absorb the activity of their minds, to tranquillize their passions, and relieve, in some degree, the gloom which to them necessarily settles over man and the universe. To them, as to the saint, though for a different reason, the world with all its interests is vanity, yea, less than vanity and nothing. Darkness is behind them; darkness is before them. There is nothing to live for. Existence has no end or aim, and, if relief is not obtained from some source, it becomes too literally intolerable, and men with their own hands, to a fearful extent, cut its thread. Some plunge into the dissipation of the senses; others into that of the sentiments, and annoy us with their Utopian dreams of moral or social meliorations; and others, perhaps the least foolish, betake themselves to the quiet and tranquillizing pursuits of literature.

It is as a relief, as a solace, that literature is mainly recommended by the moderns, as well as the ancients, and it is to wants like these we have indicated that what is reckoned as literature, from the pagan classics down to the last new novel, addresses itself. It takes and studies to adapt itself to the old heathen view of life. This undeniable fact is not unworthy of being meditated, and if meditated might help us to form a tolerably correct estimate of what the world calls literature, and of the importance of devoting ourselves to its cultivation. Are we required to reproduce heathenism, and to provide for the old pagan views of life, the old pagan state and temper of individuals and society? Are we, like the old pagan philosopher, to think only of a solace for the cares and burdens of exist-

ence, and to confine ourselves to those resources only which were open to him? Has not the Gospel brought life and immortality to light, thrown a new coloring over all things, dissipated the darkness behind us and the darkness before us, and opened to us resources from the burdens of existence, the vanities of the world, the vacancy of thought, the listlessness of effort, the perturbations of the passions, and the solicitations of the senses, of which he knew nothing, and which for his blindness, unbelief, and despair had no existence?

We live under the Gospel, and we insist upon our right to try all things by the Christian standard. Under the Gospel, no man has the need or the right to resort even to letters as a relief from the burdens of existence, a solace for the troubles and afflictions of life, or as a means of personal enjoyment. The pleasures of intellect, of taste, and imagination may be less hurtful than those of the senses, but there is no more virtue in seeking the one than there is in seeking the other; and though he who seeks the one may make a better calculation than he who devotes himself to the other, neither can claim to have risen to the lowest degree of Christian morality. Hence, literature, either in author or reader, can never be sought by a Christian for its own sake, nor for the sake of the pleasures of wit, taste, and imagination it may bring. No Christian man can esteem it or cultivate it for the old heathenish reasons still too often urged, and a literature for those reasons, and adapted to meet them, he not only does not desire, but looks upon as a positive evil. Such literature, and he includes within it the most admired productions of ancient and modern genius, however highly he may appreciate them under the relation of form, he believes to be incapable of contributing any thing good, in the Christian sense, either to individuals or to the world at large; he even believes it likely to do great harm, for it takes a false view of life, and in all cases springs from man's forgetfulness of his real relations to his Maker, of the real purpose of his being, or from a revolt against the law imposed on him by his Sovereign for his governance, and the desire to find a resource independent of that appointed, in his infinite wisdom, by our good Father, and which it is against our true interest we should find or resort to.

Nevertheless, though in the popular sense, if sense it be, we have and can have no respect for mere literature, there is a sense—a sense we began by hinting—in which we prize letters, and can go as far as any of our countrymen in

praising or cultivating them. We are by no means among those who hold that a man, unable to read, is necessarily deprived of all good ; nor are we in the habit of estimating the intelligence and virtue of a community by the number of its members who have or who have not mastered the spelling-book. There are blockheads who can read, write, and even cipher ; and of the amount of intelligence actually possessed by the great majority of those who have graduated at our common schools, we should perhaps be surprised, were we to inquire, to find how little has been acquired by their own reading. The proportion of those having a good common education, who are able to read with profit a serious book on any important subject, is much smaller than is commonly imagined. There is, unhappily, amongst us no little senseless cant on the subject of education, which we owe in no small degree to certain English, Scotch, and French unbelievers, who were kind enough some years since to visit us for the benevolent purpose of enlightening the natives, or, as George Combe, Esq., of Edinburgh, expressed it, in his opening lecture in this city on his favorite humbug, Phrenology, to "sow" among us "the seeds of civilization." The principal of these were Frances Wright, Owen, father and son, R. L. Jennings, and William Phiquepal. These felt sure, that, if they could once get a system of universal education established throughout the country, which should pass over religion in silence, and teach knowledge, they would soon be able to convert all our churches and meeting-houses into Halls of Science, and our people generally into Free Inquirers. In furtherance of their plan, they organized among us a secret association, very much on the plan of the Carbonari in Europe. How far the organization extended, and whether it yet subsists or not, we are unable to say, for our personal connection with it was short, and has long since ceased altogether ; but it might be not uninteresting to inquire how much of the cant about education and the irreligious direction education has received of late, and which so scandalizes the Christian, are due to its influence. However this may be, and however little we are disposed to give in to the nonsense which is constantly babbled about education, we still prize education, rightly understood, as highly as do any of our countrymen. The question with us is of the quality before the quantity. A bad education is worse than none, as error is always worse than simple ignorance. But let the education be of the right sort, be that which instructs, prepares,

and strengthens the pupil for the prompt and faithful discharge of all the duties which pertain to his state in life, and the more we have of it the better.

So of literature. Literature, in our sense of the term, is composed of works which instruct us in that which it is necessary for us to know in order to discharge, or the better to discharge, our duties as moral, religious, and social beings. Works which tend to divert us from these, which weaken the sense of their obligation, or give us false views of them, or false reasons for performing them, are bad, worse than none, though written with the genius of Byron, Moore, Goethe, Milton, Dante, or Shakspeare. Genius is respectable only when she plumes her wing at the cross, and her light dazzles to blind or to bewilder when not borrowed from the Source of light itself. No man, whose soul is not filled, whose whole being is not permeated, with the spirit of the Christian religion, can write even a spelling-book fit or safe to be used by a Christian people. But works written in exposition of the Christian faith, or of some one or all of our duties in any or all of our relations in life, and breathing the true Christian spirit; or works which tend to enlist our sensibilities, taste, imagination, and affections in the cause of truth and duty, though not in all cases, under all circumstances absolutely indispensable, are yet desirable, useful, and compose a literature honorable to the individuals or the nation creating, cultivating, or appreciating it.

Such a literature is, unquestionably, religious in its spirit, in its principles and tendencies; but this is its recommendation; for religion is not only the primary interest of mankind, but the sole interest, and includes in itself all subordinate interests, and what it does not include and identify with itself is no interest at all. Who says religion says every thing not sin or vanity. Yet this need frighten no one. A religious literature is no doubt grave and solemn, working the deep mines of thought, or plodding through piles of erudition; but it is also light and cheerful, tender and joyous, giving full play to wit and fancy, taste and imagination, feeling and affection. It ranges through heaven and earth, and gathers from every region flowers to adorn its song or gladden its music. It demands, indeed, the solemn purpose, the pure intention, the manly thought, and strong sense; but it delights in smiles, eschews the dark and gloomy, the sour and morose, and decks even the tomb with garlands of fresh-blown roses.

But such a literature is not produced with "malice pre-

pense." It is never produced when it is sought as the end, and we never show our wisdom in saying, — Go to, now, let us create a literature. On this point we must be permitted to quote a passage from an article on *American Literature*, which we wrote in 1838, as more likely to weigh with our countrymen generally than any thing we could write now.

"Moreover, we doubt whether we show our wisdom in making direct and conscious efforts to create an American literature. Literature cannot come before its time. We cannot obtain the oracle before the Pythoness feels the god. Men must see and feel the truth before they can utter it. There must be a necessity upon them before they will speak or write, at least before they will speak or write any thing worth remembering. Literature is never to be sought as an end. We cannot conceive any thing more ridiculous, than for the leading minds of a nation to set out consciously, gravely, deliberately, to produce a national literature. A real national literature is always the spontaneous expression of the national life. As is the nation, so will be its literature. Men, indeed, create it; not as an end, but as a means. It is never the direct object of their exertions, but a mere incident. Before they create it, they must feel a craving to do something to the accomplishment of which speaking and writing, poetry and eloquence, logic and philosophy, are necessary as means. Their souls must be swelling with great thoughts struggling for utterance, — haunted by visions of beauty they are burning to realize; their hearts must be wedded to a great and noble cause they are ambitious to make prevail, a far-reaching truth they would set forth, a new moral, religious, or social principle they would bring out and make the basis of actual life, and to the success of which speech, the essay, the treatise, the song, are indispensably necessary, before they can create a national literature.

"We feel a deep and absorbing interest in this matter of American literature; we would see American scholars in the highest and best sense of the term; and we shall see them, for it is in the destiny of this country to produce them; but they will come not because we seek them, and they will be produced not in consequence of any specific discipline we may prescribe. They will come when there is a work for them to do, and in consequence of the fact that the people are everywhere struggling to perform that work. How eloquently that man speaks! His words are fitly chosen; his periods are well balanced; his metaphors are appropriate and striking; his tones are sweet and kindling; for he is speaking on a subject in which his soul is absorbed; he has a cause he pleads, an idea he would communicate, a truth he would make men feel, an end he would carry. He is speaking out for truth,

for justice, for liberty, for country, for God, for eternity ; and Humanity opens wide her ears, and her mighty heart listens. So must it be with all men who aspire to contribute to a national literature.

"The scholar must have an end, to which his scholarship serves as a means. Mr. Emerson and his friends seem to us to forget this. Forgetfulness of this is the reigning vice of Goethe and Carlyle. They bid the scholar make all things subsidiary to himself. He must be an artist, his sole end is to produce a work of art. He must scorn to create for a purpose, to compel his genius to serve, to work for an end beyond the work itself. All this which is designed to dignify art is false, and tends to render art impossible. Did Phidias create but for the purpose of creating a statue ? Was he not haunted by a vision of beauty which his soul burned to realize ? Had the old Italian masters no end apart from and above that of making pictures ? Did Homer sing merely that he might hear the sound of his own voice ? Did Herodotus and Thucydides write but for the sake of writing, and Demosthenes and Cicero speak but for the purpose of producing inimitable specimens of art ? Never yet has there appeared a noble work of art which came not from the artist's attempt to gain an end separate from that of producing a work of art. Always does the artist seek to affect the minds or the hearts of his like, to move, persuade, convince, please, instruct, or ennoble. To this end he chants a poem, composes a melody, laughs in a comedy, weeps in a tragedy, gives us an oration, a treatise, a picture, a statue, a temple. In all the masterpieces of ancient and modern literature, we see the artist has been in earnest, a real man, filled with an idea, wedded to some great cause, ambitious to gain some end. Always has he found his inspiration in his cause, and his success may always be measured by the magnitude of that cause, and the ardor of his attachment to it." — *Boston Quarterly Review*, Vol. II. pp. 22 — 25.

There are a few turns of expression in this which we should now avoid, but the principle is sound, and applicable not merely to American literature, but to literature in general, if either is to have any significance. In writing, whatever the work, the end for which we write must always be above and beyond that of making a book, or a contribution to the literature of the nation or the world. The book, treatise, dissertation, essay, address, poem, must always be held as a means to an end, and be adopted because, time, place, and persons considered, it is the only, or at least the fittest, means of gaining it. The author must will the means only in willing the end ; and it must be the end, not the means, that moves him, fills his soul, captivates his heart, unlocks his thoughts, and compels him to

write or sing. As men become filled with the strong desire of realizing ends to which literature directly or indirectly contributes, they will resort to it ; and as they become filled with a sense of their obligation to seek the true end, or to fulfil the real purpose, of life, they will, in proportion as there is occasion, produce, with more or less success, the kind of literature which is desirable, and the only kind which it is not better to be without.

The end to be sought in literary effort is determined by God himself, and we have no option about it, except to consult it under that particular aspect which is most consonant to our special vocation, individual talent, genius, and taste. But in seeking the end Almighty God appoints, under one or another aspect, we are at liberty, nay, are bound, to use all diligence to adapt our means to it, to make them as effectual as possible in gaining it. Under this point of view the question of form becomes important, and is never to be neglected. All our faculties, even our sensibilities, taste, fancy, imagination, wit, and humor, were given us for a purpose, and are proper to be exercised, used,—only not to be exercised and used for their own sake, for low, worthless, or sinful ends, but for God, for the great and solemn purpose of life itself. Christianity commands total self-denial ; but the self-denial it commands is moral, not physical,—the moral annihilation, not the physical annihilation, of ourselves. We retain as Christians all our faculties, essential qualities, and properties as men, none of which are bad in themselves,—for nothing bad ever came from the hand of the Creator ; but we retain and exercise them no longer for their own sakes, or for the sake of ourselves, or the pleasure which results from their exercise. We retain and exercise them only for God. We live, but we live not for ourselves. The self-denial is the denial of self as an end, and the substitution, as the end of existence, as the end of all exertion, of God in the place of self. It is, indeed, something more than the mere subordination of self to God, worldly motives to religious motives ; for we are to love God not only supremely, above all things, but exclusively, and therefore are to love ourselves and our neighbours only in him and for him. Nevertheless, denying or annihilating self as the end or motive, and referring all to God, our nature remains physically in all its strength, and all our faculties are good, and to be exercised in their appropriate sphere and degree ; and, in point of fact, they are never so active, so powerful, so ef-

ficient, as when diverted from all selfish ends, elevated by grace to divine ends, and exercised for God and for God alone. True religion strengthens the intellect as well as the will, and purifies the taste in purifying the heart. The power which men of the world seem to find in those who forget God, and think and speak only of what is human, is, in fact, only weakness. It is the fool who says in his heart, — "God is not"; and all our faculties run to waste and become unproductive in proportion as we remove from God, in whom we live, move, and are.

In seeking to subject literature to the empire of religion, we are far from seeking to deprive it of any of its power, its variety, extent, delicacy, or grace. We are seeking to provide for these in a higher degree, to give to literature itself a higher order of excellence. Form may still be studied, and must be; and the more truly beautiful and appropriate it is rendered, all the better. Religion looks with no favor on the literary sloven. What is worth doing at all is worth doing well, and no man has the right to send out a literary production, great or small, without having made it as perfect in its kind as possible in his circumstances, and with the other duties of his vocation. Crude and hasty productions, on which the author bestows no thought, and which he makes no effort to mature and perfect, are reprehensible under a moral as well as under a literary point of view. Accomplished scholarship, wide and varied erudition, science in its deepest principles and minutest details, are never to be depreciated, but sought, though not for their own sake. The past may be explored, the present surveyed, all nature, moral, intellectual, social, physical, investigated, experimented, and its facts collected and classified, the boundless regions of fancy and imagination may be traversed and laid under contribution, and should be, so far as requisite or useful to the improvement or perfection of the work on which we are engaged. No time, no labor, no patience, no research, is to be spared, when requisite to the accomplishment, or better accomplishment, of the ends we have in view, and which religion imposes or sanctions. Even the old classics, so far as they can aid in the improvement or perfection of the literary form, where the improvement and perfection of the form is sought only for the purpose of subserving the cause of truth or virtue, by rendering our works better adapted to the ends for which they are designed, may be studied, and, no doubt, with profit; for under the relation of form they are unsurpassed, and not to be surpassed. To the pure all things are pure.

The only restriction laid on the scholar or the author is a restriction on his motives, that whatever he does he do it from religious motives, for the sake of subserving the great and solemn purpose of existence. Religion, therefore, while it restricts the will, the intention, the motive, by the law of God, leaves as wide a margin for the display of the powers and capacities of the human mind, and for the production of a free, pure, rich, graceful, pleasing, influential, and soul-stirring literature, as the maddest of the modern worshippers of humanity can possibly wish.

Now it is clear to all who are not stark blind, that before a literature like the one we commend can be created or flourish, or even be esteemed, men must be Christians ; and therefore that the effort should never be directly for the literature, but to make men Christians. It is only a Christian literature that is desirable or allowable. The dominion of the world belongs to Christ, to whom belong all things. All things are his by virtue of his own proper divinity, his consubstantiality with the Father ; all are his by inheritance, for as the Only Begotten Son of the Father he is heir of all things ; all are his by the gift of the Father ; and all are his by his own conquest, effected by his voluntarily consenting to become man, his voluntary sufferings and death, by which he overcame death and hell, and rose again and led captivity itself captive. We have, therefore, no complaisance to show to unbelievers or their literature. They and their literature are out of the normal order, and have no right to the least favor or indulgence. They have no rights in modern society. Modern society is bound by the law of God to be Christian, and the only appropriate literature of a Christian society is a Christian literature. Christian literature is, then, the only literature which has any right to be, and therefore the only literature for which provision can rightfully be made. But a Christian literature obviously can be produced only by Christians. Men do not gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles. The great question even as to literature, then, as well as to religion, is that of making men Christians. Literature may be safely left to itself. It must be produced by Christians ; and in proportion as men turn their attention to Christianity, become filled with its spirit, and find literature necessary or useful to its purposes, they will produce it, and only in that proportion.

The special question of American literature cannot now detain us long. The ends for which literature is needed, the

principles on which it must rest, and the spirit which must inform it, are and can be peculiar to no nation, but, like all true religion and morality, nay, like all genuine science and art, are catholic ; national life will and cannot but affect the form and coloring, but the more free the literature is from all national or individual idiosyncrasies, the more perfect it is. Whatever is narrow, contracted, sectarian, is, however we may tolerate it, defective, never to be sought or approved. No doubt, each nation has its peculiar wants, and its peculiar modes or habits of thought and feeling, which to some extent are to be consulted and addressed ; but that which is addressed to them should be peculiar to no particular time or place, but universally true and applicable in its principle. It is not necessary or proper to say the same things and use the same arguments to all sorts of persons. Where the social order is unsound, oppression reigns, and man is deprived of his rights and means of well-being, it may be necessary on the one hand to preach submission, resignation, and on the other to demand judicious and salutary reforms ; where liberty is denied, where the laws have no dominion, and the people are subjected to mere will and arbitrariness, it may be necessary and proper to call for freedom, for the concession and guaranty of rights ; but where, on the other hand, liberty is already excessive, where legal order hardly exists, where we hear constantly of the *rights*, seldom or never of the *duties*, of man, and where the tendency is to political and social dissolution, it is necessary to call out for legal order and to insist on authority, subordination, submission, loyalty. So, again, where unbelief, heresy, and schism are rife, and men contend that they are not to be held accountable to the law of God for their thoughts and words, if in fact for their deeds, it becomes necessary to show the vanity, the nothingness, the sinfulness of all that sets itself up against God, or that refuses to submit in thought, word, and deed to his law, and to bring out in bold relief the grounds of religious faith, and to exhibit and defend in clear, earnest, and unflinching tones the truth, beauty, excellence, and authority of the Church of God ; but where all nominally assent to the truth, profess the true religion, acknowledge, in words, their obligation to obey it, we need only to labor to make men practise their religion, and adorn it by well-ordered lives and godly conversation. The same principle must govern us in relation to all other questions. In meeting the peculiar wants of our age or country, we must adapt our means to the end, use such forms of address, adopt

such modes of expression, and such peculiar arguments and illustrations, as will render us most easily understood and most persuasive; and this will unquestionably give a local coloring to our literary productions, and determine their age and country. But even in doing this, nothing in itself local or temporary is ever to be urged. Whether we preach submission or reform, demand order or liberty, defend religion against the unbelieving or the tepid, the heretical or the scandalous, the principles we adopt, the doctrines we set forth, the ends we insist upon, must be of all times and places, peculiar to no age, country, or individual. So far as adapting our literature to our peculiar needs as a nation is producing a national literature, a national literature is necessary and proper, but no farther; for if the literature be so adapted, it makes no manner of difference whether it be a home production or a foreign importation. American literature, as such, then, can demand no special attention.

We cannot give in to the cant so common about American authors, and the propriety and necessity of giving them a special preference and encouragement. We have no respect for mere professional authors, whether American or not. An author class, whose vocation is simple authorship, has no normal functions, in either the religious or the social hierarchy. Our Lord, in organizing his Church, made no provision for professional authors, and in the original constitution of society they have no place assigned them. They have and can have no normal existence, for the simple reason that literature is never an end, and can never be rightfully pursued save as a means. Authors we respect, when they are authors only for the sake of discharging or better discharging duties which devolve on them in some other capacity. Authors whose profession is authorship are the lineal descendants of the old Sophists, and are not a whit more respectable than their pagan ancestors. We can respect Cicero, Cæsar, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, because authorship was not their profession, and was resorted to only as incidental to the main business of their lives; we can and do reverence the Fathers of the Church, for they wrote their immortal works not for the sake of writing them, but as subsidiary to the discharge of the solemn duties of their ministry; we also honor Calhoun or Webster when either publishes a speech, because it is intended to subserve the purposes of their vocation, and that vocation is not authorship. We call no man a professional author, though nearly his whole life be devoted to

authorship, who merely uses authorship as a means of effecting the ends of a legitimate vocation ; and in speaking against authorship, it is only against it as it is itself adopted as a vocation or a profession.

We say, very frankly, that we regard an author class, or a class of professional authors, whose vocation is simply authorship, not only as not desirable, but as a positive nuisance. They constitute one of the greatest pests of modern society. Nothing can be conceived more ruinous to the state, more destructive of faith and manners, of all that constitutes the worth or glory of society or individuals, than a class of men of which your Bulwers, Byrons, Shelleys, Dickenses, Victor Hugos, Balzacs, Eugene Sues, Paul de Kocks, and, pardoning the bull, George Sands, not to mention a whole host of Germans and some Americans, are distinguished specimens. Such a class is a moral excrescence on the body of society, and it would be well if some Christian Socrates would arise to treat its members as the pagan Socrates did the Sophists of old. It is not for the interest of our country, nor of any country, whether we speak of moral and social or of religious interest, to support or encourage such a class ; and they who complain of the want of encouragement extended to professional authors hardly know what they do. Too much encouragement is already extended to them, as the multitude of our petty novels, Knickerbockers, Graham's Magazines, Lady Books, Saturday Couriers, and Olive Branches can abundantly testify. Every dapper little fellow, every sentimental young lady, or not young, married unhappily, or despairing of getting married, who can scribble a few lines each beginning with a capital letter, or dash off a murderous tale about love, or an amorous tale about murder, is encouraged to turn author by profession, and finds no lack of opportunity to aid in deluging the land with nonsense, cant, sentimentality, sensuality, obscenity, and blasphemy. For decency's sake let us hear no more of professional authors, of the liberal provision which should be made for them, the indifference of the public, the timidity or penuriousness of booksellers.

The *Literary World* takes a different view of authors from this, and, wishing to encourage American literature and American authors, in common with many respectable individuals, contends for an international copyright law. The actual effect of such a law, if established, we cannot pretend to indicate, for it is a subject we have not investigated. Mr. Charles Dick-

ens, lugging it in so impertinently and in such bad taste in all his replies to the civilities our citizens good-naturedly extended to him, when he visited us a few years ago, so disgusted us, that we have never been able to hear of an international copyright since, without a certain nausea at the stomach ; and we make no doubt, that if Mr. Dickens had staid at home, and British authors had remained silent, such a law would before now have been enacted by Congress. We, as a people, though singularly free from national prejudices, are very reluctant to legislate at the call or the dictation of foreigners. But be all this as it may, we have no disposition to support an international copyright law for the sake of encouraging our authors ; yet if such a law, by raising the price of books, would exert some influence in diminishing the quantity of the wretched and demoralizing literature now poured in upon us from the English press, we should regard its passage as a national blessing. We detest cheap literature, for such literature is necessarily prepared for and addressed to the tastes of the mob ; and, though a good republican and attached as strongly as any man to the institutions of our country, we have a sovereign detestation of the rule of the mob, in politics, morals, religion, or literature. Any means, not unlawful in themselves, which could be adopted to diminish the mass of cheap literature, and to check its production by diminishing the demand for it or the ability to obtain it, would receive the countenance of every man who understands and loves the true interests of his country. Whether an international copyright law would have any effect this way, we are unable to say ; but we fear it would not have much.

In conclusion, we confess that we see little that can be done in a direct way in relation to literature, either in checking the growth of a corrupt and licentious literature, or in the production of a pure and wholesome literature. Mere professional authors may and should be left to take care of themselves, and there need be no tears shed over their fate, save for individual sufferings ; others must be left to choose their own time and place to speak, and they may safely trust to their position, or their cause, to sustain them. As literature in general, and American literature in particular, is no primary want of individuals or of society, we may leave it to take care of itself, and trouble ourselves no further about it than to guard, as far as possible, against its corruptions.

Scholars, educated men, in the fullest and highest sense of the word, are always a want, a necessity, and in no country

more than in our own ; for in no country have the mass of the people so direct a voice in public affairs. It is all-important that there should be with us a large and highly educated class, far better educated than, under any possible circumstances, the bulk of the people can be, from which may be selected persons qualified to fill places of trust and influence. Too much attention cannot be paid to our higher schools and colleges. The best, in fact the only real, encouragement we can extend to American literature is to elevate the character of our colleges and universities, to place instruction on a more solid basis, and to make the course of studies more complete and more thorough. More time should be spent in the collegiate course, and young men should not be permitted to go forth as having finished their studies, when they are only able to commence them with credit. Let an effort be made to send out from our colleges and universities riper and more thoroughly disciplined scholars. Let the people learn, if they can learn any thing, that a man is not fitted for high public trusts in the church, the state, or the army, in proportion to his want of education ; and let the senseless babble, of which we hear so much, about self-education and self-educated men, cease, and American literature will soon be placed on a solid and respectable footing.

It is well, no doubt, to look after the education of the people, and to introduce and sustain as perfect a system of common schools as can be devised ; but there is no greater folly than that of relying solely or chiefly on common school education. Do your best, with all your provisions and appliances, you cannot make the bulk of the people even tolerable scholars. The welfare of the many is unquestionably to be sought ; but it must needs be sought by the few, and the chief concern of a nation seeking the welfare of the many is therefore the education of the few. For these the highest standard of scholarship is necessary, and the most liberal provisions should be made. It would be well, if we had somewhere in the country a university proper, a university worthy of the name, to which the brightest and most promising of our youths, after graduating at our colleges, might be sent, and where they might reside some six or seven years and continue their studies. Such a university would soon raise the standard of scholarship, and in time we should have, in every department of literary, scientific, and public life, scholars worthy of the name, — masters, not mere pupils, who would be a credit to their age and country, and

from whom would descend a most salutary influence upon the people below them.

But this, it is objected, is anti-democratic, and you are false to your country in proposing it. And is every thing necessary and good, wise and prudent, to be forborne lest we appear to be anti-democratic? We have studied religion and history and philosophy to little purpose, if all good influences do not come from above, instead of below. The modern dreams of equality may appear delightful to generous youth and inexperience, but there is truth as well as point in the remark of old Chief Justice Parsons, "The young man who is not a democrat is a knave; the old man that is, is a fool." Establish and preserve equality of suffrage and eligibility, establish and maintain equality before the laws, — all the equality known to our institutions, — but there stop. That is all the equality desirable or attainable; and the sooner we all become convinced of that, the wiser shall we be, and the better will it be for our country. Society must subsist; it must provide for its own being, and, as Cromwell would say, even for its own "well-being"; and if it does, some are and must be greater than the rest; but not therefore necessarily better, happier, or more favored than the rest. The modern doctrine of equality is based on pride, and proceeds, not from a contempt of rank and distinction, but from an undue love of them. We see that in the nature of things all cannot share them, as all the crew cannot be captains, and so we resolve that there shall be no diversity of ranks or of positions. We look upon the distinguished few as specially favored, and hence our antipathy to every measure which seeks to benefit the many through the medium of the few. All this is very silly. The distinctions of this world are not worth counting, and we show our folly as much in seeking to destroy them as in seeking to obtain them. There are and must be diversities of rank and condition, and it is for the interest of each and of all that there should be; but it does not follow that it is more desirable to be in one than in another: —

"Act well your part; there all the honor lies."

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *General Evidences of Catholicity ; being the Substance of a Course of Lectures lately delivered in the Cathedral of St. Louis, Louisville.* By M. J. SPALDING, D. D. Louisville : Webb & Brother. 1847. 12mo. pp. 396.

THE author of this volume is the Very Reverend Dr. Spalding, of Louisville, Ky., a native Kentuckian, educated in the College of the Propaganda, Rome, and favorably known to the Catholic public by several able, learned, and eloquent essays in the United States Catholic Magazine, of which periodical he is one of the editors, — and more especially by a work, published some three years since, in review of D'Aubigné's *History of the Grand Reformation*. This review, though less a review of D'Aubigné than of the Reformation itself, is a work of solid merit, and one of the best essays on the character, the men, and the consequences to religion, morals, manners, and literature of the great Protestant rebellion, that are accessible to the general reader, and has gained the author a high reputation, both at home and abroad.

The work now before us will increase the reputation of the author as an able and eloquent divine, and give him a high rank among the popular defenders of the Catholic faith. The Lectures are marked by talent, learning, eloquence, a deep and tender piety, an ardent charity, earnest zeal, and a true Christian independence, and give us a popular, but solid and unanswerable, argument for our holy faith, — establishing beyond the possibility of contradiction, that the evidences for Catholicity and those of Christianity are not only parallel, but identical, and that whoever establishes the one establishes the other. Here and there, in the course of the work, we have detected an expression not perhaps quite exact, and now and then a sentence to which we might wish a different turn had been given ; but we have read the work with great interest and pleasure, with instruction and edification ; and we have no need to say that we warmly commend it to all who have the least desire to learn the way of salvation. To the sincere Protestant who wishes for the truth the book cannot fail to be of the highest utility, while Catholics themselves will find their faith refreshed and invigorated by its study, and themselves furnished with ready and solid replies to the various objections and cavils they are daily liable to hear urged against their Church by their heretical and scoffing neighbours. It is, after the works of the learned Bishop of Philadelphia, the most considerable contribution made to our Catholic literature, and we give it a thousand

welcomes, and pray to our Father in heaven that the life and health of the author may be long spared to us, and that this may prove but an earnest of still greater contributions which we are to expect from the same source.

A full review of the work, with an exposition of its plan, and general statement of what it has done, is due to the author, and we regret that we have no space for it in our present number; but we intend to recur to the work in our next Review, and to speak of it at length, and more worthily than we can in this brief notice. In the mean time, we commend the work heartily to our readers, as one which they will do well to read for themselves, and which they will find an excellent work to put into the hands of all such of their Protestant friends as are seriously disposed to seek the way of salvation.

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2. — *Perlen aus Jerusalem, ein katholisches Andachtsbuch.* Von P. ALEXANDER MARTIN. Mit drei lithographirten Ansichten aus Jerusalem. Boston: Gedruckt von Wilhelm Neeb. 1847. 32mo. pp. 280.

THESE are indeed pearls from Jerusalem, brought to us by one who is himself a pearl in our American Catholic Church, and who shows by his untiring zeal, his fidelity, and disinterestedness in the work of his ministry, that he, in very deed, sells all that he has, that he may purchase the priceless pearl of eternal life. The prayers, hymns, and devotions contained in the work, the author has brought with him from the Chapel of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, and are those which for a thousand years have been offered to our God by the pious worshippers in that holy place. The work is entitled to high merit in a simple literary point of view. Its contents, in great part, have never appeared in English, and are little known beyond the Holy City, except to the thousands of pilgrims who visit it to pray and worship where our Lord lived, suffered, and died, and rose again. But so far as we have examined, it is really one of the best prayer-books for private or public worship we are acquainted with, and we are not quite willing that our German brethren should have the exclusive enjoyment of it. We should like to see it done into English, and, if well done, it would soon become a favorite with the Catholic public. We copy the Preface.

“*Andächtiger Leser!*”

“Hier überreiche ich dir in der Form eines Gebetbuches einige christliche Kostbarkeiten, die ich zu Jerusalem gesammelt, und aus der h. Stadt mitgebracht habe. Ich nenne sie ‘Perlen aus Jerusalem’ weil es erkens kostbare Hebertliefer-

ungen sind, welche im Meere tausendjähriger Verwüstungen und Blutergießungen sich an den Felsen rechtsgläubiger Christenherzen zu Jerusalem erhalten haben, und weil es zweckens Gebete, Anmuthungen und Lieder sind, die schon seit vielen Jahrhunderten, so wie noch jetzt in der Kirche des h. Grabes J. C. zu Jerusalem aus dem Munde der armen verfolgten arabischen Katholiken und ihrer Pflegenden tagtäglich erschallen, und von denselben gleich einer kostbaren Perle vor den Entehrungen der Türken und Ketzer fortwährend bewahrt und beschützt werden müssen. Hierin aus Jerusalem nenne ich endlich dreitens mit Recht die dem Gebetbuche beigegebenen Bilder, weil sie drei der merkwürdigsten Orte aus der Leidensgeschichte Jesu darstellen, und dies so getreu, wie vielleicht noch kein Bild dieser Art. Denn sie wurden etwa nicht einer andern Zeichnung nachgemacht, sondern zu Jerusalem an der Stelle selbst von der Meisterhand eines deutschen Katholiken unter meinen Augen abgezeichnet, und zwar so genau daß jedes Fenster, ja fast jedes Gras, jeder Stein in denselben ausgedrückt ist.

„Mit diesem Bächlein in der Hand kannst du daher dich im Geiste recht lebendig nach Jerusalem versetzen, die h. Orte betrachten, welche dein leidender Jesus vom Garten Gethsemani bis zum Calvarienberge mit seinen blutigen Tritten geheiligt hat; von dort aus dich hinabgeben zu den frommen Bächtern des h. Grabes (Translataner) um neben ihnen an diesem h. Orte niederzutreten, und mit ihnen zu beten; kannst dann mit eben diesen Priestern sowohl, als auch mit den bedrängten arabischen Katholiken dich vereinigen, um in Procession die h. Geheimnisse zu besuchen, und dabei die nämlichen Gebete, die sie zu Gott hinaussenden, mitbeten, die nämlichen Lieder mitsingen, mit denen sie täglich Jesum unsern Erlöser preisen.

„Sollte dies wohl nicht manchem christlichen Herzen zur Freude dienen? Sollte dies wohl nicht wenigstens Etwas dazu beitragen, die Ehre Gottes und das Heil der Seelen zu befördern? Dies war wenigstens mein Zweck, mein Wunsch bei der Bearbeitung diese kleinen Wertes. Gott gebe hiezu sein Amen!

„Boston, im Februar 1847.

„P. X. R.“

When we add, that the work is published with the authority and recommendation of the Rt. Rev. the Bishop of Boston, we need say no more to commend it to all our Catholic brethren whose mother tongue is the German.

3. — 1. *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, to which are added a few Poems.* By ALEXANDER H. EVERETT. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1845. 12mo. pp. 563.

2. *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays.* By the same. Second Series. Boston: The same. 1846. 12mo. pp. 475.

THESE elegant and instructive volumes deserve a more extended notice than we are at the present moment able to give them. Mr. Everett, their distinguished author, we have no occasion to say, ranks high in our republic of letters, and as a contributor to the higher and more solid periodical literature of the country stands unsurpassed, if not unrivalled. He is a man of a richly cultivated mind, a scholar of varied and extensive attainments, a

deep and earnest thinker on moral, political, and philosophical subjects, a writer worthy of being studied for the purity of his diction, and the classic grace, ease, and repose of his style. His essays are free from all the usual faults of our American writers. They are never childish or bald, never feverish or florid, turgid or inflated, but calm and flowing, strong and clear, chaste and manly. No man among us has done more to check the tendency to extravagance and corrupting neologisms, and to keep our authors within the current of pure and genuine English style and diction.

Of Mr. Everett's poems we have not much to say ; but some of his translations from the German are very well done, show a correct appreciation of poetic beauty, and a command of poetic language not always to be found in translators of much higher pretensions. We have been particularly pleased with the translation of the *Spirit Land*, or Invocation to the second part of Goethe's *Faust*, *The Worth of Woman*, or, as we prefer to say, *Dignity of Woman*, from Schiller, and the *Spectre Bridegroom*, imitated from Bürger's *Leonora*. Among the purely literary articles, the one in which he proves the Spanish original of *Gil Blas* has interested us the most. It has always seemed to us that a work so peculiarly national in its spirit, tone, and coloring could not possibly have been written by any but a native Spaniard. Mr. Everett, we think, makes it clear that *Le Sage* was its translator, not its author. The philosophical essays compose a large part of the second series, and have great interest for us, both from their intrinsic importance, and from their carrying us back to the time when we enjoyed the personal intimacy of the author, and were ourselves all-engrossed with the questions they discuss. A few years ago, all minds here were turned to the discussion of metaphysical topics, and all the world were becoming philosophers. A change has come over the spirit of their dream now, and other tendencies and other topics have their hour. We do not always agree with Mr. Everett in his philosophical views, but we find him always sober, always free from cant and Transcendentalism, and though he may not always be sound, and though his tendencies to liberalism and rationalism are too decided, he is always sounder and more trustworthy than the authors he opposes. He never gives in his adhesion to modern pantheism, socialism, or progressivism ; and though he may sometimes yield too much to the popular speculations of the day, he is never a no-government man, never a radical at bottom, but in fact a legitimist in the true sense, and the supporter of law and order ; and, except in their indirect bearing on religion, his essays may in general be read with pleasure and profit, and in a country where so little is produced that a Catholic citizen is not obliged to condemn, they may even be commended as likely to exert a salutary influence.

4. — *A Protestant converted to Catholicity by her Bible and Prayer-book.* By MRS. FANNY MARIA PITTAR. Philadelphia : Henry M'Grath. 1847. 24mo. pp. 154.

THIS book bears a false title, if we are to credit the narrative itself ; for according to that Mrs. Pittar was converted, not by her Bible and prayer-book, as the title says, but by a Catholic friend and a Catholic bishop, aided by the grace of God ; and all the Bible and prayer-book had to do with her conversion was simply, that, after her eyes were opened to Catholic truth by other means, she was able to perceive it in the Bible, and some vestiges of it in the Book of Common Prayer. We could relate instances in which persons living far remote from all Catholics, never having had any intercourse with them, have been led, by reading the Protestant version of the Holy Scriptures, and with no other external means of knowing the faith of Catholics, to a knowledge and belief of Catholicity. Such persons we may say were converted by the Bible ; but to assume that a lady brought up in the Catholic city of Dublin, full of zeal against Catholics, and first led to the perception of Catholic truth by the conversation of a Catholic friend and the sermons of an eminent Catholic divine, was converted by her Bible and prayer-book, is quite too loose a way of speaking, and cannot fail to convey a false impression. Moreover, when works written in Ireland, where the word Protestant is almost exclusively applied to the members of the Anglican sect, are republished in this country, the editor should note the fact that the term is so applied ; for, according to American usage, the term Protestant is applied indiscriminately to all the sects, from the High Church Episcopalian down to the followers of Mr. Parker or William Henry Channing. Aside from these objections, the little work before us may be read with interest and with profit. It contains nothing very wonderful, nothing which it was absolutely incumbent upon the excellent authoress to publish to the world ; yet now it is published, we have no doubt it will do good. If Mrs. Pittar had waited a month or two longer, she would have come to the conclusion that God had wrought a blessed work in her soul, for which she could never sufficiently thank him ; but she would most likely have also concluded that she had nothing more remarkable or edifying to relate than have the great majority of those who have been brought from the sects to the Church. She writes with warmth, with genuine feeling, in a good spirit, and shows that she was not disobedient to the heavenly vision, but prepared to obey it at any sacrifice. Still she writes in the excitement and flush of her first impressions ; and we prefer for ourselves the calm and subdued tone of the practical Catholic, long familiar with the faith, and long accustomed to be nourished with the Bread of Life.

5. — *The Library of American Biography.* Conducted by JARED SPARKS. Second Series. Vols. XII. and XIII. Boston : Little & Brown. 1847.

THIS series of works is continued in its usual spirit, and without any falling off in interest or ability. We wish the biographies of distinguished Americans could have been written from the Catholic point of view, in the spirit of Catholic faith and piety, for then they would have been not only interesting but edifying; but since that could not be, or cannot be at present, we know not that they could be written under better influences than those of Mr. Sparks, who, if no Catholic Christian, is no Protestant bigot.

The two volumes before us contain the lives of Edward Preble and William Penn, Daniel Boone and Benjamin Lincoln. The life of Commodore Preble is written by Lorenzo Sabine, an author who is wholly unknown to us. He appears to write with candor, and to aim to be just and true. We wish, however, the life of the Commodore, one of the founders of our navy, and earliest contributors to our naval glory, had been committed to abler hands, and to a man brought up in a more Christian school of morals. To praise a boy for disobedience to his father is not the best comment on the text, "Children, obey your parents," nor the best way to correct what is a crying evil among us,—the want of reverence in children for their superiors. The strictures on the naval policy of Mr. Jefferson's administration are unjust, if we accept his peace policy. Mr. Jefferson and his party wished to prevent this country from ever engaging in a career of foreign war and conquest, and to tie up its hands so that it could never fight except when actually invaded. Hence their opposition to a naval establishment. We for ourselves are a Jeffersonian, so far as to be firmly and unalterably opposed to every war of conquest; but we can conceive many cases in which a foreign war is necessary, and true policy would forbid suffering the war to be brought to our own doors. Experience has proved that Mr. Jefferson and his friends, though admirable speculatists, were not always remarkably sound or wise as practical statesmen; and we suppose there is no point on which it will be more generally admitted that they egregiously blundered, than on the navy. But Mr. Jefferson and his early partisans have gone to their final reckoning, and we can see no good, now that the country is generally agreed as to the wisdom of sustaining a naval establishment, in raking up old controversies, and reviving old passions. We had enough of this in the life of Decatur, by Captain Mackenzie, the executioner of Spencer, Cromwell, and Small.

The life of William Penn, by Mr. George E. Ellis, Unitarian

minister of Charlestown, in this State, is written with ability, in a liberal tone, and with much patience of research, and is as unexceptionable as we could expect. The author has a high estimate of William Penn, but he does not deify him; he does no more than justice to him as a man of the world, and the founder of the colony of Pennsylvania; but though he does not give in to all his Quaker fanaticism, he shows quite too much enthusiasm for his religious character. The Quakers are nothing but a sect of Theosophists, or mystical Deists, whom the devil suffers to pursue the even tenor of their way, and whom God rewards with a good share of this world's goods, due to their worldly wisdom, virtue, and shrewdness. But being unbaptized, and despising the sacrament of faith, they cannot be included, even nominally, in the pale of Christendom; and, though they have been eminent for many of the natural virtues, their influence on society, under a religious point of view, has been destructive to a degree which could hardly have been expected from the paucity of their numbers. There is no disguising the fact, that Quakerism, few as the avowed Quakers really are, is the reigning doctrine of this country, and is the greatest hindrance to the spread of Gospel truth that can be named. We wish Mr. Ellis, who has had opportunities enough of learning at least the essential doctrines of Christianity, had been less lavish in his praise of the principal founder of a sect that has done and is doing so much to obliterate every distinctive feature of our holy religion.

The life of Daniel Boone is quite interesting; but it strips the character of that bold and hardy pioneer of the greater part of the romance with which popular tradition has invested it. The life of Benjamin Lincoln, a brave officer in the Revolution, who distinguished himself at the battle of Saratoga, we have not read; but as it is written by the editor of the *North American Review*, Mr. Francis Bowen, it needs no recommendation from us.

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6. — *Tales Explanatory of the Sacraments.* By the Authoress of "Geraldine, a Tale of Conscience," and "The Young Communicant." Philadelphia: William J. Cunningham. 1847. pp. 151.

THESE tales are published with the approbation of the Rt. Rev. the Bishop of Philadelphia, and are therefore to be presumed to contain nothing contrary to faith or good morals. They are, in fact, considering they are written by a lady, remarkable for correctness of doctrine and exactness of language. As stories they are quite interesting, perhaps too intensely so for the sacred pur-

pose for which they were written. Personally, we are far from liking the plan of mixing up truth of doctrine with the fictions of the imagination, but it is the fashion of the day.

7. — *The Catholic Choralist*. To be issued regularly every Two Months ; to contain a Choice Collection of Catholic Music, viz. Litanies, Hymns, Masses, &c., designed for Choirs. The arrangement will be under the direction of an able Professor of Music, who will use every means to make it deserving of patronage. Price, Twenty-five cents per Number. Philadelphia : W. J. Ashe. 1847.

THIS musical publication is very neatly executed, and does great credit to the printer. Of the contents of the number before us we cannot speak in terms so flattering as we could wish. There is a general want of fulness of harmony. The *Stabat Mater*, said, on what authority we know not, to be sung in the Pope's chapel, is very well ; but we suspect, if Mozart were here, he would be not a little surprised to find the passage taken from his *Magic Flute* — originally composed, if we recollect aright, to be sung by a half-idiot with a bell accompaniment — arranged as a sacred piece to be sung by our choirs. Are the singers in our choirs expected to accompany themselves with bells, or to personate half-idiots, when singing the praises of God, or a hymn to the Blessed Virgin ? The less we say of the *Tantum Ergo*, the better. We wish well to an undertaking of the sort Mr. Ashe promises, for a really choice collection of Catholic music, placed within the reach and means of our choirs, is needed and would be a public benefit ; but we hope the editor of this proposed work will hereafter change somewhat the plan indicated in this number, and give us *religious* choral music from Catholic masters, either of the German or Italian school, and if he does so, he will deserve patronage and not fail to receive it.

8. — *The Following of Christ, in Four Books*. By THOMAS A KEMPIS. Translated from the Original Latin by the Rt. Rev. and Ven. RICHARD CHALLONER, D. D., V. A. To which are added Practical Reflections and a Prayer at the End of each Chapter. Translated from the French. By the Rev. JAMES JONES. Second American Edition. Baltimore : J. Murphy. 1845. 48mo. pp. 547.

To speak of the merits of *The Following of Christ* would be almost like speaking of the merits of the New Testament, with

which it may, without irreverence, be bound up. It is only necessary to notice the edition before us, which is an exceedingly beautiful one, and is sold at a price, the publisher informs us, which makes it, for the amount of matter it contains, the cheapest book ever printed in this country. We find only one fault. The work is ascribed to Thomas à Kempis as author, without the least intimation of any doubt of the fact. We think the evidence is clear, that À Kempis was only its transcriber; that the book was in existence before his time; and that it was in all probability written, not as the French critics say, by Gerson, the Chancellor of the University, but by the Abbot Gersen, as contend the Italians, with Pope Pius the Seventh at their head. But, however this may be, Murphy's edition of the work is the best in this country which we have seen.

9. — *The Devout Communicant ; or, Pious Meditations and Aspirations for Three Days before and Three Days after receiving the Holy Eucharist.* By the Rev. P. BAKER, O. S. F. Revised, with Additions. Baltimore : F. Lucas, Jr. 1847. 24mo. pp. 232.

AN excellent work, to which the publisher has added morning and evening exercises, devotions for mass, &c. The hymns of the Church, which are annexed, "done into English," really require to be done over again, unless we would have them a standing disgrace to us. What is the reason that we cannot have translations of our hymns for which we need not blush, or that we must have such as remind those of us who have been Protestants of Sternhold and Hopkins, or the early New England metrical version of the Psalms, — the first book ever printed in New England ?

* * THE author of *Pauline Seward* has represented himself to us as aggrieved by our remark, in our last Review, that the romance of his work was "hashed up from Bulwer, James, Dickens, and others"; for he says he had never read the authors named prior to writing his own work. He has taken our remark too literally. We did not mean to say, that he had actually, as a matter of fact, taken the romance of his work from those authors, but that it was precisely similar in its spirit, character, tendency, &c., to what is to be found in them, and may be read there in substance, as well as in *Pauline Seward*. We hope this explanation will be satisfactory to the author.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1847.

ART. I. — *The Exercise of Faith impossible except in the Catholic Church.* By W. G. PENNY, late Student of Christ Church, Oxford. Philadelphia: Henry M'Grath. 1847. 24mo. pp. 216.

MR. PENNY is a convert from Anglicanism, and a young man of great worth and promise. The little work he has given us here was for the most part written while he was passing into the Church, and retains some traces of his transition-state; but it indicates learning, ability, and a turn for scholastic theology not common in Oxford students. It is written in a free, pure, earnest spirit, mild but firm, and, though not always exact in thought or expression, is a very valuable controversial tract, and may, with slight reservations, be cheerfully recommended to all who are willing to seek for the truth, and to embrace it when they find it.

The recent converts from the Anglican Establishment are making large contributions to our English Catholic literature. We give their productions a cordial welcome, for, though they are in some respects immature, and not always critically exact, they breathe a free and earnest spirit, and are marked by a docile disposition, and a deep and tender piety. Nevertheless, the greater part of them are, perhaps, too local and temporary in their character to be of any general or permanent utility. They are almost exclusively confined to the controversy between their authors and their former High-church associates. Where that controversy is the only or principal one remaining between Catholics and Protestants, they are no doubt not only valuable, but all we could desire. Yet, after all, that controversy is not the important one; it affects, in reality, only a small por-

who have recently been converted, as from the hundreds of undistinguished individuals who have been gathered in, and whose names have not been gazetted. If we may say this of England, where distinguished individuals still count for something, much more may we say it of our own beloved country. When and where the people yield readily to the influence and example of their social chiefs, true wisdom may be to penetrate first of all into the palace and the castle, and labor to convert royalty and nobility ; but by no means can it be here in this country, where princes and nobles are at a discount, and the chiefs of the people are their chiefs only by being their slaves, consulting and exaggerating their tendencies. The controlling influences of modern society are in the lower instead of the higher ranks, — perhaps, in a religious point of view, with few exceptions, it has always been so. Ireland lost her princes and nobles, but she did not lose her faith ; because it had become identified with her national life, integral in her nationality, and she could no more part with the one than with the other. In seeking to restore an unbelieving or heretical country to the faith or the unity of the Church, if we may rely on the lessons of history, the true policy in general, and especially now and here, is to begin at the base of society, and seek first to convert the common people.

Believing, therefore, as we do, that the Church has been divinely commissioned to teach all nations, and wishing, as we are bound in charity to wish, to add this nation as another rich gem to her crown, it becomes our duty to study and ascertain the religious state and tendencies of the great body of the American people, properly so called. This may be a difficult and even a delicate task. It is not every one who can comprehend his own age and country, and there are not many who can do it at all, unless they have shared their passions, unless their own hearts have beaten in unison with theirs, and they have been raised by divine grace above them to a position from which they can overlook the *mêlée*, and calmly survey all the movements and evolutions going on below. The Catholic who has lived apart and studied only works written for other times and countries, as well as the Protestant whose vision has all his lifetime been contracted to his own petty sect, is very likely to mistake the true object of vision, or to see it only through a disturbing medium.

Catholicity is immovable and inflexible, one and the same always and everywhere ; for the truth never varies. He who

he must labor to make an impression on that portion of the American population which is in an especial sense the repository of peculiarly American thought, principles, passions, affections, traditions, and tendencies, — the indigenous portion, the least affected by foreign culture and influences ; and it is only in proportion as he reaches and gains the attention of these, that he can flatter himself that he is advancing in the work of converting the country.

These are not Episcopalians, nor distinguished individuals, whatever the sect to which they may appertain. The conversion of a very considerable number of distinguished individuals may take place with scarcely a perceptible effect on the great body of the American people ; because these individuals do not represent the general thought and tendency of the country ; because their example has little weight with the people at large ; and because they are, for the most part, under foreign rather than native influences. The peculiarly American people are democratic, and generally distrust whatever rises above the common level. Distinguished individuals count for less here than in any other country of the globe. With us the individual loses himself in the crowd, and leads the crowd only by sharing their passions and consenting to be their organ. It is, therefore, on the crowd that we must operate, if we would effect any thing. The multitude govern, and it is their views and feelings, their tastes and tendencies, that decide the fate or determine the character of the country. These are now all either not for us or strongly against us ; and our great and pressing work is to turn them into the Catholic channel. Hence, the important thing for us to study and address is the views and feelings, tastes and tendencies, not of distinguished individuals who may seem to be leaders, but of the great body of the common people. When we hear of the conversion of a distinguished individual, we rejoice for his sake, for he has a soul to save, and his conversion places him in the way of salvation ; but when we hear of the conversion of large numbers from the middle and lower classes, we give thanks and rejoice for our country's sake, for we see in it a token that God himself is at work in the heart of the people, and preparing the conversion of the nation itself, — that our holy religion is penetrating the living mass of American society, and subjecting it to the truth, beauty, and sanctity of the Gospel. We hope even the conversion of England, not so much from the large numbers of individuals eminent for their rank, talents, and acquirements,

who have recently been converted, as from the hundreds of undistinguished individuals who have been gathered in, and whose names have not been gazetted. If we may say this of England, where distinguished individuals still count for something, much more may we say it of our own beloved country. When and where the people yield readily to the influence and example of their social chiefs, true wisdom may be to penetrate first of all into the palace and the castle, and labor to convert royalty and nobility ; but by no means can it be here in this country, where princes and nobles are at a discount, and the chiefs of the people are their chiefs only by being their slaves, consulting and exaggerating their tendencies. The controlling influences of modern society are in the lower instead of the higher ranks, — perhaps, in a religious point of view, with few exceptions, it has always been so. Ireland lost her princes and nobles, but she did not lose her faith ; because it had become identified with her national life, integral in her nationality, and she could no more part with the one than with the other. In seeking to restore an unbelieving or heretical country to the faith or the unity of the Church, if we may rely on the lessons of history, the true policy in general, and especially now and here, is to begin at the base of society, and seek first to convert the common people.

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Catholicity is immovable and inflexible, one and the same always and everywhere ; for the truth never varies. He who

knows it in one age or country knows it in all. But with the sects it is far otherwise. They must needs obey the natural laws of development, strengthened and intensified by demonical influence. Their spirit and tendency, indeed, are always and everywhere the same, but their forms change under the very eye of the spectator, and are rarely the same for any two successive moments. Strike where Protestantism is, and it is not there. It is in perpetual motion, and exemplifies, so far as itself is concerned, the old heathen doctrine that all things are in a perpetual flux. You can never count on its remaining stationary long enough for you to bring your piece to a rest and take deliberate aim. You must shoot it on the wing; and if you are not marksman enough to hit it flying, you will have, however well charged and well aimed your shot, only your labor for your pains. It is never enough to take note either of its past or its present position; but we must always regard the direction in which it is moving, and the celerity with which it moves; and if we wish our shot to tell, we must aim, not at the point where it was, or where it now is, but at the point where it will be when a ball now fired may reach it. To ascertain this point requires either long practice or exact science. Yet it is less difficult than it may seem at first sight. We as Catholics, if we recollect ourselves, know perfectly well that the point to which all the sects are moving, with greater or less celerity, is the denial of God in the order of grace, and therefore of all supernatural revelation and religion. To this tends the inevitable and necessary development of Protestantism. This development may be hastened or retarded by circumstances, but it must sooner or later reach this fatal termination, if suffered to follow its natural course. There is an invincible logic in the human race, which pushes them on to the last consequences of their premises; and when, as in the Protestant rebellion, they have adopted premises which involve as their last consequence the rejection of the order of grace, and the assertion, if the word may be permitted us, of mere *naturism*, they will inevitably draw that consequence, and become theoretical and practical unbelievers, unless previously induced to change their premises.

The early Catholic controversialists clearly foresaw and distinctly announced that the Protestant premises involved the rejection of all revealed religion, and in every age since our divines have continued to reassert the same; but, unhappily, in no age or country has this been enough to arrest the mad

career of the Protestant people ; for in no age or country has it ever been true that the mass of them would not continue the development of their principles, at the risk of running into no-religion, sooner than return to the Church. The illustrious Bossuet, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, proved to the Protestants of his time, beyond the possibility of a rational doubt, that, if they continued their course, they must run into Socinianism, — a polite name for incredulity ; but this did not arrest them ; and not many years elapsed before they became, to an alarming extent, avowed Socinians, and even avowed infidels. To a Catholic, a doctrine or principle is refuted, proved to be false, when it is shown to have an infidel or a Socinian tendency ; but not to a Protestant. Convince him that his principle has such a tendency, and he will become a Socinian or an infidel sooner than abandon it. The only effectual way of arresting Protestants is, not merely to show them whither they are tending, but to refute that to which they tend. They have an instinctive sense even now of what it is they tend to, but, unhappily, they do not, or will not, see, that, when they have reached it, they will not have whereon to rest the sole of their foot.

Foreseeing the inevitable tendency of Protestantism may indeed produce, and unquestionably has produced, a reaction in favor of the Church in the minds of many excellent individuals at home and abroad ; but the great majority of the people in all Protestant countries are far from recoiling, and are steadily moving onwards to the rejection of all supernatural religion. They reject the Church as a positive institution, Jesus Christ as the consubstantial Son of the Father, the Holy Scriptures as the inspired word of God, and place them in the category of mere human books, and class the Lord that bought us with Zoroaster, Socrates, Apollonius of Tyana, Mahomet, Wesley, and Swedenborg. Especially is this true in this country, where all the sects are left free to run their natural course. The mass are borne onward with resistless force towards the goal, and it is useless to expect a reaction by merely showing the infidel results towards which they are borne ; — far more useless to flatter ourselves that any general reaction has commenced. In spite of a few appearances on the surface, the deep undercurrent is flowing on in the same direction it has been for the last three hundred years.

We shall deceive ourselves, if we suppose the question to-day is only between us and the Oxford party in the Anglican Establishment, or between Catholicity and any form of dogmatic

Protestantism. Protestantism, as including some elements of revealed truth from which we may reason in favor of the Church, is virtually defunct, and to argue against it is as idle as to belabor a dead ass. The real obstacle which we have to surmount is Protestant only inasmuch as it is the natural development of Protestantism. It is not seldom that we meet men and women who expressly avow, that, if they could be Christians, they would be Catholics, that in their view Christianity and Catholicity are identical, and that, if we will convince them of the inspiration of the Scriptures, they will feel bound to accept and obey the Church. Such persons as these — dispute it who may — are the real representatives of the age and country, the earnest of what the mass of the people are to be to-morrow. They are the only really significant class out of the Church. The ministers and elders and their adherents around the defunct body of dogmatic Protestantism, trying, on the one hand, to galvanize it into life, and, on the other, to persuade the uneasy multitude that it is not dead, but only taking its after-dinner *siesta*, are not worth taking into the account. They neither represent the present, nor announce the future. They belong to the generation that was. The empire of the world out of the Church has dropped from their hands, and however numerous they may be, and however powerful they may appear to the superficial glance, they are only relics of a past which can never return. Leave them to bury their dead.

The only portion of the Protestant world worth studying is the progressive portion, who continue and carry on the Protestant movement. These impersonate the age and country. What Strauss or Parker writes is far more important and instructive to Catholics than what Hengstenberg, Beecher, Spring, or Woods may write. The spirit and tendency of the age and country are better learned from *The Boston Quarterly Review*, *The Dial*, *The Herald of Truth*, *The Harbinger*, *The New York Tribune*, than from *The New-Englander*, *The Princeton Review*, *The True [Protestant] Catholic*, *The Churchman*, *The Courier and Enquirer*. The progressive minority are the only significant portion, because the only living portion, of the Protestant world, and because they are to be the majority to-morrow. They live the real Protestant life, if life that may be called which is not life, but death, and are in the minority to-day only because they are alone faithful to the principles common alike to them and the majority. Wherever the people are withdrawn from the law of grace, and abandoned to

natural development, the progressive minority is the only portion worth studying, and the only portion against which it is necessary to direct our attacks.

All who know any thing of Protestantism know full well that it subsists, and can subsist, only so long as it has free scope to develop itself. It retains its adherents never by what it gives them, but always by what it is *just a-going* to give them. Few, if any, of them are perfectly satisfied with it as it is ; and they cling to it only because they are in hopes further developments and modifications may make it precisely the thing they need and crave. Our course, then, is to head it in the direction in which it is moving, and must move if it move at all, cut off its opportunity for further development, compel it to come to a stand-still by showing that it is tending nowhither, and that farther progress carries it off into the dark and inane. When we have shown that what it is developing itself into is mere space and vacuity, and have thus compelled it to remain motionless, it soon begins to putrefy, to send forth its stench, and all who value their health or their nostrils hasten to bury it from their sight, and to leave it to return to the elements from which it was taken.

That Protestantism in most countries, especially in this country, is developing into infidelity, irreligion, *naturism*, rejecting and losing even all reminiscences of the order of grace, is too obvious and too well known to be denied, or to demand any proof. It is stated in a recent number of the *American Almanac*, that over one half of the adult population of the United States make no profession of religion, are connected with no real or pretended church, and therefore belong at best to the class expressively denominated *Nothingarians*. The majority, then, it is fair to presume, either believe that they have no souls, or that their souls are not worth saving, or that they can save them without religion ; and the great mass of those who may nominally belong to the sects, we know, hold that salvation is attainable in every form of religion, and many that it is attainable without any form. The point, then, at which we are to aim cannot be doubtful. We are called specially to convince the American population that *they have souls, souls to be saved or lost, and which cannot be saved without Jesus Christ in his Church*. Controversial works which overlook this fact, and assume that Protestants still retain some elements of Christianity, can avail us but little. They do not lay the axe at the root of the tree ; do not strike the heart of

the evil ; are not adapted to the questions of the day ; and, however logical they may be, they fail to convince, because their premises are not conceded. It is of the greatest importance that we bear this in mind, and govern ourselves accordingly.

The work assigned us here and now is a great and painful work. We cannot address those out of the Church as men who err merely as to the form of Christianity, and are yet resolved not to part with the substance. Unhappily, we are required to present our Church, not merely under the relations of the true and the beautiful, but under the relation of the necessary and indispensable. We are compelled by the existing state of thought and feeling to present it, not merely to men who hold the truth in error, as the corrective of their intellectual aberrations, but to men under the wrath of God, as the grand and only medium of salvation. We must address the world around us, not merely as aliens from the Church, but as being therefore aliens from God, without faith, without hope, without charity, without the first and simplest elements of the Christian life, as dead in trespasses and sins, and with no possible means of attaining to eternal life, but in embracing heartily, and faithfully, and perseveringly the religion we offer them. We must show them that they have souls, that these souls will live for ever, in eternal bliss or eternal woe ; that they are now in sin, and in sin which deserves eternal wrath, and from which there is no deliverance save in being joined to our Church. In a word, we must address them, in regard to these matters, in the same language and tone in which we should if they were Turks or Pagans. No account can be made of the Christianity they may nominally profess ; no reliance can be placed on it, and no appeal can be safely made to it.

It was the conviction that they had souls to be saved, and that they could not save them out of the Church of Christ, and their earnest effort to make others feel the same, that enabled Froude, Newman, and others, to produce that remarkable movement in the Anglican Establishment which has given so many choice spirits to the Church. It was by telling the people that they had immortal souls to save, and that they could not save them otherwise than through Christ in his Church, that the blessed Apostles and their successors, aided by divine grace, converted the world to Christianity ; it was by their stern and awful rebukes of heresy, by showing its disastrous effects upon the soul, by declaring in tones of fearful strength and startling energy, that all who were out of the ark per-

ished, and that all who separate or are separated from unity are separated from God and in danger of eternal death, that the Fathers guarded against or suppressed the earlier heresies, and kept the world for centuries united in the profession of the Catholic faith. It is only by following such examples, by convicting those out of the Church of sin, and convincing them of the fact, and of their need, of salvation, that we can recall them to the bosom of the Church, and persuade them to come into the way of salvation.


It will not do to shrink from this stern, bold, and awful manner of presenting the Church and her claims. There is no use in trying to persuade ourselves that strong and decided language is not called for, that we must speak to the world around us in soft and gentle accents, and not venture to arraign it for its unbelief, for its iniquity, and to tell it plainly that it is in the road to perdition. It is idle to suppose that we may win it to God, by telling it, expressly or by implication, that it is a very good world, a very candid and pious world, virtually a Catholic world, only suffering from inculpable error, only separated from us because it has had no opportunity of learning our holy faith. Undoubtedly, we are never to forget charity, without which a man is as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal; undoubtedly, he who contends for the Gospel is bound to contend for it in the spirit of the Gospel; undoubtedly, vituperation and abuse are as impolitic as they are unchristian; but we must be careful not to mistake liberality for charity, the natural meekness or amiability of our own dispositions for the meekness and tenderness of religion. We must never really or apparently strike hands with iniquity, or encourage error in her work of destruction, through fear of offending the fastidiousness or of wounding the delicate sensibilities of her votaries. No man who knows aught of the Gospel needs to be reminded of its exhaustless charity and infinite tenderness; and no one who knows any thing of human nature is ignorant that the road to the understanding lies through the affections, and that in dealing with individuals we cannot show too much sweetness and gentleness of disposition; but there is nothing incompatible with all this in setting forth in firm and even startling tones the solemn truths of our religion, let them convict whom they may. The prophet Nathan showed no uncharitableness, no want of tenderness, when he said to David, "Thou art the man"; nor did our Lord, when he called the Jews "hypocrites," a "race of vipers," and likened them to "whitened sepulchres, which

outwardly appear to men beautiful, but within are full of dead men's bones and of all filthiness." Nor, again, are we uncharitable, if, when we see a man rushing blindfold into the flames, we tell him whither he is rushing, and at what peril. Love can and often must proclaim severe truths, use hard arguments, and speak in tones of fearful power ; and the deeper, the truer, the more tender it is, the more firm and uncompromising, the more stern and unflinching it will prove itself, whenever occasion requires. Who calls the surgeon cruel and uncharitable, because he probes to the bottom or cuts to the quick ? Who regards the director of consciences harsh and wanting in charity, because he fears not to characterize the mortal sin of his penitent, and to insist, whatever the pain or mortification, on its being abandoned ? In moral surgery, we have as yet discovered no *Letheon*, and to heal it is often necessary to inflict even excruciating pain. Often, often, is it necessary to wound, if we would heal. Our Lord himself was wounded. "He was bruised for our sins," and none can come to him or be brought to him, till we are wounded for his sake as he was for ours. It cannot be avoided in the nature of things. But the Christian who gives pain, though he give it with a steady hand and an unflinching nerve, suffers more pain than he gives. It is not always safe to conclude that the man of a severe exterior, of firm and decided speech, who makes no compromise with sin, and yields nothing to error or her deluded votaries, is necessarily hard-hearted and a stranger to the infinite tenderness of the Gospel ; or that your pretty men with smiling faces, bland tones, gentle caresses, and ready condescensions, are not sometimes cold and heartless, that they are generally men of warm and gushing hearts, large souls, and generous sympathies, prepared to sacrifice all they have and all they are for the love of God and their neighbour.

He who sacrifices the truth sacrifices charity, and he who withholds the truth needed — the precise truth needed — by his age or country does sacrifice it. If that truth be offensive, and he tells it, it will offend, whatever the soft phraseology in which he may tell it. If, in order to save its offensiveness, he wraps it up in circumlocutions and a mass of verbiage which conceal it, he does not tell it, and his labor counts for nothing. If these do not conceal it, if in spite of them it is divined in its clearness, distinctness, and power, they take nothing from its offensiveness, and it might have been as well told in plain, direct, and appropriate terms. After all, the least offensive, because

the only honest, way of speaking, is to call things by their proper, their *Christian* names. We gain nothing in the long run by the round-about, the soft, or supple phraseology which timid or politic people sometimes fancy it necessary to use to wrap up their meaning, as we use jam, jelly, or molasses, to wrap up disagreeable medicine; nor is such phraseology so respectful or so conciliating as is often supposed. To adopt it is to treat those we address as mere children, to whom we must not speak in the strong masculine tones we use when speaking to full-grown men. Few people like to be so addressed. Even your most delicate and fastidious lady prefers the gentleman who always converses with her in his simple, natural tones, and with the strong, clear, manly sense with which he speaks to one of his own sex, to the exquisite who fancies that whenever he addresses her he must simper, and soften his words and tones. He who has the truth, and utters it boldly, without circumlocution or reticence, with freedom, firmness, dignity, and energy, proving that he speaks from no motive but the love of God and the salvation of souls, though he may be feared, though he may be resisted, and in some ages and countries gain the crown of martyrdom, may always count on being personally respected, and, what is far more to his purpose, on commanding respect for his cause.

We should never forget that there is that even in the most abandoned of our race which loathes the timid and cringing, and admires the strong, the manly, and the intrepid. The free, firm, consistent, and fearless utterance of great and awful truths goes home to the minds and hearts even of the unbelieving and the heretical, and makes them tremble as did Felix before the blessed Apostle St. Paul. It was not the phrase and tone of the nursery that terrified the corrupt and hardened governor. It was no fear on the part of St. Paul, then a prisoner before him, to call things by their Christian names, no forbearance to characterize the deep-dyed sinner as he deserved; but it was the minister of God speaking to his conscience, in stern and awful majesty unrolling before him his guilt, convicting him of sin, showing him the justice of God, presenting him the last judgment, and ringing in his very soul the sentence, "Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire!" that made the seared reprobate quake with fear. It is only when the minister of God so speaks that he makes the guilty tremble; and whenever he so speaks, no matter how unbelieving or heretical the sinner may be, how often or how long he may have scoffed at the idea of



death, judgment, heaven and hell, he will tremble ; for God is at the bottom of his heart to give efficacy to the word uttered. If you have God's truth, in God's name give it free utterance. Let it speak in its own deep and awful tones ; let its voice sound out a voice of doom to the guilty, a voice of consolation and joy to the just. Stand behind it, and let it have free course. Dare never tamper with it. Earth and hell may rise up against it, but it is mightier than earth and hell. Stand erect in the dignity of humility and the majesty of love, and God speaks through you, and the word that goes forth from you must go to the heart of the people, rive it as the thunderbolt rives the hoary oak, and all that is not depraved in man, all that is generous and noble in nature, and all that is true and mighty in heaven, shall work for you.*

Who are they who command men, touch the human heart, and make the race work with them and for them, — who but the heroic ? And what form of heroism is comparable to the Christian ? What are your Alexanders, your Hannibals, your Cæsars, your Napoleons, by the side of St. Peter, St. Paul, St. John, or St. Athanasius, St. Leo, St. Basil, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Gregory, St. Bernard, St. Dominic, St. Francis, St. Thomas, St. Ignatius, St. Vincent of Paul,

* What event in modern times has so struck the imagination, gone so to the heart of mankind, and called forth such a loud burst of applause, or done so much to reveal the majesty of God's minister, and to command universal homage and respect for the Papacy, as the stern and terrible rebuke of the autocrat of all the Russias by the late sovereign Pontiff ? You told us the Papacy was dead. You mocked at the feeble old man in the Vatican. The most powerful monarch of the day presents himself before that feeble old man, that aged monk standing on the brink of the grave, and that monarch at a few bold words turns pale, weeps as a child, and the world thrills with joy to learn that there is still a power on earth that can make the tyrant look aghast, the knees of the mighty smite together, and with severe and awful majesty assert the cause of the poor and vindicate the just. You told us the Papacy was dead. You heard it speak to Nicholas of Russia, not in the tone of a suppliant, not in the tone of a courtier, but as became the minister of God, before whom diadems and sceptres weigh not a feather, and power is but weakness, and you have eyes and ears only for the Papacy, and you feel and speak as if the Pope were the only power under God on earth. See what the minister of God may do, when he asserts the majesty of truth, and displays the awful grandeur of his mission. That living word of the Pope to the tyrant, to the schismatic, the heretic, the persecutor of the saints, has revealed to the world the astounding fact, that to-day the Papacy is not only living, not only not dead, but that it has a power even in the affairs of this world that it never had before.

and thousands of others, who rose above the world while in it, have sanctified the earth, and exalted human nature to communion with the divine? It is the Christian hero, he who counts nothing dear, who holds his life in his hand, who fears not the wrath of man nor the rage of hell, that, under God, overcomes the world, and wins all minds and hearts to the faith and love of Jesus Christ. He alone who fears God, who fears sin, but fears nothing else, is the world's master, and able to do whatever he pleases.

In this country the Church is placed by the constitution and laws on as high ground as any one of the sects, while, by the appointment of Almighty God, she is placed infinitely above them all. Not here, then, most assuredly, is the Catholic to fear to speak above his breath; not here is he to crouch and hide. He is at home here, and no man has a better right to be here. Let him stand erect; let his tone be firm and manly; let his voice be clear and distinct, his speech strong and decided, as becomes the citizen of a free state, and a freeman of the commonwealth of God. Let him be just to himself, just to his fellow-citizens, just to his religion, — be what his religion commands him to be, and fear nothing. The American people may fear him, they may not love him; but if he bows and cringes, and whimpers and begs, or scrapes and palavers, they not only will not love him, but they will despise him; for though puerile, deluded, and perverse on religion, they are in most other things straightforward and honest, high-minded and honorable. They love plain speaking and plain dealing, and they never fail to do honor to the man who, from a sense of duty, tells them in strong and direct terms the awful truths he is bound, or regards himself as bound, by his Church to proclaim, though by doing so he convicts them of unbelief and heresy, of deep and aggravated sinfulness before God.

“The road to the understanding lies through the affections.” Be it so. But the first affection we are to seek to win is that of respect for our Church, and that we must win by first winning respect for ourselves as Catholics; for the sects are slow to distinguish between the Church and her members. The spirit we manifest will be assumed to be approved and inspired by our Church. Nothing tends more to give Protestants a mean opinion of us, than for us to be tame or apologetic in setting forth or in defending our faith. We once loaned a Protestant lady a pamphlet by an eminent Catholic divine. She read it, and returned it with a note, stating that she could not

endure it, for nothing was so disgusting to her as to find a Catholic apologizing for his Church, or defending it in a Protestant spirit. "If he believes his Church infallible, there can be nothing in her history which he can believe needs an apology ; and if he believes himself divinely commissioned, why does he not speak as one having authority ?" Protestants, of course, in general appear delighted, when they find us apologizing or seeming to apologize for our Church, or apparently laboring to soften what they regard as the severity of her doctrines ; but it is only because in so doing we seem to them to surrender her infallibility. All our gentle phraseology, all our conciliating manners, all our apparently liberal expositions in the sense of latitudinarians, appear to them only as so many departures from what the Church once insisted on ; and while they applaud us for our Protestant tendency, they can but ill disguise their contempt for us, since, in spite of such tendency, we pretend that our Church is infallible and invariable ; and they can conclude from our conduct only that either we are not sincere in our concessions, or the Church, like the sects, modifies her doctrines to suit times and places.

Protestants generally believe that the Church is not what she was formerly ; that, in fact, she has greatly improved since the Reformation ; and this in consequence of finding in her so little that is to them unreasonable or offensive. They cannot understand, if she was in the sixteenth century what she now appears to be, how the Reformers could have been so enraged against her, or why they should have judged it necessary to separate from her communion ; and it is a common theory among them, on which they seek to justify the Reformers, that their movement has done by its reaction perhaps more to reform the Church than to reform those who separated or have remained separated. But this, though it may tend, in some measure, to diminish hostility to her as she now is, is to them an unanswerable argument against accepting her for what she claims to be ; for it implies progress, improvement, which is incompatible with the claim of Catholicity and infallibility. Whatever a Catholic says which looks, or can be imagined to look, like a departure from the earlier formularies of the Church, though it should render her doctrines less unpalatable to them, has a direct tendency to keep them out of her communion.

Hence there is no use in affecting a liberal tone, and in treating those outside as if we regarded them, upon the whole, as very good Christians, not far out of the way, meaning right,

perfectly well disposed, in only inculpable error, and by no means necessarily out of the way of salvation ; for it only tends, on the one hand, to make them distrust our Church, or, on the other, our sincerity. It only goes to confirm them in one of their most dangerous and unjust prejudices against us. Surveying the strange, eventful history of our Church, seeing her survive all attacks, gaining strength by every effort to crush her, and turning every apparent defeat into a victory, a triumph, Protestants say she must be a miracle of craft and cunning, and they attribute her preservation and triumphs to her wily and adroit policy. They, in general, hold us to be destitute of principle, but extremely cunning and politic. The popular, though erroneous, sense of the word *Jesuitical* is the popular Protestant sense of the word *Catholic*. If we adopt the liberal tone of modern times, speak in the modern spirit, show ourselves ready to conform to prevailing modes of thought, anxious to throw off whatever appears exclusive or rigorous, or disposed to apologize for past practices not exactly acceptable to our own age and country, and to excuse them on the ground that they originated in the ignorance or barbarism of the times, or in popular sentiments now obsolete, we gain no credit for our Church, or if so, none for ourselves ; but seem only to furnish proofs of her consummate policy and suppleness, and of her want of fixed and unalterable principles, leaving her always at liberty to assume the shape and color of the time and place, be they what they may.

In a country like ours, where we are a feeble minority, even if principle permitted, the affectation of a liberal and condescending spirit, of a disposition to conform to the views and feelings of the majority, and a studied forbearance to assert the claims of our Church in all their rigor and exclusiveness, would indicate a policy the very reverse of wise. Where Catholics are the immense majority, where place, fashion, wealth, and social influence are in their hands, moderation towards dissenters, a mild and condescending demeanour, and the disposition to yield to their ignorance all that can be yielded without giving up any portion of the sacred deposit of faith, may be wise, and even a duty ; for it is the condescension of the superior, of the nobleman, to those below him, always welcome, and seldom failing to beget gratitude and to win confidence. But the condescension of the social inferior to the social superior is a different thing. Here, where the social and political influences, instead of being ours, are against us, where we are voted in

advance suspicious persons, and where our very virtues are tortured into grounds of accusation against us. Such a policy would be regarded as sycophantic, or as tame and cringing, as a proof of meanness, weakness, or suppleness, and would only excite contempt or distrust. Our liberal professions, our apparent sympathy with views and feelings Protestant rather than Catholic, would be supposed to be affected, — adopted to ward off hostility till we had gained a footing, and become strong enough to exhibit our rigor or exclusiveness. It is lawful to learn of an enemy ; and we all know, or may know, that this is the precise view which Protestants very generally take of such a policy, wherever Catholics are in the minority, and silly enough to adopt it.

It is hard for innocence to conceive that she is suspected, and when she does get some glimmering of the fact, she almost inevitably blunders, and in attempting measures to remove suspicions adopts the very measures most likely to confirm them. No man can have studied the history of Catholics living in a Protestant community without being often reminded of this fact. They judge Protestants too often by themselves, and transfer to them their own innocence, candor, and good faith. But this will not do. What we are to aim at is not to make our religion acceptable to them as they are, but to make them feel, that, so long as they are what they are, they are wrong, and in need of “a radical change of heart.” Our deepest and truest policy is to have no policy at all. By the very fact that we are Catholics, we are freed from all dependence on mere human policy. We have the truth, and it will sustain us, instead of our being obliged to sustain it. It is the glory of our religion that she identifies the expedient and the right, the true and the politic. That is most expedient, most politic, which is most consonant with her spirit ; and the most effectual way of subserving the interests of the Church is for her members to be Catholics and nothing else, — to throw themselves without reserve and with entire confidence on God, and to leave him to support them, instead of their officiously undertaking to support him. We shall best advance the Catholic cause by showing that we hold our religion true and sacred, complete and all-sufficient, that we live for it, and for it alone, and that we do and can regard none who do not so live as the friends of God. God made and gave us our religion, and we have nothing to do with modifying it to suit prevailing tastes and prejudices, contracting it here or expanding it there, now by

our ingenious distinctions increasing its laxity, now its rigor. It is perfect as God gave it ; and it is ours simply to receive and obey. If its rigor or its laxity prove an odor of death unto death to some, that is not our affair, and the less we meddle with it the better.

In censuring loose and latitudinarian views, in commending the free, firm, frank statement of Catholic truth in its awful severity as well as in its sweetness, in contending for a bold, manly, independent, straightforward, and energetic, as well as affectionate mode of addressing those who are without, and the fearless and faithful proclamation of the precise truth needed to rebuke the reigning error or the reigning sin of the age or the country, we trust no one will be so foolish as to suppose that we are urging a low, vulgar, harsh, or vituperative method of presenting the claims of our religion, and of addressing those who unhappily reject them. Fidelity to the cause we advocate, and the bold and firm assertion of unpalatable truths, do by no means require us to lose command of ourselves, or to forget the meekness of the Christian, or the courtesy of the gentleman. Firm adherence to principle, strong masculine language, plain and energetic speech, and even bold and severe denunciations, when called for by the rigor of our faith, and justified by the facts or arguments we adduce, are no departure from good breeding, and are rarely, if ever, offensive. What is to be avoided is not the severity of reason, but the severity of passion. Loose and violent declamations, low wit, vulgar and opprobrious epithets applied in ill-temper, sustained by no principle, warranted by no argument, and called for by no truth established in our essay or discourse, are wrong, offend, and justly offend, and we should be sorry to suppose that there is any Catholic capable either of recommending or of resorting to them. But the severity of authority exercising its clearly legitimate functions, of charity speaking out from the depth of her infinite concern for the salvation of souls, or of reason evidently deducing necessary conclusions from premises regarded as incontrovertible, is always allowable, and is never held to be abusive, or a transgression of good manners.

In direct personal addresses to Protestants, it is rarely necessary to call them heretics, and we may with propriety, after the illustrious Bossuet, call them "our separated or our dissenting brethren," if we call them so only through conventional politeness. But if we avoid the term heretic, and call them our separated brethren for the purpose of implying some

sort of religious sympathy with them, to conceal from ourselves or from them the fact that all good Catholics presume them to be heretics, or so as to produce an impression on those within or those without that we do not look upon heresy and schism as deadly sins, we occasion scandal, and have nothing to plead in our justification. If, on the other hand, we call Protestants heretics in ill-humor, from the virulence of passion, for the sake of wounding their feelings, and insulting them, we are also unjustifiable ; for even the truth spoken for unlawful ends is libellous, and the greater the truth, not unfrequently, the greater the libel. But if, in addressing Catholics, or in reasoning against Protestant errors, we call Protestants heretics, because they are so in fact, and because we would call them by their *Christian* name, either for the sake of leading them to reflect on the danger to which they are exposed, or for the sake of guarding the unwary against their seductions and the contamination of their heresies, we give them no just cause of offence, and do only what by the truth and charity of the Gospel we are bound to do.

Undoubtedly the mass of the American people are deeply prejudiced against the Christian religion ; undoubtedly they are at heart strongly opposed to Catholics ; but the course we urge is not likely to render them more prejudiced or opposed. Touching the matter of religion, we have of course nothing to say in their favor, and this is, no doubt, in the estimation of Christians, to say the worst against them ; but in the natural order, in the domestic and social virtues which have their reward in this life, in the natural strength of their understanding, acuteness of intellect, and honesty and energy of character, they by no means rank lowest in the scale of nations. Should we call them thieves, robbers, liars, cowards, or in general hard-hearted and cruel, they would be offended at our injustice, or smile at our folly, and justly ; for we should then address them in our own name, on the authority of our own reason, or from the ebullition of our own passions, as weak and sinful men addressing their equals, and we could offer no excuse or palliation of our conduct. But if we speak to them in relation to the supernatural order, not from ourselves, but from the word of God, and tell them in the spirit of ardent charity, plainly, directly, unreservedly, energetically, what our religion commands, and assure them in unequivocal terms and tones that they are out of the way, following the devices of their own hearts, the delusions of the devil, wedded to damnable heresies,

under the wrath and condemnation of Almighty God, and that their only possible chance of escape is in humble submission to that very Church against which their fathers wickedly rebelled, and which they themselves so haughtily reject, though they may be pricked in their hearts, though they may be startled from their dreaming, or may even bid us go our way for this time, till they find a more convenient season, they will respect our principles, and acknowledge in their hearts the free, noble, lofty, and uncompromising spirit of our Church, and the high worth of character she gives to her children. It was thus spoke the Prince of the Apostles on the day of Pentecost: — “Ye men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you, by miracles, and wonders, and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as you also know; this same, being delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, *you have crucified and put to death* by the hands of wicked men. . . . Therefore let all the house of Israel know most assuredly, that God hath made him to be Lord and Christ, this same Jesus whom *you have crucified*. Now when they heard these things, they had compunction in their heart; and they said to Peter and the rest of the Apostles, Men and brethren, what shall we do? But Peter said to them, Do penance, and be baptized *every one of you*, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of your sins.” *

Protestants, indeed, expect Catholics to speak in this way. They expect them to speak differently from their own scribes and elders, with whom they are wearied half to death, and whose doubt, and hesitation, and arrogance they find all but insupportable. They know the Catholic claims to speak with authority, as divinely commissioned to teach, and they wish him to speak in character. They are disgusted when he descends from the pulpit to the rostrum, or from the preacher sinks into the mere reasoner, taking their stand-point, and discoursing to them in their own spirit, as one of their own number. They demand of him what he professes to have, and which they know their own ministers have not; and if he gives it not, they conclude it is because he has it not to give. He is then, say they, with all his lofty pretensions to authority, no better than one of us; and they turn away in disappointment and disgust. Let him speak as one having authority, as the authorized minister of God, never forgetting his commission,

* Acts ii. 22 – 41.

never forgetting that he is priest and doctor, and that it is not he that teaches, but God through him, and, cold, and unbelieving, and heretical as they may be, they cannot but listen with awe, and some of them with profit.*

The great body of the American people are serious, plain, and practical, little addicted to mere intellectual speculations, and not easily moved by what does not promise some positive result. They are not averse to change, have no invincible attachment to old ways and usages, or to the sects in the bosom of which they have been reared, and can, for what appears to them a solid reason, abandon them without much reluctance; but no reason drawn from merely intellectual or æsthetic considerations will appear to them sufficient. The only reasons which can weigh much with them, indeed with any people, are such as are drawn from ethical sources. They may be shown the truth and beauty, the consistency, grandeur, and majesty of our religion, and remain untouched; for it is not as philosophy or as art that they need it. Individuals in particular localities, or of a peculiar temperament, may at first be induced to think of entering our communion, as they are led to pass from one sect to another, to satisfy some particular intellectual want, to please some special taste, or to indulge some specific social or devotional tendency; but the great body of the people will remain unmoved and be unaffected by our profound philosophy, our learned expositions, our conclusive arguments, our eloquent appeals, unless we succeed in presenting the question as one involving life and death. In vain we show the truth of our doctrine, in vain we set forth our pure and lofty morality, in vain we exhibit the solemn grandeur, imposing magnificence, pomp, and splendor of our ritual, in vain we charm them with the

* We are often reminded, when we insist on this, that St. Francis of Sales, whose labors restored over seventy thousand Protestants to the Church, was wont to say that "more flies can be caught with honey than with vinegar." This is unquestionably true, but they who are familiar with the Saint's works do not need to be told that in his own practice he gave considerable latitude to the meaning of the word *honey*. Certainly we ask for no more bold and severe mode of presenting Catholic truth, or stronger or severer language against Protestants, than he was in the habit of adopting. Even the editor of his controversial works did not deem it advisable to publish them without softening some of their expressions. In fact, much of the *honey* of the Saints generally, especially of such Saints as St. Athanasius, St. Hilary of Poitiers, and St. Jerome, would taste very much like vinegar, we suspect, to some of our modern delicate palates.

simple majesty and unction of our divine hymns, or entrance them with our heaven-inspired chants, if we do not bring the matter home to the conscience, make them feel that they have souls to be saved, that they are sold unto sin, are under the wrath of God, and have no possible means of escaping everlasting perdition but by coming into the Church, and submitting to her authority and direction. So long as we leave their consciences at ease, so long as we address only the intellect or the sense of the beautiful, or leave them to feel that it is not absolutely impossible to be safe where they are, we have given them no solid or intelligible reason for becoming Catholics.

There is not the least sense or propriety in addressing the great mass of Protestants, especially in this country, as if they were already Christian, sincerely and honestly Christian, according to their understanding of Christianity, and only in intellectual error as to the true form of Christianity. We cannot repeat this too often, nor insist upon it too earnestly. The error is moral rather than intellectual. The question between them and us is a question, not of the form, but of the substance. The whole head is sick, the whole heart is sad. From the sole of the foot to the top of the head there is no soundness. The disease has penetrated the whole system, and reached even the seat of life itself. The remedy which shall restore them is not the mere exposition of the truth and beauty of our holy religion, in contrast with what they still nominally profess to believe. It is with them as it was with the unbelieving Jews in the days of our blessed Saviour. Now, as then, there is no beauty in him, or comeliness; they see him, and there is no sightliness in him that they should be desirous of him. Despised and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows, and acquainted with infirmity, his look is, as it were, hidden and despised, and they esteem him not. Surely he hath borne their infirmities and carried their sorrows, and they have thought him, as it were, a leper, and as one struck by God and afflicted.* They have eyes, but they do not see, ears, but they do not hear, hearts, but they do not understand. What is true, beautiful, pure, and salutary in our holy religion is to them a stumbling-block, as it was to the Jews, or foolishness, as it was to the Gentiles. Not to them is Christ crucified, whom we preach, the power of God and the wisdom of God.†

What is doubted, scorned, rejected, is not Catholicity as a

* *Isaias*, liii. 2-4.

† *1 Cor.* i. 23, 24.

form of Christianity, but Christianity itself. It is Christ crucified that is denied. The doubt goes to the bottom, and strikes at all revealed religion, at the whole order of grace. Forms are easily got over. No small portion of the people even now have no doubt of the identity of Catholicity and Christianity, if Christianity means a positive religion, any thing more than a form of natural religion. The active cause of the hostility to the Church is the want of belief in all positive religion, in the doubt that God has spoken or made a revelation of his will to men, established a Church for their salvation, which he loves, protects, and out of which he will save no one. No matter what they pretend, no matter what account they give of themselves, no matter what say their old symbols and formularies which they retain as so many heirlooms, it is Christianity itself they doubt, whenever it is assumed to belong to the supernatural order, to be inflexible and unalterable, authoritative and supreme, or to be elevated at all above mere natural morality, with perhaps a few sanctions more distinct and solemn than natural reason unaided could of itself have discovered. It is simplicity, not charity, to question this. We cannot prudently address them as believers simply holding the truth in error, but, if we wish to arrest their attention, we must address them as sinners in rebellion against God, dead in trespasses and sins, under the wrath and condemnation of God, — reason with them of sin, of justice, of chastity, and the judgment to come, and compel them to cry out, Men and brethren, what shall we do to be saved? What shall we do to be saved? asked from the depths of the affrighted soul, in the breaking up of the whole moral nature, trembling before the awful judgment of God, is the question; and till men ask it in deep and terrible earnestness, they will never become real and true-hearted Catholics. When they have once been made to feel their sinfulness, their danger, their lost and perishing condition, out of Christ, we shall have little difficulty in convincing them that there is no safety for them out of the communion of the Church. It is not so much of infidelity, or of heresy, that they need to be convicted, as of sin; not so much of Catholicity as the only true Christianity, as of Christianity itself, that they require to be convinced; not so much of this or that particular error, as of the grand mother error of all, that they are safe where they are, and may be saved in any religion or in none, that it is necessary to disabuse them.

We say nothing new or recondite. Our holy religion has

from the first been addressed to sinners, and its grand assumption is that all men are sinners, dead in trespasses and sins, till made alive in Christ Jesus. The wages of sin is death, and death hath passed upon all men, for all have sinned. The Church addresses herself to a world lying in wickedness, feasting in its own iniquity, as the divinely provided means, and the only means, of their restoration to spiritual life and health. Her mission is the revelation of the glory of God in the salvation of sinners. It is against sin, sin in all its forms, in all its disguises, in all its subterfuges, in high places or low places, that she is commissioned to carry on a fierce and exterminating war. She is here in this world the Church Militant. She fights and never ceases to fight sin, for she is holy, and she only can overcome it. Wherever she sends her missionary, the brave soldier of the cross, she sends him to a world dead in trespasses and sins, to carry to them the Gospel of life and immortality. She sends him, not to find the Gospel with them, to tell them that what he brings is preferable to what they have, but yet it is possible for them to be saved without it ; but to tell them that they are dead, that they are strangers to eternal life, that he has eternal life to offer them, that he alone has it, and that they must receive it from his hands or not receive it at all. "How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the Gospel of peace, that bring glad tidings of good things !" He goes to sinners to proclaim, in the name of his Master, the glad tidings of eternal life, through a crucified, a risen Redeemer ; and who but he has these glad tidings to proclaim ? "Lord, to whom shall we go ? Thou hast the words of eternal life." And where is Christ, he who is the resurrection and the life, who has come that we might have life, and have it more abundantly, to be found as the Saviour of sinners, and the giver of eternal life, but in his Church, his mystical body, his Spouse, his Beloved ? Assuredly nowhere else. The words of eternal life are with us, and not elsewhere, — in our Church, and in her only. Need we, then, fear to say so ? Need we, then, hesitate to tell the world lying in wickedness around us, that they are destitute of eternal life, that they are in sin, and to beseech them, as they love their own souls, to come into the ark where, and where alone, there is safety ?

There is no salvation out of the Church. Men must come into her communion or be lost, and lost for ever. If it be not so, why has God instituted his Church, why has he given her authority, and commanded her to teach all nations until the con-

summation of the world? Why are we so attached to her, why does she hold so high a place in our affections, and why would we rather suffer a thousand deaths than swerve one iota from the faith she enjoins? Why do we strive to bring all men into her sacred inclosure? Why visit our missionaries every land, and in every land suffer privation, want, distress, persecution, and death, to bring men into the Church, if salvation is possible without her agency, if the people who sit in the region and shadow of death, by following such light as they have, can be saved, though living and dying out of her communion, and in ignorance of her very existence? Concede the possibility, and the conduct of the Apostles, the Fathers, the Saints and Martyrs, of zealous Catholics in every age, is madness, folly, or fanaticism.

But, if it be true, and as sure as God exists and can neither be deceived nor deceive it is true, that there is no salvation out of the Church, what a fearful responsibility should we not incur, were we to forbear to proclaim it, or, by our mistimed or misplaced qualifications, to encourage the unbelieving, the heretical, or the indifferent to hope the contrary! And how much more fearful still, if we should go farther, and attempt in our publications to prove that he who firmly insists on it is harsh, unjust, uncharitable, running in his rash zeal to an unauthorized extreme! No doubt, the truth is always and everywhere to be adhered to, let the consequences be what they may; no doubt, he who errs by his rigor is to be rebuked, as well as he who errs by his laxity; but if, in our zeal to rebuke imaginary rigor, we should compel the missionary to prove the necessity of his Church against his friends before he could be at liberty to assert it against infidels and heretics, — run before him and intercept his arrows winged at the sinner's conscience, or follow immediately after and bind up and assuage the wounds they may have inflicted, — our zeal would but indifferently atone for the good we hinder, or the scandal we cause. These poor souls, for whom our Lord shed his precious blood, for whom bleed afresh the dear wounds in his hands, his feet, his side, bound in the chains of error and sin, suspended over the precipice, ready to drop into the abyss below, admonish all who have hearts of flesh or any bowels of compassion to speak out, to cry aloud in awful and piercing tones to warn them of their danger, rather than by ingenious distinctions or qualifications to flatter them, or to have the appearance of flattering them, with the hope that, after all, their condition is not perilous.

We speak not now in relation to other ages or countries. We are discussing the question in its relation to our own countrymen, the great practical question of salvation, as it comes up here and now. We have no concern with distant or merely speculative cases, or with scholastic distinctions and qualifications which have and can have no practical application here. The question is, What are we authorized and bound by our religion to proclaim to all those of our countrymen whom our words can reach? Here are the great mass out of the Church, unbelieving and heretical, careless and indifferent, and it is idle to expect to make any general impression upon them, unless we present the question of the Church as a question of life and death, unless we can succeed in convincing them, that, if they live and die where they are, they can never see God. This is the doctrine and the precise doctrine needed. Is it true? Yes or no? Is it denied? By those out of the Church, certainly, and hence the great reason why they are content to live and die out of the Church. Is it denied by those in the Church? What Catholic dare deny it? To what individual or class of individuals are we authorized by our holy faith to promise even the bare possibility of salvation, without being joined to the visible communion of the Church of God?

Is it said that those without are simply bound to seek, and that we can deny them the possibility of salvation only on the condition that they do not seek? Be it so. But if they are bound to seek, it is because Almighty God commands them to seek, and gives them the grace which enables them to seek; and who is prepared to say, if they seek *cauta sollicitudine*, as St. Augustine makes it necessary for them to do, that they will not find? If God commands them to seek, they can find; for he never commands one to seek in vain. "Seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you. . . . For every one that seeketh findeth, and to every one that knocketh it shall be opened."* It is fair, then, to conclude, if there is one who does not find, to whom it is not opened, that he is one who does not seek; and if he does not seek, he is out of the Church by his own fault. The grace of prayer is given unto every one, and every one can pray, and if he does, he shall receive; and it would impeach both the wisdom and the veracity of God to maintain the contrary.

* St. Matt. vii. 7, 8.

Those of our countrymen not in the Church may be divided into two classes, and each of these may be subdivided into two subordinate classes, — infidels and sectarians, — and each negative and positive; that is, infidels and sectarians who are such knowingly, and infidels and sectarians who are such through ignorance. The first two subdivisions are formal infidels or heretics, and are condemned for their sin of infidelity or heresy. Of these, there can be no question; not one of them can be saved, unless he become a member, truly a member, of the Church. These know the will of God and do it not, and therefore “shall be beaten with many stripes.”* But they who are infidels or sectarians through ignorance, what is to be said of them? “The servant that knew not his master’s will, but did things worthy of stripes,” shall he not escape? Our Lord answers, not that he shall escape, but that “he shall be beaten with few stripes.”† The Holy Ghost represents the sinners in hell as saying, — “We have erred from the way of truth; and the light of justice hath not shined unto us, and the sun of understanding hath not risen upon us. We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity and destruction, and have walked through hard ways; but the way of the Lord we have not known.”‡ It is clear, then, that ignorance does not always excuse, and that the servant who knoweth not his master’s will, though he may be punished less than the one who does know it and doeth it not, will nevertheless be punished.

But they who are merely negative infidels, or unbelievers purely through ignorance, in consequence of never having heard about the Gospel, are not guilty of the sin of infidelity? Certainly not. Every Catholic is presumed to know that the 68th proposition of Baius, *Infidelitas pure negativa in his, quibus Christus non est prædicatus, peccatum est*, is a condemned proposition, and therefore that purely negative infidelity in those to whom Christ has not been preached is inculpable, — as St. Augustine teaches, the penalty of sin, not sin itself. But who therefore concludes that they are in the way of salvation, or that they can be saved without becoming living members of the body of our Lord? “Infidels of this sort,” says St. Thomas, “are damned, indeed, for other sins which without faith cannot be remitted, but they are not damned for the sin of infidelity. Whence the Lord says, ‘If I had not come and spoken

* St. Luke xii. 47.

† Ibid.

‡ Wisdom v. 6, 7.

to them, they would not have sin'; that is, as St. Augustine explains it, would not have the sin of not believing in Christ." * There is a considerable distance between being free from the formal sin of infidelity, and being in the way of salvation. No infidel, positive or negative, in vincible or invincible ignorance, can be saved; "for without faith it is impossible to please God," and "he that believeth not shall be damned," and *faith in voto*, not *in re*, is inconceivable.† Neither of the subdivisions of the unbelieving class of our countrymen are, then, in the way of salvation.

But may it not prove better with sectarians? With those who are knowingly such, of course not, and nobody pretends that it can. But may not those who are baptized in heretical societies through ignorance, believing them to be the Church of Christ, be regarded as in the way of salvation? We will let the Brothers Walenburch answer for us from St. Augustine. They are speaking *de excusationibus simpliciorum* among Protestants. The first excuse they notice, the influence of tyrants, &c., is nothing to our present purpose, and we begin with the second.

"The second excuse they make is, That not they who are born and educated in Protestant churches have separated themselves from the unity of the Catholic Church, but their ancestors, Calvin, Luther, &c. Let St. Augustine reply: — 'But those who *through ignorance* are baptized there [with heretics], judging the sect to be the Church of Christ, sin less than these [who know it to be heretical]; *nevertheless they are wounded by the sacrilege of schism*, and therefore sin not lightly, because others sin more gravely. For when it is said to certain persons, It shall be more tolerable for Sodom in the day of judgment than for you, it is not therefore said because the Sodomites will not be punished, but because the others will be more grievously punished.'

"The third excuse is, They say that they have been baptized, that they believe in Christ, apply themselves to good works, and therefore may hope for salvation, although they adhere to the party divided from the Church. St. Augustine replies, — 'We are accus-

* "Qui autem sic infideles, damnantur quidem propter alia peccata, quæ sine fide remitti non possunt; non autem propter infidelitatis peccatum. Unde Dominus dicit, Joan. xv. 22, — *Si non renissem, et locutus eis fuissem, peccatum non haberent*. Quod Augustinus (*Tract. in Joan. lxxxix. ante med.*) dicit, 'quod loquitur de illo peccato quo non crediderunt in Christum.' " — *Summa* 2-2. Q. 10. a. 1. corp.

† Heb. xi. 6; St. Mark xvi. 16.

tomed from these words* to show men that it avails them nothing to have either the sacraments or the faith, if they have not charity, in order that, when you come to Catholic unity, you may understand what is conferred on you, and how great is that in which you were before deficient. *For Christian charity cannot be kept out of the unity of the Church*; and thus you may see that without it you are nothing, even though you have baptism and the faith, and by your faith are able to remove mountains. If this is also your opinion, let us not detest and scorn either the sacraments which we acknowledge in you, or the faith itself, but let us maintain charity, without which we are nothing, even with the sacraments and the faith. But we maintain charity, if we embrace unity; and we embrace unity when our knowledge is in unity through the words of Christ, not when through our own words we form a partial sketch.'

"The fourth excuse is, Some say that God is to be believed according to the measure of grace received from him; Catholics, indeed, believe many things which Protestants do not, but the former have received the five talents, the latter the two or three. They do not condemn Catholics, but they hope to be saved in the small measure which they have themselves received. But here may avail what we have just adduced from St. Augustine; for if even baptism and faith profit nothing without indispensable charity, much less will profit a mere portion which is held in division and schism."†

This is high authority, and express to the purpose. It cuts off every possible excuse which our countrymen can allege, or

* 1 Cor. xiii. 1-8.

† *De Controversiis Tractatus Generales IX., de Unit. Eccl. et Schism.* cap. 15. We subjoin the original. "Excusatio 2 est, Quod dicant se non recessisse ab unitate Ecclesiæ Catholicæ, qui in Ecclesiis Protestantium nati et educati sunt, sed majores suos, Calvinum, Lutherum, et similes. Respondet S. Augustinus (lib 1. *de Bapt. contr. Donat.* cap. 5): 'Illi vero qui per ignorantiam ibi [apud hæreticos] baptizantur, arbitantes ipsam esse Ecclesiam Christi, in istorum quidem comparatione [qui sciunt esse hæreticam] minus peccant; sacrilegio tamen schismatis vulnerantur; non ideo non graviter, quod alii gravius. Cum enim dictum est quibusdam: *Tolerabilius erit Sodomis in die judicii quam vobis* (S. Matt. xi. 24); non ideo dictum est, quia Sodomitæ non torquebuntur, sed quia illi gravius torquebuntur.' Vide etiam S. Aug. lib. 1. *contr. litt. Petil.* cap. 23, et lib. 2, cap. 8; et *de Unit. Eccl.* cap. 2. S. Optat. Milevit. lib. 1 et 2.

"Excusatio 3 est, Quod dicant se esse baptizatos, se credere in Christum, se bonis operibus operam dare, ac proinde se sperare salutem, etiam si illi parti adhæreant, quæ divisa est ab unitate Ecclesiæ Catholicæ. Respondet S. Augustinus, *contr. litt. Petil.* lib. 2, cap. 77: — 'His enim nos apostolicis verbis (1 Cor. xiii. 1-8), commendantibus eminentiam charitatis, vobis solemus ostendere quomodo non prosit hominibus, quamvis in eis sint vel Sacramenta vel fides, ubi charitas non est; ut cum ad uni-

which can be alleged for them. They who are brought up in the Church, instructed in her faith, and admitted to her sacraments, if they break away from her, can be saved only by returning and doing penance ; and all who knowingly resist her authority, or adhere to heretical and schismatical societies, knowing them to be such, are in the same category, and have no possible means of salvation without being reconciled to the Church, and loosened by her from the bonds with which she has bound them. Thus far all is clear and undeniable. But even they who are in societies separated from the Church through ignorance, believing them to be the Church of Christ, according to the authorities adduced, are wounded by sacrilege, a most grievous sin, are destitute of charity, which cannot be kept out of the unity of the Church, and without which they are nothing, and therefore, whatever may be the comparative degree of their sinfulness, are in the road to perdition, as well as the others, and no more than the others can be saved without being reconciled to the Church. But these several classes include all of our countrymen not in the Church, and therefore, as every one of these is exposed to the wrath and condemnation of God, we have the right, and are in duty bound, to preach to them all, without exception, that, unless they come into the Church, and humbly submit to her laws, and persevere in their love and obedience, they will inevitably be lost.*

tatem Catholicam venitis, intelligatis quid vobis conferatur, et quantum sit quod minus habebatis : charitas enim Christiana nisi in unitate Ecclesiæ non potest custodiri : atque ita videatis sine illa nihil vos esse, etsi Baptismum et fidem teneatis, et per illam etiam montes transferre possitis. Quod si hæc et vestra sententia est, non in vobis detestemur et exsufflemus vel Dei Sacramenta quæ novimus, vel ipsam fidem ; sed teneamus charitatem, sine qua et cum Sacramentis et cum fide nihil sumus. Tenemus autem charitatem, si amplectimur unitatem : amplectimur autem unitatem, si eam non per verba nostra in parte confingimus, sed per verba Christi in unitate cognoscimus.' Vide lib. 2. *contr. Crescon.* cap. 12, in *Psalm.* 88, et *Epist.* Edit. Maur. 141, al. 152.

“ Excusatio 4 est, Quod nonnulli dicant Deo credendum esse secundum mensuram gratiæ ab ipso acceptæ ; Catholicos quidem multa credere, quæ Protestantes non credunt ; sed illos quinque talenta accepisse, hos duo, vel tria. Se Catholicos non damnare ; sed in sua modicitate salutem sperare. Resp : Hic valent, quæ ex S. Augustino ad præcedentia attulimus. Nam si nihil prodest Baptismus et fides, sine necessaria charitate, multo minus proderit aliqua portio fidei, quæ habetur in divisione et schismate.”

* Vide Bishop Hay, *Sincere Christian*, 2d American edition, Philadelphia, pp. 345–390. This is a work of high authority, second to none in our language. It has fallen into our hands for the first time since

Into the Church, unquestionably ; but not necessarily into the visible Church, some may answer. We must distinguish

the present article was written, or we should have drawn largely from its pages. We have small space left for extracts, but we cannot resist the temptation to quote an authority which the Rt. Reverend author cites from St. Fulgentius. "St. Fulgentius in the sixth century speaks thus :— ' Hold most firmly, and without any doubt, that no one who is baptized out of the Catholic Church can partake of eternal life, if before the end of this life he be not restored to the Catholic Church and incorporated therein.'— *Lib. de Fid.* cap. 37." To the same effect we may cite St. Augustine. *Tract.* 45 in *Joan.* n. 15. "Non autem potest quisque per ostium, id est per Christum, egredi ad vitam æternam, quæ erit in specie, nisi per ipsum ostium, hoc est per eundem Christum in Ecclesiam ejus, quod est ovile ejus, intraverit ad vitam temporalem, quæ est in fide." This, taken in connection with its context and the scope of the general argument of the *Tract*, cannot possibly be understood otherwise than in the sense of St. Fulgentius ; and it is worthy of especial notice, that those recent theologians who seem unwilling to assent to this doctrine cite no authority from a single Father or Mediæval doctor of the Church, not strictly compatible with it.

Unquestionably, authorities in any number may be cited to prove — what nobody disputes — that pertinacity in rejecting the authority of the Church is essential to formal or culpable heresy, that persons may be in heretical societies without being culpable heretics, and therefore that we cannot say of all who live and die in such societies, that they are damned precisely for the sin of heresy. Father Perrone, and our own distinguished theologian, the erudite Bishop of Philadelphia, whose contributions have so often enriched our pages, cite passages in abundance to this effect, which, as Suarez asserts, is the uniform doctrine of all the theologians of the Church ; but they cite not a single authority of an earlier date than the seventeenth century, which even hints any thing more than this. But this by no means militates against St. Augustine, St. Fulgentius, the Brothers Walenburch, or Bishop Hay ; because it by no means follows from the fact that one is not a formal heretic, that he is, so long as in a society alien to the Church, in the way of salvation. A man may, indeed, not be damned for his erroneous faith, and yet be damned for sins not remissible without the true faith, and for the want of virtues impracticable out of the communion of the Church. Father Perrone very properly distinguishes *material* heretics from *formal* heretics ; but when treating the question *ex professo*, he by no means pronounces the former in the way of salvation ; he simply remits them to the judgment of God, who, he assures us, — what nobody questions, — will consign no man to endless tortures, unless for a crime of which he is voluntarily guilty. *Tract. de Vera Relig. advers. Heterodox.* Prop. XI.

Moreover, Father Perrone, when refuting those who contend that salvation would be attainable if the visible Church should fail, that is, by internal means, by being joined in spirit to the true Church, maintains that in such case there would be no *ordinary* means of salvation ; that when Christ founded his Church, he intended to offer men an ordinary means, or rather a collection of means, which all indiscriminately, and at all times, might use for procuring salvation ; that if God had been willing to operate

between the body or exterior communion of the Church, and the soul or interior communion. The dogma of faith simply

our salvation by the assistance of internal means, there would have been no reason for instituting the Church ; that what is said of being joined to the Church through the spirit, and of invincible ignorance, or of *material* heretics, could be admitted only on the hypothesis that God should provide no other means ; that, since it is certain that God has willed to save men by other means, namely, by the institution of the Church visible and external, and which is at all times easily distinguished from every sect, it is evident that the subterfuge imagined by non-Catholics is altogether unavailable. "*Obj. Quæ a Catholicis proferuntur ad indefectibilitatem Ecclesiæ adstruendam nihili prorsus pendenda sunt. Etenim quamvis vera Ecclesia deficeret vel ex toto vel ex aliqua sua parte, non propterea sequeretur homines omni destitui salutis medio ; posset enim Deus supplere mediis internis, posset homines spiritu saltem conjungi cum vera Christi Ecclesia : præsertim cum error est omnino involuntarius et ineluctabilis ; tunc enim nocere non potest, ut constat ex hæreticis materialibus nuncupatis. . . . Resp. Non sequeretur homines omni destitui salutis medio extraordinario, Tr. vel C. Ordinario, N. Jam vero quando Christus condidit Ecclesiam suam, intendit præbere hominibus medium ordinarium, seu potius collectionem mediorum, quibus omnes indiscriminatim uti quovis tempore possent ad salutem sibi comparandam. Si Deus voluisset ope interiorum mediorum nostram operari salutem, nulla fuisset Ecclesiæ instituendæ ratio. Mediis internis, tum extraordinaria ratione nobis prospicit Deus, quando nulla alia suppetit via, neque nostra culpa factum est, ut media nobis ordinaria defuerint. Deus etiam posset hoc universum regere absque causis secundis, quod tamen non præstat, si excipias casus extraordinarios, cum nempe prodigia operatur. Quod vero adjiciunt adversarii de conjunctione per spiritum cum vera Ecclesia, de errore ineluctabili, aut hæreticis materialibus, locum pariter habere tantum posset in hypothesi quod Deus nullum aliud medium suppeditaret : cum vero constet Deum alia ratione voluisse hominum saluti consulere, per institutionem videlicet Ecclesiæ visibilis atque externæ, quæque ab omni secta facile semper discerni possit, patet inutile prorsus esse ejusmodi effugium ab acatholicis excogitatum, qui nolunt veram Ecclesiam agnoscere."* — *De Loc. Theologic.* p. 1, cap. 4, art. 1.

This says all we wish to say ; for we are not discussing what is possible by a miracle of grace, but what is possible in the *order* of grace. Nor does the admission of an extraordinary interposition for our salvation, when the ordinary means, through no fault of ours, fail us, necessarily imply the possibility of salvation without the *medium ordinarium* ; for it may be to bring us to it, or it to us, so that we may be saved by it, and not without it. That there may be persons in heretical and schismatical societies, invincibly ignorant of the Church, who so perfectly correspond to the *graces* they receive, that Almighty God will by extraordinary means bring them to the Church, is believable and perfectly compatible with the known order of his grace, as is evinced by the case of the eunuch of Queen Candace, that of Cornelius, the captain of the Italian band, and hundreds of others recorded by our missionaries, especially the missionaries of the Society of Jesus. In all the instances of extraordinary or miraculous intervention of Almighty God, whether in the order of nature, or in the order of *grace*, known to us, he has intervened *ad Ecclesiam*, and there is not a shadow of

says, out of the Church there is no salvation, and you have no right to go farther and add the word *visible* or *exterior*.

We add the word *exterior* or *visible* to distinguish the Church out of which there is no salvation from the invisible Church contended for by Protestants, and which no Catholic does or can admit. Without it the dogma of faith contains no meaning which even a Socinian or a Transcendentalist has any urgent occasion to reject. Unquestionably, as our Lord in his humanity had two parts, his body and his soul, so we may regard the Church, his Spouse, as having two parts, the one exterior and visible, the other interior and invisible, or visible only by the exterior, as the soul of man is visible by his face ; but to contend that the two parts are separable, or that the interior exists disconnected from the exterior, and is sufficient independently of it, is to assert, in so many words, the prevailing doctrine of Protestants, and, so far as relates to the indispensable conditions of salvation, to yield them, at least in their understanding, the whole question. In the present state of the

authority for supposing that he ever has miraculously intervened or ever will intervene otherwise. To assume that he will, under any circumstances, intervene to save men without the *medium ordinarium* is perfectly gratuitous, to say the least. To bring men in an extraordinary manner to the Church is easily admissible, because it does not dispense with the revealed economy of salvation, nor imply its inadequacy ; but to intervene to save them without it appears to us to dispense with it, and to imply that it is not adequate to the salvation of all whom God's goodness leads him to save.

That those in societies alien to the Church, invincibly ignorant of the Church, if they correspond to the graces they receive, and persevere, will be saved, we do not doubt, but not where they are, or without being brought to the Church. They are sheep, in the prescience of God Catholics, but sheep not yet gathered into the fold. "Other sheep I have," says our Blessed Lord, "that are not of this fold ; THEM ALSO I MUST BRING ; THEY SHALL HEAR MY VOICE ; and there shall be made one fold and one shepherd." This is conclusive ; and that these must be brought, and enter the fold, which is the Church, in this life, St. Augustine expressly teaches in the words cited in the beginning of this note. See also *Sincere Christian*, p. 366. Almighty God can be at no loss to save by the *medium ordinarium* all who are willing to be saved, and that, too, without contradicting himself, departing from, or superseding the order of his grace ; and, till better informed, we must believe it sounder theology to trust to his extraordinary grace to bring men to the Church than it is to invincible ignorance to save them out of it ; "quia et ipsa ignorantia in eis qui intelligere noluerunt, sine dubitatione peccatum est ; in eis autem qui non potuerunt, pœna peccati. Ergo in utriusque non est justa excusatio, sed justa damnatio." St. Aug. Epist. ad Sixtum, Ed. Manr. 194, n. 27. Those who think otherwise we hope will not go so far as to say with Rousseau, — "Quiconque ose dire, '*hors de l'Eglise point de salut*,' doit être chassé de l'état !" *Du Contr. Soc.*, liv. iv. ch. 8.

controversy with Protestants, we cannot save the integrity of the faith, unless we add the epithet *visible* or *external*.

But it is not true that by so doing we add to the dogma of faith. The sense of the epithet is necessarily contained in the simple word *Church* itself, and the only necessity there is of adding it at all is in the fact that heretics have mutilated the meaning of the word *Church*, so that to them it no longer has its full and proper meaning. Whenever the word *Church* is used generally, without any specific qualification, expressed or necessarily implied, it means, by its own force, the *visible* as well as the *invisible Church*, the body no less than the soul; for the body, the visible or external communion, is not a mere accident, but is essential to the Church. The Church by her very definition is "the congregation of men called by God through the evangelical doctrine, and professing the true Christian faith under the regimen of their legitimate pastors." * This definition may, perhaps, not be complete, but it certainly takes in nothing not essential to the very idea of the Church. The Church, then, is always essentially visible as well as invisible, exterior as well as interior; and to exclude from our conception of it the conception of visibility would be as objectionable as to exclude the conception of body from the conception of MAN. Man is essentially body and soul; and whosoever speaks of him — as *living* man — must, by all the laws of language, logic, and morals, be understood to speak of him in that sense in which he includes both. So in speaking of the Church, if the analogy is admissible at all. Consequently, when faith teaches that out of the Church there is no salvation, and adds herself no qualification, we are bound to understand the Church in her integrity, as body no less than as soul, visible no less than invisible, external no less than internal. Indeed, if either were to be included rather than the other, it would be the body; for the body, the congregation or society, is what the word primarily and properly designates; and it designates the soul only for the reason that the living body necessarily connotes the soul by which it is a living body, not a corpse. We have, then, the right, nay, are bound by the force of the word itself, to understand by the Church, out of which there is no salvation, the visible or external as well as the invisible or internal communion. Hence the brothers Walen-

* FF. Walenburch, de Controv. Tract. IX. cap. 1. Vide Bellarmin. de Eccl. Milit. Lib. 3. cap. 2.

burch begin their Treatise on Unity and Schism by assuming, — “ 1. Ecclesiam vocatorum esse visibilem ; 2. Extra communionem *externam* cum vera Jesu Christi Ecclesia, non esse salutem ; 3. Extare hoc tempore visibilem Ecclesiam Jesu Christi, cui se fideles debeant conjungere.” *

What Bellarmine, Billuart, Perrone, and others say of persons pertaining to the soul and yet not to the body of the Church makes nothing against this conclusion. They, indeed, teach that there is a class of persons that may be saved, who cannot be said to be *actu et proprie* in the Church. Bellarmine and Billuart instance catechumens and excommunicated persons, in case they have faith, hope, and charity ; Perrone, so far as we have seen, instances catechumens only ; and it is evident from the whole scope of their reasoning that all they say on this point must be restricted to catechumens, and such as are substantially in the same category with them ; for they instance no others, and we are bound to construe every exception to the rule strictly, so as to make it as little of an exception as possible. If, then, our conclusion holds true, notwithstanding the apparent exception in the case of catechumens and those substantially in the same category, nothing these authors say can prevent it from holding true universally.

Catechumens are persons who have not yet received the visible sacrament of baptism *in re*, and therefore are not *actu et proprie* in the Church, since it is only by baptism that we are made members of Christ and incorporated into his body. With regard to these “ there is a difficulty,” says Bellarmine, “ because they are of the Faithful, and if they die in that state may be saved ; and yet no one can be saved out of the Church, as no one was saved out of the ark, according to the decision of the fourth Council of Lateran, C. 1 : — *Una est fidelium Universalis Ecclesia, extra quam nullus omnino salvatur*. Still, it is no less certain that catechumens are in the Church, not actually and properly, but only potentially, as a man conceived, but not yet formed and born, is called man only potentially. For we read, Acts ii. 41, — ‘ They therefore that received his word were baptized ; and there were *added* to them that day about three thousand souls.’ Thus the Council of Florence, in its Instructions for the Armenians, teaches that men are made members of Christ and the body of the Church when they are baptized ; and so all the Fathers teach. Cate-

* FF. Walenburch, *ubi supra*, cap. 2.

chumens are not actually and properly in the Church. How can you say they are saved, if they are out of the Church ? ”

It is clear that this difficulty, which Bellarmine states, arises from understanding that to be in the Church means to be in the visible Church, and that when faith declares, out of the Church no one can be saved, it means out of the visible communion. Otherwise it might be answered, since they are assumed to have faith, hope, and charity, they belong to the soul of the Church, and that is all faith requires. But Bellarmine does not so answer, and since he does not, but proceeds to show that they do in a certain sense belong to the body, it is certain that he understands the article of faith as we do, and holds that men are not in the Church unless they in some sense belong to its body.

But Bellarmine continues, — “ The author of the book *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* replies, that they are not saved. But this appears too severe. Certain it is that St. Ambrose, in his oration on the death of Valentinian, expressly affirms that catechumens can be saved, of which number was Valentinian when he departed this life. Another solution is therefore to be sought. Melchior Cano says that catechumens may be saved, because, if not in the Church properly called Christian, they are yet in the Church which comprehends all the faithful from Abel to the consummation of the world. But this is not satisfactory ; for, since the coming of Christ, there is no true Church but that which is properly called Christian, and therefore, if catechumens are not members of this, they are members of none. I reply, therefore, that the assertion, out of the Church no one can be saved, is to be understood of those who are of the Church neither actually nor in desire, as theologians generally say when treating of baptism.” *

“ I have said,” says Billuart, “ that catechumens are not *actually and properly* in the Church, because, when they request admission into the Church, and when they already have faith and charity, they may be said to be in the Church proximately and in desire, as one may be said to be in the house because he is in the vestibule for the purpose of immediately entering. And in this sense must be taken what I have elsewhere said of their pertaining to the Church, that is, that they pertain to her inchoately, as aspirants who voluntarily subject themselves to her laws ; and they may be saved, notwithstanding

* *De Eccl. Milit.* lib. 3. cap. 3.

ing there is no salvation out of the Church ; for this is to be understood of one who is in the Church neither actually nor virtually, — *nec re, nec in voto*. In the same sense St. Augustine, *Tract. 4 in Joan.* n. 13, is to be understood, when he says, — “ *Futuri erant aliqui in Ecclesia excelsioris gratiæ catechumeni*, ” — that is, in will and proximate disposition, — “ *in voto et proxima dispositione*. ” *

It is evident, both from Bellarmine and Billuart, that no one can be saved unless he belongs to the visible communion of the Church, either actually or virtually, and also that the salvation of catechumens can be asserted only because they do so belong ; that is, because they are in the vestibule, for the purpose of entering, — have already entered in their will and proximate disposition. St. Thomas teaches with regard to these, in case they have faith working by love, that all they lack is the reception of the visible sacrament *in re* ; but if they are prevented by death from receiving it *in re* before the Church is ready to administer it, that God supplies the defect, accepts the will for the deed, and reposes them to be baptized. If the defect is supplied, and God reposes them to be baptized, they are so in effect, have in effect received the visible sacrament, are truly members of the external communion of the Church, and therefore are saved in it, not out of it. †

Bellarmino, Billuart, Perrone, &c., in speaking of persons as belonging to the soul and not to the body, mean, it is evident, not persons who in no sense belong to the body, but simply those who, though they in effect belong to it, do not belong to it in the full and strict sense of the word, because they have not received the visible sacrament *in re*. All they teach is simply that persons may be saved who have not received the visible sacrament *in re* ; but they by no means teach that persons can be saved without having received the visible sacrament at all. There is no difference between their view and ours, for we have never contended for any thing more than this ; only we think, that, in these times especially, when the tendency is to depreciate the external, it is more proper to speak of them as belonging in effect to the body, as they certainly do, than it is to speak of them simply as belonging to the soul ; for the fact the most important to be insisted on is, not that it is possible to be saved without receiving the visible sacrament *in re*, but that it

* *Theologia, de Reg. Fid. Dissert. 3, Art. 3.*

† *Summa 3, Q. 68, a. 2. corp. ad 2. et ad 3.*

is impossible to be saved without receiving the visible sacrament at least *in voto et proxima dispositione*.

The case of catechumens disposes of all who are substantially in the same category. The only persons, not catechumens, who can be in the same category, are persons who have been validly baptized, and who stand in the same relation to the sacrament of Reconciliation that catechumens do to the sacrament of Faith. Infants, validly baptized, by whomsoever baptized, are made members of the body of our Lord, and, if dying before coming to the age of reason, go immediately to heaven. But persons having come to the age of reason, baptized in an heretical society, or persons baptized in such society in infancy, and adhering to it after having come to years of understanding, — for there can be no difference between the two classes, — whether through ignorance or not, are, as we have seen, out of unity, and therefore out of charity, without which they are nothing. Their faith, if they have any, does not avail them; their sacraments are sacrilegious. The wound of sacrilege is mortal, and the only possible way of being healed is through the sacrament of Reconciliation or Penance. But for these to stand in the same relation to this sacrament that catechumens do to the sacrament of Faith, they must cease to adhere to their heretical societies, must come out from among them, seek and find the Church, recognize her as the Church, believe what she teaches, voluntarily subject themselves to her laws, knock at the door, will to enter, stand waiting to enter as soon as she opens and says, Come in. If they do all this, they are substantially in the same category with catechumens; and if prevented by death from receiving the visible sacrament *in re*, they may be saved, yet not as simply joined to the soul of the Church, but as in effect joined or restored to her external communion. By their voluntary renunciation of their heretical or schismatic society, by their explicit recognition of the Church, by their actual return to her door, by their disposition and will to enter, they are effectually, if not in form, members of the body as well as of the soul. Persons excommunicated stand on the same footing as these. They are excluded from the Church, unless they repent. If they repent and receive the visible sacrament of Reconciliation *vel re, vel voto*, they may be saved, because the Church in excommunicating them has willed their amendment, not their exclusion from the people of God; but we have no authority to affirm their salvation on any other conditions.

The apparent exception alleged turns out, therefore, to be no real exception at all ; for the persons excepted are still members of the body of the Church in effect, as the authorities referred to labor to prove. They are persons who have renounced their infidel and heretical societies, and have found and explicitly recognized the Church. Their approach to the Church is explicit, not constructive, to be inferred only from a certain vague and indefinite longing for truth and unity in general, predicable in fact, we should suppose, of nearly all men ; for no man ever clings to falsehood and division, believing them to be such. Their desire for truth and unity is explicit. Their faith is the Catholic faith ; the unity they will is Catholic unity ; the Church at whose door they knock is the Catholic Church ; the sacrament they solicit, they solicit from the hands of her legitimate priest. They are in effect Catholics, and though not *re et proprie* in the Church, nobody ever dreams of so understanding the article, out of the Church no one can be saved, as to exclude them from salvation. These being in effect members of the external communion, the distinction between the soul and the body of the Church does not at all affect the assumption of the Brothers Walenburch, "out of external communion with the true Church of Jesus Christ there is no salvation."

The Church is always and everywhere, at once and indissolubly, as the living Church, interior and exterior, consisting, like man himself, of soul and body. She is not a disembodied spirit, nor a corpse. The separation of the soul and body of the Church is as much her death, as the separation of the soul and body of man is his. She is the Church, the living Church, only by the mutual commerce of soul and body. There may be grave sinners in her body who have no communion with her soul ; these are indeed members, but not living members, — and are *in* the body rather than *of* it, as vicious humors may be in the blood without being of it, for they must have communion with the soul in order to be living members ; and some theologians maintain that they who are in the body of the Church, without pertaining to the soul, at least by faith, though a dead faith, are not, strictly speaking, members at all. On the other hand, if, as all our theologians teach, and Moehler and Perrone especially, the life of the Church is in the mutual commerce of the exterior and the interior, the body and the soul, no individual not joined to her body can live her life. Indeed, to suppose that communion with the body alone will suffice, is to fall into mere formalism, to mistake the corpse for the living man ;

and, on the other hand, to suppose that communion with the soul out of the body and independent of it is practicable is to fall into pure spiritualism, simple Quakerism, which tapers off into Transcendentalism or mere sentimentalism, a doctrine which Father Perrone expressly controverts. Either extreme is the death of the Church, which is, as we have said, to be regarded as always, at once and indissolubly, soul and body.* To assume real or virtual communion with the body is not necessary, or that we may be joined to the spirit without being joined to the body is to make the body only occasionally or accidentally necessary to salvation ; and, in fact, some modern speculations imply, perhaps expressly teach, that it is necessary only in the case of those who recognize it to be necessary, as if its necessity depended on the state of the human intellect, and not on the appointment of God, or as if a man's disbelief could excuse or make up for his want of faith, — a doctrine not to be extracted from the Holy Scriptures, taught by no Father or Mediæval Doctor, and from which we should suppose every Catholic would instinctively turn with loathing and disgust. The Church is the living Temple of God, into which believers must be builded as so many living stones. It is his body, and its body is no more to be dispensed with than its soul ; otherwise we could not call her always visible, for to some she would be visible, to others only invisible, and then there would be no visible *Catholic* Church.

There is no name given under heaven among men but the name of Jesus Christ by which we can be saved. There is salvation in none other ; and what Catholic needs to be told that Christ, as the Saviour, is in the Church, which is his body, and that it is in the Church, and nowhere else, that he does or will save ? True, though in the Church, he is also out of her, by his grace operating on the hearts of those not yet within ; but he operates *ad Ecclesiam*, to bring them within, that he may save them there, not that he may save them without. He loves his Church ; she is his Chosen, his Beloved, his Spouse, and he gave his life for her. In her, so to speak, centre all his affections, his graces, and his providences ; and all creatures and events are ordered in reference to her. Without her all history is inexplicable, a fable, and the universe itself meaningless and without a purpose. The salvation of souls itself is in order to her, and God will have no children who are not also

* *Vide Perrone, de Loc. Theol.* p. 1, cap. 2, art. 3, et cap. 4, art. 1, ad 1.

hers. As there is but one Father, so can there be but one Mother, and none are of the Father who are not of the Mother. Clear and explicit are all the Fathers and Saints as to this, and they plainly teach that it would dishonor her, and make God an adulterer, to suppose the salvation of a single soul of which she is not the spiritual mother.

God, in establishing his Church from the foundation of the world, in giving his life on the cross for her, in abiding always with her, in her tabernacles, unto the consummation of the world, in adorning her as a Bride with all the graces of the Holy Spirit, in denominating her his Beloved, his Spouse, has taught us how he regards her, how deep and tender, how infinite and inexhaustible, his love for her, and with what love and honor we should behold her. He loves us with an infinite love, and has died to redeem us ; but he loves us and wills our salvation, only in and through his Church. He would bring us to himself, and he never ceases as a lover to woo our love ; but he wills us to love, and reverence, and adore him only as children of his Beloved. Our love and reverence must redound to his glory as her Spouse, and gladden her maternal heart, and swell her maternal joy, or he wills them not, knows them not. O, it is frightful to forget the place the Church holds in the love and providence of God, and to regard the relation in which we stand to her as a matter of no moment ! She is the one grand object on which are fixed all heaven, all earth, ay, and all hell. Behold her impersonation in the Blessed Virgin, the Holy Mother of God, the glorious Queen of heaven. Humble and obscure she lived, poor and silent, yet all heaven turned their eyes towards her ; all hell trembled before her ; all earth needed her. Dear was she to all the hosts of heaven ; for in her they beheld their Queen, the Mother of grace, the Mother of mercies, the channel through which all love, and mercies, and graces, and good things were to flow to man, and return to the glory and honor of their Father. Humblest of mortal maidens, lowliest on earth, under God, she was highest in heaven. So is the Church, our sweet Mother. O, she is no creation of the imagination ! O, she is no mere accident in human history, in divine providence, divine grace, in the conversion of souls ! She is a glorious, a living reality, living the divine, the eternal life of God. Her Maker is her Husband, and he places her, after him, over all in heaven, on the earth, and under the earth. All that he can do to adorn and exalt her he has done. All he can give he gives ; for he gives himself, and unites her in

indissoluble union with himself. Infinite love, infinite wisdom, infinite power, can do no more. All hail to thee, dear and ever-blessed Mother, thou chosen one, thou well-beloved, thou Bride adorned, thou chaste, immaculate Spouse, thou Universal Queen ! All hail to thee ! We honor thee, for God honors thee ; we love thee, for God loves thee ; we obey thee, for thou ever commandest the will of thy lord. The passers-by may jeer thee ; the servants of the prince of this world may call thee black ; the daughters of the uncircumcised may beat thee, earth and hell rise up in wrath against thee, and seek to despoil thee of thy rich ornaments and to sully thy fair name ; but all the more dear art thou to our hearts ; all the more deep and sincere the homage we pay thee ; and all the more earnestly do we pray thee to receive our humble offerings, and to own us for thy children, and watch over us that we never forfeit the right to call thee our Mother.

Did we reflect on what the Church is, did we consider her rank in the universe, her relation to God, the place she holds, so to speak, in his affections, the bare thought of the salvation of a single soul not spiritually begotten of her would make us thrill with horror. It would give the lie to all God's providences, and subvert the whole economy of his grace. We need not start at this. All may have the Church for their mother, if they choose. Christ is in the Church, but he is also out of the Church. In the Church he is operating by his grace to save those who enter ; out of her he operates also by his grace, or is ready to operate, in the hearts of all men, to supply the will and the ability to come in. Do not imagine that God has only half done his work, that he has merely prepared his Church, fitted her up as a palace, filled her with all good things, all things necessary for our salvation, when once we have entered, but that he has left us without the ability to find her out, or, having found her out, without ability to enter. He leaves nothing undone. No man has the natural ability to come into the Church, any more than he has the natural ability to save himself after he has come in. All before and all after is the work of God. We can do nothing of ourselves alone, — make not even the first motion without his grace inciting and assisting us. Of no use would have been his Church, — it would have been a mere mockery, or a splendid failure, — if he had not provided for our entrance as well as for our salvation afterwards.

But he *has* provided for our entrance. He gives sufficient grace to all men. The grace of prayer, *gratia orationis*, is

given freely, gratuitously, unto every one. All receive the ability to ask ; all, then, can ask, and if they do ask, as sure as God cannot lie they shall receive the grace to seek ; and if they seek, the same divine veracity is pledged that they shall find ; and if they find, they may knock ; and if they knock, it shall be opened to them. God has said it. Christ is in the Church ; he is out of it. In it and out of it he is one and the same, and operates ever *ad unitatem*. He is out of the Church to draw all men into the Church ; all have, then, if they will, the assistance of the Infinite God to come in, and if they do not come in, it is their own fault. God withholds nothing necessary. He gives to all, by his grace, every thing requisite, and in superabundance. If we come not at his call, on our own heads lies the blame. We have no excuse, not the least shadow of an excuse. The reason why we come not can be only that we do not choose to come, that we resist his grace, and scorn his invitations, and will not yield to his inspirations. No nice theological distinctions, no scholastic subtilty, no latitudinarian ingenuity, can relieve us of the blame, or make it not true that we could have come, had we been so disposed. If, then, we stay away, and are lost, it is we who have destroyed ourselves.

Here are the great mass of our countrymen aliens from the Church of God. Why do they not come and ask to be received as children and heirs ? Is it lack of opportunity ? It is false. There is no lack of opportunity. God does not deny them, not one of them, the needed grace. The Church is here ; through her noble and faithful pastors, her voice sounds out from Maine to Florida, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. How can they hear without a preacher ? But they have heard. Verily the voice of the preacher is gone out into all the earth. They have no need to say, Who shall ascend into heaven to bring Christ down ? or, Who shall descend into hell to bring Christ up from the dead ? The word is nigh them. It sounds in every ear ; it speaks in every heart. We all know they might come, if they would. From all sections, and from all ranks and conditions, some have come, and by coming proved that it is possible for all to come ; and in so proving rendered invalid the plea of ignorance or inability. Those who have not come can as well come as those who have come ; and their guilt in not coming is aggravated by their knowledge of the fact that some of their own number have come ; for they are no

longer in ignorance.* The fault is their own. They stay away because they do not will to come. "Ye will not come to me that ye may have life, because your deeds are evil." They disregard divine grace, they disdain the Church, they condemn her pastors, they scorn her sacraments. For what Catholic can doubt, if they were to seek the truth, *cauta sollicitudine*, as St. Augustine says they must, even to excuse them from formal heresy or infidelity, that they would find, and, finding and knocking, that they would be admitted?

No; let us love our countrymen too much to be ingenious in inventing excuses for them, to strain the faith in their behalf till it is nearly ready to snap. Let us from a deep and tender charity, which, when need is, has the nerve to be terribly severe, thunder, or, if we are no Boanerges, breathe in soft but thrilling accents, in their ears, in their souls, in their consciences, those awful truths which they will know too late at the day of judgment. We must labor to convict them of sin, to show them their folly and madness, to convince them that they are dead in trespasses and sins, and condemned already, and that they can be restored to life, and freed from condemnation, only by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, whom we, and we only, preach, which is dispensed through the Church, and the Church only.

It has been said that our countrymen are not to be driven into the Church, and that a soft answer turneth away wrath. All very true, — who doubts it? Use as soft words and speak in as honeyed tones as you please, but do not forget to set forth sound doctrine, or to use hard arguments. Tell the truth in your own way, and by all means in a manner as little offensive as possible; but TELL IT. Nobody has any wish or intention to drive people into the Church. There are some things so obvious, that men of ordinary sense may be presumed not to overlook them. The only driving we wish is the driving by the force of truth distinctly enunciated, by solid arguments clearly stated, and solemn appeals well put. So far as this may be called driving, which is only presenting motives to reason and free-will, we are for driving, and will do all we can to drive, till every one is driven within the fold. The lord of the nuptial feast did not command his servants to go out into the highways and hedges and *coax* people to come in, but to

* S. Aug. lib. 1, *de Bapt. contr. Donat.* cap. 5. Etiam S. Joan. Chrysost. in *Epist. ad Rom.* xxvi.

compel them to come in, that his house might be full. No man can honestly mistake the drift of our remarks, or imagine that they proceed from harshness of temper, or want of respect for the rights or the characters of those without, as well as of those within. What we urge and insist upon is, that we feel, and freely, earnestly, solemnly, without fear or palliation, set forth to our unbelieving and heretical countrymen, the danger, the sinfulness, of their present condition ; that, in so far as we wish or seek their conversion, we must follow the example of the Apostles and Fathers, and reason of sin, justice, and judgment to come ; that we must present the question of the Church, not as an intellectual or æsthetical question, but as a question of life and death, of heaven and hell. Infidelity and heresy have not improved by age, and they are as hateful to God, as odious to the Saints, as destructive to the souls of men, here and now, as they were in the days of St. Athanasius, St. Hilary, St. Jerome, or St. Augustine, and are to be met and conquered only in the spirit and by the weapons these holy Fathers and great Saints met and conquered them.

If any Catholics imagine, that, in some things we have said, their favorite policy has been arraigned, they will take care not to misinterpret us. We have spoken strongly, earnestly, as we have the right to speak, as it was our duty to speak ; but we hope we have not spoken arrogantly, harshly, uncharitably, or without authority. We have impeached no one's motives, faith, zeal, or piety. We trust we are not so utterly destitute of Christian humility as to imagine that we have any special monopoly of true Catholic faith and zeal, or as not to feel that they who prefer a policy we may disapprove may be at least as true believers, as deeply in earnest, as solicitous for the salvation of souls, as ourselves. God forbid that we should think of drawing a parallel, or presume in the remotest degree conceivable to breathe a censure against them ! We are not insensible to the pious worth, nor destitute of admiration of the labors, of those who have worn out their lives in laboring to plant the Church in this moral wilderness. We are not untouched by the recital of their labors, their privations, their sufferings, their sacrifices, and we would that we could aspire to their virtues. We offer our prayer at the tombs of those who have been called to their reward ; we love and reverence those still living. Who are we, to judge them ? We speak not of the policy they may have adopted in its relation to their times, and the frightful circumstances under which they unfurled here the

banner of the cross. We speak only in relation to the country as it now is. Times have changed. Protestantism is not, as to its forms, what it was even twenty years ago. We have as bitter enemies as ever, but not in the same shape. The bigot gives place to the latitudinarian. We have not now to prove that the Church may be as good as the sects, or even better than the sects ; for these two points are now virtually conceded us. We have now to prove that she alone is Christianity, and that without Christianity, without Christ, there is no true life here or hereafter. It is this great fact, so solemn and so terrible, that we have wished to place prominently before our readers, — not to censure the past, but to guide our future efforts, and for the purpose of rendering such service as may be in our power to the great and glorious cause equally dear to all Catholics.

ART. II. — *Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions.* Translated from the French of M. LE COMTE JOSEPH DE MAISTRE. Boston : Little & Brown. 1847. 16mo. pp. 173.

COUNT JOSEPH DE MAISTRE was among the most distinguished men of his age. He was born at Chamberri in Savoy, 1753, was a senator of Piedmont at the time of the French invasion in 1792, and resided at St. Petersburg, as the ambassador of the king of Sardinia, from 1804 to 1817, in which last year he returned to Turin, where he died in 1821. Though not a subject of France, he was descended from a French family ; was peculiarly French in his genius as well as his language, and his works were all written in reference to French ideas and affairs at the time of their composition. No one among those who labored during the first years of this century to revive and restore French literature, perverted by the philosophers, and nearly destroyed by the Revolution, deserves a more honorable mention, or exerted a more salutary influence in exposing the popular fallacies of the day, and in recalling men's minds to deeper and sounder religious and political doctrines.

As a theologian, some may think that he placed too much reliance on the analogies his profound and varied erudition supplied him with between the principles of our holy religion and those which were acknowledged in the old heathen world, that he

was more fond than is prudent in these times of citing pagan authorities for his doctrines, and that he gave an almost unorthodox application to the dictum of St. Vincent of Lerins, *quod semper, quod ubique, et ab omnibus*; but it cannot be denied that his works were peculiarly adapted to the temper of the times in which they were written, and admirably fitted to excite and engage the attention of a lively people grown weary indeed of infidelity, anarchy, and military despotism, but not yet recovered from the habits of incredulity and impiety, of sneering at the priest and the altar, and of regarding Christianity as old and effete; or that, if they contain some things local and temporary in their interest, they still contain much that is universal and permanent, which may be profitably studied in every age and country. No one acquainted with them can hesitate to regard them as peculiarly appropriate to our own country, and worthy the serious attention of our people, whether Catholic or Protestant.

The analogies between the principles of our holy religion and those of the ancient world, on which Count de Maistre lays great stress in all his works, are undeniable; but if we adduce them without taking great care to mark their precise nature, and the precise purpose for which we adduce them, we are in danger of giving occasion to an argument unfavorable to Christianity. German neologists and their American followers, it is well known, appeal to these analogies, and attempt from them to construct an argument against Christianity as a positive revealed religion, or against the special divine inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, and in favor of their pernicious error, that inspiration, so far as it is to be admitted at all, is a universal phenomenon, not peculiar, unless it be in degree, to certain individuals, but common to all men in all countries and ages of the world, — that God speaks objectively to no one, but reveals subjectively, in their spiritual nature, reason, conscience, sentiment, the same great truths to all. Hence they conclude that all religion is *natural*, if we consider the fact that it is common to all men, and resulting spontaneously from universal humanity, — or *supernatural*, if we consider the fact that our nature lives and operates only in God, and through the creative and upholding power and wisdom of God, who is himself above nature. All religions, say they, are therefore at bottom one and the same, natural or supernatural according to the point of view from which we choose to consider them; and they differ as concrete religions only according to, and in consequence of, the

differing degrees of mental and moral culture of mankind in different ages, countries, and individuals. To get at the perfect form of religion, we must eliminate whatever is local, temporary, peculiar to this or that individual, to this or that age or country, and seize upon that which has been held always, everywhere, and by all. What we thus obtain, the residuum which remains after this analysis, will be absolute religion ; that is to say, all religion in general, and no religion in particular, like man without men, the race without individuals !

No man was ever farther from adopting this gross absurdity, or of countenancing this religious nihilism, than Count de Maistre ; but we sometimes feel, while reading his learned and brilliant pages, that he has not been always careful to guard against it, and that he says many things which could, without much difficulty, be construed in its favor. He does not appear to us to state clearly always the precise purpose for which he adduces these analogies, or the precise grounds on which he ascribes to them the value he evidently supposes them to possess. In a word, he does not appear to have marked with precision the place which belongs to the *consensus hominum*, and seems at times to hold it to be the ground of certainty, and to favor the notion that the Church is authoritative for the reason that she is the organ through which the universal consent of the race expresses itself, and therefore to favor the heresy taught a short time after by De Lammenais. Yet it is only in appearance ; for in his thought, though not always sufficiently guarded in his expression, we are sure he was sound and orthodox.

If we appeal to these analogies to show what has always been the reason or belief of mankind, and, from the fact that mankind have always assented to principles identical with the principles of Christianity, or analogous to them, conclude the truth of the Christianity as a divinely revealed religion, we fall into the error of De Lammenais, condemned as heretical ; because we then make the *consensus hominum* the ground of certainty, the authority for believing, instead of the veracity of God, as required by faith. But, if we adduce them as authorities, not for faith, but for what is and always has been the practical reason or common sense of mankind, and therefore as proofs that the principles of our holy religion are not unreasonable, but reasonable, our method is perfectly legitimate, and perhaps the very best that can be adopted against the unbeliever. It is only in this latter sense, we are confident, that Count De Maistre, in reality, appeals to the *consensus hominum* and adduces the analogies in question.

The unbeliever, born and bred in Christian lands, professes to meet the Christian on the ground of reason, and from reason alone to disprove the Christian religion ; that is, he objects that Christianity is contrary to reason. But in order to sustain his objection, he must prove that Christianity is contradicted, either by the pure or demonstrative reason, or by the practical or moral reason ; that is, either by reason as the principle of metaphysical certainty, or by reason as the principle of moral certainty. The first is out of the question ; for reason in the former sense, — the speculative reason of Kant, — as Kant himself has shown in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, cannot affirm or deny any thing on the subject. Moreover, it has been proved, over and over again, that there is nothing in Christianity which contradicts any principle of speculative reason ; and all the chiefs of the modern infidel school, Bayle, Voltaire, D'Alembert, Hume, and Thomas Paine, concede that it is impossible to prove any thing, metaphysically, against Christianity. “ They themselves,” says Benjamin Constant, an unsuspicious authority on this point, “ acknowledge that reasoning can authorize only doubt.”* They can only say they do not believe it, or that there is no sufficient reason for believing it ; but no one of them ventures to say that it must necessarily be false, or that, after all, it may not be true. So far as regards the speculative reason, it is certain, that, if reason cannot, as we concede it cannot, pronounce a judgment in favor of our religion, it cannot pronounce a judgment against it. It can and must concede its metaphysical possibility, and this is as far as it can go, either one way or the other.

The unbeliever, then, must leave the speculative reason, and show that our religion is condemned by the practical reason, or withdraw his objection. But the criterion of the practical reason is the *consensus hominum*. In speculative reason the individual needs not to go out of himself, for the speculative reason *in se* is as perfect in one as it is in all men ; and when I have demonstrated that the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles, I have no need of the assent of the race, and their assent can add nothing to the demonstration, or to the certainty of the fact. But in regard to the practical reason it is not so ; for this may be warped or perverted by individual idiosyncrasies, ignorance, education, position, passions, prejudices. Here the individual reason must be rectified or veri-

* *De la Religion*, Tom. I. p. 7. Paris, 1824.

fied by the reason of the race, and that only is the reason of the race which is held always, everywhere, and by all. Hence we say the *consensus hominum* is the criterion of the practical reason, and the authority on which this or that is to be taken, — not as divine revelation, for that is the error to be avoided, but as practical reason ; for certainly that is not unreasonable, contrary to the practical reason, which the race universally assents to, but must be in accordance with it, and demanded by it ; or else the race would not and could not have universally assented to it. The *consensus hominum* is not the ground for believing this or that to be revealed, but simply for believing it approved by the practical reason ; and if it is approved by the practical reason, we believe it on the authority of that reason, — not *fide divina*, indeed, but *fide humana*, — and must do so, or prove ourselves unreasonable, be ourselves condemned by reason.

Now if the unbeliever fails, as he does, to show that there is something essential to the Christian religion repugned by the practical reason, he fails entirely to sustain his objection. He boasts of common sense, but common sense is only another name for what we call the practical reason. He says our religion contradicts common sense. But his assertion is worth nothing, unless he proves it by showing the contradiction ; which he never does and never can do. But if, on the other hand, we prove to him that every one of the principles of our religion has the authority of common sense, or that in believing our religion we assent to nothing not assented to in principle always and everywhere by the race, we prove that our religion in principle is reasonable, that the unbeliever cannot object that it is unreasonable, and that he, if he denies its principles, is himself unreasonable, obnoxious to the precise objection which he brings against us.

This last is what Count de Maistre has done. He proves, by admirable philosophical analysis and rare erudition, that there is in our holy religion no principle which the race has not always and everywhere assented to, and therefore, that, in refusing to believe it, in rejecting its principles, we are rejecting not merely the word of God as handed down to us by the Church, but also the practical reason or common sense of mankind, and, by doing so, placing ourselves in direct hostility to the reason we boast, and whose authority we acknowledge. He thus turns the tables upon the loud-boasting and conceited infidel, and shows him that it is he, not the Christian, who must humble himself before reason, and beg pardon for the outrages

he offers her. The unbeliever, in fact, builds never on reason, but always on unreason. Reason disowns him, scorns him, nay, holds him, intellectually considered, in perfect derision. Poor thing! she says, he has lost his wits; send him to the lunatic asylum.

Having established, as Count de Maistre has done, that all the principles of our religion have the *consensus hominum*, we have established that they are approved by reason. We must now assume that they are principles inherent in reason itself, immediately ascertainable by reason, or that they have been derived from some other source. If we say either of the former, they are authoritative for reason, and reason must assent to them on the peril of ceasing to be reason. If we say they are not inherent in reason, nor immediately ascertainable by reason, we must attribute them—since the practical reason by approving pronounces them pure, sacred, good—to some source above reason, that is, the supernatural, and therefore either immediately or mediately to God himself. Then they are unquestionably true, and we must believe them, or again prove ourselves unreasonable; for nothing is more reasonable than to believe God, and therefore what he reveals. So, on either supposition, we must assent to them or deny reason itself. Consequently, the analogies alleged against us by the enemies of our religion fully establish the reasonableness of Christianity in principle, and that reason must assent to it in principle or abdicate itself.

Yet we pretend not that by these analogies and pagan authorities we prove the absolute truth of Christianity as a positive revealed religion. We simply remove all objections *a priori* which can be conceived against it, and establish the reasonableness, the truth, for the practical reason, of its principles; but we leave the fact of Christianity as a supernaturally revealed religion to be proved or not proved by the testimony in the case. The argument thus far shows the possible truth of the religion, the actual truth for the reason of its principles, and places it as a positive religion in the category of facts which may be proved by testimony. If the actual testimony appropriate in the case be equal to what satisfies the reason in the case of ordinary historical facts, to what is sufficient in the ordinary affairs of life to render assent prudent, it is proved as a positive revealed religion to the full extent that reason does or can demand; and he who does not assent and act accordingly abdicates his title to be considered a reasonable being. The

appropriate testimony in the case is unquestionably equal to this, — is all that reason, unless it ceases to be reason, requires or can require. Whoever, then, withholds his assent from the Christian religion, unless through sheer ignorance, denies reason. True, the assent thus yielded or warranted is only the assent of reason, and by no means the assent of faith, in the proper Christian sense ; something more is undoubtedly demanded for faith ; but that, whatever it be, is to be sought, not from reason, but from divine grace, which is freely given to all who do not voluntarily resist it.

The Count's method of argument, properly understood, is therefore triumphant against the unbeliever, as the neologists themselves have proved over and over again. The objection of the neologists which we have stated is met, — 1. by the fact that the analogies adduced extend to the principles, not to the positive doctrines, of Christianity ; and consequently, before the neologists can be entitled to their conclusion, they must rebut the positive testimony in favor of Christianity as a supernaturally revealed religion, and also prove that the principles without the doctrines are sufficient, neither of which they do or can do ; and, 2. by the fact that the principles in question, between which and Christianity there is the relation of analogy or identity, are not themselves originally derived from simple natural reason, or from an interior subjective revelation made immediately to each man in particular, but from the primitive revelation made to our first parents, and preserved and diffused by tradition. We, as well as they, find Christian elements in the old heathen poets and philosophers ; and perhaps in general the heathen world, under each of its various religions, retained more of Christian principle — we say not of Christian doctrine — than is retained by our modern sects. Under veils and symbols more or less transparent, we find not seldom, not only Christian principles, but a very near approach to some one or more of the Christian Mysteries themselves. Indeed, the type after which all religions have been fashioned is evidently the Christian religion, and there is scarcely a single Christian *idea*, if we may use the term, which is not to be found out of the Christian Church. This, however, presents no difficulty to the Christian ; — not, indeed, because he supposes all has been derived from the Holy Scriptures and intercourse with the Jews, as some have thought, — though more may have been derived from this source than many in our days are willing to acknowledge, — but because it was contained in the primitive

revelation to our first parents, and formed the common patrimony of the race. What we thus find is revealed truth, truth pertaining to the Christian revelation, pure in its source, but in the lapse of time corrupted and mixed up with fables by the nations, as they multiplied and spread themselves over the face of the earth. The fountain was pure and supernatural, but the streams which flowed from it became gradually corrupt by receiving waters flowing from other fountains. Thus, what we find in consonance with our religion as supernatural we attribute to the primitive revelation preserved by tradition; what we find repugnant to it we attribute to men speaking from themselves, their own darkened understandings and corrupt hearts.

The Christian revelation is not, strictly speaking, a new revelation; Judaism as such, though a divine institution for a special purpose, was not a dogmatic revelation, and contained no revealed truths not contained in the primitive revelation. The primitive revelation contained in substance the whole Christian revelation, and the only difference between the faith of the Fathers from the beginning, before Christ, and that of the Fathers since, is, that those before believed in a Christ to come, and those since believe in a Christ that has come, and that in many things our faith is clearer and more explicit than was theirs. From the beginning till now, the revelation believed has been ever one and the same revelation, the faith has always been one and the same faith. Our Lord and his Apostles introduced no new religion, no new faith, made no new revelation, except to clear up and render more explicit what had been revealed and believed by the faithful from the first. It is not the true view to look upon our Lord as coming into the world to found a new religion, or to reveal even new dogmas, as do many of our modern sects. He came to make the Atonement, to perform the act of redemption, to open the door for the admission of the just into heaven, and to establish a new order, the order of grace, in place of the Law, that we might have life, and have it more abundantly.

Due consideration of this fact would correct the errors of our Liberal Christians, and enable them to get over some of the difficulties they now find, or imagine they find. They read the New Testament, and find in it no creed formally drawn out, and therefore conclude that none is enjoined or necessary. They find some one asking what he shall do to be saved, and an Apostle in his answer requiring him simply to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and therefore they conclude only the sim-

ple belief in Jesus as the Messiah, whether as God, as a supernatural being, or as man only, it matters not, is all the faith the Gospel requires. But they forget that they to whom the Apostle so answers are supposed to be already instructed in the faith, and to lack nothing of the true Christian faith, but to believe that the Christ that was to come has come, and is this same Jesus whom they crucified, and whom God has raised from the dead. The simple article enjoined was all the addition or modification their previous faith required. But to conclude from this that nothing more was required at all is very bad logic.

This fact attended to furnishes us one of the reasons why the faith is always assumed or presupposed in the Holy Scriptures, instead of being distinctly and formally taught. The sacred writers always address themselves to believers, to persons supposed to have already received the faith, and therefore not in need of being formally and systematically taught the whole creed. They write, not to propose the creed, but simply, under the relation of faith, to correct the errors of believers, or to enlighten them on some particular points of doctrine. Nothing is more illogical than to conclude, from the absence of all distinct and formal statement from their pages of the several articles of the creed, that no formal creed was proposed, believed, or required.

The recognition of the primitive revelation is necessary, also, to account for the sublime truths we often meet with in ancient pagan writers, Oriental and Occidental, in juxtaposition with mere puerilities, gross absurdities, and abominations. Any one who has read Plato will understand what we mean. There are passages in this writer hardly unworthy of a Christian Father, which are admirable for the truth and sublimity of the thought, for their lofty religious conception and pure morality; and there are others childishly weak, obviously absurd, and grossly impure, as, for instance, some passages in the *Banquet*, the *Timæus*, and the *Republic*. Take Socrates himself. What more noble than his speech on his trial? He speaks of God, of virtue, and immortality with his disciples, while awaiting his execution, almost as a Christian, and more worthily than many who call themselves Christians do or can speak; and yet, just before his death, he can order a cock to be sacrificed to Æsculapius. Through nearly all heathen antiquity we find similar phenomena constantly recurring. How explain them? The mind capable of producing from its own resources the true, the pure, the sublime, and beautiful thoughts and sentiments we find,

could never have produced or tolerated those of a totally different character, invariably mixed up with them. The only possible explanation is, that in the former they spake from tradition, from the sublime wisdom of the ancients, derived from a primitive revelation, as they themselves always acknowledge ; just as the only explanation of what we find agreeable to the purity, truth, and sublimity of the Gospel in the writings and discourses of modern heretics is that it is derived not from their heresy or their own minds, but retained from the Gospel itself, is the reminiscence of the true faith, not yet wholly lost in the crude mass of their own errors and speculations.

But we have suffered ourselves to be carried too far away by a topic only incidental to our present purpose. While acknowledging the danger to which Count de Maistre's method of reasoning for religion against an unbelieving and scoffing age is exposed, when not duly guarded, we have wished, in passing, to show that it is substantially sound, and may be used with great propriety and effect. The influence his writings have exerted on France are a proof of it. When he first appeared, religion was out of fashion, and her voice failed to arrest the attention of the reading public. It required no ordinary degree of moral courage at that time to avow one's self a Christian, a firm believer in the Church of God, and ready to do battle for the faith. For more than half a century the whole literary taste had been perverted ; the philosophers and their followers, Voltaire and his school, reigned supreme in the world of letters, in the public acts, and the saloons of fashion. But Count de Maistre did not hesitate to raise his voice, and, seconded by De Lammenais, not yet fallen, and by the Restoration and its friends, he succeeded, by the grace of God, in bringing up religion once more to men's thoughts and affections, and of showing to faith and purity—what is never to be doubted—that they have no cause to blush before the pretended worshippers of reason, even in the temple of reason herself. France is no longer what she was. The French works best known and most generally read by the people of this country are the groans, writhings, and contortions of a party in its agony. They proceed not from the mind or the heart of the real, living, progressive France of to-day. Sans-culottism in religion, morals, or politics is a cast-off Parisian mode, and it is no longer incompatible with good taste and admission into good society to cover one's nakedness with the robe of justice and piety. Incredu-

lity, impiety, and Jacobinism, under the form of socialism, Saint-Simonism, Fourierism, or progressism, may indeed have their second-hand dealers, and a few purchasers, both for home consumption and exportation, — especially for exportation to this country, — but they are no longer the fashion in Paris, and France is rapidly resuming her former rank among Christian nations, with a warm Christian heart, a strong Christian arm, and a liberal Christian hand. The scoffers, the unbelievers, and the socialists among ourselves, who dream that France is on their side, have been asleep for this quarter of a century, and belong to the family of the Rip van Winkles.

Of the several works of Count de Maistre, there is no one which, at the present moment, could be circulated or read with more advantage amongst us, than the one now before us, or better fitted to the actual wants of our politicians, whether Catholics or Protestants ; for, unhappily, a very considerable portion of our Catholic population are as unsound in their politics as their Protestant neighbours. Both classes, with individual exceptions, have borrowed their political notions from the school of Hobbes, Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Paine, and forget, or have a strong tendency to forget, that Divine Providence has something to do with forming, preserving, amending, or overthrowing the constitutions of states. We say nothing new, when we say that modern politics are in principle, and generally in practice, purely atheistic. Even large numbers, who in religion are sound orthodox believers, and would suffer a thousand deaths sooner than knowingly swerve one iota from the faith, may be found, who do not hesitate to vote God out of the political constitution, and to advocate liberty on principles which logically put man in the place of God. It is to such as these the little work before us is addressed, and they cannot study it without perceiving the capital mistake they have made, — not in seeking political freedom, but in seeking to base it on atheistical principles. The man who advocates political liberty on Protestant principles can stop short of atheism only at the expense of his logic.

Count de Maistre is, no doubt, a stanch monarchist, and holds hereditary monarchy, tempered by a due admixture of aristocracy and democracy, to be the best of all possible forms of government ; but it is not for this we commend him, for this is by no means a necessary conclusion from the great generative principle of political constitutions he insists upon. That principle we may accept without any disposition to be monarch-

ists, for it is as true and as applicable in the case of a republican constitution as in that of a monarchical constitution. Where the existing legitimate order is monarchical, it undoubtedly requires us to support monarchy, and forbids us to seek to substitute another order in its place ; but, for the same reason, where the existing legitimate order is the republican, it requires us to support republicanism, and forbids us to seek to introduce monarchy. In this country the existing legal order is republican, and the principle the Count insists upon commands us, whatever may or may not be our private convictions as to the best form of government *in se*, to support it, and to resist with our lives every attempt to subvert it. It may or may not be, we may or we may not believe it, the best of all possible forms of government in the abstract ; but that has nothing to do with the question. It is the form which God in his providence has established here, and therefore it is the best for us ; it is the law, and therefore we must obey it, and cannot resist it without resisting God, from whom is all power, by whom kings reign and legislators decree just things.

There are two grounds on which we may seek support for our republican institutions ; — the one, opinion ; the other, conscience ; — that is, either because we believe them the best *in se*, or because they are the law. Our modern politicians, who uniformly mistake falsehood for truth, and substitute the feebler for the stronger, the worse for the better reason, as a matter of course, place all their reliance on the former, and regard those who prefer the latter as the enemies of our free institutions. But nothing is more fluctuating, precarious, or uncertain than opinion. The multitude may be of one opinion to-day, and of another to-morrow. To-day they may hurrah for democracy ; to-morrow they may throw up their caps for some military hero, and cry, Long live the king ! To rely on mere opinion is to lean on a broken reed. The opinion may change, and the moment it does, we have no reason, if it has been our reliance, to urge for sustaining the present order, or why the people should not subvert it, and substitute some other order ; and we may be sure the opinion will change, whenever the present order proves, or attempts to prove, itself a government by restraining popular passion and caprice, or any thing more than a by-law of a voluntary association ; —

“ For no man ever feels the halter draw
But with a mean opinion of the law.”

But if we place their support on the ground that they are the legal order, the law, we make our appeal, not to opinion, but to conscience. Conscience uniformly and invariably commands us to obey the law, but does not command us always to obey opinion. Opinions may vary as to what is the law ; but when this or that is decided to be law, conscience, which is not opinion, without any variation or the least hesitation, commands us to submit to it, and all who regard at all the voice of conscience do so. When we place the obligation to support our institutions on the notion we may have that they are the best, we give them only an intellectual basis, and can enlist only the intellect in their behalf ; but when we demand obedience to them on the ground that they are the law, we base them on morality, and place them under the protection of religion. We demand then obedience as a *duty*, not merely as a sound judgment, and make loyalty not merely a sentiment, but a virtue. It was only the folly or delusion of the last century that could, for a moment, have hesitated between conscience and opinion, or even pretended to doubt which is the more reasonable and solid basis of government.

We suspect, however, that our politicians will continue to prefer opinion to conscience ; for it is not the preservation of our institutions, but the facility of changing them, that they wish to secure. It is not government they want, but the liberty to make the government any thing they please ; or if they ask for government, it is not that it may govern them, but that they may govern it. They want, not a fixed and permanent order, but a loose and flexible order, yielding without the least resistance to their passions, caprices, or supposed interests. They regard, and for this reason will continue to regard, all those who would make our institutions sacred, place them under the protection of religion and morals, and support them on the ground that they are the law, and that the law must be obeyed, as the enemies of the people, and to be denounced as anti-republican and anti-American. They are willing to appeal to opinion and sentiment, but they cannot endure that we should appeal to religion and morals, to conscience, or the sense of duty. For on the former ground there is liberty to change, modify, subvert, at will ; but on the latter there is a strict obligation to preserve the institutions as they are, and to resist unto death every one who would seek to subvert them. It is not monarchy or aristocracy against which the modern spirit fights, but against *loyalty* ; what it hates is not this or that form

of government, but *legitimacy*, and it would rebel against democracy as quick as against absolute monarchy, if democracy were asserted on the ground of legitimacy.

The modern spirit is in every thing the direct denial of the practical reason. It reverses every thing which has received the sanction of the race. In former times, it was universally held that authority was a good, indeed a necessity, and in all things men sought for an authority, something which could and had the right to command. They inquired always for the law, and law was always held to be imperative. Religion was the highest law, and authoritative, and no individual or nation had a right to dispute its dominion ; morals were binding, were the law imposed by religion ; politics were referred to the sovereign authority, to the majesty of the prince, or the state. The greatest evil conceivable was supposed to be that of being without law, without religious, moral, and political authority having the right to exact and the ability to secure submission. Man's glory, according to the ancient spirit, was in obedience to law. But the modern spirit reverses all this. It seeks not the authority which men are bound to obey, and to induce them to obey it, but it claims for man himself the authority in all things to make the law. It asserts the universal and absolute supremacy of man, and his unrestricted right to subject religion, morals, and politics to his own will, passion, or caprice. There is no denying this. Its direct aim and tendency is to place the subject over the sovereign, and to give to the subject in religion, morals, or politics the right to put a rope round his sovereign's neck, as the Chinese sometimes do around the neck of their idol, and drag him from his throne, and through the streets, and apply the bamboo whenever he chances not to conform himself to their will and pleasure. It calls government government, because it is *not* government ; morals morals, because they are *not* morals, that is, not obligatory upon the will ; religion religion, because it is *not* religion, that is, does *not* bind man to God ; law law, because it is *not* law ; and reason reason, because it is *not* reason. Marvellous is the age we live in ! Marvellous the light and progress of the modern world ! We have extinguished the light of reason, and therefore are reasonable ; reduced wisdom to folly, and therefore are wise ; substituted nonsense for sense, and therefore are intelligent, and have the right to call all who went before us fools and madmen, which assuredly they were, — unless we are.

The political mania of the last century, and a mania not yet

much abated, was that a political constitution may be written and clapped into one's pocket. Men not in a lunatic hospital, men who were regarded by their contemporaries as great men, learned men, profound philosophers and statesmen, in open day, in elaborate treatises, in grave deliberative assemblies, actually contended that the political constitution is a thing which may be made as one makes a handcart or a wheelbarrow, or drawn up beforehand as one draws up a note of hand ; and, what is stranger still, they were believed, and whole nations thrilled at the wonderful discovery, and, leaving all other business, engaged heart and soul, might and main, in the manufacture and sale of constitutions. We ourselves opened a shop for the business, or pretended to do so ; but France opened an establishment on a much larger scale, and carried on the business to an extent which differed only a step from the sublime. The facility and rapidity with which the lively French, for a series of years, turned out ready-made constitutions, for home consumption and exportation, can be compared to nothing better than to the facility with which a Connecticut Yankee turns out wooden clocks, wooden bowls, wooden nutmegs, cut-nails, clothes-pins, or locofoco matches. The delusion was all but universal for a time, and can be accounted for not without attributing it in part to demoniacal agency. Men not drawn down below the rank of their own nature, not made worse than human in their passions, and less than human in their reason and understanding, could never have been so wildly and madly carried away.

In the work before us, Count de Maistre attacks with all his erudition, philosophy, experience, and wit, this terrible delusion, — a delusion which even Carlyle has mercilessly ridiculed, and against which, our readers will bear us witness, we ourselves have argued and declaimed with all our might, ever since we began to address the public on political subjects. De Maistre shows, beyond the possibility of doubt or cavil, that the political constitution of a state is not and cannot be made ; that whatever it is, whatever its form, if it be a constitution at all, it is generated, not made ; that it grows up by Divine Providence, and is never framed beforehand, drawn up deliberately, and put into operation by those who live or are to live under it. It is never the work of deliberation, but always the work of Divine Providence, using men and circumstances as his instruments. It is always immediately or mediately — mediately in all cases, perhaps, except one — imposed by God himself, is the

expression of the divine will, and therefore legitimate, sacred, and suited to the nation. This is the leading principle of the Essay before us. The generative principle of all political constitutions which are such is Divine Providence, never the deliberate wisdom or will of men.

This doctrine is unquestionably conservative ; for it makes the constitution sacred. It is monarchical, where monarchy is the constitution of the state ; it is also republican, where, as with us, the constitution is republican. It would forbid the subjects of a monarchy to throw off monarchy and attempt to create a republic ; it would also forbid the citizens of a republic to throw off republicanism and attempt to found a monarchy. If we are destructives or revolutionists on principle, and are resolved to be always able to govern the government when we please and as we please, this doctrine must offend us, and we cannot but resist it ; but if we are attached to our institutions, hold our constitution to be law, not a mere regulation, and wish to preserve it, this is the very doctrine we need, and must heartily embrace. For our own part, we hold the republican constitution of this country to be the law, to be the legitimate order, and we hold ourselves bound in conscience to submit to it, whether we believe it the best possible form of government for every people on earth or not. **IT IS THE BEST POSSIBLE FORM FOR US.** We wish to preserve it intact, in all its life and vigor, and therefore we wish to see the doctrine in question embraced and cherished by every American citizen.

But when we speak of the American constitution, our readers must not imagine that we mean the written instrument usually denominated the constitution. The written constitution may sometimes be a memorandum of the real constitution, but is never that constitution itself ; and it is always a mere cobweb, save so far as it is also written on the hearts, and in the habits, the manners and customs of the people, as our own daily experience abundantly proves. The constitution is the living soul of the nation, that by virtue of which it is a nation, and is able to live a national life, and perform national functions. You can no more write it out on parchment, and put it into your pocket, than you can the soul of man. It is no dead letter, which when interrogated is silent, and when attacked is impotent ; it is a living spirit, a living power, a living providence, and resides wherever the nation is, and expresses itself in every national act. Written constitutions are never resorted to, when the real constitution is in full vitality and vigor, and the

state performs freely its normal functions ; and the most beautiful period in the history of every nation is the period prior to the attempt to reduce its constitution and laws to writing. The written instrument is invariably a proof that the constitution has suffered violence, has been enfeebled, and its existence endangered. It is resorted to as a means of preservation, in the hope that by writing it the constitution may be strengthened, and further encroachment prevented. But when it is in its full vigor, and has suffered no violence, men no more think of writing it, than the housewife thinks each morning of reducing to writing her arrangements for her household during the day.

We showed in our last Review that the people of this country have not made, and could not make, our political constitution. It was imposed by a competent authority, and has grown to be what it is through the providence of God. The people have never had the control of it. It was not their foresight, wisdom, convictions, or will, that made it republican. The constitution was republican from the first, and we established no monarchy or nobility at the close of the war of Independence, for the simple reason that neither was in our constitution. The royalty and nobility we knew prior to Independence were English, not American. Mr. Bancroft has well remarked, in his *History of the Colonization of the United States*, that royalty and nobility did not emigrate. Since they did not emigrate, they remained at home, and were not here ; not being here, they were not in our political constitution. The commons alone emigrated, and consequently our constitution recognized only commons. When, therefore, the foreign authority was thrown off, and we were left to our own constitution, we had only the government of the commons, that is to say, the representative democracy, or the elective aristocracy, if we may use the term, which we brought here from the mother country. Our government is simply the British House of Commons, without the king and House of Lords, divided for the sake of convenience into an upper and lower chamber, and with such few changes and modifications as were necessary to provide for an executive authority. The constitution was determined for us by the providence of God, which so ordered it that only the commons emigrated, and so created and arranged circumstances as to compel us from sheer necessity to live under a government from which royalty and nobility are excluded.

Count de Maistre not only contends that the constitution is

never made, or drawn up by the people with deliberation and forethought, that it is always the work of Providence using men and circumstances to effect or express his will, but that it can never be essentially changed by the people or the nation, deliberately or otherwise, without the destruction of the nation itself. If God determines and fixes the political constitution of a people, it follows that the constitution exists by the divine will and authority ; to seek to subvert or essentially change it is, then, to war against God, and we need not labor to prove that no individual or nation can ever rebel against God with success or impunity. Nations and individuals who conspire against God, and seek to make their will prevail instead of his, are sure to be destroyed. They separate themselves from the source of life, from the fountain of strength, and can but wither and die, as the branch severed from the vine.

This conclusion, which we know by infallible faith to be true, is, moreover, verified by all history. Our wise politicians seek a thousand reasons to explain the different results which national independence has produced here, from those which it has produced in Spanish America. There can be no question that in every one of the Spanish American states republicanism has proved a complete failure ; yet with us it is thought to have succeeded. Whence the difference ? It is idle to look for the cause in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon over the Spanish race, for this superiority is perfectly imaginary ; and the Spanish American colonies, as colonies, were in real prosperity and genuine civilization in advance of the Anglo-American. The difference of religion, too, has been immensely in favor of Spanish America ; because, while Protestantism tends to render men disorderly, insubordinate, impatient of restraint, and indifferent to the sacred obligations of law, Catholicity generates habits of order, subordination, and reverence for law. Yet the attempt to establish republicanism in Spanish America has resulted very nearly in the dissolution of all society. The cause of the difference is in the fact that republicanism with us was from the first the constitution, but was never the constitution of the Spanish American colonies. In them royalty and nobility settled ; and the whole constitution of the mother country, not merely that of the commons, was transferred to the New World. Royalty and nobility were integral elements in their constitution from the outset. We in declaring independence made no revolution in the government ; we only threw off what was foreign, while we retained all that was indigenous,

and the removal of the foreign or English authority only enabled the indigenous to manifest and exert itself in open day, in full and unimpeded life and vigor. But in Spanish America independence was not merely throwing off the foreign element, the authority of the mother country, but was a revolution, a subversion of the existing constitution, and the attempt to establish a new and a totally different political order. The cause of the failure is precisely in this attempt to change essentially the political constitution. If Spanish America had simply declared herself independent of Old Spain, but retained intact her domestic constitution, there can be no reason to doubt that her prosperity would, at least, have kept pace with ours. Portuguese America, Brazil, has succeeded the best, after us, of all the American States, for she only partially changed her original constitution. She would have done still better, if she had not changed it at all.

We can easily suppose what would have been our success, if we had attempted to introduce and establish monarchy and nobility. There were among us distinguished men — the most distinguished, perhaps, and firm patriots, too — who had no confidence in republicanism, and were pretty well persuaded that a government without king and nobles must prove a failure. But we had no royalty and nobility. Neither was here, and neither could be introduced without a social revolution. Suppose we had attempted to introduce them, to constitute the three estates, and retain the whole constitution, of the mother country ; who can doubt that the result would have been similar to what has been in Spanish America the attempt to introduce republicanism ? Neither being in the constitution, both would have been resisted by the whole force of American society, and could have triumphed only by overcoming that force, and destroying the whole existing social order, that is, the state itself.

France sought to change from a monarchy to a republic. She was great, powerful, intellectual, and enthusiastic. Never could the attempt have been made under more favorable auspices. She was aided, or not impeded, in the outset, by the very orders in the state which had the greatest privileges to lose ; the surrounding nations, the whole world, sympathized with her, and applauded her movement ; and yet her failure was striking, and no man can doubt, if he has ordinary judgment, that, if she had not returned to her old constitution, or in part returned, she would ere this have been blotted out from the chart of Europe as an independent nation. Her present uneasiness, her

present unsettled and ominous state, and all the difficulties she has to encounter grow out of her return having been partial, instead of complete. The most glorious period of French history since the reign of Louis the Fourteenth, perhaps since St. Louis, is that of Charles the Tenth, — a man and a prince to whom history is not likely to do justice. The Bourbons committed great faults, and they deserved and drew down upon their guilty heads the vengeance of Almighty God ; but if the family had, before the breaking out of the Revolution, or in its first stages, listened to the Count d'Artois, or if France had been wise enough to understand his character and appreciate the firmness of his principles when he became Charles the Tenth, she would now have been in the possession of her ancient constitution and of all her ancient glory. There would have been no "glorious three days," no *programme de Hôtel de Ville*, no such anomaly as a "citizen-king," — a king by virtue of the *Bourse*, it is true, but only so much the better. The same impossibility of changing the constitution without destroying social order we see in the recent history of Spain and Portugal. Each of these kingdoms, Spain especially, played at no distant date a distinguished part among the kingdoms of Europe ; but both are now fallen so low that there are few so poor as to do them reverence. It is not difficult to trace their present degradation, we say not to efforts at social amelioration, but to efforts to ameliorate their social condition by organic changes, or fundamental changes in the political constitution of the state, that is, to revolutionism, and they must return substantially to their old national constitutions, lapse into anarchy and barbarism, or be absorbed by their more powerful neighbours.

We have found in our historical reading no instance of a fundamental change of the national constitution that was successful. Never does a republic become a monarchy, or a monarchy a republic, without the virtual destruction of the state. Athens was originally monarchical, tempered, we suspect, by both aristocracy and democracy. The democratic element finally gained the mastery ; but it retained the ascendancy for only one hundred and four years. Solon himself saw the Pisistratidæ, and the whole period was one of political turmoil, of change, and usurpation, and the government was almost always in the hands of a single chief, who ruled, with or without law, during his ascendancy, very much as he pleased. The smaller Grecian cities, which adopted the republican order with

scarcely an exception, in brief space fell under the rule of tyrants or usurpers. We make no account of Rome, because her constitution was originally patrician, a modification of the patriarchal, and the royal authority acted not really on the people, but simply on the patrician, or head of the *gens*. The abolition of the royal and the substitution of the consular authority were no fundamental change in the constitution ; nor was the establishment, at a later period, of the tribunitial veto ; for the positive power of the state continued where it had been placed by Romulus, in the patrician body. The change to the imperial government was perhaps more fundamental, and makes decidedly for the doctrine we maintain ; for just in proportion as the constitution was changed under the emperors, and they usurped the functions of the Senate, Rome declined, and continued to decline, till it was no more.

In fact, if we may credit at all the lessons of history, the change of the original constitution of a state, if fundamental and permanent, is always and inevitably the destruction of the state itself. It is as easy to extract the soul from the body, and give to the body another soul, without causing death, as to take from a state its original constitution and give it a new one, and still retain the life of the nation. If the original constitution has died out, the nation is dead, and you can no more give it a new constitution and restore it to life, than you can give to a dead body a new soul, and render it once more a living body. The new constitution must come in with a new people, which subjects and takes the place of the old, as is clearly evinced in the case of the downfall of the old Roman empire, and the rise of the modern states of Europe. Even religion herself cannot prevent it ; she may delay the catastrophe, but she has no power to avert it. Constantine, Theodosius, Justinian, cannot prevent the doom of Rome, old or new. The Northern barbarian executes it upon the one, the Turk upon the other. The vast populations of Asia have no indigenous power to rise from their degradation, and they will be restored never, unless conquered and subjected by a people already living, already in possession of a constitution in its life and vigor, because their old political constitutions are effete, and they now subsist as populations rather than as states.

God, by giving in his providence a particular constitution to a particular people, has fixed its law, the law of its life, its prosperity, and its duration. No people survives its constitution. The overthrow of our republican constitution would be our

political death. Spanish America, if it does not reëstablish its original monarchical and aristocratic order, must either lapse into complete barbarism, or be absorbed by us. The Canadas have foolishly attempted once, perhaps may attempt again, independence of the mother country, in view of establishing the republican regime; they have thus far failed, for they have royalty and nobility in their constitution. If Lower Canada had not had, she would, in what we call our Revolution, have made common cause with us, gained her independence, and become a member of our confederacy. Some Young Irelanders appear to us also to dream of republicanism or democracy for Ireland. They could not be madder. The constitution of Ireland is not, never was, and never can be, republican. Royalty and nobility are essential elements of it. She cannot subsist, if she throws off even the authority of the crown of Great Britain, for she would have left only an incomplete constitution, only two elements out of the three which are essential to it. She cannot supply from herself the element of royalty for all the island, and she would divide into several petty principalities, each under the representative of its ancient chief, with no suzerain or lord paramount, and thus revive the interminable feuds and wars of a former period of her history. Legislative independence is not impracticable, because she has, without going to England, both the lords and commons. With the lords she could not be a democracy, with the commons she could not be an aristocracy, and with the two without royalty to mediate between them she could not maintain a government. The crown of Great Britain has become integral in her constitution, if we regard her as Ireland, and not as Leinster, Ulster, &c. But, retaining the authority of the British crown, there is no reason why she may not have her own parliament; and, indeed, since the suppression of her national parliament was an essential change in her constitution, she has a right to it, and it is necessary to restore it, as the condition of her national life and prosperity. Without it she must cease to be Ireland, and in time become an integral part of England, politically considered, as Scotland already has become. Scotland, as Scotland, has ceased to exist, and so must Ireland, as Ireland, unless she recover her national parliament. It was not, therefore, from a shallow thought, or without profound philosophy, that the lamented O'Connell on the one hand avowed his loyal attachment to the crown of Great Britain, which is also the crown of Ireland, and on the other demanded with all his energies

the repeal of the Union, and the restoration of the Irish parliament.

They wholly mistake O'Connell, and reduce him to the level of a very commonplace man, who suppose that the question between him and Young Ireland was a question between "peaceful agitation" and "physical force." Peaceful agitation and physical force were the respective symbols of the parties; but the real question lay deeper. The Young Irelanders, unless we have wholly mistaken them, are in principle revolutionists, and hold that a people may make or unmake its constitution; O'Connell was a conservative, holding the national constitution sacred, and seeking only to restore and preserve it. He studied history and politics to ascertain the constitution; they study them to find the means of enkindling the national ardor to make such a constitution as they imagine will be best for their country. He was a legitimist; they care not a fig for legitimacy. He saw that the constitution of his country had been suppressed by the act of union, and that it must be restored, or his country, as a distinct country, be blotted out; and he therefore sought to restore what his country had lost through the zeal, kindled at the altar of Jacobinism, of the hot-headed patriots of '98. If any man ever lived who held the principles of revolution in abhorrence, the principles of the French Revolution, in particular, that man was Daniel O'Connell, and if there was ever a people that should detest them, that people is the Irish. Here is the principle of the difference between him and Young Ireland, a principle which, we regret to say, his friends in too many instances seem to us to overlook. Too many of them seem to imagine that he would go as far in effecting a revolution as any one, that he was a thorough-going radical, only he would not consent to employ physical force as a means,—in a word, that he was a sort of Quaker Jacobin, a broad-brimmed *Sans-culottes*. Here is their capital mistake, and the reason why they suppose his rupture with the Young Irelanders was after all for a slight cause, and imagine that it may be healed. Healed it may be, by the conversion of Repealers to Jacobinism, or that of the Young Irelanders to legitimacy, but on no other condition.

What Ireland wants is not revolution, is not a new political order, a change in her constitution, but her own national constitution restored to its normal state, and preserved in its vitality and force; and this, if done at all, must be done on the principles of legitimacy, as O'Connell contended; not on the

principles of revolution, as Young Ireland contends. It is Ireland, Old Ireland, whose life is at stake, and which it is necessary to rescue and save. Ireland can know no Young Ireland. A nation cannot be twice born. There can be no Young Ireland. By the very fact that these young enthusiasts call themselves "Young Ireland," they declare that they are not Ireland, proclaim themselves, not *nationalists*, as they falsely pretend, but *anti-nationalists*. Nationalists are those who live the national life, are true to the national constitution, and ready to die in its support; not they who separate from the nation, discard the national constitution, and are ready to draw the sword, not for the nation that is, but to hew out a nation after their own image. They may have poetry; they may write stirring newspaper essays; they may excel in vague and frothy declamation; they may believe themselves honest, enlightened, and patriotic; they may even fancy that their spirit is not Jacobinical, and regard the charge of being revolutionists as a gross calumny; but, alas! all men who demand liberty by appeals to sentiment instead of conscience, and expect it from passion instead of law, are revolutionists in principle, and need only the time and the occasion to reenact the part of Mirabeau, Danton, and Robespierre. These Young Irelanders, most likely, foresee not now whither tends the spirit by which they are governed; but let them follow it for a time, and they will find that there is no retreat for them, that they have placed their country in such a situation that they cannot prevent a Jacobinical revolution, even if they would, and such a revolution would only complete the work begun by the Saxon. If Ireland, the Ireland we have known and loved, the Ireland which has withstood the storms and tempests of two thousand years, famous in the annals of literature and religion, rich in saints, sufferings, and long centuries of perpetual martyrdom, be not doomed to utter extinction, she will disown these her pretended children, and treat them as St. Patrick did the less venomous serpents and reptiles which he found on her soil, and which can no more touch it and live.

But let no one be so silly as to imagine that the conservative principle contended for by Count de Maistre is hostile to such social meliorations and such administrative changes as time and its vicissitudes may render necessary or expedient. But the true social reformer is the state physician, and proceeds in regard to the state precisely as the medical doctor does in regard to the human body. He seeks always to heal the dis-

orders of the state without destroying or impairing the constitution, and by the application of such remedies as are peculiarly adapted to the constitution. If the constitution is already broken up and become incurable, he knows there is no effectual remedy, and that complete dissolution, sooner or later, must inevitably ensue. But if he finds the constitution still sound at bottom, he seeks simply to restore it to its normal state, and to guard against whatever would tend to impair its healthy and vigorous action. In other words, he restores, but does not seek to create ; develops, but does not attempt to institute.

On this principle we see our present Holy Father introducing administrative changes in the temporal government of the States of the Church. How far the reforms he has introduced or proposed extend, we are not able to say ; and how far they will effect the end intended, and serve to tranquillize the turbulent spirits, the unprincipled and ambitious, among his subjects, it is not for us to judge, or even to inquire. But we can easily believe that in an old government, like that of the Roman States, some administrative abuses may with the lapse of time have crept in, and that the alterations which for the last hundred years have been taking place around them have rendered some administrative changes expedient. As a wise and judicious prince, as a watchful and tender father, the Pope seems to believe such to be the fact, and to be determined to correct the former and to introduce the latter ; and for this he has been applauded to the echo, rather in the hope of inducing him to go farther, we apprehend, than from any real satisfaction felt for what he has thus far done or proposed. But we confess, that, notwithstanding the shouts which ring in our ears, and the loud praises he has secured from those whose praise is always suspicious, we have seen in him not the least conceivable tendency to countenance the misnamed Liberalism now so rife in the European populations. They who flatter themselves that the Sovereign Pontiff of Christendom is about to place himself at the head of the Liberals, as their leader in the war against legitimacy, will find their shouts have been premature, and their hopes fallacious. That Pius the Ninth is the father of his people, that his sympathies are with the oppressed and down-trodden of all nations, that he is the uncompromising enemy of injustice and arbitrary rule, whether of kings or peoples, is no doubt true, and in saying so we only say he is Pope ; but *because* this is true, we have the fullest assurance that nothing can be farther from his thoughts and intentions than to countenance, even in the remot-

est degree, the mad and ruinous radicalism or socialism of the day, or that it has aught to hope from him but his anathema.

We know the enemies of law and order have rejoiced ; we know that even some Catholics, placing their politics, unconsciously no doubt, before their religion, — and we commend the fact to the *London Tablet* and its Parisian correspondents, — have flattered themselves that our Holy Father seeks to effect an alliance between Catholicity and modern socialism ; but he is the Vicar of Jesus Christ, not a pupil from the school of the apostate De Lamennais, and can no more form an alliance with socialism than with despotism. One Pope is not in the habit of reversing, in what involves a principle, the decisions of another. We all know the doctrine of the *l'Avenir* ; we all know that after the revolution of July, 1830, De Lamennais sought to persuade the Church to make common cause with the European populations against their political sovereigns, to throw herself into the arms of the people, and trust for her support to their holy instincts ; and we all know the answer he received from Rome. The Church throws herself into the arms of neither the people nor the sovereigns ; she relies for support on no power foreign to herself. She rests on God alone, who has promised to be with her all days unto the consummation of the world. She forms no alliances. The sects may trim their sails to the breeze, and appeal now to despotism and now to liberalism, now seek to avail themselves of a temperance excitement, and now of an Abolitionist or a socialist movement, for they are all impotent in themselves, and can subsist only by means of supplies drawn from abroad. But the Church draws all her support and all her motive power from within, from God himself. Her ensign is the cross, the cross alone, and her battle-cry, from the first to the last, is *Deus vult*. As she withstood the despotic tendency of kings and emperors in the Middle Ages, and taught the sovereigns that they held their power as a trust from God, and were bound to exercise it for the good of their subjects, so will she withstand the popular tendencies towards license and anarchy, and teach the people that their duty and their interest are in the maintenance of the order Almighty God has established for them, and in frank and conscientious submission to law.

Nothing could be madder, on the part of Catholics with us, than to give in to the radicalism of the country. Our only security here is in the supremacy of the law, and the prevailing sense of its sacredness, without which its supremacy is impos-

sible. The Catholic who does not wish to pave the way for the confiscation of the property of his Church, and for the suppression of his worship in these States, must beware how he binds himself to the extreme *liberalism* of the country, and aids the tendency now so active, under the name of progress, to sweep away all the guaranties of law. It is natural that persons who have during their whole lives felt only the pressure of government, and known government only in its abuses, should on coming here be disposed to adopt extreme views, and think only of restricting the sphere and diminishing the power of government ; and it is natural also, that, finding their religion generally unpopular, they should seek to conciliate favor for it, or to acquire popularity for themselves, by falling in with the popular political current, and showing themselves enthusiastic in their support of the dominant tendency of the country ; but in doing either they are as far from consulting their true interest as they are their duty as Catholics. Majorities may protect themselves ; minorities have no protection but in the sacredness and supremacy of law. The law is right as it is ; we must study to keep it so ; and if we do, we shall always throw our influence on the conservative side, never on the radical side.

It may be objected, that the doctrine we contend for is opposed to progress ; but it is opposed to progress in no sense in which progress is not a delusion. There is progress of individuals, but no progress of human nature, — a progress of particular nations, but none of the race. Nations are like individuals ; they are born with their peculiar constitutions and capacities, which determine all that they can be. They grow up like individuals, attain their growth, their maturity, decline into old age, become enfeebled, and die, and pass away. It is the universal law, and there is no *elixir vitæ* for nations any more than for individuals. The Rosicrucians pretended that it is possible in the case of the individual to ward off death and maintain perpetual youth, and Godwin, and Balzac, and Bulwer have made the notion the theme of interesting romances, as all know who have read *St. Leon*, *Le Centenaire*, and *Zanoni*, and our modern politicians try to persuade us to believe the same is possible with regard to the state ; but, in either case, it is a mere dream of the fancy or a delusion of the devil. The limits of our national progress are fixed by the inherent principles of our constitution, and it is madness to dream of passing beyond them.

In conclusion, we would express our thanks to the translator of the excellent little work which we have made the theme of

our remarks. He has done his task with taste and fidelity, and the notes he has annexed to the work add to its permanent value. There is one thing, however, the translator has not done ; but as he knows what it is, and as it concerns him personally, we say no more. Disagreeing with De Maistre as to his monarchical views, at least so far as concerns our own country, and avowing it as our full and settled conviction that the destiny of our country is inseparable from the destiny of its republican constitution, we yet recommend his *Essay* as worthy of general study, and as almost the only sensible political pamphlet that has ever been published amongst us. Our politicians may slight it, may denounce it, and denounce us for recommending it ; but if they do, so much the worse for them, so much the worse for the country.

But, be this as it may, dark and lowering as are our political heavens, we know there is a good Providence over us, and we will never despair of the republic. There is a limit to the power of evil, and when things are at worst they sometimes mend. We will hope that we have reached the term of our downward tendency ; that radicalism has had its day ; that a reaction has commenced, and that the mass of our people will recover from their folly, and henceforth not fear to be conservative.

ART. III. — *The Dublin Review*, No. XLIV., Art. III. London : Richardson & Son. July, 1847.

THE July number of the *Dublin Review* contains an article, by one of the recent converts from Oxford, on *Doctrinal Developments*, professedly in reply to some remarks of ours on the same subject, in our Review for January last. For the obliging terms in which the writer speaks of ourselves personally, he will accept of our grateful acknowledgments ; but he must permit us to say that his article, regarded either as a reply to our remarks, or as a defence of the Theory of Development, has struck us as singularly deficient, and as exhibiting by no means that extensive and accurate acquaintance with Catholic theology which we naturally look for in a contributor to so respectable a periodical as the *Dublin Review*, the leading Catholic periodical in our language.

We must remark by the way, — and we do so with no disrespect to the distinguished author of the article, — that we regret that the task of replying to us had not been committed to the hands of some learned Catholic doctor, instead of one who, however able and well disposed, can speak on the general subject with no more authority than ourselves, and, from the defect of professional training, is not less likely, perhaps, to mistake the sense of the authorities which must be cited than we are. But our friends in England have the right to select their own champion, and we must, with Divine assistance, which we implore, manage our side of the controversy as well as we can.

The article, however, has the advantage of being from a personal friend of Mr. Newman, and a hearty admirer of that gentleman's theory, who is not likely to misunderstand or misstate it. We may, therefore, take it as a good proof of the correctness of our own statement, that it does not in any respect whatever object to it ; but reasserts the theory, both in regard to Christian doctrine and development, substantially as we ourselves understood it. We trust that this will satisfy our friends on this side of the water, that we have not, as some of them have supposed, either misunderstood or misrepresented Mr. Newman.

We understand the writer to concede the correctness of our representation of the Theory of Developments. If he does, he is bound either to abandon it, or to show that the consequences we deduced from it are not legitimate ; for those consequences, if warranted, prove that it is subversive of Christianity. Unhappily, he does neither. He has left our statement of the theory, our objections to it, and the arguments by which we sustained them, standing in all their force. He has not even pleaded to them. Yet he cannot be unaware that he is held to concede every count in our declaration to which he does not plead, and that we have the right in reasoning with him to assume its truth. This consideration alone sets aside his whole reply.

The theory of Development is a special theory, resting for its logical basis on a certain view of Christian doctrine, namely, that Christian doctrine is not the revealed truth itself, but the mind's idea of it ; or that inspiration supplies only the *materia informis* of doctrine, which is rendered *doctrina formata* only by the action of the uninspired intellect, — thus degrading Christianity, by Mr. Newman's own confession, to the level of human sects and philosophies, which is, of course, to deny it. Our

main objection was to this view of Christian doctrine, from which developments of doctrine are only a logical deduction ; and we objected to this, not because it authorizes developments, but *because it subverts Christianity*. The Reviewer by neglecting to plead to this charge concedes its truth, gives us the right to assume it against him, and thus throws himself out of court, or debars himself from the right to enter. He cannot introduce testimony to prove developments in the sense of his theory, because that would be to introduce testimony to disprove Christianity, which is not lawful ; and to introduce it to prove developments in some other sense would be to undertake to prove what is not in question, — an instance of what logicians call *ignorantia elenchi*.

If held to strict logic, or to the rules of legal pleading recognized by the common law courts, both in his country and in ours, the Reviewer is estopped, and cannot proceed till he gets permission to plead to the charges against the basis of his theory. Till then, his authorities are of no avail ; for we have only to reply, your theory is anti-Christian, and you are not at liberty to introduce testimony to prove any thing which is not Christian. If he rejoins, his authorities are Christian ; we reply, again, then they must be understood in a Christian sense, and therefore cannot be understood in the sense of your theory, for your theory is anti-Christian. In any and every possible case, it is more reasonable to suppose that he misinterprets his authorities than that they authorize any thing against our holy religion.

We insist on this for two reasons : — 1. because, if there is to be a controversy on this subject, it must be conducted on strict logical principles, or it will be interminable ; and, 2. because it is precisely in their view of Christian doctrine antecedently to developments, that, in our judgment, the chief error of the Developmentists lies, and it is especially to this point we wish to call their attention. We object to the developments themselves, but because they imply the false view of Christianity entertained by Mr. Newman and his school, rather than to their view of Christianity, because it authorizes the developments. The developments are bad enough ; but their view of Christianity leaves us no Christianity to develop. What we mean is, that, though we object to all developments of doctrine properly so called, when they mean any thing more than new or fuller explications of the faith *propter errores insurgentes*, we are not so scandalized by them, regarded simply as develop-

ments, as we are at the view of Christian doctrine which is set forth as their logical basis. In other words, it is less to the developments than to the *theory* of developments that we object, and we demand that the controversy turn, as it should, on the theory itself, which we have the right to do, because it was against that we directed our principal attack.

We complain of the Reviewer that he has neglected entirely the logical basis of his theory, and proceeds as if no objections were made to it. We regard a theory as refuted, if refuted in its principles; for we do not comprehend how a superstructure can stand, when its foundation is taken away. When the foundation of a theory is attacked, we have always supposed that it is that which is to be defended, in order to defend the theory. Now we feel confident that very few can examine the foundation of Mr. Newman's theory without rejecting it; and we wish especially to call the attention of his friends to its defence, because we think the moment they seriously attempt its defence they will abandon the theory in despair, perhaps in disgust.

But waiving this preliminary objection to the consideration of the theory at all, yet reserving our right to fall back on it whenever we choose, we will, lest the Reviewer conclude that we are objecting to the form of his argument because we are unable to reply to its matter, proceed to consider what he has actually attempted to allege in his defence. He proposes to do three things:—1. Make as precise a statement as may be of the general principle which seems understood in the language of Mr. Thompson, Mr. Lewis, and Mr. Northcote; 2. Bring together a sample of the high Catholic authority on which that principle rests; and, 3. Offer some brief remarks on the testimony we adduced against it (p. 327).

Our readers will perceive that the names of Mr. Thompson, Mr. Lewis, and Mr. Northcote are substituted for Mr. Newman's. Why, we must ask, is this? The article is professing a reply to us, and our attack was directed against Mr. Newman, not against these gentlemen, save so far as they may choose to indorse and defend him. Is their theory essentially different from his? Then we have not assailed it. Is it substantially the same? Then why defend it under their name rather than his? Would they appropriate to themselves the honor that is his? Or have they too profound a respect for him to mention his name? Or is such their estimation of the theory of development, that they would shield him from its

responsibilities? Our article was directed against his doctrine, as we gathered it from his Essay; yet the Reviewer, in replying to it, does not once mention even his name. Does he suppose that by suppressing Mr. Newman's name he can deprive him of the glory, or relieve him from the shame, of being the founder and chief of the school of development? However unwilling his friends may be, either for his sake or their own, that he should appear before the world as the leader of a school, he does so appear, and will, till he either obtains for his theory the sanction of authority or abandons it; and they, however great their repugnance to be called a school, will be so called, so long as the theory remains unsanctioned, and they are understood to adhere to it. The thing is so and cannot be helped, and they need not seek to disguise it; for it is not to be presumed that any body supposes, that, if, contrary to the wishes of Mr. Newman, the Church should decide the theory to be not "coincident" with her judgment on the subject, their Catholic faith would be shaken, or they would withhold their submission. We own, their present attitude towards the Church is exceedingly awkward; for they are endeavouring to persuade her to accept a theory which she has not taught, but which they devised for themselves, when *in transitu* from heresy and schism to truth and unity, and when, according to Mr. Newman, they could use "only reason in the things of faith"; but it is an attitude of their own choosing, and are they the men to shrink from its responsibility?

It would have been only simple civility to us, if the Reviewer, in making his statement of the principle of his theory, had referred to our statement of it, and either acknowledged its correctness or pointed out its inaccuracies. By doing so, he would have at once put us in possession of his precise thought, and have saved himself from the liability of being misunderstood, and us from that of being found fighting a man of straw. For ourselves, we have supposed, in replying to an opponent, that it is at least civil to pay some attention to what he says, — to his words, instead of being wholly engrossed with our own. But the Reviewer appears to think differently, and we must submit. We have, however, examined his statement with what ability we have, and, supposing him to use language according to its ordinary import, and not, as Mr. Ward said of subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles in a "non-natural sense," we must understand his doctrine to be substantially the same that we ascribed to Mr. Newman, and in what follows we shall

assume that it is so. Since, then, all that we have heretofore objected to it stands good, inasmuch as no exception has been taken to it, nothing more is necessary to be added now for the purpose of proving its anti-Christian character. We have already refuted it, and need not to refute it again; for certainly to ignore an objection is not to remove it. We proceed, therefore, at once to the authorities cited.*

The Reviewer cites in support of his theory, Petavius, Bellarmine, Vasquez, Suarez, Cano, Cardinal Fisher, St. Vincent of Lerins, St. Augustine, Moehler, Doellinger, and the Count de Maistre,—authorities enough to establish it, if they were really authorities for it, we are willing to concede. But, —

1. The Reviewer proposes by these authorities to prove developments in the sense of his theory. But these authorities are Christian, and therefore it is to be presumed that they cannot be understood in the sense of his theory, for his theory is to be presumed to be anti-Christian.

2. The theory is confessedly a novelty in Catholic theology; for the Reviewer says expressly, that he has given his own view because none of his authorities have drawn out a distinct and systematic statement of it (p. 352). But the presumption is against every novelty, and the *onus probandi* rests upon its advocates. Consequently the Reviewer must prove, not only that his authorities *may*, but that they *must*, be under-

* There is one point, however, in his statement, to which we take the liberty of directing the Reviewer's attention. In treating the subject of inspiration, and throughout his article, he distinguishes the *intellect* from the *spiritual nature*, and proceeds on the assumption, that the truth may be impressed on one's spiritual nature, and the individual nevertheless remain intellectually ignorant of it. We are at some loss to understand this psychology. What does the Reviewer mean by *spiritual nature*? The inferior nature, which is the seat of concupiscence! Of course not. The rational nature! But the rational nature, if distinguished from intellect or understanding, is simply *the will*. If he means by spiritual nature the will, he adopts the Socinian view of inspiration, namely, that it is not the revelation of the truth to the intellect, but a disposing of the will to seek truth, and to embrace and obey it, when found. That is, inspiration is ethical rather than intellectual. We cannot suppose this to be his doctrine, and therefore are unable to imagine what it is he means by the spiritual nature, when distinguished from the intellect. We shall be obliged to him, if he will be so kind as to inform us. Catholic theology can hardly accept the sentimentalism of Jacobi, or the Transcendentalism of Schelling, Cousin, or Coleridge, and perhaps the Reviewer will find it not useless to revise his psychology.

stood in the sense of his theory, and cannot possibly be understood otherwise.

3. Since the theory is a novelty, and, as a theory, confessedly not drawn out by the authorities themselves, the Reviewer is not at liberty to conclude it from what they say, even if what they say should seem to imply it. In understanding Catholic authorities, when the point to be proved is a novelty, and for which we have no express authority, the rule of strict construction obtains, and the authorities are to be restricted to what they explicitly assert; for it may be that the author did not foresee the consequences we deduce from his premises, that, if he foresaw them, he denied their legitimacy, or that, if he had foreseen them, and believed them to be legitimate, he would have modified his premises so as to have escaped them. This rule is itself conclusive against the theory; for it confessedly rests on the *explicit* authority of no Catholic theologian.

4. Since the theory is confessedly a novelty, and the principal authorities adduced in its support all flourished before the close of the seventeenth century, and some of them before the close of the fifth, without its having been hitherto deduced from them, the *presumption* is that they do not warrant it; for if they did, we may reasonably conclude that it would have been drawn from them before now. It is true, the Reviewer says (p. 352), that "it is in accordance with, it is only an instance of, the principle he contends for, that development should be developed"; but the *petitio principii* is not a respectable figure of logic, and it is not allowable to assume development as the medium of proving development.

5. It is a still further *presumption* against the supposition that the authorities cited warrant the theory, that no *Catholic* has ever so held. The theory is not only a novelty, — in Catholic theology, we mean, for in Protestantism it is no novelty, — but a novelty that comes to us from without; and it cannot be supposed for a moment that an Anglican minister, as Mr. Newman was, though *in transitu* from heresy and schism to truth and unity, however great his abilities, deep his religious feelings, extensive his learning, or sincere and honest his intentions, yet destitute of the graces of the Sacraments, and uninitiated into the science of Catholic theology, should better understand Catholic theologians than they understand, or have hitherto understood, one another.

6. The more especially is this to be said, when the theory is confessedly adopted as an hypothesis, as an expedient for

getting rid of a difficulty which cannot, without heresy, be assumed to be a difficulty at all. We are bound as Catholics to take our reading of history and philosophy from the Church, and not our reading of the Church from history and philosophy. The theory implies that the teaching of the Church is to be taken from history and philosophy, and says so and so the Church must have believed, because so and so history and philosophy, as we understand them, teach, — the very error broached by Abelard in his *Introductio ad Theologiam*, for which St. Bernard so sharply censures him, and which is at least the seminal principle of Rationalism.

7. We insist on these presumptions, themselves in fact conclusive, not because we propose to avail ourselves of them to much extent in solving the difficulties suggested by the authorities cited, but because we wish the Developmentists to perceive their exact position and its responsibilities. It would not surprise us, if, in ranging through the long catalogue of Catholic theologians, who have discussed all manner of subjects, in every possible point of view, and, first or last, emitted many singular opinions, some half a dozen should be found who have said things which an ingenious fancy or a subtle speculator may, when taken from their connection, detached from the special purpose of the writer, and from the general principles of theological science which must restrict their meaning and application, develop into a sense not absolutely unfavorable to the theory in question. But this, if so, is nothing to the purpose. Single doctors are not to be interpreted by a theory invented especially for their interpretation, but by a rule drawn from the general current of theology. What they say which appears exceptional must, as far as possible, be reduced to the rule, and what cannot be so reduced must be regarded as a private opinion, at best as a *sententia in Ecclesia*, not as *sententia Ecclesiæ*, and therefore as unauthoritative, on which we can never venture to build any thing to be put forth as the doctrine of the Church. Nothing is more unscientific, nothing theologically more reprehensible, than to rove through the multitude of doctors, seize upon their private opinions, their incidental expressions, their *obiter dicta*, their special solutions of special problems, as primitive *data*, and generalize them into a theory to be henceforth taken as the sense of Catholic doctors, and the recognized doctrine of the Church of God. And yet this is an exact description of what is done, or attempted to be done, by Mr. Newman and his school; and their theory is at best, in

its most innocent statement, simply a theory for proving that the *sententiæ in Ecclesia* are the true and *proper sententiæ Ecclesiæ*, as they themselves virtually, if not expressly, maintain. What else is the meaning of such a sentence as this? "In fact, it is only in accordance with, it is only an instance of, the very principle we have been contending for, that development should be developed; that a principle on which the Church has ever proceeded [unconsciously for the most part, pp. 300, 301], and which her greatest doctors have *from time to time* recognized and fully allowed, should *at last*, by the progress of controversy, have to be drawn forth into a *consistent and systematic theory*" (p. 352).

But, in addition to this, we must remark that the Reviewer has enumerated in his article six classes of developments, and confessedly cites authorities for only the last two. Why is this? Do these two include the other four? If so, his classification is unscientific. If not, if the six classes are mutually distinguishable, *per differentiam*, how conclude the truth of the four from the proof of the two? Is this accidental, the result of a loose manner of thinking, and of an unscientific manner of writing? or is it designed, and intended to enable the Reviewer, in case his proofs should turn out to be insufficient to prove the developments in the special sense to which he adduces them, to insist that he has nevertheless sustained his theory, if they are found sufficient to prove them in *some* other sense which he has recognized?

The first class of developments described, but taken for granted, are those which scandalize us the most, because they strike at the Mystery of the Trinity, the foundation of the Christian profession, are those on which Mr. Newman places the greatest reliance, and from which he draws the principal illustrations of his theory; and, also, because they are those on which the weight of authority is overwhelming against him. To assume, as the Reviewer does (p. 329), that the doctrine of the Trinity was only imperfectly understood and believed before the Nicene Council, to assert of the Ante-Nicene Fathers generally, that in treating this Holy Mystery they erred in thought and expression, held opinions subsequently condemned by the Church, and yet were far from "doctrinal error," and to assume such a horrible doctrine as a matter of course, as a thing which will be admitted without controversy, is presuming a little too much on the ignorance, stupidity, or indifference

of the Catholic public. It is not less scandalous than the reason the Reviewer assigns, near the close of his article, why his theory, as some have objected, will not impair the evidences of Christianity; namely, that the argument it impairs can affect only a limited class of persons! (p. 353); that is, the ignorant may have as good evidence as they had before! But waiving this, we come without further preface to the two kinds of developments which the Reviewer does attempt to prove, and to the authorities he cites in their support. These are what he calls *ethical* developments and *logical* developments. We begin with the ethical.

1. An ethical development, according to the Reviewer, "arises from the gradual action of the Christian mind upon revealed truths or principles," is "the gradual growth of an idea under the influence of pious meditation and practical realization" (p. 332). As an instance of what he means, he cites the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the ever-blessed Virgin. His positions with regard to this doctrine are two:—
1. The doctrine is an ethical development; 2. It can be defined to be of faith. His conclusion is, if this can be, then the whole class of ethical developments. To prove his two positions he cites Petavius, Vasquez, and Suarez.

But what are these ethical developments? Whence originates the idea which gradually grows under the influence of pious meditation? Is it the *revelatum* itself? No; for if it were, it would not be a development. Is it an idea implicitly contained in the *revelatum*? No; for if it were, it would be a *logical* development, not ethical, since it is by a logical and not an ethical process that we draw forth from one truth another which it implicitly contains. What is it, then? It can be nothing but an idea, a pious thought, which springs up in the Christian mind on the occasion of meditating on the revealed truth or principle. Then it is either a special revelation to the pious mind, or it is an idea furnished by the pious mind itself. In either case, it is not a doctrine contained in the word of God, written or unwritten, but something which the Christian mind, by natural or supernatural means, *adds* to it. This is what the writer must mean, if he distinguishes, *per differentiam*, ethical from logical developments. The simple point for the Reviewer to prove, then, is, that an idea of this sort, after having floated for a while in the minds of the faithful, and become a prevailing opinion, may be defined *de fide*. The simple statement is sufficient to prove the contrary.

Such being an ethical development, it will be seen at a glance that the Reviewer, by assuming the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception to be an ethical development, denies it to be an Apostolic tradition, and supposes it to be a mere pious thought which some day sprang up in some devout mind while meditating on the glorious privileges of the Blessed Virgin, or at best a private revelation made subsequently to the time of the Apostles, and therefore in either case incapable of being defined *de fide*, because it has not and cannot have the formal reason of divine and *catholic* faith. This is a bold denial to begin with,—a formal decision, on private authority, of a question which many people have supposed could be decided only by the public and infallible authority of the Church. Many of the faithful have cherished the hope that the Church would one day decide the doctrine to be of faith ; for they have believed it to be a *doctrine of Apostolic tradition*, though less explicitly recognized by the early Fathers in their writings than it is now ; for, as Suarez says, they were engaged in matters of more pressing moment, having to defend the very foundation of the Christian profession of faith. Perhaps these will not agree with the Reviewer in his decision, which, if sustained, cuts off the hope they have cherished.

But do the authorities sustain the Reviewer ? In order to do so, they must prove two points :— 1. That the doctrine is an ethical development ; 2. That it can, being such, be defined of faith. Petavius gives it as his *private* opinion, that the doctrine is not of faith, that is, is not an Apostolic tradition, — and he may have considered it to be something approaching what the Reviewer calls an ethical development, or rather he in fact held it to be supernatural, and a posterior revelation, by ordinary or extraordinary means, to individuals ; but he says nothing as to its capacity to be defined of faith. This was not his problem. His problem was, how to account for a belief so extended and so firmly held, not taken from the Scriptures, not known to be a doctrine of tradition, which has never been defined by the Church, and has been denied or doubted by many eminent doctors and saints. And he attempts to solve it by representing the belief to be revealed in the sense recognized by St. Augustine in the passage he cites from him, and which he contends is sufficient to produce in individuals, without a decision of the Church, “ what the Greeks call *πληροφορίαν* and the Latins *firnam persuasionem*.” The presumption is, that Petavius did not imply or believe that the Church

could decide it to be of faith.* The authorities Petavius cites are cited to prove this view, and, as it is not a view we now controvert, they are not against us.

Vasquez, in the passage cited, does not represent the doctrine as an ethical development; he only maintains that an argument not light for its truth may be collected from private revelations, miracles, and the common consent of the faithful, since the time of St. Thomas, who doubted the doctrine, — a fact which we have never heard questioned. Suarez says the doctrine may be defined of faith, but denies it to be an ethical development; for he says expressly, that to such a definition “some supernatural truth contained implicitly in tradition or Scripture” is necessary, as we read in the place cited by the Reviewer. Here is all the proof of ethical developments which the Reviewer has adduced, and it amounts to nothing. But, even if his authorities were express to the points to which he adduces them, they would avail him nothing, for he would have even then only an *opinion in the Church*, which is not authoritative for doctrine.

The Reviewer should have selected an instance of unquestionable ethical development, already defined to be of faith. One such instance would have decided the question at once and for ever. Perhaps he had no such instance to adduce, and therefore is not to be blamed. As to the question, whether the Immaculate Conception can be defined of faith, we have nothing to say; for it is not the question before us. The question before us is, whether, if it be a mere ethical development, it can be so defined. This the Reviewer asserts, but fails to prove. For ourselves, we are content to await the action of the Church, and not to take it upon us to advise her what she ought to do, or what we wish her to do. It is hers to teach, ours to believe; and we have no wishes but hers on the subject. With these, when made known to us, we will do our best, grace assisting us, to comply.

2. So much for *ethical* developments; we pass now to the *logical* developments. “The various kinds of development already mentioned,” says the Reviewer (p. 333), “by bringing consciously before the mind propositions which before were there only unconsciously or even only potentially or in germ, lead to a last kind, viz. *logical deductions from themselves*.” Logical developments are, then, logical deductions from devel-

* Petavius, *De Incarnatione*, lib. 14, cap. 2, sec. 8–11.

opments, that is, developments of developments. A slight objection occurs *in limine* to these logical developments, namely, the reality of the developments from which they are logical deductions does not appear to be proved. The first four are confessedly left without proof, affirmed, in so far as developments, gratuitously; and the fifth, we have just seen, is not sustained by the authorities. But let this pass; for we assure our Anglican friends that it is not the only instance in which they seem to us to imagine that substantial conclusions may be drawn from unsubstantial premises.

For this class of developments the Reviewer cites Melchior Cano, Vasquez, Bellarmine, and Suarez. The point he wishes to establish by these authorities is, as we understand it, that logical deductions from developments, *interveniēte Ecclesiæ definitione*, are *de fide divina et catholica*. Do these high authorities prove this point? We begin with Melchior Cano, the writer who, in the judgment of the Reviewer, has come nearer than any other named to giving a distinct and systematic theory of developments. He is the principal witness introduced, and the Reviewer says, — “The fact of his having taken part in the Council of Trent gives of course an especial weight to his judgment on points such as these” (p. 341). Let us examine his testimony.

The Reviewer has two points to make out: — 1. That, *interveniēte Ecclesiæ definitione*, logical deductions from developments are *de fide*; and, 2. That, the definition of the Church intervening, the developments from which they are deductions are also *de fide*. His doctrine must be, that theological conclusions may be defined of faith, and when they are, they become the principles of new conclusions, and these again of another series, and so on, for aught that appears, *ad infinitum*. Does Cano say this? He shall answer in a passage the Reviewer has himself cited (p. 338). Cano, we must premise, is discussing the formal reason of faith and theology, and defining what are the proper principles of the *science* of theology, or from which, by the natural light of reason, theological conclusions may be deduced. These, he says, are not so diffuse and ample as some people imagine; and, after excluding every thing the *ratio formalis* of which is not *prima veritas revelans et Ecclesia Catholica proponens*, he says, “They are all those things which are divinely revealed through the Sacred Authors.” He then proceeds to define who are sacred authors, and restricts them, in a word, to our Lord himself, and to the Proph-

ets and Apostles. Then follows immediately the passage cited, the precise purpose of which is to show that councils, pontiffs, and doctors are not sacred authors. Thus he says, — “Although the authority of Councils and of the Apostolic See, as well as the consent and one accord of the Saints, makes the faith of the Catholic dogma certain, *we do not therefore accumulate principles of theology or extend its formal reason. Because*, as I have often elsewhere said, neither the Council, nor the Sovereign Pontiff, nor the Saints, interpreters of the Scriptures, put forth for the faithful new revelations; but either hand down to posterity integral and untarnished those which the Church has received from the Apostles, or express and interpret them; or at least collect (*colligunt*) their consequences and things connected with them, and manifest the things which are adverse and repugnant to them.” *

This is a faithful and exact translation of the passage the Reviewer cites; and this, unless we are altogether mistaken, is so far from sustaining his doctrine, that it is point blank against it. A better text against development we could not have wished. It certainly denies absolutely the first point, deductions from developments, for it denies all accumulation of principles of theology, or extension of its formal reason.

The Reviewer, however, we infer from his Italics and his comment, fancies that he finds his developments asserted in the third thing specified which Cano says is or may be done by the Council, the Pontiff, or the Saints. He reads *colligant* where we read *colligunt*, and seems to translate, mentally, *colligare consequentia, to deduce consequences*. Or, be it that he understands it to bind up or connect with the Apostolic revelations their *consecraria et conneza*, we do not see how that favors development. Who ever denied to the Church the right to draw inferences, or even in her definitions to condemn the denial of the certain deductions from the faith? But to do either is a different thing from defining the *consequentia et conneza*, or *anneza*, as the Reviewer reads, to be of faith, — the point we deny, and which was to be proved.

But this passage itself proves, that, in the view of Cano, they could not be defined of faith, properly so called; because, if they could be, they would, since they would then be portions of the Catholic faith, be principles of theology, and then by their definition there would be an accumulation of the

* *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. 12. cap. 2.

principles of theology, or an extension of its formal reason, which is what Cano expressly denies. If the Reviewer had analyzed the passage, he would have seen that it condemns his whole theory of development under any and every possible aspect. There cannot be development without new *credibilia*, as the Reviewer himself cites Suarez to prove; and there cannot be new *credibilia* without an accumulation of principles of theology or an extension of its formal reason; for each new *credibile* becomes a new *principium theologiæ*. If no new *principium theologiæ*, then no new *credibile*, and then no development. It is the Reviewer's own witness that authorizes this conclusion, so express against him.

But we will not rest on mere reasoning, however certain and conclusive. The Reviewer would persuade us that Melchior Cano held that theological conclusions, or deductions from the faith by the light of reason, are *de fide*. Now Cano has discussed this question *ex professo* in the fourth chapter of his *De Locis*, the chapter immediately preceding the one from which the Reviewer cites three passages to prove his position. The title of the chapter is *Quæ sint Quæstiones, seu Conclusiones Theologicæ*. Near the close of the chapter he says:—

“Fidei porro quæstio *bifariam* intelligitur: una, quæ immediate ad fidem attinet, ut vere attinent omnia, quæ Deus Ecclesiæ suæ verbo edidit, aut scripto; altera, quæ mediate fidei est, cujusmodi sunt omnes conclusiones, *quas ordine disciplinæ ex illis prioribus* colligere et definire possumus. Quæ, quoniam non *in se ipsis*, sed in aliis tamquam principiis revelatæ a Deo sunt, *mediate fidei* dicuntur esse, et qui eas negat, is fidem negare *hoc modo* dicitur. Atque equidem illud etiam animadverto, eas non abs re *forsitan* quæstiones fidei vocari, quæ vehementer ad Ecclesiæ doctrinam pertinent, fideique sunt propter affinitatem appendices; *non quod aut ex iis pendeat fides, aut iis sublati funditus illa tollatur*, sed quod affecta ægraque sit, si harum rerum veritas labefiat, quæ illi hærent et adjunguntur. Oportet nempe in Ecclesia sanam doctrinam esse et verbum sanum, ut Apostolus ait, 1. ad Tim. 1. 10, et alibi passim. Quemadmodum autem morbi quidam lethales sunt; alii vero non interficiunt quidem hominem, sed afficiunt tamen valetudinem; sic errores quidam non fidem extinguunt, sed obscurant; non evertunt, sed infirmant; morbumque afferunt, non exitium. Sicut ergo quod salutis est noxium, vitæ id quoque noxium est, ita quodcumque sanæ doctrinæ adversatur, hoc fidei est etiam *quodam modo* adversum. Ex quo intelligitur, *quæstiones illas quæ doctrinæ Ecclesiasticæ sanitatem spectant, ad fidem in suo quodam modo spectare, sed nos hujus generis controversias NON IN FIDE PRO-*

PRIE, sed propter fidem esse dicimus; nec qui in his errant, eos in fide, sed præter fidem errare existimamus."

And again, at the conclusion of one, and just preceding another passage cited by the Reviewer, and which must have been under his eyes, — "Nec enim sic fidei adhærescunt, ut separari ab illa non queant. Ægrotat sane, ut ita dicam, in earum errore fides, non perit."

This is sufficient; for it cannot be necessary to add, that to deny any proposition of faith is mortal, and does not merely obscure or weaken the faith, but kills it outright. The Reviewer's witness is decidedly against him; yet we agree that "the fact of the author having taken part in the Council of Trent of course gives an especial weight to his judgment on points such as these."

It is easy to understand the Reviewer's mistake. He apparently, at least, confounds in his own mind Christian doctrine and theology. If he had distinguished between *Faith* and the *science* of theology, between the *sources* of the former, and the *sources* of the latter, and borne in mind that Cano was professedly treating *de Locis Theologicis*, whence arguments may be drawn to elucidate and defend the faith, or to refute its adversaries, he would have understood what is said of *initis* and *seminibus* not of the *beginnings* or *seminal* principles of the faith, or what is revealed only seminally or potentially, but of the science of theology, and not have claimed him as an authority for developments of which he was, as we had supposed was well known, one of the sturdiest opponents.

Vasquez we must reluctantly pass over, for we have not access to his works, and it is impossible to determine, from the brief citation the Reviewer has made, whether the theological conclusions he asserts may be defined *de fide* are of the class which we admit may be so defined, or of the class which we assert cannot be. From what we know of him, however, we presume his doctrine on the point to be that of Suarez, and, if so, it will be answered in what we say of Suarez himself. Bellarmine will by and by explain himself. The only point to which he is cited is, that *evident deductions* from the word of God, written or unwritten, are of faith, which in one sense we concede, and nothing proves that this is not Bellarmine's sense. If the Reviewer contends to the contrary, he must prove it; for the *onus probandi* is upon him, since all the presumptions are against him. We proceed, therefore, at once to Suarez, the Reviewer's chief witness after Melchior Cano.

Suarez is not an author for a novice like ourselves to grapple with. He was a great man, and, since the Schoolmen, none have surpassed him, although his opinions on school questions may sometimes be disputed, and we have been more accustomed to see them cited to be controverted than as authority. As an authority he is no doubt high, but by no means so high as St. Thomas, nor, on a question of Catholic doctrine, higher than Bossuet. Nevertheless, we have no reason to be dissatisfied, and we hope the Reviewer will continue to be satisfied, with him. We shall, in what we say, confine ourselves to the citations of the Reviewer, and assume that they are correctly made. In the place cited, Suarez asks, "whether, in the Church of Christ, as to *some* propositions to be believed *de fide*, in later times, which before were not explicitly believed as of faith, the faith has grown," and answers : —

"From what has been said the negative appears to follow ; for the infused wisdom in this Church cannot increase even *extensivè*, otherwise the later pastors of the Church might surpass in this wisdom the Apostles. Also, there are in this Church no new revelations, and therefore no new credibles. And, finally, so the scholastics above cited appear to think, saying that the faith of the Church is not augmented as to the number of credibles, but is only further explained. St. Thomas also says on this question, that nothing is taught by the Church not contained in the doctrine of the Apostles, but the faith is further explained and proposed to the faithful on account of heretics [St. Thomas says, *contra errores insurgentes*] ; whence also Waldens says, the Church explains the ancient faith, but cannot found a new article ; so also deliver Castro and CANO."

Thus far Suarez gives the reason and authorities for denying that there can be any increase of the faith in the lapse of time, even in the restricted sense of his question ; and, what we wish our readers to bear in mind, for a reason which will by and by appear, he understands St. Thomas in the very sense we ourselves did. Is Suarez about to deny what is here adduced ? Or is he about to introduce something which will essentially modify the plain and natural sense of what is here said ? If he is, here are strong reasons and fearful odds against him. But, after referring us to the part of his work in which he treats the subject *ex professo*, he continues : —

"I say, therefore, briefly, that it is to be simply asserted, indeed, that the Church *never gives a new faith, but always confirms and explains the ancient* ; and so also teach the ancient Fathers, St.

Vincent of Lerins, *Contr. Profan. Voc. Novit.* c. 7, &c., St. Irenæus, *Contr. Hæres.*, and St. Jerome on that Psalm, *Dominus narrabit in Scripturis populorum et principum horum qui fuerunt in ea* where he explains this word *fuerunt* so as to show that those princes were the Apostles."

This is express. For there cannot be development without new credibles, and new credibles cannot be proposed without the proposition of new faith. Whatever modification of this Suarez may contend for, he can contend for nothing corresponding to the developments in question, without contradicting himself. But let us read on.

"Yet notwithstanding this, it is still true that there is *some* proposition — *aliquam propositionem* — now explicitly believed of faith, which was not formerly explicitly believed by the Church, although implicitly contained in the ancient doctrine. The examples above cited prove this; and it is best proved by that of baptism given by a heretic in the form of the Church: Whether is it valid, or to be repeated? For in the time of St. Cyprian neither was of faith, and therefore, although he himself, and the Pope, St. Stephen, held the opposite opinions, they nevertheless remained in the union of the same faith, for St. Stephen defined nothing. But afterwards it was delivered of faith, that such baptism is valid and not to be repeated; and many similar instances may be adduced; and this unquestionably relates to the *defining* power of the Church. Nor is a new revelation necessary for this, but the infallible *assistance* of the Holy Ghost suffices for explicitly defining and proposing what was already implicitly contained in revelation, — *revelatis*. And so the authors are to be explained. For the explication, they say, the Church can make [*subintellige, propter errores insurgentes*], is *sometimes* by the explication of a new proposition contained in the ancient. But this proposition is never a new article, *because* it does not pertain *ad materiam veluti substantialem* of the faith to be explicitly believed by all, — for that was always sufficiently explained in the Symbol, — but it often pertains to the doctrine of faith, which it behooves the doctors of the Church to know according to the varieties and the necessities of the times."

Here the Reviewer fancies that he finds his theory of developments; but he is mistaken. Suarez asserts here only two things: 1. The faith may be further explained and proposed *contra errores insurgentes*, according to the authorities, — as was the validity of baptism in the form of the Church by a heretic, against the error of St. Cyprian, — as was the doctrine, that "in Christ there are two natural wills and two natural operations," against the heresy of the Monothelites, — or as the doctrine,

that "the substance of the bread does not remain after consecration," against the Berengarians and the Consubstantialists, and others of a like kind ; — and, 2. That this explication is *sometimes*, not always, but sometimes, by the *explication* of a new proposition contained in the ancient. Here is all that Suarez asserts. The whole question between us and the Reviewer turns on this *new proposition*, by the explication of which the explication of the faith is sometimes made *contra errores insurgentes*. What is this new proposition ? First, it is not a *proposition* of faith, properly so-called, for Suarez expressly places it within the province, not of the *Ecclesia docens* or *proponens*, but of the *Ecclesia definiens*, for he says, it without any doubt relates to the defining power of the Church. It is, then, necessarily, not something new *proposed* by the Church, but a new proposition *defined* by the Church. Secondly, it is never *a new article*, because it does not pertain *ad materiam veluti substantialem fidei*, to be explicitly believed by all, since that was *always sufficiently explained*. It cannot, then, be a development ; for it is undeniable that the development in the sense of the theory is a new article, proposes new faith, if not *quoad materiam*, at least *quoad formam*, and it is precisely of formal faith Suarez is speaking. This is decisive against the Reviewer. And lastly, it often pertains to the doctrine of the faith, which it behooves the doctors of the Church to know. Yet not these at all times, but only *juxta varietatem et necessitatem temporum*. But, as the faith to be believed by all was always sufficiently explained, the doctors can need this, not to propose or to explain the faith *propter fideles*, but only for the avoiding of error, or the defending of the faith against *errores insurgentes*. Make what you will of it, then, its explication can be only the application of the faith held from the beginning to the definition of some new proposition which the Church, in the discharge of her mission, in space and time, encounters ; and therefore is only what we ourselves, under the head of negative developments, admitted in our article against Mr. Newman. Thus far, then, Suarez not only does not recognize the Reviewer's developments, but clearly condemns them ; for all the explication of the faith, which he thus far admits, is *propter errores insurgentes*, and such explications of new propositions of the faith held from the beginning, as are necessary for the avoidance or the condemnation of these errors. Such explications we of course admit the Church can make, and is bound to make. But Suarez concludes : —

"In fine, as to what relates to the Apostles, we may distinguish a twofold order of propositions which are explicitly believed in the lapse of time ; for some pertain, as it were, to the substance of the mysteries, — as in the mystery of the Incarnation, *Christ has two wills*, — and in that of the Eucharist, *the substance of the bread does not remain after consecration*, &c. ; and we must believe *those of this kind* were known by the Apostles not only implicitly, but explicitly ; because they had the fullest understanding of the Scriptures and all the mysteries which pertain to the tradition of faith. But the others are *contingent propositions of what in the time of the Apostles had not yet happened*, — such as *this man* (Pius IX., for instance) is Pope, *this council* is a true council, &c. ; and it was not necessary that the Apostles should have known these explicitly, it sufficed to know them in the universal ; for it was not necessary that all future things should be revealed to them. And in this way, perhaps, they were not explicitly instructed on the day of Pentecost in all the mysteries, *as to all their circumstances*, such as the manner of calling the Gentiles, and of the cessation of the Jewish legal rites, as may be plainly collected from Acts x. and xv. And thus also St. John, in the Apocalypse, understood many things of the future not revealed to the others, and perhaps many of them will not be certainly and explicitly known till they come to pass. Thus *in the knowledge of these things the Church may make progress*, even with the certitude of faith, by the intervention of the definition of the Church, which, because of the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost, has the force of revelation, or infallibly applies the revelation of the universal to the particular object." *

Here is the whole text cited by the Reviewer, and which we have taken the liberty to translate for the purpose of more easily marking the sense in which we understand it ; we find it a clear and express statement of the doctrine we hold, and an equally clear and express condemnation of the Reviewer's. Suarez asserts distinctly two orders of propositions which are explicitly believed in the lapse of time : 1. Certain propositions which pertain *veluti ad substantiam mysteriorum* ; and 2. Certain contingent propositions of things, which in the time of the Apostles had not yet happened. The first order includes the propositions which Mr. Newman and his friends rank under the head of developments. This is undeniable, for they expressly teach that the doctrine of the Two Natural Wills was a development, and Suarez expressly cites this as an instance of the first order of propositions which, he contends, are explicitly believed in the lapse of time. This being evident, they claim

* Suarez, *De Fide. Disput. 2, sec. 6*, as cited by the Dublin Review.

Suarez as authority for developments ; this being evident, we claim him as express authority against them. The explicitness acquired in the lapse of time by this whole order of propositions must be understood, not *quoad fideles*, but *quoad hæreticos* or *errores insurgentes* ; because, 1. Suarez asserts that these propositions — therefore the Reviewer's developments — pertain *veluti ad substantiam mysteriorum*, and from that fact argues that they must have been explicitly known by the Apostles ; 2. Because he has just said that what pertains *ad materiam veluti substantialem fidei*, which we understand to be the same thing, was *always* sufficiently explained, that is, *quoad fideles* ; and, 3. Because he denies that the new proposition — by the explication of which *that* explication is sometimes made which the authorities say the Church can make *propter hæreticos* — is ever a new article, and does so on the ground that it never pertains *ad materiam veluti substantialem fidei*. Either, then, Suarez contradicts himself, which it will not do to suppose, or the first order of propositions explicitly believed in the lapse of time, and which include what Mr. Newman and his friends call developments, belong *veluti ad substantiam mysteriorum*, and were explicitly known by the Apostles and always sufficiently explained, *quoad fideles*. Then the explicitness acquired in the lapse of time, which he predicates of them, can be explicitness only *contra errores insurgentes*, which is the express doctrine of St. Thomas, and which we maintain. Mr. Newman and his friends evidently cannot assert developments on the authority of Suarez, for the doctrines they term developments he asserts positively were explicitly known by the Apostles, and always sufficiently explained, and, moreover, excludes from these the *new proposition* by the explication of which the faith is sometimes further explained on account of errors which spring up.*

Moreover, we are compelled so to understand Suarez, not from his own words only, but in order to save him from contradicting the express testimony of Scripture, of Pope Agatho,

* This is conclusive against the Reviewer. He must say, either that his developments are included in the first order of propositions defined by Suarez, or that they are not. If he says the latter, he must concede at once that Suarez is against him, because he excludes them from the number of propositions which, Suarez says, are explicitly believed in the lapse of time ; if he says the former, which he does and must, if he pretends to cite the authority of Suarez in his favor, he must also concede that Suarez is against him, for then he expressly says they were explicitly known by the Apostles, and always sufficiently explained.

and the Sixth Œcumenical Council. He gives as an example of his first order of propositions, the doctrine that *Christ has two wills*. If we suppose him to maintain that this was only implicitly believed at first, and has been explicitly believed only in the lapse of time, we must suppose him to maintain that it was not *de fide* prior to its definition against the Monothelites, and then that before that definition the dogma of the Monothelites was not a heresy, — a proposition which we cannot persuade ourselves Suarez was the man to maintain; for we say with Tournely, — “*Contendimus cum Scrutinii doctrinarum auctore [Antonius de Panormo] antecederet ad sextum Concilium Œcumenicum hæreticum Monothelistarum dogma. Id clare demonstrant Scripturæ et Sanctorum Patrum testimonia, quibus duas in Christo voluntates probant sextæ Synodi Patres: Non mea sed tua voluntas fiat, Luc. xxii. 24; Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu, Matt. xxvi. 39; — unde in Epistola Synodica Agathonis ad præfatam Synodum directa habetur: Juxta quod Prophetæ olim de Christo, et ipse nos erudit, et Sanctorum Patrum nobis tradidit Symbolum, duas naturales voluntates in eo, et duas naturales operationes prædicamus.*” * We must, therefore, understand the explicitness predicated to be not of the doctrine considered in its relation to the faithful, but considered in relation to the errors which contradict or impugn it. In regard to the first order, then, Suarez asserts nothing that we have denied, or which we did not expressly admit; consequently, again, he does not assert the developments the Reviewer maintains, otherwise the Reviewer would not have undertaken to prove any thing against us; but instead of smiling at what he calls our *stationariness* of doctrine, he would have shown us that we concede all that he and his school contend for.

There remains, now, only the second order of propositions. Suarez unquestionably means to maintain that there is besides the new explication of the faith which is made *propter hæreticos*, as he says, — *propter errores insurgentes*, as we say after St. Thomas, for a reason obvious to every theologian, — there is another sort of explication which may be made with the certitude of faith *propter fideles*, and without a new revelation, in regard to which the Church may be said to make progress. These are the second order he describes, — including the new propositions, by the explication of which he says the faith is further explained and proposed on account of errors which from time to

* *De Locis Theologicis, De Censuris*, art. 2. Vide etiam Perrone, *De Incarnatione*, p. 2, cap. 4, propositio.

time are encountered by the Church, — and which are expressly defined to be “contingent propositions of what in the time of the Apostles had not yet happened.” These he contends the Church may define with the certitude of faith, by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, without a new revelation, because in defining them she only *applies* the revelation of the universal, which she has received from the Apostles, to the particular object. The positive progress, or development, if you choose, of the faith which he admits is, then, restricted to this class of propositions, which pertain rather to the mission of the Church in space and time, than to her faith, strictly so called, and are, therefore, propositions of *fact* rather than of *law*. The Reviewer will find them discussed at great length under the head of *Dogmatic Facts* by almost any of our modern theologians; and if he attends to the controversy which grew out of the condemnation of the five propositions from the book of Jansenius, he will find much to satisfy him that his doctrine of development cannot be admitted by Catholic theology. So far as concerns ourselves, we admit the doctrine of Suarez with regard to these contingent propositions, for it is only the application of the revelation of the universal to the particular, which, in our article last January, we conceded might be made with the certainty of faith; for what is revealed as the particular in the universal, or as the part in the whole, we concede, being formally revealed, is, *accedente Ecclesiæ definitione, de fide*.

If the Reviewer had attended to the sense of Suarez, he would have seen that what Suarez contends for is nothing but his own *third* class of developments, namely, the authoritative application of old principles to new cases, which even the Reviewer himself seems to doubt can be made with the certainty of faith; for he represents it as only “the opinion of many theologians.” Is the Reviewer turning against himself? But, by the way, who before ever regarded the application of the faith to the definition of a new question as a development of doctrine? In making such application there is no development of the faith, for the decision requires only the application of the standard which the Church has had from the beginning in Scripture and tradition. Suppose the Church knows the faith beforehand; she then knows all that she needs to know in order to decide in relation to any question what the faith is, or what it is not. The question is always one of identity. She knows always what is not faith by knowing what is faith, as God knows evil by knowing its opposite, good.

But we have almost lost sight of logical developments in following Suarez, who was cited to prove them. As logical deductions from developments we may dismiss them without further comment, for the Reviewer has cited no authority for them, and his own witness, Cano, positively denies them. One word, however, on logical conclusions, properly so called, and we will conclude this part of the discussion. The Reviewer has cited Bellarmine in a passage which we shall cite at length, in a moment, against his conclusion, to prove that what is *evidently deduced* from the word of God, written or unwritten, or what is revealed only *mediately* in Scripture or tradition, is *de fide*, which appears at first view to be at variance with the doctrine we maintain, and for the Reviewer. But it is admitted by all that there is a class of deductions which are *de fide*, such as are evidently deduced from premises, *both of which are revealed truths*. With regard to these there is no dispute with the Reviewer. Besides these there are what are called "theological conclusions," or conclusions evidently deduced from premises, one of which is *de fide*, the other certain by the natural light of reason. These, again, are divided into two classes, — those in which the conclusion is revealed as the part in the whole, or the singular in the universal, as *Christ died for me* is revealed in the proposition, *Christ died for all men*; and those which are revealed only as the effect in the cause, or the property in the essence, as *Christus est risibilis* is revealed in the proposition, *Christus est homo*. The first of these two classes, it will be seen, are the contingent propositions of which Suarez speaks, and which he contends, *interveniente Ecclesiæ definitione*, are *de fide*. With regard to these, again, we have no controversy with the Reviewer; for though they are not explicitly revealed *quoad nos*, they are *formally* revealed, and have the *ratio formalis fidei*. The controversy turns on this second class. These we deny to be of faith, because they are not *revelata*. Thus, *Omnis homo est risibilis; atqui Christus est homo; ergo, Christus est risibilis*. Here the conclusion is evidently *not* revealed; for the fact on which it depends for its cause, namely, that risibility is a property of human nature, is not a revealed truth, and is certain only with the certainty of natural reason; consequently, the conclusion is certain only with the certainty of natural reason. It is revealed that Christ is a man, but the truth we apply to him, for the reason that he is a man, is not revealed, nor made more certain by the truth that is revealed. That conclusions of this class are not

de fide, prior to the definition of the Church, is certain. Thus Tournely, *ubi supra* : — “ Conclusiones mere et vere theologicæ ex duabus præmissis, quarum una est de fide, altera vero lumine naturali nota, certo et evidenter deductas, non esse de fide. . . . Ita Gregorius, Major, Gabriel, Cajetanus, et Thomistæ, Salamanticenses, Cardinalis de Lugo, Lorca, Valentia, Molina, Antonius de Panormo, et alii passim, quos refert et sequitur Suarez. *Disput.* 3, *de Fide*, sect. 11, nu. 3, 7, et 10. Here is the authority of Suarez himself, and we have already had that of Cano, that theological conclusions are not *de fide*, at least prior to the definition of the Church, and we have found no theologian who contends that they are.

But if they are not revealed truths, — if they are truths certain only with the certainty of natural reason, — they cannot, without *gratia inspirationis*, be defined *de fide* ; for the *ratio formalis fidei* is, as St. Thomas teaches, *prima veritas revelans*, and, as all agree, of divine and Catholic faith, *prima veritas revelans et Ecclesia proponens*. But these, not being revealed truths, want the first essential condition, the *prima veritas* or *Deus revelans*, and therefore cannot be of faith. In proof of our conclusion we cite a passage from Bellarmine, a part of which the Reviewer has cited to prove the contradictory.

“ Prima igitur regula est, Quando universa Ecclesia aliquid tamquam fidei dogma amplectitur, quod non invenimus in divinis litteris, necesse est dicere, ex Apostolorum traditione id haberi. Ratio hujus est, quia cum Ecclesia universa errare non possit, cum sit *columna et firmamentum veritatis*, 1 Tim. 3, et cum de ea dictum sit a Domino, Matt. 16, *Portæ inferi non prævalebunt adversus eam* ; certe quod Ecclesia *de fide esse credit, sine dubio est de fide* ; at nihil est de fide, nisi quod Deus per Apostolos aut Prophetas revelavit, aut quod evidenter inde deducitur. Non enim novis revelationibus nunc regitur Ecclesia, sed in iis permanet quæ tradiderunt illi, qui ministri fuerunt sermonis, et propterea dicitur, Eph. 2, *Edificata supra fundamentum Apostolorum et Prophetarum*. Igitur illa omnia, quæ Ecclesia fide tenet, tradita sunt ab Apostolis, aut Prophetis, aut scripto, aut verbo. Talis est perpetua virginitas beatæ Mariæ, numerus librorum canonicorum, et similia.” — *De Verbo Dei*, Lib. 4, cap. 9.

This, if we understand it, is conclusive. The Church cannot define that to be of faith which she does not believe to be of faith ; for her definition is only the solemn profession of her faith on the point defined. She cannot believe that to be of faith which is not of faith. These conclusions are confessedly not

of faith before she defines them, and therefore she cannot define them to be of faith ; otherwise she could solemnly profess to believe what, at the time, she does not and cannot believe. Thus, again, Tournely, *ubi supra*.

“ Sententiam hanc exponit et probat *Scrutini* auctor, cap. 3, art. 5, nu. 19–22, et pro hac citat Waldensem, Alphonsum a Castro, Lorcum, *Canum*, et Thomistas communiter, Molinam, Valentiam, Hurtadum, Tannerum, &c. In hanc sententiam coincidit opinio Illustrissimi Tutelensis Episcopi, in suo de elementis theologicis tractatu, ubi docet, *id numquam committere posse Ecclesiam, ut meras conclusiones theologicas tamquam ad fidem Catholicam pertineant, declaret.*”

To the same effect Veronius, in his *De Regula Fidei Catholicæ*, cap. 1, sect. 1 et 2. “ Illud omne et solum est de fide catholica, quod est revelatum in verbo Dei, et propositum omnibus ab Ecclesia Catholica.” — “ Duo debent conjunctim adesse, quo doctrina aliqua sit fidei catholicæ. Alterum, ut sit revelata a Deo, per Prophetas, Apostolos, seu auctores canonicos. Alterum, ut sit proposita ab Ecclesia. Si utrumque adsit alicui doctrinæ, illa fide divina et catholica est credenda ; si alterum desit, seu revelatio, seu propositio Ecclesiæ, non est fide divina et catholica credenda.” This tract of Veronius was so highly esteemed by the Brothers Walenburch, that they adopted it in place of one of their own. To the same effect also we may refer to Melchior Cano, — already cited through Antonius de Panormo, an acute and learned author, who was Consultor to the Congregation of the Index, and *Qualificator Inquisitionis Romæ*, — *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. 12, cap. 2, a good authority in the estimation of our friend the Developmentist. Silvius, also, a passable authority, may be adduced, *Summa* 2, 2, Quæst. 1, art. 7 : — *Erat quidem fidei, priusquam definiretur ab Ecclesia*, et consequenter *oppositum tenentes jam tum errabant in fide*, sed inculpabiliter ; quia non errabant in fide definita et declarata.” We may also cite St. Thomas, although the Reviewer does not appear to esteem him very highly : — “ Sic igitur in fide si consideremus formalem rationem objecti, nihil est aliud quam *veritas prima*. Non enim fides de qua loquimur, assentit alicui, *nisi quia est a Deo revelatum*. *Summa* 2, 2, Quæst. 1, art. 1. And, finally, we cite the following from St. Augustine, which we find in Bellarmine : — “ Si quis sive de Christo, sive de ejus Ecclesia, sive de quacunque alia re, quæ pertinet ad fidem, vitamque nostram [ves-

tram, ed. Maur.], non dicam, si nos, sed quod Paulus adjicit, *Si Angelus de celo vobis annuntiaverit, præterquam quod in Scripturis legalibus, et Evangelicis accepistis, anathema sit.*" St. Aug., lib. 3, *Contr. Litt. Petil.*, cap. 6.

We might multiply authorities on this point to any extent, but these must suffice for the present. If theological conclusions themselves, for the reason that they are such conclusions, are not *de fide*, do not pertain to the *objectum materiale fidei*, then *a fortiori* not logical deductions from them. Consequently our friend's class of logical developments dissolve, and,

" Like the baseless fabric of a vision,
Leave not a wrack behind."

We have said *for the reason that they are such conclusions*; for nobody questions, that propositions, dogmas, articles, which are *a parte rei* logical conclusions from others, may be proposed and defined *de fide*; or that the fact that they are logical conclusions may be appealed to by the Church and by doctors, as evidence of their truth, and as a conclusive reason why they must be believed, and cannot be denied without injury to the faith; but the Church can never appeal to this fact as the motive of her decision, since the faith can never be discursive, and the Holy Ghost does not need syllogisms. The conclusions are defined, *ex parte definiente*, to be of faith, not *because* they are conclusions, but because they are *revelata*, and have the formal reason of faith, *Deus revelans*. The Church often prefaces her decisions by arguments, drawn sometimes from reason, sometimes from tradition, more frequently from the Scriptures; but she does so in respect of those who are to receive her decision, not to set forth her own motives, for the motive of her decision is always *visum est Spiritui Sancto et nobis*. Strange as it may seem, it can hardly be doubted that neglect to consider this very obvious fact is one of the most active causes of the mistakes and false reasoning of the Developmentists in regard to theological conclusions.

We have but brief space to remark on the other authorities cited, and who are cited, not to prove any particular point, but developments in general. Moehler was a distinguished theologian, but needs to be read with care, and to be cited with caution, not so much because he is not sound, as because he deviates much—at least in the English translation, and we have not read him in the original—from the usual mode of presenting Catholic truth, and from the ordinary language of theologians. The passage cited, however, confirms our doc-

trine. Thus he says, — “ One doctrine of faith hath subsisted, and must subsist, through the whole history of the Church. *We will not and cannot believe otherwise than as our fathers have believed,*” p. 345. We can conceive nothing more express against development than this. What follows speaks only of the progress that is made, not in the *faith*, but in *science*, in the scientific view which the mind takes of the several articles of faith in their mutual relations, in their connections, and general bearings, — that is, as we said, a progress not in the faith, but in that which is not it; and in this very sense, Moehler, the Reviewer’s own witness, understands St. Vincent of Lerins, as appears from the citation itself. That by this the faith gains in clearness, light, evidence, — in its relations, not *in se*, — we suppose few have been disposed to deny.

The Reviewer cites anew a passage from St. Vincent of Lerins, which we ourselves cited, *Comm.* 1, cap. 23, but wholly disregards what precedes and follows it, and which must be taken into the account, if we wish to determine its sense. St. Vincent of Lerins most certainly does speak of a *gain, profit, or increase* [*profectus fidei*] of the faith in the process of time. Nobody denies this. But what does he mean? He himself tells us, in the clauses which the Reviewer discreetly suppresses, and in what immediately follows : — “ *Fas est etenim prisca illa cœlestis philosophiæ dogmata processu temporis excurentur, limentur, poliantur; sed nefas est ut commutentur, nefas ut detruncantur, aut mutilentur. Accipiant licet evidentiam, lucem, distinctionem, sed retineant necesse est plenitudinem, integritatem, proprietatem.*” Here the holy Doctor defines what the faith gains, namely, *evidence, light, distinction*. Does the Reviewer maintain that the evidence, light, distinction, furnished to the faith by science and study, are a progress in the faith, or *sapientia infusa* itself? Are they not evidently a progress, a development, not in it, but in that which is not it, and which is clearly distinguishable from it? If so, were we deserving the Reviewer’s sneer for representing the gain of the faith to be only in relation to that which is not faith?

Of De Maistre we have little to say. He is neither a Father nor a Doctor of the Church; he writes as a statesman and politician, not as a theologian; and is always more commendable for the rectitude of his heart, and for his erudition, than for the critical exactness of either his thought or expression. The passage cited, when the motive with which it was written is

taken into the account, may be easily harmonized with the doctrine we set forth, but, as we should never think of citing the distinguished author as a theological authority, there is no necessity of doing it. Cardinal Fisher, if correctly cited, which we very much doubt, was wrong in his facts, and his opinion only goes to the point, that every portion of the faith may not be equally known at all times by every individual teacher, nor in all times and places set forth in the same special prominence, — a fact of which we need not go far to find an illustration. The citation from St. Augustine is only to the same effect ; or, at most, to the effect, that, in some portion of the Church, some things, more immediately connected with the practice than with the *dogmata* of the Church, may become obscured, and so obscured that a man who errs in respect to them may be inculpable, till the matter is investigated, thoroughly sifted, or an authoritative decision on the subject is had. St. Augustine brings forward this as a ground on which to excuse St. Cyprian, and Bossuet takes the same view in his correspondence with Leibnitz ; but it is easy to see that the holy Doctor does not depend much upon this, and that he relies at last almost entirely on St. Cyprian's martyrdom as washing out his fault in his blood. We have found in St. Augustine no hint that the baptism in question was not, in St. Cyprian's time, *de fide*. The passage from Doellinger says nothing more than we have ourselves said in both of our previous articles against developments.

We here close our comments on the sample of the Catholic authority on which the principle of development rests. Of the authorities cited, not one is express for the Reviewer ; De Maisre is not himself authority, and as he cites no authority for his opinion, it is of no avail, even if it must be understood in the sense of the Reviewer, which we deny. Vasquez, as cited, *may* be interpreted to favor a collateral point, but nothing proves that he *must*. Doellinger, Cardinal Fisher, and Petavius are not for him ; St. Augustine, St. Vincent of Lerins, Suarez, Bellarmine, and Melchior Cano are decidedly against him ; and yet this is a *sample* of the high Catholic authority on which the principle rests ! In this we are happy to agree with the Reviewer.

A few words will suffice to dispose of the remarks which the Reviewer offers on the testimonies we introduced. He can find only three : a condemned proposition, a citation from St. Thomas, and another from Bossuet. So he counts for nothing

the express testimony of St. Vincent of Lerins, who lays down the rule, *ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova* ; for nothing, the testimony of holy Fathers and Councils cited by Bossuet. But let this pass. In regard to the first, he “ desiderates a reference,” which he shall have, if he will inform us in how many different senses the term *science* of morals, taken strictly, may be used, or is used by Catholic theologians.

To the citation from St. Thomas, express to our purpose, he replies :—“ The passage from St. Thomas, it will have been seen, is quoted also by Suarez in the passage above cited ; and he says it must be understood in that very sense to which Mr. Brownson regards it as the contradictory.” p. 351. It will have been seen, as we requested our readers to bear in mind, that Suarez says no such thing, but cites St. Thomas in the very sense we did. The assertion of the Reviewer we must regard as a — development.

As to Bossuet, the Reviewer says his testimony is suspicious. He was a Gallican, had a case to make out, — that of “ preserving a merely external and hollow similarity with earlier times,” — was at issue with the profoundly learned Petavius, and actually joined in a vote of thanks to Bull, an Anglican schismatic, for his defence of the Nicene Creed. This, it strikes us, has been said inconsiderately. Bossuet is high Catholic authority, and, on a point of faith which he has treated *ex professo*, second to none in modern times. He was eminent among the most eminent ; he was the unwearied and successful defender of the faith against enemies within and enemies without, and the whole Catholic world has been eager to acknowledge the services he rendered to his religion ; he has never been convicted, and, so far as our knowledge extends, never accused, of a single error on a point of Catholic faith ; and his works are a vast treasure-house of profound and varied erudition, — of philosophy, history, eloquence, and piety. It will not be to the Reviewer’s credit to call the testimony of such a man *suspicious* ; for most people will be inclined to regard him as a better authority, on any point of Catholic faith and theology, than our recent converts from Oxford ; and if they are found maintaining, as they are, by the concession of the Reviewer, a doctrine contradictory to his, suspicion will be more likely to light on them than on him.

But the Reviewer is apparently mistaken as to the affair of Petavius. We have before us, in his first *Admonition to Protestants*, Bossuet’s defence of Petavius, where he vindicates

him, in the words of Petavius himself, from ever holding or countenancing the doctrine he was accused of holding, and for which the Reviewer would by implication claim him as authority. Petavius never held the doctrine of development, but has given, in his *Preface* to his *De Trinitate*, a most masterly refutation of it. Besides, he retracted, as Father Zaccaria, in a little apologetic appendix to the *Preface*, just mentioned, informs us, the chapters — third, fourth, and fifth of the first book, *De Trinitate* — in which he had cast some suspicion on the orthodoxy in thought or expression of a very few of the ante-Nicene Fathers ; and those very Fathers, Zaccaria, in his notes to those chapters, has successfully vindicated from all suspicion. We refer the Reviewer to the Works of Petavius, folio edition, Vol. II., Venetiis, 1757.

That Bossuet joined in a vote of thanks to Bull for his Defence of the Nicene Creed we have no authority for denying ; but Bull in that work was simply defending a Catholic dogma — the foundation of the profession of the Christian faith — and Catholic Fathers with Catholic arguments, not his Anglicanism. Does the Reviewer think Bossuet could not, with a good conscience, thank him for this ? Be it so. The Reviewer rejects the testimony of Bossuet. Then Bossuet was wrong. Then the Protestant minister Jurieu, who maintained the opposite doctrine, was right. The Reviewer, then, sides with the Protestant, whose purpose was to overthrow Catholicity, against the Catholic bishop who was defending it. Again ; Bossuet, in his correspondence with Leibnitz on the *Project of Union*, asserts in still clearer and more distinct terms the same doctrine as that of the Catholic Church : Leibnitz, for the purpose of obtaining an argument against the infallibility of the Church, denies that it is the doctrine on which she has proceeded, and cites the very instances the Reviewer cites against us, to prove it. But Bossuet was wrong ; therefore Leibnitz was right, and the Reviewer sides with the Rationalistic Leibnitz opposing, against the Catholic bishop defending, the Church ! This is no scandal. The scandal, it appears, is only in thanking the schismatic or the heretic, when he is defending a Catholic dogma and Catholic Fathers with Catholic arguments.

As to Bossuet's Gallicanism we have nothing to say, for it does not relate to a question of faith. We are ourselves Ultramontane, of the extreme right ; but Gallicans are Catholics as well as we, and have the same right to maintain their opinion

that we have to maintain ours. We have no right to condemn a man whom the Church does not condemn ; and certainly we shall not coincide with the Reviewer in the doctrine, that a man who has, as we believe, erred in a matter of opinion can never be cited as authority on a question of faith in which it has never been pretended that he has erred. The allegations of the Reviewer are not sufficient to impeach the testimony of Bossuet.

But it was not, as the Reviewer leaves his readers to infer, simply as authority that we introduced Bossuet. We introduced him as one who had discussed the question of development *ex professo*, and for the facts, arguments, and authorities he adduced against the Reviewer's doctrine. These spoke for themselves, and were conclusive, without taking Bossuet's personal authority into the account. It was the duty of the Reviewer to reply to these ; for even if he could have impeached Bossuet, these would still remain to be answered. The Reviewer does not seem to us to be aware that he is not at liberty to treat objections to his theory, when gravely urged and well put from respectable sources, with disdain. To do so smacks of Oxford rather than Rome ; for among Catholic theologians it is a point of honor and of conscience to meet objections fairly, and to respond to authority by authority, and to solid reasoning by solid reasoning.

Here we might close, but we make a few additional remarks in hopes they may save us from the necessity of recurring to this painful subject again. The Catholic doctrine on the subject under discussion, as it has been taught us, is, that our Lord has made a full and perfect revelation of all that is, or is to be, received *de fide*, and that he has instituted his Church, and committed to her this revelation as a sacred deposit, to be preserved and transmitted without addition, diminution, or alteration, and that with regard to it, *assistente Spiritu Sancto*, she exercises the functions of an infallible *witness* and *teacher*, and an infallible judge of all controversies which arise respecting it in space and time. *Testis, magistra, judex* comprehend the whole of her functions in regard to the faith, so far as relates to the question before us. She bears witness to the deposit and its faithful preservation ; she proposes what she has received to the faithful ; and she decides every dispute which may relate to it, and infallibly ; for He who commissioned her abides with her, and she has at all times, in each of her functions, the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost.

As *testis* and *magistra*, she certainly does not develop. This

is evident from the force of the word *witness*, from the terms of the commission, "Teach all nations . . . to observe *all things whatsoever* I have commanded you," St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, and from the promise of the Holy Ghost, namely, "who will bring *all things to your mind whatsoever I may have said to you*," St. John xiv. 26. Also in what St. Paul says to St. Timothy:—"O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane novelties of words, and oppositions of knowledge falsely so called, 1 Tim. vi. 20; as St. Vincent of Lerins teaches. "Quis est hodie *Timotheus*," asks this holy doctor, "nisi vel generaliter universa Ecclesia, vel specialiter totum corpus Præpositorum, qui integram divini cultus scientiam vel habere ipsi debent vel aliis infundere? Quid est *depositum custodi*? *Custodi*, inquit, propter fures, propter inimicos, ne dormientibus hominibus, superseminent zinzania super illud tritici bonum semen, quod seminaverat Filius hominis in agro suo. *Depositum*, inquit, *custodi*. Quid est *depositum*? Id est, *quod tibi creditum est*, non quod a te inventum; quod accepisti, non quod excogitasti; rem non ingenii, sed doctrinæ, non usurpationis privatæ, sed publicæ traditionis; rem ad te perductam, non a te prolatam; in qua non auctor debes esse, sed custos; non institutor, sed sectator; non ducens, sed sequens. *Depositum*, inquit, *custodi*; Catholicæ fidei talentum inviolatum illibatumque conserva. *Quod tibi creditum*, hoc penes te maneant, hoc a te tradatur. Aurum accepisti, aurum redde. . . . Eadem tamen quæ didicisti doce, ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova." *Comm.* 1, cap. 22.

It is not possible for language to be more explicit, and on this point we have found no disagreement among our theologians, and their uniform doctrine is admirably summed up and set forth by our own theologian, the learned and venerable Bishop of Philadelphia, in his excellent *Theologia Dogmatica*, Vol. I., pp. 221–228, where he gives, in establishing *the perpetuity of the faith*, as conclusive a refutation of the theory of development as any one can desire. Father Perrone clearly sustains the doctrine we set forth; so does the learned and scientific Dr. Wiseman. Indeed, the point is of faith, and not debatable; for the Holy Council of Trent, session 4, in the Decree on the Canon, expressly declares that those things, and those only, can be held of faith, which are contained "in libris scriptis, aut sine scripto traditionibus, quæ ipsius Christi ore ab Apostolis acceptæ, et ab ipsis Apostolis, Spiritu Sancto dic-

tante, *quasi per manus traditæ, ad nos usque pervenerunt.*" No ingenuity can possibly develop transmitting a doctrine from the Apostles to us, as it were by hand, into development. *Handing* down a doctrine can never be *developing* it.

This point settled, it is determined that there can be no positive developments, for the Church as *judex* does not propose faith, but simply defines it. If, as witness and teacher, she is restricted to the *depositum*, so must she be as judge of controversies. The limitation of that which she can witness to having received is the limitation of that which she can propose, and the limitation of that which she can propose is the limitation of that which she can define *de fide*.

Such is the Catholic doctrine as it has been taught to us. The Church *witnesses* infallibly to the deposit, *proposes* infallibly what she has received, and when controversies arise, when innovators, men fond of the profane novelties of words, or only partially instructed, bring in errors which obscure, undermine, or in any way impugn it, she infallibly *declares* it and condemns them. Such explications of the faith as are necessary for its preservation, and for the clear and distinct application of it to the condemnation of whatever opposes it, she can of course make; for this comes within the province of the judge who applies the law. That by these explications the faith becomes more definite, that is, its boundaries are more clearly and distinctly marked, and it is better understood in relation to what is not faith and to what cannot be maintained without directly or indirectly impugning the faith, nobody, to our knowledge, disputes. The only point disputed is, that the faith opposed to the novel error is a new *proposition* of faith *quoad fideles*. The faithful knew it before its application, and explicitly believed it; only they did not know explicitly that it condemned the error, because they did not know explicitly the error itself. As faith, it was explicitly believed before the application; as explicitly condemning the error, it was only implicit. So in the application, there is no change, no development, no advancement of the faith, no extending the faith over new territory, or taking up new elements into it, but simply its explicit application to the definition of points which it was not before explicitly known that it condemned. The analogy to the civil judge in the application of the law is perfect. The judge has no *legislative* function, and can only define and apply the law. So with the Church in her judicial character.

The Developmentists appear to us to have fallen into their

error by not keeping these several functions of the Church distinct, or rather by supposing that the Church *witnesses* and *proposes* only in *defining*. They sink the *Ecclesia docens* in the *Ecclesia definiens*, and hold that nothing is authoritatively proposed of faith, except in its authoritative definition. Thus the Reviewer says, p. 348, — “ Indeed, our doctrine is implied of necessity in the language so universally held by Catholics, as to the essential importance of the attribute of infallibility ; without which, we always say, there would be a series of endless and hopeless controversies. For how would this be the case, if the Church always held *explicitly and consciously* the contradictory to a heresy before that heresy sprang up ? *What need is there of infallibility to declare that Rome is in Italy ?*” While this passage makes us thrill with horror, we are glad that it is written ; for it will show our Catholic friends that we do not mistake the theory of development. Here it is plainly asserted, or necessarily implied, that the essential importance of the attribute of infallibility is for the determination of controversies ; that the Church does not explicitly and consciously hold the contradictory of a heresy till that heresy springs up ; and that, if she did, there would be no more necessity of an infallible Church to propose the faith, than to declare that Rome is in Italy. It is clear, then, that the theory maintains that the attribute of infallibility comes into play only in the act of defining the faith ; therefore, that the Church *infallibly* proposes the faith only in defining it. But since the Church never defines a point before it is controverted, it follows necessarily that there is infallible proposition of the faith only after it has been controverted, and only in proportion as it is controverted and defined ! Do our friends now understand the theory of development ? And after this will they censure us for opposing it ?

Hence it follows necessarily, since the authoritative proposition of the faith is in its authoritative definition, the contradictory of a heresy cannot be held explicitly and consciously till the heresy has arisen, — the second point the Reviewer asserts. So the Church did not and could not explicitly and consciously hold the doctrine of the Trinity before the contradictory heresy sprang up ; the consubstantiality of the Son, before Arius ; the one person in two natures, before Nestorius ; the two forever distinct natures in one person, before the Eutychians ; the two natural wills and two natural operations, before the Monothelites ; and so of all the points which have in the lapse of time been defined. Do not accuse us of misrepresen-

tation. Read the article in the *Dublin Review*, read Mr. Newman's Essay, and you will find not only that this follows as a consequence, but that it is explicitly asserted ; and, in Mr. Newman, attempted to be demonstrated philosophically, and historically verified. Hold this for certain, that the Developmentists found their theory on the assumption, that the first formal proposition of the faith, saving a few elementary ideas, is in its first formal definition. If, then, it had so happened that there had been no resistance to the faith, not a single article, even to this day, could have been completely, distinctly, and consciously held by the Church. On their principles, the Church has attained to a consciousness of her faith by means of the successive errors which have controverted it.

There is something in the doctrine of the Reviewer which strikes us with more horror than even this. He asks, "What need is there of infallibility to declare that Rome is in Italy?" None, if you are to believe the fact with only human faith. But if you are to believe it with Catholic faith? This is the question. Has the Reviewer ever made an act of faith? May we ask him what is the *objectum formale quo seu sub quo fidei divinæ et catholicæ*? Has he studied his *Tractatus de Fide*? If he has, he knows that the *objectum formale quo* or the *ratio formalis fidei divinæ et catholicæ* is the *prima veritas revelans et Ecclesia Catholica proponens*, and therefore that he cannot make an act of faith except in that which God reveals and the Catholic Church infallibly proposes. We could hardly have supposed it could be necessary to remind even a Catholic child, who has been taught his catechism, of this fact. It follows from this that the attribute of infallibility is as necessary to propose what is explicit and consciously held, as it is to define the faith on the points which are controverted. The question of the Reviewer marks the character of his theory, and betrays an ignorance of the simple conditions of Catholic faith which we should not have marvelled at in a Protestant, but which in a Catholic is as astonishing as it is deplorable.

After this, it is easy to comprehend the Theory of Development. God has made his revelation once for all, and, as Mr. Newman says, "thrown it upon the concurrence of men." On a few essential or seminal points it is clear and explicit from the first ; all the rest is preserved in the Scriptures, and unconscious traditions of this concurrence of men. As time rolls on, a portion so preserved, which makes no part of the explicit or conscious teaching or belief of the Church at the time, is

detached, floats in the minds of the faithful for a while, in the state of opinion. Some maintain that it is of faith ; others that it is not ; gradually a controversy arises on the point, and waxes warm ; authority then intervenes, and defines and proposes the point, and what was opinion is now *de fide*. Here is a development. Soon another portion is detached, floats for a while as opinion, is controverted, then defined, then proposed, and is another development. Then another, and then another ; and the process may continue, for aught we know, and the whole revelation not be all developed, defined, and proposed, till the consummation of the world. Here is the theory in a nutshell. It satisfies the condition of the perpetuity of the faith, as it is supposed, by asserting that nothing is defined and proposed not contained in the original revelation ; and the demand of the age for a progressive faith, by assuming that it is only according to the progress of controversy, and the advance of the age, that it is developed, defined, and proposed as *de fide*. We entreat our Anglican friends either to deny or to confirm this. How they can deny it we do not see, for it is really nothing but the statement the Reviewer himself makes officially in the article before us, reproduced from the Catholic point of view. If they acknowledge it, will they oblige us by drawing up a complete list of the articles and dogmas, or parts of articles and dogmas, now taught, which they class under the head of developments, and maintain were not explicitly and consciously held by the Church in the primitive age ? We have ourselves prepared a list for them, but we withhold it, preferring, if more must be said on the subject, to be furnished with one from themselves.

Taking the theory as we understand it, the Developmentists fall into this error by overlooking the fact that the Church *infallibly proposes the faith before she infallibly defines it*. The Catholic says, *Testis, magistra, iudex*, — the Church witnesses, proposes, defines ; the Developmentists say, the Church *develops, defines, proposes* ; but as she defines only on the occasion of controversy, she proposes nothing to be believed till it has been controverted. Trace, then, the history of the controversies respecting the faith, and you will trace the history of the Church's formal or authoritative teaching, and ascertain the exact order and progress of development. The assumption here is, that the date of the controversy is the date of the formal or explicit admission of the article into the creed. Thus, purgatory, though held by many as opinion, was not of faith

till after Aërius denied it in the fourth century. Here is the common Protestant assumption, and that of Anglicans in particular.

It is easy now to comprehend why some Catholics have mistaken the real character of this theory. There are two things which Catholics always keep distinct, — the Church's *teaching*, and the *historical evidence* of her teaching. The Church herself is the only competent witness to the former. She is one in time as well as in space. Knowing what she teaches to-day, we know what the Apostles taught, — what she has taught in every age since, and will continue to teach till the consummation of the world. It never occurs to us to resort to history to find what she taught in this or that age, for, to determine that, we have only to ask what she teaches now. In her *teaching* there is no progress, no variation, no development.

But in the *historical evidence* of her teaching, which is a matter of no moment to the faithful, the case is different; for the evidence *follows not the teaching, but the controversies* respecting it, and in it there is a progress or development; because the several articles of the creed, as an historical fact, have been, prior to our day, not all controverted at once, but successively. Now, if you predicate developments of the teaching, you unquestionably err; but if you predicate them of the historical evidence of the teaching, you may be substantially correct. The former is so gross an error, that very few Catholics have been able to believe that such men as Mr. Newman and his friends could possibly fall into it; and therefore, making liberal allowances for their inaccuracies of language and frequent confusion of thought, not unaccountable in men trained in an erroneous system of philosophy and theology, and not yet fully instructed in the truth, have supposed they must really mean the latter, in which sense the greater part of what they say can be suffered to pass. So supposing, although regarding the theory with no especial favor, they have not believed it necessary to make any outcry against it, and have looked upon our attacks upon it as uncalled for, and, in fact, unjust, because we take the theory in a sense — authorized, indeed, by some few passages — which is not the sense really intended by its authors. In this view of the case they are right, and we are inexcusable, and deserving severer censures than we have received.

Now we frankly concede that a very considerable portion

of Mr. Newman's Essay *may* be interpreted on this hypothesis ; but if it *should* be, why has not the Reviewer told us so ? If the subject of the developments be not *Christian doctrine*, but the *historical evidence* of Christian doctrine, why, since the distinction has been suggested to the friends of Mr. Newman more than once, have they not said so ? We have good authority for saying it is not so. The fact is, they do not make or admit this distinction, save in a very few cases. They begin with the assumption, that what is not explicitly recognized in the history of the Church's teaching in a given age was not, as a general rule, in that age explicitly taught, and therefore they conclude that they must predicate generally of the Church's teaching what they find to be true of the historical evidence of her teaching. We shall do these gentlemen essential injustice, if we interpret their theory from the Catholic, instead of the Protestant, point of view. They assume in the outset that all which Protestants allege as to *Roman additions to the primitive creed* is *TRUE*, only that what Protestants call *additions* should be called *developments*. They agree precisely with their former Anglican friends on the main point, that there are doctrines to be found in the Church's teaching to-day which were not in her primitive teaching. *Their theory is an expedient for asserting the Anglican antecedent and escaping the Anglican consequent.* On the main point controverted between Protestants and Catholics, for these three hundred years, as to these pretended additions, they take, as they always did, the Anglican side, and are, as before, at issue with all our Catholic divines. Here, say they, are the facts. The *stationariness* of doctrine contended for by Roman divines cannot be maintained with truth ; and you must either call these facts additions with Anglicans or developments with us. If you call them additions, you must renounce your Church. If you will not admit them to be developments, you cannot maintain your Church. The evidence of history is overwhelming against you. It is either our theory, or no Catholicity. This is the alternative these modest gentlemen present to the Catholic Church.* Let them deny it, if

* We find a confirmation of what we here state, in another article in the number of the Review before us. The Reviewer says, p. 307, — " Various Anglican writers have lately maintained or implied that the historical arguments, adduced by writers of their school, have driven Catholics to the necessity of devising a new theory." Now these Anglican writers referred to distinctly state the theory to be precisely what we state it to be ; and they do pretend that Catholics have been forced to abandon the

they can. Would to God they could deny it, and prove us to have misrepresented them. We demand of them an explicit statement on this point, whether we state the case correctly, or whether we misrepresent them. That we do not misrepresent the *Dublin Review* is certain. The Reviewer writes with much finesse, and, like every member of the school, makes a statement, then qualifies it away, and then qualifies away his qualification. But he plainly intimates to us, p. 352, that, even if we should refute his *theory*, the facts which have suggested it, and, as he maintains, are recognized by the theologians he has cited, will remain to be disposed of. He evidently believes that history presents an obstacle, as Mr. Newman expresses it, to communion with Rome, which cannot be removed without some theory or hypothesis; and this obstacle is precisely, in his mind, the discrepancy or difference which Protestants say history presents between the actual Church and the Church of the primitive age. He will not take the testimony of the Church herself, that she has never varied; for he thinks he finds historical evidence to the contrary. Now this variation, difference, discrepancy, between the actual Church and the primitive, he says, virtually, remains to be explained, and that it devolves on Catholics to explain it. We answer him very briefly with the Catholic formula, — the Church is infallible, and is in each age the continuation and *witness* of the Church in the age next preceding; and by it we are placed in

doctrine we oppose to it. But how does the Reviewer meet this? By showing that they misunderstand or misrepresent the theory? Not at all, — but by denying the theory to be a novelty, and maintaining “that the said theory was fully recognized by doctors of the highest repute in the Church centuries before they or their arguments were heard of.” — *Ibid.*

We will add here, that, in speaking of the Developmentists, we do not include in their number all the recent converts from Anglicanism. How large a number embrace the theory we know not; but we have authority for including none but Mr. Newman and six others; yet these are all whose publications, since their conversion, we have seen, and they now evidently have the *Dublin Review* for their organ. We will state still further, that we have proceeded in examining the theory on the assumption that it is a well-defined theory, distinctly and systematically drawn out, and with regard to which there is no difference of opinion among the Developmentists; but in reality this is not the case. They do not, as we have authority for asserting, agree among themselves; and we suppose the truth to be, that none of them have any clear, distinct, and precise views of what it is they are contending for; and if they could for a moment forget their theory, they would no doubt readily admit that it was never in reality for them more than “much ado about nothing.”

communion with the Apostles and they with us. We have no difficulties to explain. We deny your assumption, on her infallible authority, and assert, that, if you undertake to maintain it, you will find yourself, *ipso facto*, a heretic. O my brother, are you a Catholic, and have not yet learned that the Church is higher than history and philosophy? Have you not yet learned that the difficulties are for those who do not believe, and not for those who do? Let all the objections from history and philosophy, which schismatics, heretics, infidels, wicked men on earth, or devils in hell can bring, be brought against my poor servant girl, who cannot read a word, and she has but to say *credo*, and they melt and vanish into vacuity. O, do not ask us for theories, for we *believe*; and when we have faith, we are done with theories. Make your act of faith, be contented with what contented those who endured reproach for the Church, and shared her consolations, when you and we were wallowing in the filth of our heresy and schism and infidelity, and you will behold the immaculate Spouse herself, and draw milk from her breasts, and your heart will be too full of love and gratitude to be thinking of theories. As yet you dream not how glorious, how lovely, how rich in graces, how full of truth and sanctity, is this dear mother who has taken us to her bosom, spread her own robe over our nakedness, and called us her children. Tear away the bandage your theory binds over your eyes, and lo! a vision of loveliness, of purity, of truth, of majesty, stands before you, that infinitely surpasses all you have yet imagined, — your heart and mind are filled, your soul is entranced, and you exclaim, “O my God, what am I, that this blessedness should be for me?”

We here close what we have to say on this subject for the present. We need not say how bitterly we regret the necessity of taking part in so painful a controversy, or that we should shrink from it, if we were not encouraged and sustained by those who have authority to teach. We have endeavoured to treat the gentlemen who advocate this horrible theory, personally, with forbearance and respect; for we regard their error as resulting from the mistake they made of fancying their form of Anglicanism to be simple schism, not heresy, which prevented them, on their accession to the communion of the Church, from attending as they otherwise would have done to what they had to learn and to unlearn. They have, unhappily, given the devil an opportunity to take his revenge for their defection. But for Catholics no evil is irreparable. They will most

likely be obliged at last to abandon their theory ; and if they are not yet convinced that they must do so, they yet will do well to desist for a time from urging it upon the public. We have spoken to them plainly, but not unkindly, if seemingly uncourtteously. If in any thing we have wronged them, we ask their pardon in advance, and shall only need to have the wrong pointed out to retract it, and to make all the amends for it in our power.

ART. IV. — *The Life of St. Stanislaus Kotska, of the Society of Jesus, Patron of Novices.* From the Italian. First American Edition. Baltimore : Metropolitan Press. 1847. 16mo. pp. 144.

THE Catholic public owe a large debt of gratitude to the Sulpicians of Baltimore for establishing the Metropolitan press, and for the excellent works they have printed and circulated. Their publications are selected with Catholic taste and judgment, and are admirably adapted to the edification of the faithful. They are from a class of works which are always deeply interesting, and which cannot be read without advancing the cause of truth and piety. Excepting one or two school-books which we do not much like, we can cordially recommend every publication we have seen from the Metropolitan press ; and, indeed, the fact that a work is sent forth from that press is of itself a much higher recommendation than ours, or that of any other editor in the country.

These excellent fathers would deserve our lasting gratitude for their edition of Butler's *Lives of the Saints*, if for nothing else. They have given us a complete edition of that invaluable work, in twelve numbers, making four handsome octavo volumes, well printed, on good paper, and fair type, at the low price of three dollars, instead of twenty dollars, the price, we believe, of the English edition, and have thus placed it within the reach of every Catholic family in the country wishing to possess it. There could be no better work selected for general circulation, or one the reading of which could be more instructive and profitable. It is the best history of the Church which we have in English, and, at the same time, it furnishes the best description of spiritual reading. Nowhere can we so well study the history of the Church as in the lives of her

saints ; and nowhere can we better learn the maxims of holy living than in the examples of those who have successfully reduced them to practice. To all who object to our holy religion, and, in their blindness and rage, declaim against it, we hold up these Lives of the Saints, and say, Read these, and then doubt, if you can, where is the true Church, where the Holy Ghost is infused, or where are truth, sanctity, heroism.

We have but one fault to find with Butler's *Lives of the Saints*. The learned author is an Englishman, and, like too many English Catholics, writes with the fear of heretics before his eyes, and prunes away whatever he fears may not be able to withstand the most searching criticism. Perhaps this is well ; but we wish the excellent author had written with less reference to those who are without, in exterior darkness, and consulted more exclusively the edification of the faithful. His pages are learned, critically accurate, recording no fact not proof against the cavils of the critic ; but we cannot disguise the fact that they are often cold, dry, destitute of the glow and the unction we look for in the genuine Catholic writer. Alas ! our noble mother tongue has so long been all but monopolized by heretics and unbelievers, that it is not easily pressed into the service of truth and piety, and not without immense effort is it made a passable medium for expressing even the more ordinary emotions and affections of the Christian life. It has well-nigh lost its power of expressing any thing which pertains especially to the Christian experience. It has no celestial sense, and its terms are rarely significant of any thing which goes out of the natural order. It may answer the purposes of business and practical politics ; it may even lend itself with some facility to the poet of external nature, or of merely human love ; but, according to its ordinary usage, it is wholly unfitted to express that higher, purer, richer, and more delicate class of affections which are peculiar to the Christian. Whenever we seek to make it express the deeper religious experience, the fervent and tender love of the soul for her celestial Spouse, her ardent longings for the visits of her Divine Lover, who engrosses all her thoughts, absorbs, as it were, her whole being, her detachment from the world, her entire self-annihilation, her sweet peace, her ineffable repose as she leans on the arm of her Beloved, or her raptures when he deigns to embrace her with his love ; the associations with which the terms we must use are invested in the popular mind are all foreign to our purpose, and we are more likely to suggest what we would not than

what we would. What is highest, purest, and most holy in our thought becomes cold, dry, or coarse in our expression. The most we can do is to talk *about* these things, we cannot talk them themselves ; as it was said of Dugald Stewart, that he discoursed about philosophy, but did not discourse it.

Language is the exponent of the life of the people who use it, and it can be the exponent of only such life as they live. The native capacity of our language is equal to that of any modern tongue. It might have all the delicacy, flexibility, and liquid harmony of the Italian, the depth and tenderness of the German, the pomp and dignity of the Spanish, the vivacity and unction of the French, as well as a directness and energy peculiarly its own. No language has a richer vocabulary than it has or may have, for it has the power of naturalizing whatever is excellent in every ancient or modern tongue. But the boasted and boasting Anglo-Saxon race, since it rebelled against the Church, has been a stranger to the Christian religion, and living without God in the world. There is no Christianity, and therefore no true religion, distinguishable from the Church. None who live out of her communion do or can live the Christian life. The terms of religion they retain they soon cease to understand in a Christian sense. Their whole order of ideas becomes contracted to what is of the earth, earthy, and their language is restricted in its meaning to what is low, outward, and sensual. We charge the stubbornness and defects of our language, not to the language itself, but to the fact that it has been all but monopolized for three hundred years by the enemies of God and his holy religion, who have lost the Christian life, and have had no occasion to express its phenomena.

But, after all, our language is not the property of heretics and infidels. It was ours before it was theirs. They are only usurpers by violence, and as such have acquired no rights by prescription. They have and can have no right to frame its laws, or to determine its usage. It is ours by right, for we never do and never can forfeit our rights. We should therefore reclaim the dominion which in unhappy times was wrested from us, and at least, so far as it concerns ourselves, restore to our language its Christian character and habits. We already constitute no insignificant portion of all who speak it, and in a very few years we shall be the majority. There is no longer, if ever there was, any occasion to consult heretical and infidel usage. We are false to ourselves and to religion, if in writing we place the Protestants who speak our language before

our eyes, instead of Catholics, and seek to adapt ourselves to the tastes of the former, instead of the wants of the latter. We must write with a view to the edification of Catholics, not with a view either to commend ourselves to sectarians, or to escape their criticisms.

The heretical and unbelieving who speak our language, no doubt, at the present moment, outnumber the faithful, and surpass them in worldly position and influence ; but we need not mind that. There is just as little occasion for us to defer to them in matters of language, of science, of art, of taste, as in matters of religion. We have nothing to learn from them, and can teach them in those very things in which their attainments are the most respectable. We are all of us disposed to overrate them, and to conclude, that, where so much is pretended, there must needs be some little reality. It is all a mistake. They affect airs of superiority, talk largely, pompously, and even venture to sneer at some of our own great masters ; but their persuasion of their own superiority results solely from their ignorance. In the law, which was systematized by their Catholic ancestors, there is found not unfrequently a Protestant who can reason, and reason well. In matters of business we also find Protestants who are shrewd, able, and not ridiculous ; but in almost every thing else, it is rare to find one who can talk for five minutes in succession, without committing the most laughable blunders, or betraying the most deplorable ignorance. By rejecting religion, by scorning the Gospel, they have gone far indeed, *magni passus*, but out of the normal order, *extra viam*, and retain the normal exercise of none of their faculties. We almost always estimate too highly their attainments, and in our addresses to them, or in our arguments with them, are almost always too profound, too scientific, and too logical for them to follow us. We suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by their lofty airs and loud pretensions ; yet they never reject the truth because they have attained to a high state of mental cultivation, but always because they want true mental and moral discipline. Our most illiterate servant-girls can teach the best of them, and are familiar with great truths, to the conception of which the most learned of them are not equal. The simplest elements of religion are too recondite for them, and the most ordinary sermon of the most ordinary Catholic priest, if they catch its sense, is full of novelty for them. Poor souls ! how little do they reflect that there is a wisdom which is folly, and a folly that is wisdom ! How little do they

suspect the ridiculous figure they cut in the eyes of even an ordinary Catholic ! Poor Pat or Bridget laughs, or is shocked, at their ignorance ; and yet they swell up, and are fain to persuade themselves that they are the great lights of the age. Alas ! if the light that is in you be darkness, how great is that darkness !

We speak not disparagingly of the natural ability of heretics and infidels ; God has dealt as bountifully with them as with others. Nor do we speak disparagingly of their zeal for education, or their unwearied efforts to cultivate their minds and hearts, and to advance in science and literature. Their wrinkled brows, sunken eyes, furrowed cheeks, and care-worn countenances, indicate plainly that they waste not themselves in idleness ; but, alas ! it is not easy to fill a sieve with the waters even of the ocean ; and labor misdirected yields ordinarily but a poor return. One must look long indeed before he will behold and appreciate the beauty upon which he turns his back, and long and rapidly indeed must he run before overtaking the truth from which he recedes. We need not wonder that they toil and study in vain. We need not wonder that they amass no treasures, and that they remain poor and destitute in the midst of abundance. They have turned their backs upon God ; they have thrown themselves out of the Divine order ; they are running from all that is true, beautiful, and good ; and what is there for them to acquire but emptiness and nothing ? The treasure can be found only in the field in which it is hid, and, if they will not seek there, they must seek in vain. Confining themselves to the earthly, only the earthly can exist for them. The book of celestial truth is a sealed book for them, — sealed within and without with seven seals, and none but the Lion of the tribe of Juda prevails to open it, or to loose the seals thereof. Yet no man does or can know the earthly as it is, save as he beholds it in the light of the celestial. Alas for them ! — esteeming themselves wise, they become fools ; are ever learning, but never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. There is only one thing more deplorable than their mistake, and that is for Catholics ever to write with the fear of them before their eyes, or to consult their tastes and habits in using the language which, in their blindness and unbelief, they have emasculated, made weak, and meaningless. Let us, unless when writing directly for them, forget their existence, leave them entirely out of the account, and study to write solely for the edification of Christians. It is for them to come and learn

of us, not for us to go and learn of them. It is for us to determine the laws of our language and to fix its usage, not for them ; for nothing they do or can do will endure. They and their works are of this world, and will pass away with the fashion thereof. The promise is not to them, and time, as he passes on, levels their proudest monuments to the dust, and sweeps out every vestige of their existence, and draws the black pall of forgetfulness over all they did, all they had, and all they were.

But we have wandered from our purpose. Living as we do in the midst of this boasting and boasted Anglo-Saxon world, — witnessing the lofty pretensions of the heretical and unbelieving, — beholding them filling the places of trust, honor, and profit, multiplying schools, praising education, and professing themselves wise beyond all precedent, we are apt to regard them as somebody, and, with that modesty and self-distrust our religion inculcates, to suppose that we may profitably defer to them in all matters where our faith does not positively forbid us. Our writers seek to catch the Protestant manner, and study to set their Catholic gem in a Protestant case. We have wished to protest against this, and to urge upon our brethren the folly of such a procedure. We love our Protestant brethren, and daily pray for their conversion ; but we cannot take lessons from them on any subject whatever. Wherever we see the stamp of Protestantism, we see something to be abhorred ; for even the truth in a Protestant garb seldom fails to have the effect of falsehood.

We esteem highly Butler's *Lives of the Saints*. It is a work of vast erudition ; but we always feel, when reading it, that the excellent author would have made it still more valuable, if he had written it solely for the edification of Catholics, and not with an eye to Protestant criticisms and cavils. We wish he had written less as the critic, and more as the pious believer. He strips his subject too bare, prunes away its natural branches, and divests it of its ever-green foliage. When we read the *Lives of the Saints*, we wish to do it always with the wonder and reverence which Plato calls the beginning of wisdom ; we would read them, not for historical criticism, nor in a doubtful, hesitating spirit, determined to reject every miracle for which there is not evidence to satisfy the court of Rome in a process for canonization ; but as spiritual exercises, in open faith and ardent love, remembering that no heart of man can conceive how much our good Father loves even the least of his saints, and that there is nothing he is not ready and willing

to do for any of us, if we are only simple and humble, and will not claim the glory for ourselves. The more miracles are crowded into the Life of a Saint, the better we like it ; and we suffer ourselves to be edified, without stopping at each one to ask, Can it be proved that this miracle was really wrought ? Nevertheless, Butler's *Lives of the Saints* is one of the noblest monuments reared in this English tongue to the glory of God in his Church, and we again thank the worthy Sulpicians of Baltimore for placing it within the reach of even the poor of our community. Happy will it be for the people who make it their daily reading.

We know not the author or the translator of the *Life of St. Stanislaus Kotska*, now before us, and which is one of the sweetest little books that has as yet issued from the Metropolitan press. It is a model in its way, — simple, chaste, full of tender piety, of charity, and unction. The author has written with a deep sympathy with his subject, under the gentle and holy influence of the sweet youth and mature saint whose brief but glorious life he records. The translator has caught the spirit of his author, and the English language under his plastic piety loses its stubbornness, and becomes pliable and Catholic. The work is just one of those little works we love. We cannot have too many such works ; nor can they be too widely circulated, or too often read.

We cannot trust ourselves to speak of the Saint himself. The little book before us says all that needs to be said, and we hope before this it is in the hands of all our readers. Our Catholic life begins at too recent a date, and we have been too little inured to Catholic discipline, to be able to speak with any edification of the saints of God. It is for us to say, " St. Stanislaus Kotska, pray for us," rather than to attempt either a brief sketch of his life, or a panegyric on his virtues. As the patron of novices we invoke him, for, if we are no novice in the technical sense, we are in every other. He seems to have been sent to us to show us how near heaven we may live even while in the flesh. A lovelier flower of divine charity has rarely bloomed in an earthly garden, and we may well term him " the Beloved of Mary." It is not easy to meditate on his short but heroic life without having our affections weaned from the earth, without becoming able to trample whatever pertains to this world under our feet, without rising superior to all that is visible and temporal, and longing to enlist in the noble army of Jesus our King, and to aspire to win the crown of life, which God with

his own hand will confer one day on them that love him and persevere to the end.

Heaven lies much nearer to us than we, busied and engrossed with the things of time and sense, permit ourselves to believe. St. Stanislaus seems to have all but entered upon the life of the blessed, even while he lived only by *promise*. And then, if the promise lifts us so far above all the reality we know or can conceive, what must be its fulfilment, the reward itself? Truly, eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. Behold with what love the Father hath loved us! It hath not yet appeared what we shall be, but when he shall appear, we know we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.

We shall see him as he is. The ever-blessed Virgin, the glorious Queen of Heaven, has more than once appeared to mortal eyes. He to whom she has appeared, though with her resplendent beauty veiled, and her glory tempered to his feeble vision, has yet been filled with rapturous delight, and felt that he could ask no more than to be permitted to behold her sweet loveliness and listen to the music of her voice. Yet she is but a creature, an humble mortal raised for her humility by divine grace to the rank in heaven highest below the Ever-adorable Trinity. All-resplendent as she is by divine grace, her beauty and loveliness are but the hidings of the beauty and loveliness of Him who hath exalted her. If she so fill the soul, if even her presence can be so rich a reward, if even to have seen her but once has carried the soul for ever away from itself, and even by its recollection made the cold and dusty earth a blissful paradise, what must it be to be permitted to behold our God himself, not through a glass darkly, not once for a brief moment, but as he is, and to dwell for ever in his presence! Is it strange that this young saint, to whom Mary had appeared and spoken, should have longed to be with her? Is it strange that his desire to be with her should have consumed his mortal frame, when to be with her was to be with God, to behold Him who hath loved us and redeemed us, and to behold him as he is in himself? How welcome the permission to leave this world, with the sweet assurance of meeting our Father, and entering into the joy of our Lord! What has death, called the king of terrors, then, to frighten the soul? Shall not the soul leap with joy to end her wanderings, to return from her exile, to reach her home, her Father's house, and receive his hearty welcome and warm embrace?

What is this world to one who looks forward to this glorious reünion at home, in his Father's house? How poor and mean its honors and rewards! how unworthy of a thought its sorrows, its trials and afflictions! Yet to this we may all look forward, if we will; to this home of our Father we may all return, if we will; we can gain heaven by simply willing it. What fools, then, we are! Here we are, wedded to this world, sighing and struggling for its tinsel honors, mad with rage if some are more successful than we, — filled with jealousy, or pining with envy. Yet there lies heaven with all its resplendent beauty, with all its eternal glories, with all its inconceivable beatitude, to be had for the simple willing! Surely, the saints are the only wise. The rest of us are fools, fools sunk to such a depth of folly that we cannot conceive it. Yet we call ourselves wise, and count it a sacrifice to give ourselves to God, to forego the earth and live for heaven! Parents feel that their sons and daughters throw themselves away, when they die to the world that they may live to God; and think that they have well settled them, if they have succeeded in securing them honorable worldly establishments. O, the madness of men is beyond conception!

Nay, the religion which promises and secures us heaven, which crowns us with the Supreme Good, is not only neglected, made to give way to the world, but it is actually hated, and men are mad against it, conspire to overthrow it, and feel that they have gained a noble victory, if they have withdrawn some poor child from its sweet and holy influence. There is hardly a city in the Union in which there are not benevolent ladies banded together, practising self-denial, and giving alms enough even to gain heaven, if accompanied by faith and charity, who make it a business to find out poor children, and with sweetmeats, and fine dresses, and flattering words, entice them from religion, lure them from God, to be brought up in hatred of Him who redeemed them, of the Spiritual Mother who bore them, and to burn eternally in the fire prepared for the devil and his angels. And these charming ladies persuade themselves that they are doing a deed of charity, that they are serving God, that he will love and reward them for it, — poor deluded creatures, who are nothing more or less than procuresses to the devil. How strange! What terrible infatuation! As if it were not ten thousand million times better that our children should starve to death before our eyes than that they should be brought up Protestants? This hatred of Christianity, this war against the Church, the sweet solace of men here,

and the medium of heaven hereafter, is the strangest and most unaccountable madness. It is a thing hardly conceivable, much less believable, yet here it is before our eyes ; and these people, who do their best to destroy themselves and all mankind, really imagine that they are wise and good people, the salt of the earth, the reformers of God's Church, and they affect to look down with pity and contempt on the poor Christian who repeats his *Credo*, *Pater-noster*, *Ave*, and *Confiteor*.

There is nothing better fitted to humble the pride of man, to make him see his own blindness and malice, than this hostility so widely manifested against the Immaculate Spouse of God. It shows us what man is, when he turns his back upon truth, and is abandoned to himself. He is then at war with all nature, at war with heaven, at war with himself, and revels in the delight of plucking out his own eyes, tearing out his own bowels, and rending his own heartstrings. How grateful should we be to Almighty God, who through his great mercy has retained us in his Church, or brought us within his "closed garden"! Never can we be sufficiently thankful for the blessing we enjoy. Never can we sufficiently deplore the condition of those without, or with sufficient earnestness pray for their enlightenment. We, if left to ourselves, would be as they ; like them, we should blaspheme God, and deride his character, and destroy our own souls. St. Stanislaus Kotska, pray for us, that we may persevere ; and give thanks for us, that we have been enabled to see and know the truth, and to hope one day to be permitted to join thee in heaven, to behold Mary whom thou didst so love, and God who has crowned her with his grace Queen of Heaven. Beseech, also, the glorious Queen, our sweet Mother, to pray for the conversion of these revilers of her Divine Son, that heresy and infidelity may cease from our land, and the Church here be universal, and our whole population be her faithful, zealous, obedient children.

But we have introduced this Life of St. Stanislaus Kotska to our readers, not only to recommend it to their attention, but to suggest anew to those of our friends who are ambitious of producing an American Catholic literature, that, instead of aiming at the production of original works, they would do more credit to themselves and more service to religion, if they would confine themselves to translations, and especially to translations of the lives of particular saints. Original works written by English or American Catholics may be desired, but, unhappily, we can at present produce few such that will not be more Protestant in tone, temper, and influence, than Catholic.

Then, again, truth is stranger and more interesting than fiction. Pauline Seward is a very respectable young lady ; has a fine person, genteel manners, and is free from vice ; but what is she to a St. Agnes, a St. Theresa, a St. Catherine of Sienna, a St. Bridget, or a St. Gertrude ? What is Father Felix, Father Le Fevre, or Father Thomas, beside hundreds of meek and faithful pastors gently performing their duties in the Church in any Catholic country ? What are your Normans, Eugenes, and other heroes of your modern Catholic novels, beside a St. Lawrence, a St. Stanislaus Kotska, a St. Aloysius Gonzaga ? Why, your most successful Catholic, or pretended Catholic, romancers of the day cannot begin to rise even in imagination to what the Church presents us everywhere in the lives of her saints. Shall we exchange the saints who have really lived, those admirable specimens of art in which the eternal God has been the artist, for the puerile conceits and puny creations of sentimental young men and boarding-school misses ? Who has not laughed at poor Glaucus for giving his golden armor for the brazen armor of Diomedes ? Shall we escape, if we exchange the pure gold of reality for the tinsel of a weak and sickly fancy ? These little books with red embossed covers and gilt edges are very pretty, no doubt, and the young gentleman or the young lady who has written one of them may claim it as a noble birth ; but are we not stupid beyond conception to rest contented with them, or to suppose that we have nothing more attractive to offer our young people ? Have we, as Catholics, become so poor, so utterly impoverished, that we must borrow the pens of Protestants, of heretics, and therefore children of the devil, to portray saints and heroes for the contemplation and imitation of our sons and daughters ? Or are we so lost to all sense of the riches of our Church, that, when we do not borrow the Protestant pen, we must borrow the Protestant spirit, and write after the Protestant model ? Really, this is more stupid than exchanging gold for brass. We mean not to be too severe upon the young men and women, or old men and widows, or men with wives, or wives with husbands, who write our pretty red or blue covered Catholic novels. They no doubt aim well, do the best they can, without more study ; and we are not disposed to blame people for not doing better than they can. Nevertheless, these novels are a reproach to us ; no inconsiderable part of our popular English Catholic literature is a reproach to us ; and is it to be wondered at that our young people seek to gratify their reading propensity elsewhere ?

There is no more attractive reading for the young than biography, and there is really no department of biography which may be made more attractive than that of the saints, the true and only real heroes and conquerors. Why not, then, enrich our literature with translations from the French, Italian, &c., of the excellent lives of the saints which so abound in those languages? How much better it is to spend an hour with St. Francis of Sales, St. Jane Francis Chantol, St. Francis of Assisium, St. John of God, than with Florence Ruthven, Cora Leslie, or Jessie Linden, Norman Ruthven, Elder Graham, or even Father Thomas! If we wish the country to become Catholic, we must study, not to bring Catholicity down to it, but to bring it up to Catholicity. Your pretty novels will do little to guard our children against the infection of heresy, still less to win heretics to the truth. We must aim higher, propose higher models of excellence than are to be found in the public marts or the gay saloons of rich heretics. We must hold up the saints, and kindle a noble aspiration in our youth to follow their examples, to imitate their heroic virtues. Then Catholicity will really advance in our country. Then our youth will not blush to be called *Papists* or *Romanists*. They will glory in reproach, joy in being contemned.

Why not? An Englishman has written a book which he calls "The Ages of Faith," as if the ages of faith had passed away. They may have passed away in proud and sensual England, but let us beware of harbouring the notion that there is not faith now, and that even now Christians may not or do not equal Christians of the past. The Church does not grow old, the faith does not grow old, the Holy Ghost does not grow old; say not, The days that have been are better than those which are. We can go into this city and find as strong faith, as tender piety, as thorough self-annihilation, as the world in any age ever witnessed. God is as near us as ever; we have all the aids we ever had, and we may emulate the virtues of any past age. God has not changed; his religion has not changed; man's nature has not changed. What was possible aforetime is possible now. Let us not, then, suppose we have come too late into the world to aspire to holy living. Let us turn our eyes, not out upon the barren wilderness without, but in upon the vast treasures we have been accumulating for ages, and dare use them.

Who cares for the heretics and infidels around us,—except for their conversion? They cannot harm us against our will.

Were not the early Christians in a hostile world? Were they not surrounded by Jewish and Pagan relatives and friends? Had they not apparently even greater obstacles than we to overcome? Why, then, shall we not speak to this age as they spoke to theirs? Suppose we are sneered at, ridiculed, abused, insulted, trampled on. Suppose the world becomes mad against us, mobs us, shoots us down, sends us to dungeons, the scaffold, or the stake; worse it cannot do. Suppose all this. What then? We have only to rejoice and be exceedingly glad. Woe unto us only when all men speak well of us. Woe unto us only when we prefer the praise of men to the praise of God.

We honor the zeal we see increasing in behalf of Catholic literature, but we wish the literature to be such as will kindle our zeal for Catholicity, — set before us heroic examples worthy of our imitation. We want no linsey-woolsey literature, no diluted Catholicity. Let us have our religion in all its power, majesty and glory, sweetness and beauty, as we see it exemplified by our noble army of saints. Let us study to enlist early our youth in this army, and to bring them into close communion with the beloved of God. And the best way to do this is to leave the regions of fancy and imagination, and soar to those of truth and reality, and substitute heroes and heroines fashioned by the grace of God, for those of our own creating. God's works are more beautiful than man's. Let us prefer his works to ours, and we shall soon see that the "Ages of Faith" have not passed away, but are now as well as formerly. Give us the saints, and there will be no call for the heroes of romance.

ART. V. — *The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America: containing the Confession of Faith, the Catechisms, and the Directory for the Worship of God; together with the Plan of Government and Discipline, as ratified by the General Assembly at their Sessions in May, 1821, and amended in 1833.* Philadelphia: Haswell & Co. 1838.

IN our Review for April last, we discussed at sufficient length the first part of the doctrine of Predestination, namely, — Almighty God purposed from the beginning to create some

angels and men in order to condemn them to everlasting misery. We proceed now to consider the second part, namely, — the Almighty, to render his decree effectual, lays both the elect and the reprobate under the invincible necessity, the former of doing good and the latter of doing evil. This part teaches us that the wicked are driven by this necessity into sin, and to plunge into every excess, that their condemnation may be certain ; or, in other words, to recur to a figure already used, the Almighty binds around their waists the leaden jacket, which leaves them no alternative but to sink. This part of the doctrine, still more than the former, renders Presbyterianism execrable, for it makes God the real author of the sins which men by his decree are placed under the necessity of committing.

The passages of the Confession which establish this monstrous doctrine are numerous and clear, and there seems to have been not much effort to conceal it. Soon after their first appearance in the world, the Calvinists split on the question, whether predestination to hell and sin was anterior or posterior to the fall of Adam, and they divided into two parties, the antelapsarians or *supralapsarians* and the postlapsarians or *sublapsarians*. The Westminster Divines, as mighty geniuses, appear to have contrived to be of both parties at once. Their Confession speaks of God's decree to damn some angels and men before saying a word of the fall of Adam ; and as angels had no original sin, it is fair to conclude that men and angels are placed on the same footing ; and therefore that the predestination preceded foresight of the fall. In conformity with this, we read, —

“ The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God so far manifest themselves in his providence, that it extendeth even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and of men, and that *not by a bare permission*, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends.” — Chap. V., Art. IV.

As God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass, and as the sins of angels and men do not proceed from the bare permission of God, it can hardly be supposed that the angels and Adam had any real power to avoid sin after this ordering of God concerning their fall ; and that they had not appears evident from the chapter of the Confession which treats of *Free Will*.

“ God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that

it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined, to good or evil.

II. Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it.

III. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto.

IV. When God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, he freeth him from his natural bondage under sin, and by his grace alone enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good; yet so as that, by reason of his remaining corruption, he doth not perfectly, nor only, will that which is good, but doth also will that which is evil.

V. The will of man is made perfectly and immutably free to good alone, in the state of glory only." — Chap. IX.

The beginning of this chapter is edifying and orthodox, and would seem to indicate that Presbyterians, after all, hold to a genuine free-will in man; but to judge of a performance, it is always well to see the end; and in this case the end contradicts the beginning, and shows that the free-will asserted is in kind simply that by which the blessed in heaven love good. The blessed, we are told, are perfectly pure because they embrace good with great intensity; and therefore, when we are told that the sinner wills freely that which is spiritually good, the meaning is, that he wills it without dissent in himself and with great earnestness, in which sense a Presbyterian would say that the cat pounces with great freedom upon a rat. When, therefore, we are told that man's will is neither forced, nor determined, by any absolute necessity of nature, to good or evil, the meaning is, merely, that his will is not under any *absolute* necessity of nature, because some other order in which it would have been really free was possible. It is probable, therefore, that in the minds of Presbyterians even Adam had no real free-will, but was under the necessity of falling, though God might, if he had chosen, have established an order in which his fall would not have been necessitated.

But whether, according to Presbyterians, Adam had or had not free-will, is of little consequence, for all men have fallen; and it is with their state since the fall that we are chiefly concerned. There can be not the shadow of a doubt that Presbyterians are Postlapsarians, and admit in sinners, not predes-

minated to heaven, no power whatever to escape their impending fate. Since the fall, and in consequence of it, whether before it or not, Presbyterians recognize the leaden jacket, and allow the non-elect sinner no alternative but to sink into the abyss of hell. "They who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ. . . . Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only." Chap. III., Art. VI. This, taken in connection with what is said in the article just cited above, that man by the fall "has lost all ability of will to any spiritual good," warrants the conclusion, that the reprobate, not being redeemed by Christ, are left in their disability to good, and by the depravation of their will, consequent upon the fall, are led to every kind of evil and corruption, without its being possible for them to do good. Thus we read concerning our first parents, —

"II. By this sin they fell from their original righteousness, and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.

"III. They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation.

"IV. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.

"V. This corruption of nature, during this life, doth remain in those that are regenerated; and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet both itself, and all the motions thereof, are truly and properly sin."—Chap. VI.

Here we are plainly taught that the non-elect are *disabled* and made opposite to all good, and therefore we do not say *compelled*, but *necessitated*, to all evil; and even those motions of concupiscence which arise prior to any reflection or deliberation are properly sin, and are forgiven to the elect, but to no others. Here, undeniably, is the leaden jacket, which causes the sinner necessarily to sink, though in the act of sinking, he is willing to sink, and even takes delight in sinking. But this does not affect the necessity of the act, because he has no power not to sink. He is predestinated to hell, to which he is drawn, without compulsion indeed, but necessarily and irresistibly.

But here is another passage, from the chapter *Of Effectual Calling*, still more explicit : —

“ III. Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated, and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, and where, and how he pleaseth. So also are all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word.

“ IV. Others not elected, although they may be called by the ministry of the word, and may have some common operations of the Spirit, yet they never truly come to Christ, and therefore cannot be saved : much less can men, not professing the Christian religion, be saved in any other way whatsoever, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature, and the law of that religion they do profess ; and to assert and maintain that they may is very pernicious, and to be detested.” — Chap. X.

A queer passage this. If an Indian, or infidel, a Chinese for instance, be a Presbyterian *elect*, he will be saved, though he never hear of the Christian religion ; but another Chinese, not a Presbyterian *elect*, cannot be saved, although he does his best to live according to the law of nature, and to say that he can is very pernicious and to be detested !

To refute this revolting doctrine, that some are under an invincible necessity of committing sin, we undertake to prove that every sinner, even since the fall, however reprobate in the estimation of Presbyterians, is truly and properly free as to the commission of sin, has truly the power to refrain from sin, if he chooses ; and, also, that every inordinate effect beyond the control of his free-will, — as certain bad thoughts and motions of concupiscence which may arise prior to deliberation, — though inordinate in its nature, is not properly sin, and is not punishable as such, whether the individual be an elect or a reprobate, a saint or a sinner. We say not, however, — and this must be borne in mind, — that this true power of resisting evil, which all sinners certainly have, proceeds in all cases from the proper and innate strength of their free-will, which has certainly been much weakened by original sin ; but we do say that the grace which strengthens the will can never be wanting to empower them to resist sin, if they choose. This grace is given to all through the merits of Jesus Christ, who proves himself the Saviour of all men, by imparting all the graces necessary for the avoiding of sin and the obtaining of salvation.

The fact of free-will in man is proved from the first chapters of Genesis, where it is said man “ was made to the image and likeness ” of God, which is repeated after original sin, and even the flood, and assigned as the reason for prohibiting his

blood to be shed. Gen. ix. 6. In these first chapters God himself declares to Cain that he is able to restrain his inclination to sin, which had impaired, but not destroyed, the image of God. Before he murdered his brother, Cain saw his offerings rejected by the Lord, because they were made from an unclean heart. "Cain was exceeding angry, and his countenance fell; and the Lord said to him, Why art thou angry, and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou do well, shalt thou not receive? but if ill, shall not sin be forthwith present at the door? but the lust thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Gen. iv. 5-7. It would seem that Almighty God made this declaration from the beginning, that he might shut the mouth of fatalists in every age. By it he teaches clearly and undeniably, that, even after original sin, — for Cain had certainly contracted it as deeply as any one, — we have the ability to refrain from sin and to keep its lusts in subjection; and certainly God is always able to give us the strength necessary to do this, if he chooses.

This text is so decisive, that Calvinists have found no way to escape its force, but by departing from the translation usually given by the Fathers. We copy the Protestant version: "And the Lord said unto Cain, Why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door. And unto thee *shall be his desire*, and thou shalt rule over *him*." It is strange that Protestants should present the public such a foolish translation as this; but Calvin felt the text was conclusive against him, and that he must in some way alter it, — sectarians are in the habit of making the Bible very elastic, — and he, and Protestants after him, make therefore the Almighty say to Cain, Thou shalt rule over *him*." Whom? As there were then in the world, besides Cain, only Adam and Abel, and as it will hardly do to suppose the Lord gave Cain dominion over Adam, the pronoun *him* must needs relate to Abel. Here God, by these words, makes Abel the slave of Cain, although he had a moment before preferred Abel to Cain; and, moreover, by giving Cain this express dominion over his brother, the Almighty must be understood to have all but sanctioned the murder which Cain perpetrated! Are we to adopt a translation which authorizes such horrible conclusions? A pronoun must be referred to the substantive which precedes it, unless there be some evident reason for inverting the natural order of construction. The translation, therefore, should be,

“Thou shalt rule over *it*,” that is, *sin*, the substantive which precedes ; not over *him*, for which there is no reason in the context. Calvin and his followers say that in Hebrew the pronoun is masculine, while the noun rendered *sin* is feminine ; but commentators answer, and every tyro in Hebrew knows, that the word translated *sin* is of both genders, and consequently masculine, which they prove by showing that in the very passage, “sin lieth at the door,” a masculine construction is employed. But all this, though a hundred times more than sufficient, weighs nothing with Presbyterians, who very naturally prefer to assert an ungrammatical and absurd translation to writing down their own condemnation.

We find a second Scriptural proof against Presbyterians in Deuteronomy. Moses is speaking to the whole house of Israel, all of whom were concluded under original sin, and he says, — “This commandment that I command thee this day is not above thee, nor far off from thee ; nor is it in heaven, nor is it beyond the sea, that thou mayest excuse thyself. But the word is nigh thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it. I call heaven and earth to witness that I have this day set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. CHOOSE therefore life, that both thou and thy seed may live.” xxx. 11–19. Hard language this to reconcile with the dogma that the greater part of men are so depraved as to be utterly unable to avoid sin and to be saved. Does not the Lord say by Moses, that his commandments are neither above us nor far off from us ? What can more clearly prove that it is in the power of any sinner to avoid sin if he chooses, and to make a good use of his free-will, and of the Divine grace which is never refused ? What more absurd and hypocritical than to tell a man to *choose* life, when he has no power to do so ? What more cruel mockery than to tell one who has a leaden jacket around his waist, with great solemnity, in presence of heaven and earth, to *choose* floating ?

In the last chapter of Josue we have another proof clearer than the light of day, that no one is ineluctably driven to sin, and that he who sins, sins because he chooses to do so. The great leader of the people of God assembles his nation, and, in the name of the God of their fathers, tells them, — “If it seem evil to you to serve the Lord, you have your choice. CHOOSE this day that which pleaseth you, whom you would rather serve, — the gods which your fathers served in Mesopotamia, or the gods of the Amorrites in whose land you dwell ; but as for me

and my house, we will serve the Lord. And the people answered and said, God forbid that we should leave the Lord, and serve strange gods." xxiv. 15, 16. Which shall we believe, — Josue who tells us in the name of the Lord that we have our choice, or the Confession which tells us that this choice, without our participation, was made for us, and that, if we are predestinated unto life, we must necessarily embrace virtue, and if predestinated unto death, we must necessarily cleave to our corruption, and have no possibility of being saved? The word *choose* implies always the power to do either of the two things proposed. If free-will were only the strong inclination of the will to one of the alternatives, without the power to do the other, there would and could be no *choice*. Who will say to another, Choose to hold that two and two are equal to four? Why not? Because there is no choice in the matter. Both the intellect and the will assent to the equality asserted, and have no power to do otherwise.

But here is still another proof that we have the power to choose between good and evil. Elias, having assembled the people of Israel, so strongly inclined to idolatry, says to them, — "How long do you halt between two sides? If the Lord be God, follow him; but if Baal, then follow him." 3 Kings xviii. 21. Assuredly Elias was no Presbyterian. He evidently supposes that the Israelites were *halting* between idolatry and true religion, but with full power to choose between the two and to embrace either. What would be more ridiculous than to say to a man falling from a tower, Why do you halt? Would he not answer, "I do not halt, — I have no power to halt"? But, according to Presbyterianism, those predestinated to everlasting death have even less power to halt, and are driven down even with greater power than that with which the man falls from the tower to the ground.

Let our Presbyterian friends also meditate on these words of Isaias, — "Hear the word of the Lord, ye rulers of Sodom; give ear to the law of our God, ye people of Gomorrha. . . . If you be willing and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke me to wrath, the sword shall devour you; because the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." i. 10–20. It would almost seem that this was specially intended for Presbyterians. Does not the Lord here plainly imply that these sinners whom he addresses, and who had certainly contracted original sin, had the power either to hearken or to rebel? Suppose a number

of men, having on the leaden jacket, to be thrown overboard, and the captain to say to them, — “If you will float, you will breathe freely, you will not be choked, and will enjoy the comforts of life; but if you will not float, you will sink, you will be smothered, and perish in a watery grave.” Who would not call it bitter mockery? Are we to suppose that God by his prophet thus cruelly mocks those who are sinking into everlasting death?

Here are some passages from Ecclesiasticus which speak for themselves. “God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts. . . . He has set water and fire before thee: stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil: that which he shall choose shall be given him.” xv. 14–20. And again, — “Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish; . . . who is he, and we will praise him. . . . He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed, and could have done evil things, and hath not done them.” xxxi. 8–10.

Passages without number to the same effect might be multiplied, but we will close with the words of our Lord: — “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.” St. Matt. xix. 17. Are not these words as clear and as concise a refutation of fatalism as can be desired? Do they not necessarily imply that men have the power to keep the commandments if they choose, and that no one is under the invincible necessity of violating them and incurring eternal death? If the reprobate have no power to choose to keep the commandments, if they are borne onward and downward by an irresistible current to perdition, what is the meaning of the exhortation of our Lord? Suppose a philosopher shouting out from the top of his voice to a man tumbling down the Falls of Niagara, — “Good friend, if you would save your life, stop the water”; would any refutation of such a philosopher be pertinent, other than physic and good regimen in a lunatic asylum?

But it is not against the Scriptures only that Presbyterianism makes war. Its doctrine concerning free agency is repugnant to the common sense of mankind. It is the universal conviction of all ages and nations, that crime is imputable to us when we commit it, because we have the power to avoid it, and that it is never imputable when and where this power is wanting. To suppose that this conviction is false would be to suppose that the very Author of our nature has deceived us.

Even Presbyterians themselves, whatever they may do in theory, dare not assert practically a contrary doctrine. Let the stubborn boy grossly insult his father, call him a liar or a fool, and the father, even though a Presbyterian *elder*, will, we may presume, without danger of a rash judgment, pounce upon him for good; and if the boy rejoins that he had no power to do otherwise than he did, the *elder* will show the deep impression such reasoning makes upon him by redoubling the chastisement. Now this, not precisely a fanciful supposition, proves very conclusively that even the Presbyterian does not practically believe the doctrine of fatalism he asserts.

The falsity of this doctrine is evident from the absurd and shocking consequences it necessarily involves. All laws, whether Divine or human, whether religious or civil, are, if Presbyterianism be true, but empty words; for it is essential to the law that all those for whom it is intended should have the power to obey it. It would be a strange thing indeed to pass laws for horses, pigs, turnips, and cucumbers. What would be thought of the legislature who should decree, that all turnips should grow with the root downwards, or that cucumbers should all grow ready pickled? Take away free-will from man, and you reduce him to the rank of brutes and inanimate things, for which laws are not and cannot be made, because their motions are regulated by necessity. In this system moral merit and demerit have no existence. Every punishment inflicted for the violation of law is a flagrant injustice. Is the storm culpable and punishable, because it destroys our ships and occasions the death of their crews and passengers? Is punishment to be decreed against the eagle for pouncing upon the timid and lovely wren? It is evident from common sense, that, if the wicked cannot avoid committing sin, they can not be blamed or punished for it without gross folly and injustice. What Lucian, the Pagan philosopher, wittily says against the Stoics, the Presbyterians of his day, is strictly to the point. "If Parca is the cause of all things, then when a man kills his father, it is Parca that is in fault. If, then, Minos would judge justly, he would do better and more equitably to punish Destiny than Sisyphus, Parca than Tantalus. For what injustice is there in them, since they have only obeyed superior orders?" * Calvinists have nothing to reply to this simple argument of Lucian. They have even made matters worse than the Destiny

of the Stoics ; for they tell us that both good and bad are in the hands of God as the horse under its rider, as the wheel under him who makes it revolve, as the saw in the hands of the sawyer, as clay in the hands of the potter. When the lord found the man who had not on the wedding-garment, and said to him, " Friend, how camest thou in hither, not having a wedding-garment ? " we are told the man was silent, and, evidently, because he had no excuse to offer. But if Presbyterianism were true, he might have answered advantageously in the words of Lucian, and we see not what the lord of the feast could have said in return.

According to Presbyterianism, God is the author of sin, and although the Confession is unwilling to admit it, and even positively denies it, with an attempt to mystify the reader by pious words commendatory of God's infinite sanctity, the fact is as we state it. Calvin and his followers have always been justly accused of making God the author of sin, which Presbyterians virtually admit, when they assert that God has from the beginning foreordained every thing that comes to pass, — therefore sin, since it is not excepted, — and say that sin does not happen by his *bare permission*. But whether they admit it or not in words, they do really and effectually make God the author of sin, by representing the reprobate under the invincible necessity of committing it. When I ride a horse, which is under my control, over a child on the road and trample it to death, it is not the horse, but myself, that is the cause of the murder. Men have always so understood it. If the sinner is under an impossibility of avoiding sin, it is not he, but the necessity he is under, that commits it. Now, Presbyterians say, that it is the decree of God that constitutes this necessity. In vain, then, does Calvin pretend that God is not the author of the sin, because he decrees it from a good motive, to wit, the manifestation and praise of his justice. Besides, this represents God as acting on the principle so often and so falsely attributed to the Jesuits, namely, the end sanctifies the means, — the contradictory of the principle laid down by St. Paul, Rom. iii. 8, that we are never to " do evil that there may come good." In vain is it alleged, that, God being bound by no law, there can be no sin for him, — a notion which strikes at the eternal distinction between good and evil. God forbids sin because it is bad in itself, and contrary to the eternal law to which he is essentially subjected ; for he is essentially order, justice, truth. Seek to disguise it as they may, Presbyterians

do make God the author of sin, and the man who commits it, as his necessary agent, is only executing the orders of the Supreme power, and is entitled rather to praise than to censure.

Presbyterians may throw the blame of the sins of men upon original corruption ; but if this corruption impose a real necessity of sinning, there is no more commission of *new* sins among men than there is among the devils and the damned in hell, who, all admit, can commit no new sin, because they are deprived of free-will. We, however, know that God has not left men in that necessity. The moment he promised that the head of the serpent should be crushed, they were restored to the state of responsible beings, and through his mercy fitted again to obtain the supernatural end for which they were created. The reason assigned by Presbyterians for the necessity of sinning, namely, that the reprobate receive no grace, no help, is manifestly false, and is contradicted by every page of the Holy Scriptures. " I called and you refused." Prov. i. 24. " How often would I have gathered together thy children, and thou wouldst not." St. Matt. xxiii. 37. " What more is there I ought to do to my vineyard that I have not done to it ?" Isa. v. 4. " We do exhort you that you receive not the grace of God in vain." 2 Cor. vi. 1. Here are words which clearly show that some receive graces which they reject through the malice of their will.

We conclude from this against Presbyterians, that any regular effect, produced in us without any participation of our free-will, is not sin at all, though it be the consequence of original sin. Bad thoughts or motions arising in us against our free-will are not sin, and assume its character only when they are deliberately entertained. If they were properly sins, the sins so called of ignorance would also be properly sins, for ignorance is one of the effects of original sin ; yet they are not sins when the ignorance is in no sense voluntary, as appears from the case of Abimelech, Gen. xx. 6, who through ignorance would have married the wife of Abraham ; and, also, from the positive declaration of our Lord to the Jews, — " If you were blind, you should not have sin [that is, the sin of not believing in me] ; but now you say, We see, your sin remaineth." St. John ix. 41. And again, xv. 22, — " If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sinned [the special sin of infidelity] ; but now they have no excuse for their sin."

If Presbyterians object, that St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, calls the motions of concupiscence sin, we reply in

the words of the Holy Council of Trent, — “Concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the Holy Synod declares the Church has never understood to be called sin, because it is truly and properly sin in the regenerate, but because it comes from sin and inclines to sin, — *ex peccato et ad peccatum inclinat*. If any one maintains to the contrary, let him be anathema.” Session v. 5. This decision explains itself; and who can hesitate between the whole Church, declaring the word *sin* in some passages of St. Paul does not mean sin properly and truly so called, and a little knot of Presbyterians who are of yesterday, maintaining that it must be taken in its rigorous sense? The meaning of words is determined by common consent. Even Presbyterians themselves depart from their rigorous interpretation of the word *sin*, when they read, Osee iv. 8, that the priests “eat up the *sins* of the people”; and, 2 Cor. v. 21, “He hath made him [Christ] to be *sin* for us, who knew no sin.” Indeed, if it were admitted that all effects of original sin came through our fault, and are imputable to us, we should blame the man who is born blind, lame, crooked, or otherwise deformed; for this is the effect of original sin. But that this is absurd every body admits, and we are taught as much by what our Lord says in reference to the man born blind, St. John ix. 3, that “neither hath this man sinned nor his parents.” If, then, corporeal blindness be not blamable in one who is born blind, so neither is concupiscence, when there is no positive act of our free-will which makes up assent to it.

We have quoted the Council of Trent to show the sense of the word *sin* in its relation to concupiscence, which St. Paul sometimes calls sin. We quote it further to show the firm and uncompromising doctrine of the Church on free-will. The Presbyterian or Calvinistic doctrine, it is true, is at variance with common sense, with our primary notions of good and evil, and with every page of Scripture; but it receives its final death-blow from the positive and formal decisions of the Church, the pillar and ground of truth, and against which the gates of hell cannot prevail, and which if we hear not, we are no better than heathens. The Holy Council condemns Presbyterianism in several canons of its sixth session. Thus, Canon iv., — “If any one says that the free-will of man, moved and excited by God, in assenting to God exciting and calling, coöperates in nothing, . . . and that it cannot dissent, if it chooses, but is as something inanimate, which does nothing at all, and is merely

passive, let him be anathema." This condemns that part of Calvinism which teaches that the elect are under the irresistible influence of Divine grace ; for it is as absurd to rob the just as the wicked of their free-will, since without it they would deserve no greater praise for practising virtue, than the rain for fertilizing our fields, or the sun for diffusing upon us its light and warmth. The Holy Council continues, in Canon v., — " If any one says the free-will of man, after the sin of Adam, was lost and extinct, or that it is only a mere title, nay, a title without reality, and even a figment introduced by Satan into the Church, let him be anathema." Hence, men by the sin of Adam have not lost free-will, and fallen under the sway of inexorable necessity, but have really retained their free-will, though much weakened and bent, as the Council elsewhere declares. The Council judged it proper to condemn in an especial manner that worst feature of Calvinism, namely, sinners are subjected to the ineluctable necessity of sinning and of incurring everlasting death. Hence it declares, Canon vi., — " If any one says that it doth not lie within the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God himself operates evil works, as well as good, not merely by permitting them, but even properly and by his own action, so that the treason of Judas is no less properly his work than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema." Finally, in Canon xviii., the Holy Council establishes the doctrine, that the precepts of God are never impossible : — " If any one says that the commandments of God are to man, even justified and established in grace, impossible to keep, let him be anathema."

Before taking our leave of Presbyterians on the momentous topics which we have been discussing, we owe it to them to take a brief notice of the Scriptural texts which they cite to prove that some are under the *necessity* of forfeiting their eternal salvation. This will not detain us long, if we confine ourselves to those which bear on the subject, and the others we may well pass over. One of these last, however, we must notice for the sake of the admirable Scriptural logic of Presbyterians which it displays. In order to prove that some elect can be saved without being outwardly called by the ministry of the word, they quote (Confession, p. 52) the text, — " There is none other name under heaven, given among men, whereby we must be saved." Acts iv. 12. And then, on the next page, they cite it again to prove that men not professing the Christian religion cannot be saved at all. This displays rare

economy of logic, for it makes the same text answer to prove each of two contradictory propositions. It is something to be able to prove two such propositions, — it is much more to be able to prove them both from the same text. A plain man, however, would say that the text, if it proves any thing to the purpose, proves the second proposition, and therefore disproves the first.

To prove that the fall of Adam brought about a necessity of sinning, Presbyterians quote Gal. v. 17, — “The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other; so that *ye cannot do* the things that *ye would.*” The blessed Apostle here speaks of a struggle between the flesh and the spirit, — that struggle between concupiscence and reason, pleasure and duty, to which every one not utterly profligate must bear witness; but Presbyterians add, what the Apostle does not, that in this struggle men are under the necessity of doing what they would not, and are unable to repress concupiscence, — “*Ye cannot do what ye would.*” But they flagrantly corrupt the word of God. Have they not told us that the New Testament in Greek is divinely inspired, and by God’s singular care and providence it has been kept pure in all ages, and is therefore authentical, and that in all controversies of religion the Church is to appeal to it? Why, then, do they not appeal to it? The Greek does not say, “*ye cannot,*” but says, “*you do not,*” — *ὅτι μὴ ἂν θύληται, ταῦτα ποιῆτε*. Griesbach gives no various reading of the text, and all the versions on this point agree with our Douay Bible, which translates, — “So that you do not the things that you would.” The substitution of *cannot* entirely changes the sense. “*You do not resist your passions,*” — “*you cannot resist your passions,*” are propositions of widely different import, and resemble each other no more than the Catholic doctrine, “Many are called, few *are* saved,” resembles the Presbyterian heresy, “Many are called, few *can be* saved.” The Presbyterians will do well to expunge this corruption from their Bible and Confession without delay.

The Presbyterians with no better grace cite the latter part of the seventh chapter of Romans. It is nothing to their purpose. St. Paul, it is true, says, — “I am carnal, sold under sin. . . . What I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that I do. . . . I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, there dwelleth no good thing; for to will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not”; but he is

far from saying that he is responsible and will be condemned for that inward warfare between nature and grace. In fact, he says directly the reverse. "Now, if I do that I would not, it is no more *I* that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." Rom. vii. 14-20. This proves the very contrary of Presbyterianism; for, since it is not *Paul* that produces these motions of concupiscence, but sin, that is, concupiscence, that dwelleth in him, it is evident he did not view this concupiscence as something truly and properly sin, which might be imputed to him, but as a misfortune, a burden under which he groaned, and which made him exclaim, — "Unhappy man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God by our Lord Jesus Christ."

We come now to another text, disfigured in the same way. Presbyterians wish to prove that the elect only are redeemed, and, therefore, that the others are left in the fatal necessity of sinning. To this end, they cite John xvii. 9, — "I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine." They would have us infer from this, that those whom God has given to his Son are the elect, and for them Christ prays; the others are the reprobate, and for them he does not pray; therefore they have no power to escape damnation. This is another example of the way in which people are humbugged in the interpretation of Scripture. The pious old Presbyterian lady who reads this flatters herself that she is unquestionably one of those whom God gave to his Son, and thanks him that she is not one of the worldly Papists for whom our Lord did not pray. But this seventeenth chapter of St. John's Gospel, if examined, will soon dispel the dear old lady's pleasant dream. It contains a prayer addressed by our Lord to his Heavenly Father, after the Eucharistic Banquet, and in the presence of his Apostles, to whom he had made a long discourse on the occasion. In this prayer he states, verses 6-8, what he has done for these men who had been given him; and then he says, "I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me." It is evidently a distinct, a *special* prayer for his Apostles, who surrounded him at the moment. So the words, "I pray not for the world," are not expressive of a resolution not to pray for the world at all, but simply mean, "I pray not for the world *now*, but for my Apostles." This interpretation will be undeniable, if we read on; having prayed specially for his Apostles, our Lord extends his prayer, verse 20, — "And not

for them only do I pray, but for those also who through their word shall believe in me"; and in verse 21, still further, — "that the *world* may believe that thou hast sent me." He excludes, therefore, no one from his prayers; and we know that on the cross he prayed for his very executioners. God so loved *the world* as to give his only Son to die; and 1 St. John ii. 2 positively asserts that "he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world."

The last text we will notice is St. John vi. 65 [66]: — "No man can come unto me except it were [be] given unto him of my Father." Presbyterians appear to rely much on this text, for they quote it on several occasions; but it is by no means to their purpose. It does not in the least say that it is impossible for some to go to Christ, or that those who do go do so through irresistible grace, though voluntarily. It merely teaches, that grace or supernatural illumination of the mind and supernatural motion of the will are necessary to enable us to come to Christ, as Catholicity uniformly asserts; but it does not say that this grace is refused to any not determined to offer resistance to God. It offers no contradiction to that other text of St. John, that Christ is "the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," i. 9; or that of St. Paul, 1 Tim. ii. 4, that "God wills the salvation of all men." God offers to all the remote means, at least, of coming to Christ by prayer; and if it be written, St. John vi. 44, "No man can come to me except the Father draw him," it is also written, xvi. 23, "If you ask the Father any thing in my name, he will give it you." Hence St. Augustine adds, "You are not yet drawn; . . . pray that you may be drawn." This is a drawing, however, which does not necessitate the will, which one may resist; for Judas was drawn at first, but afterwards refused to follow the attraction of grace.

Here we close our discussion on this part of the Confession. We might offer some reflections; but those who have followed us will not have failed to remark the utter weakness and folly, as well as falsity and wickedness, of Presbyterianism. Surely, if Presbyterians were not under demoniacal influence, if they had even the free exercise of ordinary human reason, they would abandon their system in disgust.

